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Abstract 
This thesis examines the politics of international regime formation, with particular 
reference to the global atmospheric problems of ozone layer depletion and global 
warming. A review of the international relations literature reveals that there are three 
approaches to the study of international regime formation: global, state-centred 
and individualistic. Building upon these, three preconditions and four catalysts for 
international regime formation are proposed. Each of the hypothesised 
preconditions -- scientific consensus, tolerable domestic economics costs and 
global equity -- is necessary, though not by itself sufficient, for international regime 
formation. Meanwhile, although no one of the hypothesised catalysts -- political 
entrepreneurs, the solidity of the broader international political system, 
environmental pressure groups and the mobilisation of public opinion -- is a 
necessary element for the formation of an international regime, the presence of any 
one can nevertheless accelerate the rate at which regimes are formed. The 
theoretical framework that is proposed is applied to the histories of the ozone layer 
depletion and global warming issues. In this investigation, data up to the end of 
1991 were considered. The thesis also considers some issues that extend beyond 
the end of 1991, for the nature of parts of the analysis precludes an unwavering 
commitment to this cut-off date. The findings of this investigation have both 
theoretical and empirical dimensions. First, because the application of the 
theoretical framework does not invalidate it, thinking about the formation of regimes 
in international society in general is advanced. And second, by applying the 
framework to these two particular issues, explanations are offered as to why an 
international regime had been formed by the end of 1991 to preserve the earth's 
ozone layer, while one to deal with global warming had not. 
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Introduction 
At the end of 1991, the global environmental issues of ozone layer depletion and 
global warming were firmly entrenched upon the international political agenda. The 
significance of these issues had been demonstrated by two findings which had 
revealed the consequences of human intervention in the earth's natural systems. 
First, scientific investigations after the 1985 discovery of an ozone 'crater' above 
Antarctica showed that chlorofluorocarbons and other widely-used substances 
were destroying the earth's protective ozone layer.' And second, in 1990, an 
international group of scientific experts (the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change) concluded with certainty that 
emissions resulting from human activities are substantially increasing the 
atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gases ... These increases will 
enhance the greenhouse effect, resulting on average in an additional 
warming of the Earth's surface. 2 
It was recognised that such changes in the earth's natural equilibria could have 
profound impacts upon the world's population. 3 Indeed, a number of reports 
published during the late 1980s and the early 1990s illuminated the possible social 
consequences of human intervention in the earth's natural systems. 4 The research 
teams commissioned to produce these reports suggested that if the members of 
international society did not change their normal practices and address each of the 
two issues in an effective manner, then substantial disruptions to international 
relations would undoubtedly take place. The scale of the transformations 
1 J.C. Farman et a!, 'Large Losses of Total Ozone in Antarctica Reveal Seasonal CLO X/NOX 
Interaction', Nature (Vol. 315, 16 May 1985), pp. 207-10. 
2 WMO and UNEP, The Policymakers' Summary of the Report of Working Group I to the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Geneva: WMO and UNEP, 1990), p. 2. 
3 These first two paragraphs are adapted from Ian H. Rowlands and Malory Greene, 
'Introduction', in Ian H. Rowlands and Malory Greene (eds.), Global Environmental Change and 
International Relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), p. 1. 
4 See, for example, the Report of the Environmental Panel, one of the Open-Ended Working 
Groups of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol (UNEP, Synthesis Report, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.II (1)/4, 
13 November 1989); and W.J.McG. Tegart, G.W. Sheldon and D.C. Griffiths (eds.), Climate Change: 
The IPCC Impacts Assessment (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service for WMO and 
UNEP, 1990). 
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suggested by some of these estimates underlined the need for change. 5 
The condition of the earth's atmosphere is of concern to every person on 
the planet, because no individual would be able to escape the consequences of 
a deteriorated atmosphere. There was no guarantee, however, that the members 
of international society would be able to abandon their usual practices, which were 
degrading the global atmosphere, in order to implement a new order. Indeed, there 
are significant forces within any society that hinder any departure from the status 
quo. Over 400 years ago, Niccolo Machiavelli noted the considerable challenges 
facing any attempt to introduce new arrangements: 
It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor 
more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a 
new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by 
the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by 
the new order, this lukewarmness arising partly from fear of their 
adversaries, who have the laws in their favour; and partly from the 
incredulity of mankind, who do not truly believe in anything new until they 
have had actual experience of it. 6 
Present-day scholars in international relations echo this. Oran Young, for example, 
notes that: 
Social practices and convergent expectations frequently prove resistant to 
change, even when they produce outcomes that are widely understood to 
be undesirable or suboptimal. Existing institutional arrangements, such as 
the international agreements pertaining to coffee or Antarctica, are familiar 
constructs while new arrangements require actors to assimilate alternative 
procedures or patterns of behavior and to accept (initially) unknown 
outcomes. Additionally, planned changes in regimes require not only the 
destruction of existing institutions but also the coordination of expectations 
5 Much of the work on 'environmental security' suggests that environmental degradation could 
cause international conflicts. See, for example, Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, 'On the Threshold: 
Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict', International Security (Vol. 16, No. 2, Fall 
1991), pp. 76-116; Jessica Tuchman Mathews, 'Redefining Security', Foreign Affairs (Vol. 68, No. 2, 
Spring 1989), pp. 162-77; Norman Myers, 'Environmental Security', Foreign Policy (No. 74, Spring 
1989), pp. 23-41; and Michael Renner, National Security: The Economic and Environmental 
Dimensions (Washington, DC: Woridwatch Paper No. 89, May 1989). I adopt a similar theme, 
applying it directly to the ozone layer depletion and global warming issues, in Ian Rowlands, 'The 
Security Challenges of Global Environmental Change', The Washington Quarterly (Vol. 14, No. 1, 
Winter 1991), pp. 99-114. 
6 	. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince and The Discourses (New York: The Modern Library, 1950), 
p. 21. 
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around new focal points.' 
These views are generally regarded as representative of broader classical and 
contemporary opinions, respectively, and together they suggest that the 
implementation of new policies to stabilise the global atmosphere was not 
probable, let alone inevitable. 
The particular nature of global atmospheric change, 8 furthermore, increased 
the difficulties of achieving a new arrangement. Although every person in the world 
may have desired a particular end -- that is, an atmosphere with an ozone layer 
that is intact and a climate that is stable -- individual states' leaders may have 
perceived it to be rational to implement policies that worked against the 
achievement of this end. In the fourth century BC, Aristotle identified the root of this 
seemingly counterintuitive assertion: 
What is common to the greatest number gets the least amount of care. Men 
pay most attention to what is their own: they care less for what is common. 
... When everyone has his own sphere of interest ... the amount of interest 
will increase, because each man will feel that he is applying himself to what 
is his own. 1° 
Because the global atmosphere is a 'common' good -- that is, no parts of it are 
`owned' by any entity, state or non-state -- the leaders of states may not have 
attempted to change their country's policies in order to work to preserve it. Indeed, 
if they did change direction and other states' leaders did not adopt similar policies, 
then this unilateral action may have brought about substantial net costs. Such a 
prospect may have therefore persuaded every national decision-maker to maintain 
7 Oran R. Young, 'Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes', International 
Organization (Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 1982), p. 280. Others have, additionally, noted that because 
international arrangements often involve substantial 'sunk costs', they are 'not likely to be readily-
changed or destroyed' (Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in 
International Relations (London: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 52). 
8 In this thesis, I use the term 'global atmospheric change' to refer to the two issues of ozone 
layer depletion and global warming together. 
9 A rate of warming of 0.1 °C per decade has been advanced as 'an "ecologically manageable" 
rate of increase in warming -- i.e., it is the rate at which non-disruptive ecological change will take 
place' (David Pearce, 'Economics and the Global Environmental Challenge', Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies (Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1990), p. 371). Pearce, in turn, cites a study by the 
International Project for Sustainable Energy Paths (Energy Policy in the Greenhouse (El Cerrito, CA: 
International Project for Sustainable Energy Paths, 1989)). 
10 Aristotle, Politics, Book II, Chapters 3 and 4, quoted in: 'Preface: The Evolution of Cultural 
Norms', in Garrett Hardin and John Baden (eds.), Managing the Commons (San Francisco: W.H. 
Freeman and Company, 1977), p. xi. 
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a course of policy that served to deteriorate the global atmosphere. Consequently, 
as many scholars in the international relations literature recognise, states' actions 
may, in such instances, `produce collective outcomes that are socially undesirable 
or, in other words, [their actions may] generate collective-action problems'. 11 Like 
a traditional 'tragedy of the commons' scenario, 12 therefore, the preservation of 
a habitable global atmosphere required worldwide commitment. 13 
In spite of these powerful forces that mitigate against a co-ordinated 
response, a number of international collective goods have been provided in the 
past. Since the beginning of our present international political system in 1648, 
states' leaders have sometimes entered into mechanisms for international co-
operation (e.g., conventions, understandings and treaties) in order to escape sub-
optimal outcomes in the anarchical international system. 14 Such issues include: 
human health standards, 15 security, 16 trading practices'' and transportation 
regulations. 18 Furthermore, a number of environmental collective action dilemmas 
have been successfully overcome by the members of international society. 
11 Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the 
Environment (Ithaca. NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 2. 
12 Garrett Hardin, 'The Tragedy of the Commons', Science (Vol. 162, 13 December 1968), pp. 
1243-48. See, also, William Forster Lloyd, 'On the Checks to Population' [1833], reprinted in Hardin 
and Baden (eds.), op. cit., in note 10, pp. 8-15. 
13 In this way, we can model each of these issues as 'collective goods'. See, for example, 
Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Mancur 
Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1965); and Duncan Snidal, 'Public Goods, Property Rights, and Political 
Organizations', International Studies Quarterly (Vol. 23, No. 4, December 1979), pp. 532-66. 
14 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1977). 
15 See, for example, Richard N. Cooper, 'International Cooperation in Public Health as a 
Prologue to Macroeconomic Cooperation', in Richard N. Cooper et al, Can Nations Agree? Issues 
in International Economic Cooperation (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1989), pp. 178-
254. 
16 See, for example, Mancur Olson Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, 'An Economic Theory of 
Alliances', Review of Economics and Statistics (Vol. 48, No. 3, August 1966), pp. 266-79; and 
Wallace J. Thies, 'Alliances and Collective Goods: A Reappraisal', Journal of Conflict Resolution (Vol. 
31, No. 2, January 1987), pp. 298-332. 
17 See, for example, Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-
tariff Barriers to Trade (London: Cornell University Press, 1990). 
18 See, for example, Christer Jonsson, International Aviation and the Politics of Regime Change 
(London: Frances Pinter, 1987). 
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Regional pollution problems 19 and above-ground nuclear testing 29 are but two 
cases. Both the number and the significance of these examples suggest that the 
members of international society have in some cases been able to overcome the 
obstacles to co-ordinated action. In other instances, however, the barriers have 
proved to be insurmountable, and thus these same members of international 
society have not been able to escape sub-optimal outcomes. The most obvious 
examples of this are policies of military armament and economic protectionism. 
Additionally, in each of the examples mentioned above, for the period before each 
of the appropriate agreements were concluded, the members of international 
society were in a sub-optimal position. Thus, arrangements to escape collective 
action dilemmas have only sometimes been created in international society. Indeed, 
a closer inspection of the ozone layer depletion and global warming dilemmas 
reveals that this contrast between relative success and relative failure is also 
apparent in these two issues. 
Traditionally, individuals and therefore states could do what they wanted with 
regard to the discharge of trace chemicals and particles into the atmosphere. The 
predominant norm was that neither individuals nor states possessed obligations in 
these issue-areas. There was no regime in place, because the behaviour of states' 
leaders was not facilitating the resolution of these particular collective action 
problems. 21 Additionally, no co-ordinated decision-making procedures had been 
developed, and no need for them had been perceived. 22 
By the end of 1991, however, governments had together built an 
international regime in one of these two issue-areas, for most of the world's states 
19 See, for example, Peter M. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International 
Environmental Cooperation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); and Sunneva Saetevik, 
Environmental Cooperation Between the North Sea States: Success or Failure? (London: Belhaven 
Press, 1988). 
20 See, for example, Robert A. Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954- 
60 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978). 
21 Throughout this thesis, I use the term 'regime' in the way that it is used by international 
relations specialists. This usage is distinct from that employed by other scholars and practitioners -
- for example, international lawyers or students of political science. The best-known work 
representative of the international relations approach is Stephen Krasner, International Regimes 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). A further examination of this term is provided in Chapter 
1 of this thesis. 
22 Some scholars would argue that the absence of restrictive rules itself constitutes a regime, 
called a 'laissez-faire' regime. Given the definition of 'regime' adopted in this work, however (see 
Chapter 1, note 12, and accompanying text), it is clear that a `laissez-faire' policy, worldwide, does 
not constitute a regime. 
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had implemented co-ordinated decision-making procedures which were facilitating 
the preservation of the ozone layer. 23 This was in sharp contrast, however, with 
the other issue-area under consideration in this thesis. Although some observers 
might suggest that, by the end of 1991, some common principles had been agreed 
in international society with regard to global warming, 24 the patterned behaviour 
of states' leaders was not facilitating the resolution of this particular collective action 
problem. An international regime to deal with global warming had, therefore, not 
been created. 25 
The fact that the world's governments had responded to the challenges 
posed by one source of global atmospheric change, while, at the end of 1991, they 
had failed to do so to another, invites us to study the two issues in parallel. Thus, 
the purpose of this thesis is to explain why an international regime had been 
formed to preserve the earth's ozone layer, while an international regime to deal 
with global warming had not been formed by the end of 1991. To achieve this end, 
the investigation focuses upon the conditions that must be in place before 
international regimes to address each issue can be formed. The primary concern 
is therefore with the path to international regime formation, not with a description 
of what lies at the end of that road. Thus, although some consideration of the 
particular form that a regime may take or the independent influence that a regime 
may exert is inescapable, those issues are not central to this study. 
The demand for investigations into both ozone layer depletion and global 
warming has been met by a generous supply of work from various branches of the 
social sciences, including international relations. The majority of the studies 
concerned with the international politics, however, examine the issues of ozone 
layer depletion and global warming primarily from journalistic, diplomatic or policy 
23 This assertion is supported by the fact that many states had accepted the obligations outlined 
in three important international agreements: the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer (reprinted in International Legal Materials (Vol. 26, 1989), pp. 1516-40); the 1987 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (reprinted in International Legal 
Materials (Vol. 26, 1989), pp. 1541-61); and the 1990 London Adjustments to the Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (reprinted in International Legal Materials (Vol. 30, No. 
2), pp. 539-554). 
24 I examine this more closely in Chapter 2.2 of this thesis. 
25 Formal, international negotiations on a global warming convention began in Washington, DC 
in February 1991 (under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on a 
Framework Convention on Climate Change). By the end of 1991, however, no significant co-
ordinated policy action had been agreed. 
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perspectives. 26 Although international relations scholars are beginning to explore 
the issues in a theoretical manner, 27 there remains a need for an investigation of 
the sort carried out in this thesis. By using a different theoretical prism to analyse 
data that others have previously examined, new light may be cast upon available 
information. Moreover, by explicitly comparing and contrasting the issues of ozone 
layer depletion and global warming, fresh insights may be gained. And by 
constructing a theoretical framework for international regime formation, this work 
may contribute to the broader study and practice of international relations. 
The study draws primarily upon two bodies of literature. The first -- on 
international regimes -- is tapped in order to construct the theoretical framework. 
This literature is used, because it presents a wealth of ideas about why collective 
arrangements sometimes succeed and sometimes fail in international society. 
Although the arguments employed in the thesis also draw upon work that is not 
related to the regime literature -- for example, writings on international institutions 
and international co-operation more generally -- the discussion is placed within the 
broader academic debate about international regimes. 
A second body of literature -- on global atmospheric change -- is drawn 
upon in order to gather the empirical evidence for the two issues. These works 
include books, articles (in both social science and natural science journals), 
conference records and reports, documents from governments and international 
organisations, and publications from non-governmental organisations. This 
26 Examples of these works on the ozone layer issue include: Richard Elliot Benedick, Ozone 
Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet (London: Harvard University Press, 1991); 
Lydia Dotto and Harold Schiff, The Ozone War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1978); 
John Gribbin, The Hole in the Sky: Man's Threat to the Ozone Layer (London: Corgi Books, 1988); 
and Sharon L. Roan, Ozone Crisis: The 15 Year Evolution of a Sudden Global Emergency 
(Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1989). On the global warming issue, meanwhile, they include: 
Stewart Boyle and John Ardill, The Greenhouse Effect: A Practical Guide to the World's Changing 
Climate (Sevenoaks: Hodder & Stoughton, 1989); Michael Oppenheimer and Robert H. Boyle, Dead 
Heat: The Race Against the Greenhouse Effect (New York: Basic Books, 1990); Fred Pearce, 
Turning up the Heat: Our Perilous Future in the Global Greenhouse (London: The Bodley Head, 
1989); Stephen H. Schneider, Global Warming: Are We Entering the Greenhouse Century? (San 
Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books, 1989); and Crispin Tickell, Climatic Change and World Affairs 
(New York: Pergamon Press, 1977). 
27 See, for example, Peter M. Haas, 'Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts 
to Protect Stratospheric Ozone', International Organization (Vol. 46, No. 1, Winter 1992), pp. 187-
224; Fen Osler Hampson, 'Climate Change: Building International Coalitions of the Like-Minded', 
International Journal (Vol. 45, No. 1, Winter 1989-90), pp. 36-74; and James K. Sebenius, 'Designing 
Negotiations Toward a New Regime: The Case of Global Warming', International Security (Vol. 15, 
No. 4, Spring 1991), pp. 110-48. 
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literature began, of course, when the problems of ozone layer depletion and global 
warming were initially recognised (which was, for the former, in the 1960s, and, for 
the latter, in the nineteenth century 28), and data up to the end of 1991 were 
considered. The thesis also considers issues that extend beyond the end of 1991, 
for the nature of parts of the analysis precludes an unwavering commitment to any 
cut-off date. Additionally, these written sources are supplemented by interviews with 
individuals who had been involved in the relevant political negotiations. Although 
no formal survey technique was used,29 the field work provides evidence that 
complements the information gathered from published materials. 30 In this way, a 
variety of sources are used in the presentation of the empirical data. 
This thesis is presented in six chapters. In Chapter 1, a review of the writings 
on international regime formation reveals that there are three broad approaches in 
the literature: global, state-centred and individualistic. Building upon this 
classification, it is proposed that there are three preconditions and four catalysts 
for international regime formation. In Chapters 2 through 5, this theoretical 
framework is applied to the empirical issues of ozone layer depletion and global 
warming in order to further our understanding about the international politics of 
these issues. 
In Chapter 2, the first of the three proposed preconditions -- each of which 
is necessary, though not by itself sufficient, for international regime formation -- is 
considered; it is the need for scientific consensus. Before an environmental 
problem appears upon any political agenda, it must be brought to the attention of 
policy-makers by a scientist or a group of scientists. Once the problem has been 
placed upon the political agenda, however, there may still be scientific 
disagreement about the nature of the particular issue. Therefore, the proposition 
put forward in this chapter is that the formation of an international regime will 
remain elusive as long as there is disagreement about the science of the issue 
among the world's most eminent scientists. Building upon the work of the 
individualistic theorists in the regime literature, it is proposed that this consensus 
will need to include an agreement about the nature and identification of the 
28 See Chapter 2 of this thesis for a fuller discussion. 
29 	
interv iews were open-ended. 
30 . 	. Significant attempts were made to confirm data gained from interviews by other sources. This, 
however, was not always possible. A list of interviews is given in Appendix A.5.1 of this thesis. 
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problem under consideration, together with an agreement about both the data 
collection process and the method of data interpretation. 
Additionally, it is argued that the leaders of the world's industrialised states 
will not encourage the process of international regime formation until the cost-
benefit analysis that they undertake yields a 'tolerable' outcome. This second 
precondition is explored in Chapter 3. Taking some of the contributions of state-
centred theorists in the regime literature, it is proposed that states' leaders are able 
to identify objectively the benefits and liabilities associated with particular courses 
of action. With the help of a given set of criteria, each leader costs these various 
options, and then chooses the route that will yield the highest gain or, failing that, 
result in the smallest loss. It is maintained that there exists a negative correlation 
between a leader's willingness to help to build a new international regime and the 
domestic economic costs of doing so. 
The perception of global equity is important in these issues, and it is 
considered in Chapter 4. Because the world is made up of states that exist within 
a broader international system, the decisions adopted by national leaders will not 
be reached irrespective of the realities that exist beyond national borders. Some 
scholars argue that a government is expected not only to further the interests of 
its own people (hence the recognition, in Chapter 3 of this thesis, of the role that 
economic costs play in the quest for regime formation), but it is also not expected 
to afford other states a disproportionate share of any mutual benefit achieved in an 
international arrangement. If states are to take part in international regime 
formation, then their leaders will expect not only to achieve an absolute gain, but 
also to avoid a relative loss. It is shown that of all of the calls for equity, the 
dominant issue in the international negotiations on the atmosphere is that which 
is most closely linked to North-South concerns. Employing some of the ideas of 
the global theorists in the regime literature, then, it is suggested that an adequate 
resolution of the concerns voiced by the representatives of the states of the 
developing world is the third precondition for the formation of an international 
regime. 
Along with these three preconditions, four catalysts for international regime 
formation are proposed; they are examined in Chapter 5. Although no one of the 
catalysts is a necessary element for the formation of an international regime, it is 
argued that the presence of any one can nevertheless accelerate the rate at which 
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an international regime is formed. The first catalyst is the role of 'political 
entrepreneurs': persons who find it in their private interest to work to provide 
collective goods for the international community. Second, it is hypothesised that the 
solidity of the broader international political system is also a significant determinant 
of the rate of regime formation. Changes in the political landscape may alter 
perceived payoffs and thereby affect the process of international regime formation. 
Additionally, there are forces other than the state that can help to facilitate 
international co-operation and thus act as catalysts. The primary such actor that 
is not considered in other parts of this thesis -- namely, environmental pressure 
groups -- is considered as a third catalyst. Finally, it is argued that the extent to 
which public opinion is mobilised will also affect the rate of regime formation. Thus, 
it is maintained that these four factors act as catalysts in the process of 
international regime formation. 
In each of the second, third and fourth chapters (along with the particular 
sub-sections within the fifth chapter), the arguments are developed in a parallel 
manner. In the first section, the component of the overall framework under 
examination is presented, and its inclusion as a factor is further justified. In the 
second and third sections, the relevant parts of the historical records of the 
international politics of the ozone layer depletion and global warming issues are, 
respectively, examined. By presenting the argument in this manner, the two 
histories can be easily compared in order to determine what similarities and 
differences might be discerned. In this way, it is anticipated that our knowledge 
about the processes of international regime formation can be advanced. 
A summary of the findings emerging from this investigation is presented in 
Chapter 6, and some final conclusions are offered at the end of this thesis. Taken 
together, the six chapters (along with the Introduction and the Conclusion) attempt 
to increase our knowledge about international regime formation in general, and to 
explain why an international regime had been formed by the end of 1991 to 
preserve the earth's ozone layer, while one to deal with global warming had not. 
Both ozone layer depletion and global warming could cause broader 
changes in the earth's environment that would have the potential to create 
significant turmoil in the world's social systems. If international society is to avoid 
substantial upheavals, then its members will have to construct some sort of 
international regime (or set of international regimes). Overcoming the obstacles to 
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regime formation for international collective goods, however, is a daunting task. 
Thus, the fact that the members of international society had been able to form an 
international regime that was designed both to halt and to reverse the depletion of 
the ozone layer is noteworthy. The barriers to the formation of any international 
regime to deal with the global warming issue had, however, by the end of 1991, yet 
to be surmounted. By focusing upon the theoretical dilemmas and the historical 
evidence, this thesis seeks to contribute to the general discussion as the members 
of international society attempted to build a regime to address the challenges of 
global warming. 
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Chapter 1 -- The Problem of International Regime Formation 
Many of the investigations into the collective action dilemmas that confront the 
members of international society have been made within the literature on 
`international regimes'. Based upon the ideas that scholars working in this tradition 
have developed, an examination of various theories of international regime 
formation is undertaken in this chapter. In the subsequent section, the origins of 
the term 'international regime' are identified, and some of the ways in which it has 
been defined are presented. Representative works of the study of international 
regime formation are then reviewed. Many different proposals have been put 
forward in response to the question: 'Why are regimes formed in some issue-areas, 
while not in others?' It is shown, however, that these diverse ideas can be usefully 
grouped into three categories: global, state-centred and individualistic approaches. 
By reviewing, analysing and assessing the contribution of various scholars' works, 
the strengths of each view can be distilled and subsequently used in the creation 
of a theoretical framework. This framework, which is used in this thesis to study the 
politics of ozone layer depletion and global warming, is presented in the final part 
of this chapter. 
1.1 -- International Regimes 
Regime is a term that is the subject of not only much inquiry but also much deb 
in the literature on international relations, for its use is by no means universally 
accepted) Before we study how this term has been utilised by different scholars, 
it is useful to explore its origins. 
Vinod Aggarwal notes that the 'concept of regime derives from the Latin 
word regimen, a form of the word regere, which means "to rule" in English'. 2 
 Susan Strange, in addition, notes its use in another language -- namely French: 
1 Susan Strange has delivered one of the most oft-cited criticisms of the concept (Susan 
Strange, 'Cave! hic dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis', in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), 
International Regimes (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 337-54). For further critiques, 
see: Friedrich Kratochwil, 'The Force of Prescriptions', International Organization (Vol. 38, No. 4, 
Autumn 1984), pp. 685-708; and Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, 'International 
Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State', International Organization (Vol. 40, No. 4, 
Autumn 1986), pp. 753-75. 
2 . Vinod K. Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade 
(London: University of California Press, 1985), p. 17. 
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In everyday language it means a diet, an ordered, purposive plan of eating, 
exercising, and living. ... [a] second meaning is political: the government of 
a society by an individual, a dynasty, party or group that wields effective 
power over the rest of society. 
In English, meanwhile, regime is defined as: 'Method of system of government, 
prevailing system of things [or] Condition(s) under which scientific, industrial, etc., 
process occurs.' 4 
'Regime' acquires new meanings, however, when it is modified by the word 
`international'. The best place to begin a discussion of the use of this concept in 
the international relations discipline is with Stephen Krasner's definition. He states 
that international regimes are `defined as principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-
area'.5 He expands by explaining that: 
Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards 
of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific 
prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are 
prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice. 6 
Although Krasner's is the definition that is most often cited, it is not the only one 
that has been put forward. Writing eight years earlier, Ernst Haas defines regimes 
as 'collective arrangements among nations designed to create or more effectively 
use scientific and technological capabilities'. 7 In addition, John Gerard Ruggie sees 
regimes as 'sets of mutual expectations, generally agreed-to rules, regulations and 
plans, in accordance with which organizational energies and financial commitments 
are allocated', 8 while Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye define regimes as 
`procedures, rules, or institutions for certain kinds of activity'. 9 More recently, 
Keohane has restricted his interpretation, for he writes that [e]xtensive 
3 Strange, op. cit., in note 1, p. 344. 
4 The Concise Oxford Dictionary. 
5 Stephen D. Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables', in Krasner (ed.), op. cit., in note 1, p. 1. 
6 Ibid., p. 2. 
7 Ernst B. Haas, 'On Systems and International Regimes', World Politics (Vol. 27, No. 2, January 
1975), p. 147. 
8 John Gerard Ruggie, 'International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends', 
International Organization (Vol. 29, No. 3, Summer 1975), p. 569. 
9 Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in 
Transition (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1977), p. 5. 
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terminological discussion of regimes has convinced me that it is clearest to limit the 
term "regimes" to institutions with explicit rules, negotiated by states'. 1° Finally, 
Oran Young defines regimes as 
social institutions governing the actions of those involved in specifiable 
activities or sets of activities. Like all social institutions, they are practices 
consisting of recognized roles linked together by clusters of rules or 
conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles." 
These varied interpretations lend support to the assertion made above that 
the debate about international regimes is highly controversial. It is not my primary 
purpose in this thesis, however, to assess the relative merits of the various 
definitions. Nevertheless, because 'international regimes' are objects of study in this 
investigation, the term must be defined. Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, 
an international regime exists when the patterned behaviour of states' leaders 
facilitates the resolution of collective action problems in a given issue-area of 
international relations. 12 One strength of this definition is that it does not place, 
particular emphasis upon the independent influence of regimes, 13 an aspect of the 
debate which does not enter the discussion of international regime formation 
directly. In addition, this definition seems to occupy a conceptually-useful middle-
ground between those who seem to equate international regimes with formal 
international institutions 14 and those who seem to believe that all international 
interactions can be rightfully called international regimes. 15 Therefore, for the 
purposes of our discussion, an international regime will be considered to be 
'formed' on either of the issues of ozone layer depletion or global warming when 
10 Robert 0. Keohane, 'Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics', in Robert 
0. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory 
(London: Westview Press, 1989), p. 17, note 5. 
Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the 
Environment (London: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 12-13. 
12 The definition employed here is not incompatible with the ones offered by most other 
scholars. 
13 Compare with Young, op. cit., in note 11. 
14 Compare with Keohane, op. cit., in note 10. 
15 Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations 
(London: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 26, note 2, summarising Donald J. Puchala and 
Raymond F. Hopkins, 'International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis', in Krasner (ed.), op. 
cit., in note 1, pp. 61-91. In addition, Strange argues that: "Regime" is yet one more woolly concept 
that is a fertile source of discussion simply because people mean different things when they use it.' 
(Strange, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 342-43.) 
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the above condition has been met. 
1.2 -- A Review of the Regime Literature in International Relations Scholarship 
In a review of the regime literature in international relations scholarship, it is 
impractical to present and to analyse the contribution of every scholar who has 
ever considered the concept. Instead, I divide the ideas contained in the literature 
into three separate categories and consider the contributions of some of the 
scholars who are best-known or most representative of each grouping. 
Because it is assumed that there is a constant unit of analysis in this 
investigation' s (for the foreign policies of states are together treated as the key 
dependent variable throughout this study"), the classification of the literature is 
made upon the basis of the level of analysis. 18 Thus, the ideas of scholars writing 
about international regime formation are divided and grouped under three 
umbrellas, with the members of each category using the same level of analysis --
either the system, the state or the individual -- in order to explain international 
regime formation. 
The 'global' theories that I examine focus upon the international system as 
a whole in order to explain international regime formation. The 'state-centred' 
theories that I explore direct attention to the state as a unitary entity, arguing that 
the actions of this actor are the key determinants of international regime formation. 
The 'individualistic' theories that I consider accentuate the importance of individuals 
16 This thesis is not primarily concerned with the 'agent-structure problem', which is 'whether 
the system, the state, agencies within the state and human agents are irreducible units in 
international relations' (Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, 'Beware of Gurus: Structure and Action in 
International. Relations', Review of International Studies (Vol. 17, No. 4, October 1991), p. 395). 
Instead, it merely adopts the three most obvious 'levels of analysis' as a means of classifying the 
literature (infra, in note 18). 
17 By both making this statement and defining international regimes as I do, I am assuming that 
states' representatives must take conscious decisions to implement a new order before an 
international regime will be formed. This statement was substantiated by numerous interviews with 
officials who were involved in the negotiations. They all agreed that states' governments were the 
key implementors in the process. Thus, we can consider the 'foreign policies of states' and 
'international regimes' to be directly correlated in this analysis. 
18 Wendt notes that the 'level of analysis problem ... is a problem of explanation: of assessing 
the relative importance of causal factors at different levels of aggregation in explaining the behaviour 
of a given unit of analysis' (Alexander Wendt, 'Bridging the Theory/Meta-theory Gap in International 
Relations', Review of International Studies (Vol. 17, No. 4, October 1991), p. 387). The inspiration 
for this type of approach includes: Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical 
Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954); and J. David Singer, The Level-of-Analysis 
Problem in International Relations', World Politics (Vol. 14, No. 1, October 1961), pp. 77-92. 
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in the formation of international regimes. Although each is presented separately, 
some overlap among the three necessarily exists. Nevertheless, this tripartite 
division helps us both to order our thoughts about international regime formation 
and to construct a theoretical framework for the subsequent examination of the 
politics of global atmospheric change. 
1.2.1 -- Global Theories 
First, there are various global approaches to the study of international regime 
formation. In this category, I include all of those propositions that focus upon the 
international system in order to explain international regime formation. Although 
writers from a number of diverse perspectives find themselves grouped together 
within this category, they all nevertheless share the idea that the distribution of 
power (however defined) in the international system (among whatever units) is a 
key indicator of the prospects for international regime formation. 19 The two most 
significant approaches under this umbrella are, first, associated with traditional 
realist ideas and, second, inspired by Marxist scholarship. 
Traditional realists argue that states are 'preoccupied with their security and 
power; by consequence, states are predisposed toward conflict and competition, 
and they often fail to cooperate even when they have common interests'. 20 These 
scholars maintain that the distribution of power -- primarily defined as military 
strength -- among the states of the world is the key characteristic of the 
international political system. 21 Further, because 'the structure of a system so 
constituted shapes the behaviour of its elements', 22 they are pessimistic about the 
chances for international regime formation. The only way in which regimes could 
arise, some realists contend, is if a hegemon is present in the international system. 
The theory that they put forward, which is labelled 'Hegemonic Stability Theory' 
(HST), 'predicts that the more one such power dominates the world political 
19 Although groups of theorists in this category disagree whether the distribution of power 
determines the structure of the system or whether the structure of the system determines the 
distribution of power, they do agree that a global view is essential. 
Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, American, and Non-tariff Barriers 
to Trade (London: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 4. 
21 Perhaps best known of these is Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (London: 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979). 
22 Wendt summarising Waltz's argument in Wendt, op. cit., in note 18, p. 389. 
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economy, the more cooperative will interstate relations be'. 23 Although originating 
in the field of international political economy, the idea has also been applied to 
other issue-areas. 
Scholars who subscribe to the HST generally define a hegemon (usually in 
the form of a state, or, increasingly, a group of states working in concert, which 
may be labelled a 'hegemonic bloc or condominium') as an actor that has sufficient 
resources with which to impose a co-operative order upon the international system. 
They claim that there is, therefore, a congruity between the concentration of power 
and the chances for the formation of an international regime. 
Within this general categorisation, Duncan Snidal makes a useful 
differentiation between two sorts of HST. 24 On the one hand, he identifies a 
'benign version', as presented by Charles Kindleberger and, in his earlier writings, 
Robert Keohane. 25 In this instance, the hegemonic power is willing to provide the 
international public good, because 'it will capture a share of the benefit of the 
public good larger than the entire cost of providing it'. 26 In Olsonian language, the 
group (that is, the international society of states) is 'privileged', because a single 
state desires the good sufficiently to accept the full costs of its establishment. 27 
 The benefits accruing to the hegemon, meanwhile, may be tangible or intangible. 
[The hegemon] is willing to bear an undue part of the short-run costs of 
these goods, either because it regards itself as gaining in the long run, 
because it is paid in a different coin such as prestige, glory, immortality, or 
some combination of the two. 28 
23 Robert 0. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 34. Snidal credits Keohane with 
coining the term (Duncan Snidal, 'The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory', International 
Organization (Vol. 39, No. 4, Autumn 1985), p. 581, note 4). 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., pp. 580-81. Kindleberger's first writings on the subject include: The World in Depression 
(Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1973); and 'Systems of International Economic 
Order', in David CaIleo (ed.), Money and the Coming World Order (New York: New York University 
Press, 1976); while Keohane's earlier works include 'The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes 
in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977', in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson and 
Alexander L. George (eds.), Changes in the International System (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1980). 
26 Snidal, op. cit., in note 23, p. 581. 
27 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965). 
28 Charles P. Kindleberger, 'International Public Goods Without International Government', The 
American Economic Review (Vol. 76, No. 1, March 1986), p. 8. 
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Regardless, all members of international society are better off, because of the 
deliberate actions of the benign hegemon. 
An alternative interpretation of HST, however, suggests that states are 
motivated by different incentives. Following Snidal's distinction, Peter Haas labels 
this the 'dark side of hegemony' -- that is, the 'malevolent view' of HST. 29 Robert 
Gilpin and Stephen Krasner are often identified as its best-known adherents. 3° 
 World politics, these theorists argue, is best modelled as a zero-sum game, and 
because outcomes depend entirely on the leadership of a dominant party 
and that party's willingness to compel other parties to comply, coordinated 
arrangements will occur in terms favorable to that party. Coordinated 
policies will reflect the short-term interests of the hegemon, rather than the 
more generous, longer-term ones proposed by Keohane and Kindleberger. 
Gilpin and Krasner think that cooperation will only be transitory; that, in fact, 
the possibility that resources and power will be redistributed as a result of 
faithful adherence to cooperative goals will in part deter full hegemonic 
support out of each country's fear of losing its control over other 
countries. 31 
This view of international regime formation places an emphasis upon the 
importance of the perceived relative standing of states in the international system. 
In other words, given the anarchical nature of international society, 32 a policy 
outcome should not be judged by the absolute gains that accrue from it, but, 
rather, the merit of the action can only be assessed by measuring the relative gains 
amassed vis-a-vis other states. Thus, these theorists agree with their 'benevolent-
view' colleagues that when a single actor has sufficient power resources available 
to transform the arrangements in international society, then a regime may be 
formed. They disagree, however, in their view that not all members of international 
society will be better off in light of the new regime. Instead, the new arrangements 
will yield the highest net benefits for the hegemon, most probably at the expense 
of others. Nevertheless, all HST theorists contend that an examination of the entire 
29 Peter M. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental 
Cooperation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 42ff. 
30 .
1p 
 . Giin's works include: U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy 
of Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975); and War and Change in World Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); while Krasner's writings include 'State Power and 
the Structure of International Trade', World Politics (Vol. 28, No. 3, April 1976), pp. 317-47. 
31 Haas, op. cit., in note 29, p. 42. 
32 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1977). 
30 
international system is necessary if the manner in which the composition of that 
same international system has been transformed by the hegemon is to be 
discovered. This tinkering, they continue, accounts for the formation of some 
international regimes. 
While reviewing the various strands of thought about international regime 
formation, other writers have also identified HST as a prevalent tool of analysis. 
Oran Young, in a general tripartite classification of regime formation, identifies one 
sort as 'imposed regimes'. Such regimes, he argues, 
are fostered deliberately by dominant powers or consortia of dominant 
powers. ... In short, imposed regimes are established deliberately by 
dominant actors who succeed in getting others to conform to the 
requirements of these arrangements through some combination of coercion, 
cooperation, and the manipulation of incentives. 33 
The emphasis laid here upon the action by 'dominant actors' fits very closely with 
our description of HST. 
Although its fashionableness may be fading, HST remains an important' 
proposition in the general literature on regime formation. 34 Indeed, the theory 
proved to be irresistible to American policy-makers after the Second World War, 
because it suggested that strong 'policing' interventions by the United States in 
world affairs would be necessary if any sort of co-operation and order were to be 
achieved. 35 As a tool of analysis, furthermore, HST has a clear parsimonious 
appeal, for it encourages the analyst to look at the relative power capability of the 
dominant state in world politics and to speculate upon the chances for regime 
formation or preservation from there. As Young notes: Tor all its shortcomings, the 
hegemonic-stability hypothesis offered the attractions of a simple theory 
33 Young, op. cit., in note 11, p. 88. 
34 The first part of the title of Keohane's 1984 book (Keohane, op. cit, in note 23) might lead 
some to think that scholars should be considering other analytical tools. Regardless, the reference 
to hegemony effectively demonstrates that HST had, at least in 1984, an important position in 
academic study. The debate about the so-called end of American hegemony is, furthermore, far from 
being resolved. See, for example, Susan Strange, The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony', 
International Organization (Vol. 41, No. 4, Autumn 1987), pp. 551-74, for an alternative view. 
35 Grunberg exposes the ethnocentric appeal of the theory, showing how some scholars 
(particularly Kindleberger) have stressed the moralistic mission of the hegemon both to engage in 
self-sacrifice and to work for the benefit of the entire international community (Isabelle Grunberg, 
'Exploring the "Myth" of Hegemonic Stability', International Organization (Vol. 44, No. 4, Autumn 
1990), pp. 431-77). 
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emphasizing a single, master variable.' 36 
This attraction may have encouraged a few to support its tenets, for Young 
notes that some scholars 'have even suggested that the presence of a hegemon 
constitutes a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for success in regime 
formation'. 37 Even Keohane, who himself has undergone an intellectual 
transformation on this issue, recognises that the 'dominance of a single great 
power may contribute to order in world politics, in particular circumstances...'. 38 
 Puchala and Hopkins, furthermore, identify `revolutionary change' as one of two 
sources of regime change. 39 In this instance, they argue that the dominant 
power(s) imposes a regime that has to accepted by the minor actors. They also 
maintain that power transition 'ushers in regime transformation; previously 
disadvantaged but newly powerful participants ascend to dominance and impose 
new norms favouring their own interests'. 40 They claim that this is the 'most 
frequent pattern of regime change'. 41 Arthur Stein also identifies the domination 
of the weak by the strong as a key determinant of regime formation. 42 Meanwhile, 
 Young, who is certainly no friend of the theory, notes that any criticisms laid 
upon HST do not 
exhaust the potential linkages between power and regime formation; it is not 
difficult to see opportunities to formulate a number of other propositions 
relating structural power or the distribution of such power to regime 
formation and to apply them to the realm of environmental concerns. 43 
There are also, however, a number of problems with the theory. 
Keohane is one who subjects the theory to fairly rigorous testing to 
illuminate its empirical weaknesses." The problems with HST, he argues, include 
36 Young, op. cit., in note 11, p. 206. 
37 	. Ibid., p. 200. 
38 Keohane, op. cit., in note 23, p. 46. 
39 The other that they identify is 'evolutionary change', which I consider infra., in note 116, and 
accompanying text (Puchala and Hopkins, op. cit., in note 15, pp. 61-91). 
ao Ibid., p. 66. 
41 Ibid., p. 90. 
42 Arthur A. Stein, 'Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World', in Krasner 
(ed.), op. cit., in note 1, p. 136. 
43 Oran R. Young, 'Global Environmental Change and International Governance', Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies (Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1990), p. 341. 
44 Keohane, op. cit, in note 23, Chapters 8-10. 
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the fact that it cannot explain 'lags between changes in power structures and 
changes in international regimes'. 45 He also discovers that the theory does 'not 
account well for the differential durability of different institutions within a given issue-
area', 46 and that it 'avoids addressing the question of why international regimes 
seem so much more extensive now in world politics than during earlier periods 
(such as the late 19th century) of supposed hegemonic leadership'. 47 Keohane 
further concludes that the 'empirical evidence for the general validity of hegemonic 
stability theory is weak'. 48 Young echoes this assertion after judging the theory's 
particular relevance for the sort of issue that this thesis examines: 'With respect to 
international environmental regimes, at least, this proposition [HST] has not held 
up well in the face of empirical testing.' 49 Indeed, many scholars question the real-
world validity of the hypothesis. Ernst Haas, for one, wonders if 'states really 
calculate their participation in a regime on the basis of a concern for their overall 
rank in some international pecking order...'. 50 
Aside from its failures in the face of application, the theory is also attacked. 
on theoretical grounds. Young questions the conclusions of HST: 
No doubt, the presence of a dominant player may give rise to an Olsonian 
privileged group. Also, the exertion of coercive pressure on the part of a 
particularly powerful actor or an effective ruling coalition will be critical to any 
effort to form imposed regimes or institutional arrangements. But there is 
nothing in the theoretical literature on bargaining to suggest that social 
contracts will come unglued in the absence of a dominant partner. 51 
In an oft-cited article, Duncan Snidal lays out one of the most comprehensive 
theoretical attacks upon HST. Using formal models, he comes to a conclusion that 
contradicts HST -- namely, that international regimes cannot only persist in the face 
of declining hegemony, but that they can even be strengthened. This, he argues, 
45 Robert 0. Keohane, 'The Demand for International Regimes', in Krasner (ed.), op. cit., in note 
1, p. 142. 
Ibid., p. 142. 
47 Ibid., p. 142. 
48 Keohane, op. cit., in note 23, p. 38. 
49 Young, op. cit., in note 43, p. 341. 
50 Ernst B. Haas, 'Words Can Hurt You; or, Who Said What to Whom About Regimes', in Krasner 
(ed.), op. cit., in note 1, p. 58. 
51 Although Young is referring to regime persistence explicitly, his comments are, nevertheless, 
pertinent (Young, op. cit., in note 11, p. 203). 
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shows that hegemonic stability is only a special case of international co-
operation. 52 In addition, Stein challenges the HST theorists' assertion that 
changes in the distribution of power will lead to regime change. He argues, instead, 
that more subtle factors are at work in international society. 
If interests intervene between structure and regimes, then only those 
structural changes that affect patterns of interest will affect regimes. Further, 
since other factors also affect interests, it may be that the impact of 
changing power distributions on actor preferences can be negated by other 
structural changes, such as those in technology. 53 
And although Keohane does not complement his rigorous empirical testing with an 
equally comprehensive theoretical analysis, he nevertheless maintains that the 
`argument that hegemony is necessary for cooperation is both theoretically and 
empirically weak'. 54 The conclusion in light of such observations is, Young 
contends, that 'the hegemonic-stability hypothesis is dead'. 55 Although this 
declaration might be premature, it is clear that there are problems with at least 
parts of the theory. 
Within global theories generally, there exists a second strand of thought, 
which, inspired by Marxist scholarship, has been often labelled 'dependency 
theory'.56 Many of the writers working under this broad classification are united 
by the belief that 
there is a social whole that may be called a capitalist world-economy. [They] 
believe this capitalist world-economy came into existence a long time ago, 
probably in the sixteenth century, and that it had expanded historically from 
its European origins to cover the globe by the late nineteenth century. 
[They] believe it can be described as capitalist in that endless accumulation 
is its motor force. [They] believe that the appropriation by the world 
bourgeoisie of the surplus value created by the world's direct producers has 
involved not merely direct appropriation at the market place, but also 
52  Snidal, op. cit., in note 23, pp. 597-612. 
53 Stein, op. cit., in note 42, p. 138. We should recognise, nevertheless, that Stein also 
recognises the importance of the distribution of power in the international system (ibid., p. 135). 
54 Keohane, op. cit., in note 23, p. 38. 
55 Young, op. cit., in note 11, p. 204. 
56 Brown uses this term to categorise a number of diverse writers, some of whom are noted 
infra, in notes 57-59 (Chris Brown, 'Development and Dependency', in Margot Light and A.J.R. 
Groom (eds.), International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory (London: Frances Pinter, 
1985), pp. 60-73). 
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unequal exchange, transferring surplus from peripheral to core zones. 57 
Although there are substantial differences among these scholars' work -- Andre 
Gunder Frank stresses the exploitation of the periphery by the core, 88 while 
Immanuel Wallerstein focuses upon the system (the 'capitalist world-economy') 
more generally59 -- there is little doubt that they all place an emphasis upon 
power structures in international society. However, in contrast to the HST theorists, 
who focus upon the distribution of military power among states, these scholars 
argue that the distribution of economic power among classes should be the 
primary focus of any analysis. International regime formation, they maintain, can be 
explained by looking at the way in which the subjugators structure the capitalist 
world-economy so that they can advance their economic interests at the expense 
of the subjugated. 8° 
In spite of the attention accorded the ideas of these scholars by other 
academic disciplines, their global theories do not receive as much attention as HST 
in the literature on international regime formation. Indeed, many scholars in their' 
research typologies omit such concerns altogether. 61 Others, nevertheless, do 
take note. Peter Haas, for one, identifies the contributions of these scholars to the 
discussion. Identifying dependency theorists as members of the 'historical 
materialist' school, he summarises their major proposition: 
When effective interstate collaboration does occur, it is on the terms of the 
North, or serves to reproduce the systemic principles of world capitalism, 
which permits persistent outcomes to be determined according to the logic 
57 Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein, Dynamics of 
Global Crisis (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1982), p. 9. 
58 See, for example, Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: 
Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil, Revised Edition (London: Monthly Review Press, 1969). See, 
also, Johan Galtung, 'A Structural Theory of Imperialism', Journal of Peace Research (Vol. 8, No. 
2, 1971), pp. 81-117. 
59 See, for example, Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979); and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Politics of the World-Economy: 
The States, the Movements, and the Civilizations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 
so In this manner, I am focusing upon those approaches that look at domination in the 
economic-sense. This approach has close links with ideas in the literature about domination in other 
senses. See Chapter 1.2.3 of this thesis (on 'individualistic' theories) for a further discussion. 
61 In one of the most-cited syntheses of the regime literature, this sort of analysis does not 
appear, explicitly, in the description of four types of regime scholarship (Stephan Haggard and Beth 
A. Simmons, 'Theories of International Regimes', International Organization (Vol. 41, No. 3, Summer 
1987), pp. 491-517). 
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of the international division of labor. 62 
 He continues: 
... historical materialists argue that authoritative policy prescriptions will 
inherently embody northern preferences. Southern preferences will either be 
eliminated or disingenuously associated with northern preferences. 63 
International regime formation can therefore be explained 'in terms of the systemic 
control of powerful industrialized capitalist states over weaker ones'. 64 Young, in 
addition, identifies a similar group of scholars: 
Marxists and others who think in dialectic terms, for example, can be 
expected to approach the problem of regime transformation primarily in 
terms of the impact of internal contradictions. They will search for dialectic 
laws governing regime dynamics and emphasize the growth of antithetical 
forces leading to the collapse or breakdown of existing institutional 
arrangements. 65 
Thus, although this work is neglected in most mainstream considerations of 
international regimes, some scholars have noted its contributions. 
Despite the fact that most of the discussion surrounding the validity the 
ideas of dependency theorists takes place outside of the confines of the debate on 
international regimes, their contributions may help to further our understanding of 
international regime formation. It is for this reason that their hypotheses are 
outlined here. 
In this brief review, the ideas of various global theorists are presented. The 
scholars within this general classification, who are predominantly concerned with 
the Hegemonic Stability Theory, argue that the prospects for international regime 
formation are determined by the actions of the most powerful actor in international 
society. Although there are problems with this approach (some have been identified 
and more will be discussed in the subsequent analyses), the ideas of the global 
theorists do have something to contribute to our understanding of international 
regime formation. This is elaborated further in Chapter 1.3 of this thesis. 
62 Haas, op. cit., in note 29, p. 48. 
63 Ibid., p. 51. 
64 Ibid., p. 64. 
ss Young, op. cit., in note 11, p. 101. 
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1.2.2 -- State-Centred Theories 
Second, there are a number of theories that focus upon the nation-state in order 
to explain international regime formation. Taken to the extreme, the theorists in this 
group would not deem it necessary to look at the way in which states interact in 
the international political system. Instead, they would simply identify the costs and 
benefits that would accrue to the state, contingent upon the course of policy that 
its leaders chose to follow. If a sufficient number of states found it in their interests 
to follow similar courses of action, then a regime may 'spontaneously' arise. 66 
 And, although most state-centred theorists make a point of acknowledging the 
presence of systemic constraints, it is clear that all of the theorists grouped 
together under this umbrella term have a rational, unitary state as the primary focus 
of their analysis. 
In most discussions of state-centred approaches, the concept of game 
theory is eventually raised as an issue. Many theorists have used 'games', such 
as the Prisoner's Dilemma, in order to model collective action problems that face 
the members (most commonly, states) of international society. 67 Although some 
scholars separate the two concepts explicitly (Haggard and Simmons, for example, 
have distinguished between the 'game theoretic' and the 'functional' 
approaches69), they should be considered together. Any separation might be 
incorrectly predicated upon a perceived distinction between method and theory. 
Just as it was eventually recognised that behaviourial studies did not, in 
themselves, constitute a new theory in the field of international relations, but simply 
did present a new method for realism, 69 we should recognise that game theory 
is simply a formalisation of the state-centred theorists' theme. Because of their 
66 The terminology used is Oran Young's in ibid., pp. 50-52. Keohane, meanwhile, would 
describe this situation as one of international 'harmony' (Keohane, op. cit., in note 23, pp. 51ff). 
67 See, for example, Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1982). For a clear discussion of the use of games in international relations scholarship, see 
Michael Nicholson, Formal Theories in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989). 
68 Haggard and Simmons, op. cit., in note 61, pp. 504-09. 'Functionalism' is the term they use 
to refer to state-centred approaches. To be fair to Haggard and Simmons, however, they do 
acknowledge the close links between the two. 
69 See Michael Banks, 'The Inter-Paradigm Debate', in Light and Groom (eds.), op. cit., in note 
56, p. 11; and John Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: A Critique (London: Frances Pinter, 
1983), passim, especially Chapter 2. 
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common assumptions about international politics, the two approaches are 
considered together in this typology. 
Joshua Goldstein and John Freeman note the major characteristics of the 
state-centred approach: 
Accepting most realist assumptions, this school attempts to show that it is 
possible to achieve cooperation even under conditions of anarchy. This 
school synthesizes two traditions in international relations theory, bringing 
together `neorealism' and studies of 'international interdependence.' This 
synthesis has come to occupy a central place in American international 
relations research.7° 
Robert Axelrod, Robert Keohane and Kenneth Oye are often identified as three of 
the leading proponents of this approach in international relations. 71 Their work is 
rooted firmly in both rational choice analysis and game theoretic models. 
Although inspired, and to some extent informed, by realist thinking, this 
approach's advocates do not assume that the world is doomed to the realists' 
zero-sum games. On the contrary, Keohane notes that 'rationalistic theory can be • 
used to explore the conditions under which cooperation takes place, and it seeks 
to explain why international institutions are constructed by states'. 72 The analysis 
borrows many concepts from microeconomics and suggests that participants may 
form regimes in order to 'overcome the barriers to more efficient coordination 
identified by theories of market failure'. 73 In other words, states will form 
international regimes in order to reduce both information and transaction costs. 74 
 Oran Young summarises some of these ideas: 
Self-interested utility maximizers choose continuously among available 
alternatives in such a way as to maximize their own welfare without 
comparing their performance with that of others or even considering the 
implications of their own actions for others. It is easy enough to see why 
actors of this type will often accept the constraints associated with regimes 
70 Joshua S. Goldstein and John R. Freeman, Three-Way Street: Strategic Reciprocity in World 
Politics (London: University of Chicago Press, 1990), p. 11. 
71 See, for example, the contributions in Kenneth A. Oye (ed.), Cooperation Under Anarchy 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986). 
72 Robert 0. Keohane, 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', International Studies 
Quarterly (Vol. 32, No. 4, December 1988), p. 381. 
73 Keohane, op. cit in note 45, p. 151. 
74 Haggard and Simni,qns, op. cit., in note 61, p. 506. Furthermore, Grieco notes that state-
centred scholars maintain that international regimes can 'reduce the attractiveness of cheating and 
thus are able to promote cooperation' (Grieco, op. cit., in note 20, p. 9). 
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or other social institutions on the basis of straightforward calculations of a 
utilitarian nature. ... They participate in regimes fundamentally as a means 
of maximizing net benefits for themselves. It follows that those whose 
behavior emanates from such calculations will feel no compunctions about 
violating institutional requirements, if and when they conclude that it is 
possible to increase their net benefits by doing so. 75 
Many writers have identified this approach as a distinctive contribution to 
thought on international regime formation. They have, however, done so under a 
variety of classifications: Young, for example, labels it as 'structural analysis'; 76 
 while Grieco (using Keohane's term) calls it 'neoliberal institutionalism';77 and
Jonsson identifies its tools as 'situational models'. 78 Lang identifies a 'functional 
strain of regime theories'; 79 whereas Peter Haas, in his discussion, adopts the 
`cooperation under anarchy' terminology. 8° Additionally, as is the case with global 
theories, it should be acknowledged that the pedigree of this approach dates 
further back than the early 1980s. Writing in the late 1970s, Paul Taylor's 
description of 'adjustment theories' seems to parallel, at least somewhat, this 
general classification. 
Adjustment theories are concerned with the response of national 
governments to demands made upon them as a result of changes in their 
environment. Governments are continuously faced with the need to carry 
out new tasks, which may arise from political circumstances in the 
international system, or from technological change or other features of 
modernisation, or economic development, or from new demands made 
upon them by their own citizens. ... The essential point is that adjustment 
theories are about the ways in which existing governments cope with 
demands made upon them by working through international institutions and 
carrying through appropriate adjustments in their position. They do not see 
governments, or other levels of the state, as being fundamentally changed, 
and, accordingly they stress the range of inter-governmental arrangements 
75 Young, op. cit., in note 11, pp. 210-11. 
76 Young, op. cit., in note 43, p. 340. 
TT Grieco, op. cit., in note 20. See, also, Keohane, op. cit., in note 10. 
78 Jonsson notes that: 'According to this perspective, decisions by governments to create, 
maintain or change regimes are not determined solely by existing power structures but constitute 
conscious choices in dilemma-like situations.' (Christer Jonsson, International Aviation and the 
Politics of Regime Change (London: Frances Pinter, 1987), p. 158.) 
79 Laszlo Lang, International Regimes and the Political Economy of East-West Regimes (New 
York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1989), p. 10. As noted above, Haggard and Simmons 
use a similar term (Haggard and Simmons, op. cit., in note 61). 
so While placing it firmly within the realist and neorealist camp, he labels them as the 
'cooperation under anarchy' school (Haas, op. cit., in note 29, pp. 44ff). 
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in international organisation. Governments are seen as the dominant actors, 
using international organisation to the extent that it serves their interests in 
the context of a changing environment. 81 
The ancestry of this approach is, thus, significant. 
In light of the perceived decline of American hegemony during the 1970s 
and 1980s, 82 the attraction of state-centred theories increased significantly. 
Indeed, this approach was thought to be the most appropriate, for many scholars 
saw the international system developing into a multipolar world, which could be 
modelled as a game with a greater number of players of increasingly equal 
strength. Goldstein and Freeman, however, identify an even more pressing 
impetus: 
The anarchic nature of international relations is very troubling to these 
theorists because the prospect of a continuing free for all in the nuclear age 
is so undesirable. Thus these international relations theorists are quite 
interested in formal models that propose possible resolutions of such a 
dilemma. 83 
Not surprisingly, the ideas have come under much scrutiny, and thus, various 
strengths and weaknesses associated with state-centred approaches have been 
identified. 
Focusing specifically upon game theory, Robert Jervis notes the inherent 
strengths of this tool of analysis: 
[I]t builds upon central characteristics of international politics -- anarchy, the 
security dilemma, and the combination of common and conflicting interests. 
... the approach is parsimonious and lends itself to deductive thinking. ... it 
seeks to bring together the study of conflict and the study of cooperation, 
and tries to explain a wide range of phenomena encompassing both 
security and political economy. 84 
Furthermore, Keohane maintains that these 
models, especially Prisoner's Dilemma, draw our attention to ways in which 
barriers to information and communication in world politics can impede 
81 Paul Taylor, 'A Conceptual Typology of International Organisation', in Paul Taylor and A.J.R. 
Groom (eds.), International Organisation: A Conceptual Approach (London: Frances Pinter, 1978), 
pp. 119-20. Emphasis added. 
82 Op. cit., in note 34. 
83 Goldstein and Freeman, op. cit., in note 70, p. 11. 
84 Robert Jervis, 'Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation', World Politics (Vol. 40, No. 3, April 
1988), p. 319. 
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cooperation and create discord even when common interests exist!' 
By illuminating counter-intuitive findings, the theory of games may be able to 
provide a framework for both discussion and analysis of various international 
collective action problems. The main insight developed by such approaches is that 
equilibrium outcomes in nonco-operative games may be sub-optimal; or, in less 
technical language, rational actions may not necessarily produce the most 
favourable outcome for society as a whole. In this way, state-centred theorists in 
general, and game theorists in particular, attempt to formalise the traditional 
dilemma of collective action. 
Despite their concentration upon dilemmas of collective action, however, 
these theorists, as mentioned above, do not claim that international society is 
condemned to sub-optimal outcomes. Indeed, another perceived strength of the 
state-centred approach is that the models can identify factors that encourage co-
operation. 86 First, the 'mutuality of interest' 87 can be a key determinant. States 
will engage in co-operative actions if it is in their rational self-interest to do so. By 
examining how the payoff matrices are calculated, analysts and policy-makers may 
be able to discern how these values might be changed, so that regime formation 
can be fostered. 88 
A second valuable insight is that the 'shadow of the future' is a very 
important determinant of co-operation. As Oran Young notes: 'Parties expecting to 
engage in a long running relationship are apt to find that the shadow of the future 
exerts considerable pressure on them to behave co-operatively at the outset.'89 
 Robert Axelrod, in his book The Evolution of Cooperation, makes this point, while
supporting his argument with both empirical case-studies and an analysis of an 
innovative computer tournament. 90 Again, quoting Young: 
85 Keohane, op. cit., in note 23, p. 69. 
se Kenneth A. Oye, 'Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies', in Oye 
(ed.), op. cit., in note 71, pp. 1-24. 
87 Robert Axelrod and Robert 0. Keohane, 'Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies 
and Institutions', in Oye (ed.), op. cit., in note 71, p. 227. 
Robert Axelrod, for one, has attempted this. See his 'Conflict of Interest: An Axiomatic 
Approach', Journal of Conflict Resolution (Vol. 11, No. 1, March 1967), pp. 87-99, where he explicitly 
examines the calculation of the payoff matrices. 
89 Young, op. cit., in note 43, pp. 340-41. 
so Robert M. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). 
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[Axelrod's work] demonstrates that purely self-interested actors may 
develop effective rules or social conventions through an interactive learning 
process involving trial and error coupled with a kind of behavioral natural 
selection, so long as they expect to interact with each other repeatedly and 
employ relatively low discount rates in computing the present value of future 
benefits. 91 
Axelrod and Keohane, furthermore, emphasise the importance of anticipated future 
interactions. They argue that a norm of reciprocity, which can help lay the 
foundation for the formation of an international regime, is more likely to develop if 
three conditions are satisfied: `(1) players can identify defectors; (2) they are able 
to focus retaliation on defectors; and (3) they have sufficient long-run incentives to 
punish defectors'. 92 Although these ideas, concentrating upon interaction among 
states, suggest a global focus, the primary concentration remains upon the `free' 
choice of the state in view of the perceived costs and benefits of action. 
Third, state-centred analyses highlight the significance of the number of 
players -- that is, the number of states -- involved in the particular issue. Reporting , 
upon findings made famous by Mancur Olson, 93 Peter Haas notes that a 'smaller 
number of actors facilitates surveillance, and hence improves the likelihood of 
further cooperation'. 94 Similarly, Young states that the 'number of participants is 
important, it is argued, because the transaction costs of reaching agreement on 
the content of specific provisions rise steeply as the size of the group 
increases'.95 Oye supports Olson's conclusions that the larger the number of 
participants, the harder it will be to build a regime. 96 Taken together, therefore, 
it is not surprising to find that a number of international relations scholars have 
recognised the importance of state-centred approaches. In addition to the insights 
that these theories can provide in the study of regime formation, however, there are 
also a number of problems with both game theory in particular and the entire 
approach more generally. 
First, the required-by-definition focus upon the state gives rise to a number 
91 Young, op. cit., in note 11, p. 202. 
92 Axelrod and Keohane, op. cit., in note 87, p. 235. 
93 Olson, op. cit., in note 27. 
94 Haas, op. cit., in note 29, p. 45. 
95 Young, op. cit., in note 11, p. 340. 
96 Oye, op. cit., in note 86. 
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of difficulties, because the assumption that the nation-state is the most important 
actor in the international system is increasingly coming under attack by, among 
others, those who take a more pluralistic view of international society. These critics 
claim that state-centred theorists do not, consciously, acknowledge the important 
role that other transnational actors and coalitions (for example, transnational 
corporations) play in international society. 97 Another attack from a different 
direction, furthermore, is launched by some global theorists. By treating all states 
similarly, they argue that state-centred theorists 'assume too easily that actors' 
decisions are in some meaningful sense voluntary, thus running the risk of ignoring 
inequalities of power among actors'. 98 In short, a state-centred analysis may not 
be appropriate in some international predicaments. 99 
Regardless, however, of which actor is chosen to 'play the game', difficulties 
will be encountered when attempts are. made to operationalise the theory by 
constructing the model. The first problem regards deciding what the game is -- not 
only deciding upon the form of the game, but also placing a value upon the' 
payoffs. One must wonder whether a state's leaders, in a real-world situation, are 
ever faced with a clear pair of alternatives ('co-operate' or 'defect') or even some 
sort of continuum of choices. Thus, identifying the dominant policy options may be 
a demanding task. Additionally, given the difficulty of assigning ordinal numbers to 
the boxes (that is, ranking preferences), it is that much more difficult if one has to 
establish cardinal values (that is, ranking preferences and intensities) for the 
outcomes. Further, when game theorists build their payoff matrices, sceptics claim 
that they often overlook many elements that should be included in the payoffs --
for example, ideologies, beliefs and other intangible factors -- simply because they 
are difficult to quantify. Therefore, the absence of these factors, which such critics 
argue are integral to the decision-making process, seriously weakens the method. 
Keohane, for one, accepts this criticism by recognising that the conclusions of 
97  This weakness will be further explored in the examination of the 'individualist' theories in 
Chapter 1.2.3 of this thesis. 
98 Keohane, op. cit., in note 23, p. 70. Some state-centred theorists who can also be labelled 
'modified structuralists' (this is Krasner's terminology (Krasner, op. cit., in note 5)) do acknowledge 
this point, for they argue that 'regimes cannot be relevant for zero-sum situations in which states act 
to maximize the difference between their utilities and those of others' (ibid., p. 8). 
99  Jervis makes a similar argument (Jervis, op. cit., in note 84, p. 334). Keohane also recognises 
that actors' choices 'will be constrained in such a way that the preferences of the most powerful 
actors will be accorded the greatest weight' (Keohane, op. cit, in note 23, p. 71). 
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rationalistic analyses depend upon the model chosen. He also admits that the 
choice of model necessarily depends upon contextual factors -- such as history --
which do not enter the state-centred theorists' considerations. 100 
Perceptions and misperceptions are also very important in the decision-
making process, because the way in which information is received and processed 
will affect how the dilemma is interpreted and understood. 101 In this way, different 
states' leaders may represent the same situation by different payoffs, or even 
different games. Therefore, the fact that state-centred theorists use a single matrix 
means that they may not be able to represent the predicament fully. 
Such differences may not only be found between states, but they may also 
be found within states. As advocates of bureaucratic politics argue, different 
factions within society may view an issue differently -- depending upon where they 
sit. 102 Thus, it is wrong to assume that the 'national interest' is somehow 'given', 
for an examination of the various competing interests on the domestic scene will 
be a key part of the calculation of 'national interest'. Additionally, the roles of , 
routines, habits and traditions should not be overlooked, because they are often 
influential in dictating the decision-paths that states choose to follow. 1°3 The 
'rationality' of the entire process is thus placed in doubt. 
Further, the entire state-centred approach tends to be static, while, in reality, 
the international system is quite dynamic. Not only will preferences change as 
consensual knowledge grows and as actors learn, but the individuals who occupy 
the important decision-making positions may be replaced over time and these 
transformations may affect the state's priorities. Peter Haas notes that because 
'many neorealist authors use game-theoretic techniques in their analysis, they are 
unlikely to consider the possibility of learning that recognizes and transcends the 
limitations of the game being played'. 104 Indeed, the payoffs may shift to such 
an extent that the nature of the game may fundamentally change -- for example, 
100 Keohane, op. cit., in note 72, p. 388. 
101 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1976). 
102 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, MA: 
Little, Brown, and Company, 1971). 
103 See, for example, James Rosenau, 'Before Cooperation: Hegemons, Regimes, and Habit-
Driven Actors in World Politics', International Organization (Vol. 40, No. 4, Autumn 1986), pp. 849-94. 
104 Haas, op. cit., in note 29, p. 61. 
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a Prisoner's Dilemma game may become a Chicken game. 
Another problem with the state-centred theorists' approach is that it 
assumes that states choose independently, ignorant of their opponent's choices. 
This can be questioned, because technological improvements in remote sensing 
and the greater importance attached to verification means that actors now have a 
greater understanding of the actions of others. 105 
In addition, these theories, particularly those that use games, assume that 
all actors are egoistic -- that is, that 'the desire [is] to maximize one's own utility 
function where that function does not include the utility of another party'. 106 This 
can be challenged, because it may be 'rational' for a state to have its utility function 
dependent upon the utility of other states. X07 Indeed, the state's leaders may 
behave out of some feeling of altruism or indeed feel some sort of moral obligation 
or shared ethical standards -- such conditions are not accommodated by some 
forms of game theory. 
Finally, each game must be placed within the context of a larger game --
namely, all of the activities in the international system. Many issues are linked to 
others, and therefore cannot be examined in complete isolation. In this way, a 
variety of games -- that may be compatible or incompatible -- must be 
considered. 108 The fact that many game theorists fail to do so substantially 
weakens their analysis. 
Moving from the theoretical to the empirical, a number of authors question 
the explanatory ability of state-centred approaches. More specifically, and more 
importantly for the purposes of this study, scholars note that these analytical tools 
may have more to say about regime maintenance than about regime formation. 
Even Keohane, who is one of the approach's major articulators and proponents, 
recognises that the theory has not been used much to explain the creation of 
105 See the work by Nigel Howard on 'metagames' for an attempt to address this weakness --
for example, Paradoxes of Rationality: Theory of Metagames and Political Behavior (London: MIT 
Press, 1971). 
106 Krasner, op. cit., in note 5, p. 11. 
107 Keohane makes the important distinction between 'rationality' and 'egoism' (Keohane, op. 
cit., in note 23, p. 70). 
108 I pursue this idea in Chapter 5.2 of this thesis. 
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institutions. 109 Young reiterates this observation by noting that: 'While the logic 
behind each of these propositions is straightforward, an initial assessment of the 
evidence regarding the formation of environmental regimes raises significant 
questions about their explanatory power.' 11° He further contends that: 'When we 
turn to the actual processes through which institutions emerge ... confusion 
abounds.' 111 The approach is thus not only questioned on theoretical grounds, 
but it also encounters problems in the face of empirical testing. 
In this section, the central propositions of the scholars who make up the 
`state-centred' approach to the study of international regime formation are 
presented. A focus upon the state as a rational, unitary actor is required, they 
maintain, in order to understand why international regimes are created. An analysis 
of the perceived costs and benefits will indicate, they continue, why and when 
particular states might be able to form regimes at the international level. The liberal 
use of formal methods -- in particular, game theory -- is a characteristic that is 
unique to this approach. Notwithstanding the fact that there are problems with both 
the theoretical assumptions and the methodological tools of these theorists, their 
emphasis upon state action brings to light a number of important insights that 
relate to our investigation. For this reason, an analysis of state-centred approaches 
should be undertaken to discern what contribution they can make to further our 
understanding of international regime formation. This issue is pursued at greater 
length in Chapter 1.3 of this thesis. 
1.2.3 -- individualistic Theories 
Some theorists direct attention to the most disaggregated unit of analysis in 
international relations -- namely, the human being -- in order to explain international 
regime formation. Although these writers do not focus upon the individual to the 
exclusion of other 'levels', it is clear that their primary concerns are to do with the 
processes that go on within the minds of certain human beings. An examination 
of individuals' cognitive factors, they argue, is the most important consideration in 
109 Keohane, op. cit., in note 72, p. 387. Keohane's use of the term `institution' is sufficiently 
similar to our term `regime' so as to make the comparison valid. 
110 Young, op. cit., in note 43, p. 341. 
111 Young, op. cit., in note 11, p. 200. 
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the study of international regime formation. Using the phrase 'individualistic 
theorists' as an umbrella term to include all of those scholars who emphasise the 
roles of learning, perception and other such factors in the formation of international 
regimes, their work constitutes a third distinct strand of thought in the literature on 
international regimes. 
Peter Haas, one of the foremost individualistic theorists, argues that: 
Writers from this tradition look at policymaking in terms of such nonsystemic 
variables and actors as ideas, knowledge, beliefs, experts, and scientists. 
Arguing that structural analysis alone overpredicts interstate conflict and 
underpredicts cooperation, such writers rely on insights from organization 
theory, policy sciences, social psychology, the philosophy and history of 
science, the sociology of knowledge, and international relations to explain 
the choice of state ends to which resources will be deployed and the 
preconditions for and forms of international cooperation. 112 
Indeed, many scholars, while constructing their respective typologies of the regime 
literature, identify this as a unique grouping. It is not surprising, however, to find 
that they employ a variety of different labels to do so. 
Haggard and Simmons, for example, identify 'cognitive approaches' as one 
of four branches in the literature. They argue that by focusing on 'the 
intersubjective meaning structures that bind actors together, [cognitivist theorists] 
necessarily see a looser fit between structural constraints, interests, and 
choices'. 113 Jonsson uses the same label to identify this group of scholars. 
Mixing individualistic and global ideas, he summarises their arguments as follows: 
`Changes in the power structure and the emergence of bargaining situations, as 
perceived by the principal actors, explain the evolution of international 
regimes.' 114 Similarly, Goldstein and Freeman offer 'psychological models' as one 
of their three general classifications. They note that some scholars attempt to fill 
in the game-theorists' black-box by looking at the motivations, cognitive abilities 
and perceptions of the players in the game. 115 Additionally, while identifying two 
types of regime change, Puchala and Hopkins note that there may be an 
evolutionary change -- that is, regimes 
112 Haas, op. cit., in note 29, p. 52. 
113 Haggard and Simmons, op. cit., in note 61, p. 499. 
114 Jonsson, op. cit., in note 78, p. 24. Emphasis in original. 
115 Goldstein and Freeman, op. cit., in note 70, p. 14-22. 
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may change qualitatively because those who participate in them change 
their minds about interests and aims, usually because of changes in 
information available to elites or new knowledge otherwise attained. ... Such 
change, undisturbing to the power structure and within the regime's 'rules 
of the game,' is rather exceptional and characteristic mainly of functionally 
specific regimes. 116 
Young, furthermore, identifies a group of scholars who harbour the view that 
regimes can 'only come into existence in the presence of widely shared visions of 
the problems at stake and the appropriate solutions'. 117 He goes on to argue 
that this 'way of thinking suggests the importance of hegemony in the Gramscian, 
in contrast to the material, sense in accounting for successes and failures in efforts 
to form international regimes'. 118 Additionally, in a bipartite division of the study 
of international institutions, one of Keohane's categories can be considered to be 
a grouping of individualistic theories. Referring to it as a sociological approach and 
formally labelling the adherents as 'reflective writers', he notes that this type of 
analysis `stresses the role of impersonal social forces as well as the impact of 
cultural practices, norms, and values that are not derived from calculations of 
interests'. 119 Within this camp, he directly identifies Hayward Alker, Richard 
Ashley, Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie, 129 and indirectly identifies Karl 
Deutsch and Ernst Haas. 121 
And although, once again, one might think that the individualistic theorists' 
ideas originated when American scholars demonstrated a rush of academic interest 
in regimes during the 1980s, such thinking can be traced back much earlier in the 
116 Puchala and Hopkins, op. cit., in note 15, pp. 65-66. Their other type of regime change --
revolutionary -- is noted op. cit., in note 39, and accompanying text. 
117 Young, op. cit., in note 43, p. 341. 
118 Ibid., p. 341. This is, obviously, related to our previous consideration of Marxist thought on 
the subject (which is classified in this work as a 'global' theory). When hegemony is discussed in 
terms of ideas (instead of economics), however, the arguments can be classified as 'individualistic'. 
(Robert Cox, for example, notes that 'the language of consensus is a language of common interest 
expressed in universalist terms, though the structure of power underlying it is skewed in favor of 
dominant groups' (Robert W. Cox, 'Labor and Hegemony, International Organization (Vol. 31, No. 
3, Summer 1977). See, also, Robert W. Cox, `Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An 
Essay in Method', Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 12, No. 2, Summer 1983), pp. 
162-75, where he notes the importance of the ways in which international organisations universalise 
the norms supported by the leaders of the dominant state.) 
119 Keohane, op. cit., in note 72, p. 381. 
120 Ibid., p. 381. 
121 Ibid., p. 391. 
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international relations literature. Taylor, for example, labels one strand of the 
literature on international co-operation as `integration theories'. These approaches 
`describe and explain a qualitative change in the context of decision-making: 
integration theories are about a fundamental change which is expected to be 
persistent at one or more of four levels of the state'. 122 Among them are ideas 
about security communities, 123 functionalism and neo-functionalism, 124 and 
transnationalism. 125 Although these do not include learning in their analyses as 
explicitly as more recent work, they do direct scholars to look at the role of 
individuals' actions in regime formation. 126 
Indeed, this is perhaps one of the major contributions of individualistic 
theorists. By claiming that the analysis of international regimes should not be 
obsessed with the state (either on its own [state-centred theories] or in 
combination, thereby defining structure [HST-global theories]), these scholars have 
122 Taylor, op. cit., in note 81, p. 126. 
123 This concept is attributed to Karl W. Deutsch. We should recognise that Deutsch also had 
his own explicit theories about organisational learning. See, for example, his The Nerves of 
Government: Models of Political Communication and Control (New York: The Free Press, 1966). 
124 David Mitrany is considered to be the 'founder' of the functionalist school of thought, while 
Ernst Haas and Leon Lindberg elaborated the idea of 'neo-functionalism'. For an excellent review 
of these ideas, along with further references, see Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 'Neo-functionalism: 
Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC', Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies (Vol. 20, No. 1, Spring 1991), pp. 1-22. 
125 See, for example, Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (eds.), Transnational Relations and 
World Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972). 
126 It should be noted for the sake of completeness that Taylor, in his typology, includes a third 
category, which he calls 'constitutional theories'. However, because these theories are primarily 
prescriptive, they are not included in my survey (Taylor, op. cit., in note 81, pp. 131-33). Additionally, 
at this point, let us consider a classification of Oran Young's ideas. Although some writers' ideas 
lend themselves very nicely to pigeon-holing (for example, Waltz, Keohane and E. Haas are clearly 
global, state-centred and individualistic theorists, respectively), Young, in much of his work, 
summarises various views and, in his own way, argues for a multilevel approach to the study of 
international regime formation. Nevertheless, it would seem that Young is an 'interest-based' scholar 
(this is his own categorisation from Young, op. cit., in note 43, p. 341), for he says that from this 
perspective: 
the essential concern is to overcome the collective-action problems associated with all 
processes of interactive decision-making. Specific factors highlighted by this stream of 
analysis include: the extent to which negotiations lend themselves to integrative bargaining, 
the thickness of the veil of uncertainty, the impact of exogenous shocks or crises and the 
role of leadership in overcoming the collective-action problems plaguing efforts to form 
international institutions. 
Because of the importance that he places upon these elements in his own work, it seems proper 
to consider him as an individualistic theorist, while, nevertheless, bearing in mind his multi-
dimensional approach to the general question. 
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highlighted the importance of non-state actors -- be they epistemic communities, 
political elites or pressure groups -- that are made up of individuals acting across 
national boundaries. With greater global interdependence, a broadening of the 
analysis to include such players is surely welcome. 
Individualistic theorists also encourage the analyst to consider domestic 
politics as one of the determinants of international politics. Citing this as one of the 
most important reasons for their explicit endorsement of cognitive approaches, 
Haggard and Simmons maintain that it is vital to direct attention to domestic 
political processes, which, they argue, have been ignored in the past. Owing to 
greater global interdependence, they continue, 'groups at the domestic level 
increasingly have "regime interests". 127 Although the individualistic theorists have 
much more work to do as they examine the impact of domestic processes, 
Keohane's claim that they have overlooked domestic politics seems rather 
unfair. 128 Indeed, it appears that they have done more to permeate the realists' 
billiard-ball -- the dominant image in the international relations literature for much° 
of the post-Second World War period -- than the members of any other approach. 
A third strength of this approach is that its theories are dynamic. 
Recognising one of the weaknesses of his own preferred methodology, Keohane 
notes how the reflective writers have properly included an endogenous dynamic, 
which Alker calls 'historicity' and E. Haas calls learning'. 128 This addresses one 
of the major problems with the rationalistic, or state-centred, approach -- namely, 
that preferences are assumed to be fixed. With the accelerating rates of 
development in science and technology, an approach that is better able to handle 
changes in social institutions is most welcome. 
The potential contribution of such approaches is recognised by scholars 
who are not necessarily identified with this particular strand of thinking. Arthur 
Stein, for example, notes that changes 'in the nature of human understanding 
127 Haggard and Simmons, op. cit, in note 61, p. 517. 
128 Although Keohane's assertion that an analysis of domestic politics 'could lead to a fruitful 
reexamination of shifts in preferences that emerge from complex interactions between the operation 
of international institutions and the processes of domestic politics' (Keohane, op. cit., in note 72, pp. 
392-93) is welcome, his suggestion that both rationalistic and reflectivist writers are equally guilty 
of neglecting domestic politics overlooks the contribution that some reflective scholars have already 
made in this respect. 
129 Ibid., p. 390. 
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about how the world works, knowledge, can also transform state interests and 
therefore the prospects for international cooperation and regime formation'. 130 
 Even Stephen Krasner (although still defending the validity of his preferred global 
theories) accepts that the individualist theorists may have a contribution to make: 
Knowledge alone is never enough to explain either the creation or the 
functioning of a regime. Interests and power cannot be banished. But 
knowledge and understanding can affect regimes. If regimes matter, then 
cognitive understanding can matter as well. 1 1 
In general, it seems that this is, at present, the most 'fashionable' of the three 
approaches identified in this chapter. 
This popularity has, inevitably, led these scholars' ideas to be placed under 
greater scrutiny. Such an examination prompts one commentator to suggest that 
the approach has, at this stage, more to say about the weaknesses of other 
methods than the strengths of its own particular ideas: 
Reflective approaches are less well specified as theories: their advocates" 
have been more adept at pointing out what is omitted in rationalistic theory 
than in developing theories of their own with a prior content. Supporters of 
this research program need to develop testable theories, and to be explicit 
about their scope. 132 
More recently, Young suggests that the argument about epistemic communities 
'requires further elaboration and may not stand up in its strongest form...'. 133 
 Greater critical analysis will presumably take place as the concepts of this group's 
adherents are further developed and elaborated. 
The main ideas put forth by scholars of the individualistic approach are 
outlined in this section. Because of the vagueness of their theoretical propositions 
at this point, it is difficult to identify exactly what their requirements for international 
regime formation are. Nevertheless, these scholars' emphasis upon learning directs 
the analysis towards the manner in which individuals receive, process, interpret and 
adapt to new information. Their arguments further suggest that similarities in 
cognitive processes among key decision-makers will encourage the formation of 
130 Stein, op. cit., in note 42, p. 136. 
131 Stephen D. Krasner, 'Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables', 
in Krasner (ed.), op. cit., in note 1, p. 368. 
132 Keohane, op. cit., in note 72, p. 393. 
133 Young, op. cit., in note 43, p. 341. 
51 
international regimes. Despite the present vagueness of some of the ideas of the 
individualistic scholars, their central hypothesis can contribute to an overall 
understanding of international regime formation. For this reason, the ideas of these 
theorists are explored further in Chapter 1.3 of this thesis. 
1.3 -- The Framework for Analysis 
For each of the approaches to the study of international regime formation, the 
reviews are mixed. The question remains: Which of them should be used to 
investigate the historical records of the politics of both ozone layer depletion and 
global warming? The preceding analysis suggests that an unwavering commitment 
to any one of the three approaches could constrain our analysis and 
interpretations, thereby impeding our ability to gain the fullest picture possible. At 
the same time, however, the assessment also reveals that each of the approaches 
seems to capture at least one important aspect of the process of international 
regime formation. The merits and faults of each approach, therefore, encourage 
us to attempt to draw upon the strengths of each, while rejecting (or, ideally, 
redressing) its weaknesses. To this end, a model of international regime formation 
is presented in this section. It will then be used to study the politics of ozone layer 
depletion and global warming in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
There have been previous attempts by international relations writers to make 
use of more than one theory of international regime formation. Christer Jonsson, 
for one, explicitly uses a number of established theoretical ideas in his study of the 
creation, change and maintenance of the international aviation regime. 'Rather than 
relying on any one model, [Jonsson probes] the ability of several models to 
account for the observed regime dynamics.' 134 Although his different models 
have varying degrees of explanatory power, and although no single one is a 
panacea, each contributes to a better understanding of at least part of the whole 
story. 135 As Jonsson admits, the inspiration for this approach includes the 
comments of Keohane and Nye, who suggested 10 years earlier that: 
It would not be wise to develop a single amalgamated model; but under 
different conditions, different combinations of the models will provide the 
134 Jonsson, op. cit., in note 78, p. 152. 
135 Ibid., p. 158. 
52 
best explanations of international regime change and political 
outcomes. 136 
Young puts forth similar ideas. When discussing the various models of regimes 
(specifically, Krasner's groupings of conventional structuralists, modified 
structuralists and Grotians137), he argues that each approach has something to 
offer. 
Like competing models in other fields of inquiry (for example, the wave and 
particle theories of light), each captures some important features of reality 
but none offers a satisfactory account of the full range of observable 
phenomena. 138 
Therefore, the precedence of using more than one approach is, in this way, well 
established. 
Although inspired by such past efforts, the approach that I take in this work 
is significantly different from these other inquiries. The way in which most scholars 
have attempted to make use of more than one approach is outlined by Jonsson: • 
[P]olitical scientists, like dentists, need both a variety of tools and the 
discrimination to know which to use at the right time. While the contribution 
of this study has primarily been in adding to the multitude of tools, we are 
still a long way from understanding fully the conditions under which the 
different tools are most helpful. 138 
Remaining with Jonsson's dental analogy for the moment, it is evident that he 
imagines a variety of tools lying upon a table (building upon the ideas of Keohane 
and Nye, 14° he identifies four in his book), 141 from which it is little more than 
inspired guesswork to tell which will be the most appropriate for the patient under 
examination (that is, the question of regime creation, change and maintenance). 
In this study, alternatively, I propose that each of the various tools should always 
be used to , help explain why international regimes form in some issue-areas, but 
not in other issue-areas. While I accept the assertion that the different tools will be 
used to varying degrees, I reject the proposition that only certain tools can be used 
136 Keohane and Nye, op. cit., in note 9, p. 59. 
137 Krasner, op. cit., in note 5. 
138 Young, op. cit., in note 11, p. 213. 
139 Jonsson, op. cit., in note 78, p. 165. 
140 Keohane and Nye, op. cit., in note 9. 
141 Jonsson, op. cit., in note 78. 
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in particular instances. Thus, instead of attempting to spell out the conditions under 
which one or the other tool should be used, I attempt to incorporate them into one 
theoretical framework. 142 Accordingly, in order to describe fully the framework 
for analysis that is employed in this thesis, I will examine, in turn, both the form and 
the substance of the proposition. 
To outline the methodological form, let us move, metaphorically, from 
Jonsson's dentist office to the scientist's research laboratory, so that I may offer 
a simple chemistry analogy. The theoretical proposition about international regime 
formation, from which this thesis proceeds, is notationally presented as follows: 
k 
A + B + C 	>D 	(1) 
k o < [E] [F] [G] [H] 	(2) 
Although this schema may appear to have more to tell a student of chemistry than 
a student of international relations, it does, nevertheless, present a theoretical 
framework for the study of international regime formation. An explanation of the 
symbolic notation goes some way towards clarifying the assertion. 
The first statement (1) simply asserts that if A and B and C are present in 
combination, then they will fuse to form D. In this way, A, B and C can be 
considered to be preconditions for the formation of D. The rate at which D will be 
formed will be determined by the rate constant k, which, in turn, is described in the 
second statement (2). This relationship tells us that the value of k is directly 
proportional to the product of the concentrations of E, F, G and H. In this way, E, 
F, G and H can be considered to be catalysts for formation of D. The explanation, 
of course, remains incomplete as long as the representational letters continue to 
be undefined. 
As this suggests, the next task is to identify the individual components that 
make up the hypothesis -- in other words, to specify the substance of this 
142 Other scholars have used ideas from more than one approach. Aggarwal, for example, 
supplements his global explanations for regime change in the international politics of the textile trade 
with 'a consideration of domestic politics, transnational coalitions, and bureaucratic struggles' 
(Aggarwal, op. cit., in note 2, p. 14). See, also, in this respect, M.J. Peterson, Managing the Frozen 
South: The Creation and Evolution of the Antarctic Treaty System (London: University of California 
Press, 1988), p. 9. For the most part, however, it remains that 'little thought has been given so far 
to integrating ... different approaches' (Volker Rittberger and Michael Zurn, 'Regime Theory: Findings 
from the Study of "East-West Regimes"', Cooperation and Conflict (Vol. 26, No. 4, 1991), p. 167). 
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proposition. The proposed preconditions and catalysts for this reaction are inspired 
by the analysis of the three strands of thought on international regime formation 
that are described and scrutinised in Chapter 1.2 of this thesis. Working upon the 
assumption that the strengths of each approach should be culled and collected, 
each of the three has inspired, at least indirectly and often directly, at least one 
factor (either a precondition or a catalyst) for international regime formation. At this 
point, the various factors are simply presented, and no effort is made either to 
describe them more fully or to locate them within the broader theoretical heritage 
from which they originate. Each of these tasks is performed in the subsequent 
chapters of this thesis, where the individual factors are examined more closely. 
Thus, for now, it is sufficient to note the seven factors, which are outlined in Table 
1.1, and the composite model, which is presented notationally in Figure 1.1. 143 
 These seven factors thus form the foundation for this investigation into the politics 
of ozone layer depletion and global warming. 
TABLE 1.1 -- Components of a Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of 
International Regime Formation. 
Approach Precondition 	 Catalyst Product 
Global Global Equity S of the BIPS 
EPGs 
INTER- 
State-centred Tolerable Domestic 
Economic Costs NATIONAL 
Individ- Scientific Pol. Entrepre. REGIME 
ualistic Consensus EPGs 
Mob. of Publ. Opin. 
Note: S of the BIPS = Solidity of the Broader International Political System 
EPGs = Environmental Pressure Groups 
Pol. Entrepre. = Political Entrepreneurs 
Mob. of Publ. Opin. = Mobilisation of Public Opinion 
143 There is at least one fault with the analogy that is made. In the reaction that I am proposing, 
substances A, B and C will remain after the reaction has taken place -- that is, after D has formed. 
Therefore, for completeness, these substances should also be presented on the right-hand side of 
the equation. Leaving them off, however, although technically incorrect, improves the descriptive 
power of the analytical tool while not misrepresenting the substance of the argument. 
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FIGURE 1.1 -- Statement of a Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of 
International Regime Formation. 
Scientific Consensus + Tolerable Domestic Economic Costs + 
Global Equity -3—> International Regime 
k o < [Political Entrepreneurs] [Solidity of the International Political System] 
[Environmental Pressure Groups] [Mobilisation of Public Opinion] 
Thus, a tight framework is being advanced here: if the three preconditions 
are satisfied, then an international regime will form; further, if any of the four 
catalysts are present, then the rate at which an international regime is formed will 
be accelerated. There are, nevertheless, a number of problems with this approach. 
First, a sample size of two issues (ozone layer depletion and global warming) is 
rather small, and in no way statistically significant. Second, the exclusive focus 
upon seven variables means that we cannot be certain of the causal link between 
the claimed cause and effect. Finally, the sheer parsimony of this approach may 
well repulse some scholars. Young, for example, maintains that 
there are no necessary conditions for change in international regimes ... any 
of a variety of factors may be sufficient to precipitate major changes in 
prevailing social institutions in real-world situations. This may seem 
frustrating to those seeking to construct a parsimonious theory of stability 
and change in international regimes. 1" 
Additionally, Keohane argues that: 
This suggests that no general theory of international politics may be feasible. 
It makes sense to seek to develop cumulative verifiable knowledge, but we 
must understand that we can aspire only to formulate conditional, context-
specific generalizations rather than to discover universal laws, and that our 
understanding of world politics will always be incomplete. 145 
I would like to refute each of these three criticisms individually. 
First, although only two cases are examined in this thesis, other scholars 
could use the theoretical framework that is developed in order to increase the 
sample size. Indeed, as I argue in the Introduction of this thesis, although the 
issues of global atmospheric change are unprecedented, other conceptually-similar 
dilemmas exist in international relations. Thus, this model could be applied to 
144 Young, op. cit., in note 11, p. 206. 
145 Keohane, op. cit., in note 72, pp. 379-80. 
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empirical issues in other fields. (I return to this point in the Conclusion of this 
thesis.) In this way, a larger sample size might strengthen the significance of the 
theory. 
Second, although two 'successful' applications would not necessarily 'prove' 
the model, it remains that it could be falsified. Either D could form in the absence 
of A, B or C; or A, B and C could be present, but D could fail to form. True to 
Popperian tradition, therefore, it can be argued that any successful application of 
this theoretical framework constitutes a contribution to our knowledge about the 
process of international regime formation. 146 
Finally, in spite of the discreteness of the proposition presented, the model 
has much less well-defined boundaries and much greater overlap than might first 
be imagined. It should consequently simply be regarded as a framework for 
analysis, which we can use as a starting base for our investigation. Indeed, the 
identification of certain elements should not cause us to disregard other possible 
factors. In his own work, Aggarwal employs a comparable theoretical technique. ° 
Anticipating similar criticism, he comments: 
... rather than pursuing an inductive analysis and using questions to 
discover a potential causal pattern, I use the expectations generated from 
the theoretical ideas discussed earlier to investigate regime transformation. 
This method provides the first step in utilizing cases systematically."' 
Instead of viewing the framework as an immalleable structure, therefore, it should 
simply be considered to be an initial outline for the analysis of the international 
politics of ozone layer depletion and global warming. 
Although these various concerns do highlight possible problems with the 
approach that is employed in this work, it is likely that any scholarly technique 
would attract some objections from some corners. Nevertheless, I hope that the 
framework that is presented in this chapter is either suitably defended to allow the 
examination of the empirical evidence for each of the two issues under 
consideration to proceed, or suitably documented to allow others to challenge it 
and propose their own ideas. Continuing upon the assumption that the former is 
tenable, the theoretical framework is used to examine the politics of the ozone layer 
146 Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963). 
147 Aggarwal, op. cit., in note 2, p. 39. 
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depletion and global warming issues in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
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Chapter 2 -- Scientific Consensus 
In this chapter, the first hypothesised precondition for international regime 
formation is examined.' It is proposed that there must be a scientific consensus 
with regard to the issue under consideration before an international regime can 
possibly be formed. In order to support the inclusion of this factor as part of the 
overall framework, let us first ponder how any matter becomes 'political'. 
Generally, a particular activity will not be a concern for society's politicians 
unless someone has identified a consequence of that activity that may potentially 
lower the relative level of welfare of some individual in the society. Although one 
could imagine any number of activities that could create such deleterious 
outcomes, let us narrow the focus to consider problems of particular concern to 
our investigation -- namely, environmental ones. 2 Because of the nature of the 
environmental issue-area, the 'someone' who identifies the activity that decreases 
welfare will most likely be a member of the scientific community; while the 
damaging outcome arising from that activity will most likely be the harm caused by 
a changed natural environment. Subsequently, those that are worse off because 
of changes in parts of the Earth's physical environment will probably insist that they 
be compensated for the harm that they have incurred. This, therefore, gives rise 
to a number of questions -- for example: 'Should their claim be honoured?'; 'Who 
should pay?'; 'How much should be given?'; and 'What transfer mechanisms 
should be constructed?' The ways in which any society responds to these sorts 
of questions are, of course, what politics is all about. On many environmental 
issues, moreover, international arrangements -- or regimes -- would need to be 
formed in order to institutionalise the answers at which the members of 
international society arrive. For these reasons, then, it is suggested that the 
implications of scientific discoveries can have significant political dimensions. Some 
of these ideas are pursued in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. For the 
purposes of the discussion in this chapter, however, the most important aspect is 
the suggestion that decision-makers will have no reason to consider political action 
1 See Chapter 1.3 of this thesis. 
2 Compare the analysis developed here with Anthony Downs, `Up and Down with Ecology: The 
"Issue-Attention" Cycle', The Public Interest (No. 28, Summer 1972), pp. 38-50. 
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of any sort until scientists have directed attention to a cause-effect link on 
environmental issues. 3 
We should not, however, assume that scientists will be in agreement about 
the particulars of the cause-effect relationship under consideration. Indeed, we 
should recognise that there exists a myth about science, which leads many outside 
of the fellowship to believe that 'science' is a singular body of knowledge. Helga 
Nowotny describes the 'Ideal of Science': 
[Science offers] advice held to be clean from political considerations, free 
from values and mere opinions, from interests and control over its later 
applications. Science was disinterested and neutral, committed solely to its 
own impartial and context-independent conception of Truth. 4 
Similarly, Ernst Haas, Mary Pat Williams and Don Babai identify a commonly-held 
view: 'Politicians and lay publics disagree and argue over values. Scientists 
discover facts.' 5 The perceived objectivity and universality of the scientific method 
suggest that science should be outside the realm of intradisciplinary dissent and 
that scientific consensus should therefore be easily achievable. These views are, 
however, mistaken. Instead, it is increasingly being recognised that scientific 
consensus 'is the exception rather than the rule', 6 because agreement about a 
particular problem is not assured among members of a given scientific 
community.' 
Therefore, just because the actions of individual scientists have caused an 
3 In this way, science plays an important role in 'agenda setting by identifying and highlighting 
previously unknown and often cumulative problems arising from the human use of natural resources 
and environmental services whose solution requires the creation of suitable institutional 
arrangements' (Oran R. Young, 'Science and Social Institutions: Lessons for International Resource 
Regimes', in Steinar Andresen and Willy Ostreng (eds.), International Resource Management: The 
Role of Science and Politics (London: Belhaven, 1989), p. 10). In addition, it is accepted that 
environmental issues -- especially, local ones -- may also emerge upon political agendas because 
of the concern expressed by the particular individuals who are affected. This idea is pursued in 
Chapter 5.4 of this thesis. 
4 Helga Nowotny, 'A New Branch of Science, Inc.', in Harvey Brooks and Chester L Cooper 
(eds.), Science for Public Policy (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1987), p. 62. 
5 Ernst B. Haas, Mary Pat Williams and Don Babai, Scientists and World Order: The Uses of 
Technical Knowledge in International Organizations (London: University of California Press, 1977), 
p. 27. 
6  Steinar Andresen, 'Increased Public Attention: Communication and Polarization', in Andresen 
and Ostreng (eds.), op. cit., in note 3, p. 34. 
7 A number of factors can cause a diversity of views to persist among members of a scientific 
community. A few are proposed infra, in notes 28 and 82. 
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environmental issue to become 'political', there will not necessarily be consensus 
about its nature or significance among most scientists, still less among most 
politicians. Rather, if scientific nonconsensus endures, then politicians will find a 
variety of views emanating from different parts of the scientific community. Because 
different decision-makers will tend both to select different information and also to 
process that information in different ways, then it is probable that they will support 
many diverse policy positions. 8 This speculation suggests that scientific 
nonconsensus can give rise to political nonconsensus. To arrive at the first 
precondition for international regime formation, therefore, a corollary is proposed -
- namely, that scientific consensus is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition 
for international regime formation. 9 
This proposition is not without precedent in the literature of international 
relations, for many scholars have noted the role of knowledge (even if not 
specifically referring to 'scientific knowledge') in world affairs. 1° With regard to thp 
perception of the problem under investigation, Stephan Haggard and Beth 
Simmons argue that the 'degree of ideological consensus and agreement over 
causal relationships, regardless of the nature of the issue, is an important variable 
in explaining cooperation'. 11 Seyom Brown and others, in addition, contend that 
it must be agreed that the raw data being collected is accurate and that the 
analysis (that is, the method of interpretation) is acceptable to all parties in order 
8 See, for example, John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions 
of Political Analysis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974). 
9 Some of the inspiration for this precondition derives from the contributions of the individualistic 
theorists in the literature on international regime formation. For a discussion of their work, see 
Chapter 1.2.3 of this thesis. 
10 Arthur Stein, for example, maintains that the 'nature of knowledge ... determine[s] actor 
preferences and thus the prospects for regimes' (Arthur A. Stein, 'Coordination and Collaboration: 
Regimes in an Anarchic World', in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 136). More generally, others identify a number of ways in which 
science has affected society, and vice versa. See, for example, Edward T. Chase, 'Politics and 
Technology', in William R. Nelson (ed.), The Politics of Science: Readings in Science, Technology, 
and Government (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 435-49; and Margaret Gowing, 'An 
Old and Intimate Relationship', in Vernon Bogdanor (ed.), Science and Politics: The Herbert Spencer 
Lectures 1982 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 52-69. 
11 Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, 'Theories of International Regimes', International 
Organization (Vol. 41, No. 3, Summer 1987), p. 511. Emphasis in original. 
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to achieve a co-operative agreement. 12 Scholars specifically examining global 
atmospheric issues, meanwhile, have also put forth similar ideas. Per Bakken, for 
example, maintains that as 
a basis for any international environmental treaty there has to be a scientific 
cause-effect relationship. ... without agreement at least in influential parts of 
the scientific community, the chances of reaching international agreement 
are small. 13  
Furthermore, Peter Haas's proposition about the need for 'epistemic communities' 
has close links with the stated hypothesis. 14 These references suggest, therefore, 
that the foundation of this precondition is well-established. 
Thus, the primary purpose of this chapter is to explore the proposition that 
a scientific consensus is a precondition for the formation of international regimes 
on issues of global atmospheric change. 15 To achieve this aim, the chapter is 
divided into two main sections. In the first section, the emergence of a scientific 
consensus on the ozone layer depletion issue and the way in which it affected the 
political process are examined. The second section of this chapter presents a 
similar study of the history of the global warming issue in order to discover how the 
degree of consensus among scientists on that issue not only evolved but also 
influenced the political debate. By considering these matters, it is anticipated that 
our knowledge about the process of international regime formation on issues of 
global atmospheric change can be advanced. 
12 Seyom Brown et al, Regimes for the Ocean, Outer Space, and Weather (Washington, DC: The 
Brookings Institution, 1977), pp. 234-35. 
13 Per M. Bakken, 'Science and Politics in the Protection of the Ozone Layer', in Andresen and 
Ostreng (eds.), op. cit, in note 3, p. 198. 
14 See, for example, Peter M. Haas, 'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International 
Policy Coordination', International Organization (Vol. 46, No. 1, Winter 1992), pp. 1-35. 
15 ' Science' can be defined quite broadly as 'knowledge' (The Concise Oxford Dictionary). If one 
adopts this general definition, then it is clear that science plays an all-pervasive role, for actors' 
policy positions on issues of global atmospheric change are affected by a wide variety of scientific 
considerations. However, in order to focus upon some particular dilemmas posed by these 
environmental problems, 'science' will be somewhat more restrictively defined. More specifically, in 
this chapter, 'scientific knowledge' refers to the theories and data governing and describing the 
natural processes known as ozone layer depletion and global warming. Although the laws governing 
social activity (for example, economics) are also relevant to the issues of global atmospheric 
change, the unique importance of natural processes governed by relationships independent of 
human intervention means that the natural science deserves special investigation. 
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2.1 -- Scientific Consensus and Ozone Layer Depletion 
2.1.1 -- Discovery of the Ozone Layer 
Although ozone was first detected in 1840, 16 the first suggestions that the bulk 
of the ozone must be in the upper atmosphere rather than near ground level were 
not put forward until the latter part of the nineteenth century. 17 Speculation about 
the formation and destruction of ozone prompted Sydney Chapman, a British 
chemist, to investigate the substance. In 1930, he proposed that the amount of 
ozone present in the stratosphere was dictated only by the concentrations of 
atomic oxygen, molecular oxygen and ozone. 18 His work became the accepted 
foundation of this branch of atmospheric chemistry for many years. 19 
Following an investigation of new data collected after the International 
Geophysical Year (1957-58), 20 however, scientists discovered that other 
atmospheric trace gases also affect the ozone balance in the stratosphere. 21 By 
establishing that both hydrogen and nitrogen compounds could influence ozone 
levels, these scientists demonstrated that ordinary human activities could have 
deleterious impacts upon the natural environment. Thus, such suppositions 
launched the political debate about the ozone layer. 
16 The word "ozone" itself (from the Greek ozein, to smell) was introduced by Schoenbein in 
1840 to characterize a chemical species with a pronounced odor.' (Guy Brasseur, 'The Endangered 
Ozone Layer (A Century of Ozone Research)', Environment (Vol. 29, No. 1, January/February 1989), 
p. 8.) 
17 Between 1879 and 1881, 'W.N. Hartley and A. Cornu measured the ultraviolet radiation 
reaching the surface of the earth and found a sharp cutoff, which they correctly attributed to ozone' 
('The Ozone Layer and Homo Sapiens', EarthQuest (Fall 1991), p. 3). 
18 Sydney Chapman, 'The Theory of Upper Atmosphere Ozone', Memoirs of the Royal 
Meteorological Society (Vol. 3, No. 26, 1930), pp. 103-25. A list of all of Chapman's publications can 
be found in Syun-lchi Akasofu, Benson Fogler and Bernhard Haurwitz (eds.), Sydney Chapman, 
Eighty, from his friends (Sponsored by the University of Alaska, the University of Colorado and the 
University Corporation for Atmospheric Research, 1968). 
19 For a good summary of the early investigations into the ozone layer, see John Gribbin, The 
Ozone Layer', New Scientist (Vol. 68, 2 October 1975), pp. 12-14. 
20  At this time, a 'network of ground-based instruments for continuous monitoring of ozone using 
the technique pioneered by [G.M.B.] Dobson [during the 1920s] was established worldwide (the 
Dobson network)' ('The Ozone Layer and Homo Sapiens', op. cit., in note 17, p. 3). 
21 In 1966, Hampson suggested that significant stratospheric ozone reductions might be caused 
by water vapours. Crutzen (in 1970) and Johnston (in 1971) postulated that nitrogen oxides might 
deplete stratospheric ozone. For these references, see R. P. Turco et al, 'SSTs, Nitrogen Fertiliser 
and Stratospheric Ozone', Nature (Vol. 276, 21/28 December 1978), pp. 805-07. 
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2.1.2 -- The Supersonic Transport as a Threat to the Ozone Layer, 1970-1974 
This new scientific information was used by environmentalists (and others) in order 
to challenge the supersonic transport (SST) project that was being developed 
during the late 1960s. Among other environmental concerns (including sonic 
booms and noise pollution), 22 some claimed that the hydrogen and nitrogen 
compounds released by the airplanes while in flight could deplete the ozone layer. 
One estimate suggested that there could eventually be over one thousand SSTs 
in operation, 23 leading environmentalists to argue that the damage could be 
significant. Although at the time, most of the development of the SST was being 
undertaken by the Boeing Corporation in the US, the Soviets were also building a 
prototype (the Tupolev 144) and the French and the British were collaborating on 
the Concorde project. 
With the potential impact upon the ozone layer being highlighted by a 
number of individuals, pressure mounted upon formal, political institutions to initiate 
studies. Responding to a request by the US Department of Transport, the 
Department of Commerce Technical Advisory Board was set up in September 1970 
in order to investigate the scientific evidence for the likely environmental impact of 
the proposed SST fleet. Citing a need to come 'to grips with the scientific 
issues', 24 a workshop of experts in the field of stratospheric chemistry was 
convened in Boulder, Colorado on 18 and 19 March 1971. 25 
At this meeting, debate regarding the science of possible ozone layer 
depletion raged. James McDonald of the University of Arizona continued to be the 
most vocal proponent of the hypothesis that water vapour caused depletion of 
stratospheric ozone. He warned of the potential increase in cancer rates among 
the human population that such destruction could cause. 26 McDonald's views, 
22 For further information about the SST-environment debate, see Joel Primack and Frank Von 
Hippel, 'Scientists, Politics and SST: A Critical Review', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Vol. 28, No. 
4, April 1972), pp. 24-30; and Douglas Ross, The Concorde Compromise: The Politics of Decision-
Making', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Vol. 34, No. 3, March 1978), pp. 46-53. 
23 John Costello and Terry Hughes, Concorde: The International Race for a Supersonic 
Passenger Transport (London: Angus & Robertson, 1976), p. 144. 
24 Lydia Dotto and Harold Schiff, The Ozone War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 
1978), p. 45. 
25 John Gribbin, The Hole in the Sky: Man's Threat to the Ozone Layer (London: Corgi Books, 
1988), p. 31. 
26 Dotto and Schiff, op. cit., in note 24, pp. 47-48. 
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however, did not go unchallenged. Arnold Goldburg, chief scientist of Boeing's SST 
Division, vigorously questioned the theory. 
Goldburg became obsessed with recent measurements that indicated that 
ozone had been increasing in the atmosphere and that water-vapour levels 
had also been going up at the same time. This was not what the water-
vapour theory predicted would happen, and Goldburg clearly believed these 
data to constitute a virtual death blow to McDonald's ozone-depletion 
calculations. 27 
Although certain institutional pressures may have motivated Goldburg to argue his 
case with such zeal, 28 his attacks upon McDonald's arguments were, 
nonetheless, substantial. 
The hypothesis that nitrogen compounds caused depletion of the ozone 
layer also came under scrutiny at the Boulder meeting. Harold Johnston, a chemist 
at the University of California at Berkeley, had been one of the first to put forward 
the proposition, 29 and he unyieldingly pushed the case at this time. Johnston 
believed that the scientific community was too concerned with the, as he saw it, 
relatively less important question of the influence of water vapour. The real threat, 
Johnston argued, was from nitrous oxides. In 1971, he had calculated that if SSTs 
were allowed to operate, then there would be 'quite large ozone reductions --
average global reductions ranging from 3 to 23 per cent, with 50 per cent local 
reductions near zones of high SST traffic'. 3° Johnston also used the highly 
emotive issue of increased cancer rates and other health ailments to help illuminate 
27 Ibid., p. 48. 
28 The presence of non-scientific pressures may cause different scientists working in different 
organisations to hold dissimilar views. Ernst Haas argues that scientists are 'subject to personal and 
social constraints derived from the institutional pressures on their careers, which may result in 
deviations from stipulated norms of behavior in the production of knowledge' (Ernst B. Haas, When 
Knowledge Is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Oxford: University 
of California Press, 1990), p. 41). On the ozone layer depletion issue, scientific research was 
undertaken by governments, universities, environmental pressure groups, industrial and business 
interests and associations, along with a host of other organisations. If we accept the proposition that 
'in the day-to-day practice[, scientists] are also preoccupied with the bureaucratic imperatives of 
assuring the continuity of their work with mandates, projects, personnel, and budgets' (Haas, 
Williams and Babai, op. cit., in note 5, p. 41.), then we should acknowledge that different groups 
may arrive at different scientific conclusions simply because they work in different institutions. In this 
way, scientific nonconsensus may arise out of the need for organisations to defend their particular 
interests. 
29 Op. cit., in note 21. 
30 Dotto and Schiff, op. cit., in note 24, p. 64. 
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the consequences of a depleted ozone layer. 31 Just as the water-vapour thesis 
had come under attack, however, some participants had reservations about the 
nitrous oxide hypothesis, and no consensus about the causes and consequences 
of ozone layer depletion could be reached at this workshop. 
Details of the meeting and enduring scientific disagreement had a revealing 
impact upon the political process. Lydia Dotto and Harold Schiff note that: 
news of the heated debate in Boulder had rapidly reached the ears of John 
Ehrlichman -- then the top domestic adviser to [US President] Nixon -- who 
was reported to have said that if these scientists couldn't agree with one 
another, the White House wouldn't pay any attention to any of them. This 
was later confirmed publicly by Hubert Heffner, former deputy director of the 
White House's Office of Science and Technology. In a speech, Heffner 
suggested that when scientists reach opposite conclusions based on the 
same evidence, the public and government officials tend to disregard their 
views on political issues. He is quoted as saying that such lack of public 
confidence enabled Ehrlichman to dismiss Johnston's calculations by 
saying, 'No one believes scientists anyway.' 32 
These comments suggest that, in this case, nonconsensus within the scientific 
community lessened the political influence of its members. 
Nevertheless, in light of projected environmental impacts of such 
significance, the US Government decided to investigate further the possible 
dangers of SST flights, and Congress ordered a report in 1971. 33 This report, 
initiated by the US Department of Transport and undertaken by the Climate Impact 
Assessment Program (CTAP), involved 1000 individuals from 10 countries 34 and 
cost US$40 million. 36 The final report, which was the most thorough study of the 
SST-ozone layer relationship ever undertaken, was completed in 1974. 36 
31 Ibid., p. 65. 
32 Ibid., p. 61. 
33 Johnston believes that without the attention drawn to the issue by himself and other scientists, 
politicians would not have pursued the issue. He stated that: 'The [Department of Transport] said 
they had planned even back in 1970 to make a study but Congress turned them down in 1970 and 
probably would have turned them down again in 1971.' (Quoted in: ibid., p. 67.) 
34 Ibid., p. 67. 
35 Nicholas Valery, 'SSTs are Clean -- In Small Numbers', New Scientist (Vol. 68, 2 October 
1975) pp. 19-21. 
36 Climate Impact Assessment Program, Report of Findings. The Effects of Stratospheric 
Pollution by Aircraft (Washington, DC: US Department of Transport, DOT-TST-75-50, 1974). See, 
also, Climate Impact Committee, 'Environmental Impact of Stratospheric Flight: Biological and 
Climate Effects of Aircraft Emissions in the Stratosphere', (Washington, DC: National Academy of 
Sciences, 1975). This committee was formed in 1972 to 'advise the [Department of Transportation] 
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In response to the concerns that had prompted the investigation in 1971, the 
final report concluded that a 500-plane fleet of Boeing SSTs would have caused a 
16 per cent depletion of stratospheric ozone in the northern hemisphere and an 8 
per cent depletion in the southern hemisphere. 37 It validated the hypothesis that 
Johnston had put forward about nitrous oxide, although the Berkeley chemist had 
projected greater depletion. Since the 1971 report had been commissioned, 
however, circumstances had changed. Most significantly, Boeing's SST programme 
had been discontinued. 38 Therefore, in order to try to retain some relevancy for 
their investigations, the CIAP's members also put forth their estimates for a smaller 
fleet of SSTs. The researchers concluded that 125 SSTs would have to be in 
operation before any ozone depletion would be detectable. 39 
The use of two scenarios -- large-fleets and small-fleets -- generated some 
confusion. Because the report seemed to be noting that a small fleet was 
environmentally acceptable, while only a larger fleet would be damaging, it offered, 
some support for a variety of scientific views. To add to the confusion, the manner 
in which the CTAP report was packaged ensured that the ozone layer-environment 
nail was not driven deeply into the coffin of the SST project. More specifically, 
although the 7,200 pages of the report presented a comprehensive overview of the 
issue, the 27 page executive summary did not, many scientists believed, accurately 
represent the committee's findings, for it only made oblique references to the 
harmful consequences of projected ozone layer depletion. 4° Many journalists, 
therefore, concluded that the SSTs were 'cleared'!" It was noted at the time that: 
The result has been, temporarily at least, to publicly discredit those 
scientists who initially raised a quite justified concern about SSTs and to 
raise a credibility gap in regard to the still more serious threat of ozone 
on CTAP' (ibid., p. iv). 
37 Cited in F.S. Rowland, 'Possible Influences of Human Activities on Stratospheric Ozone', WMO 
Bulletin (Vol. 25, No. 2, April 1976), p. 82. 
aa The US Senate, in May 1971, had cancelled the plan. Not only was the environmental impact 
of its operation being questioned, but the SST's economic non-viability also played a major role in 
the final decision (Andrew Wilson, The Concorde Fiasco (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), p. 85). 
39 Cited in: Colin Norman, 'SSTs: It's an III Wind...', Nature (Vol. 253, 31 January 1975), pp. 298- 
99. 
40 Allen J. Grobecker, 'The SST and Ozone Depletion (Letters)', Science (Vol. 187, 28 March 
1975), pp. 1144-45. 
41 The headline in The Washington Post on 22 January 1975 was 'SST Is Cleared on Ozone'. 
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depletion by halocarbons and other chemicals. 42 
Comments like these suggest that, in 1974, an assortment of scientific views about 
the causes and consequences of ozone layer depletion by SSTs was still credible 
among members of both the scientific and the political communities. Consequently, 
the first hypothesised precondition for international regime formation was not 
satisfied at this time. 
The SST question, however, fell down the political agenda. Not only was the 
American undertaking cancelled, but so too was the Soviet one. Additionally, the 
Concorde project was significantly scaled back, primarily because of its commercial 
nonviability. (There have never been more than 14 Concordes in operation.) 
Thus, the scientific debate about SST-induced ozone layer depletion became 
largely theoretical and, as such, a matter primarily for scientists once again. 
2.1.3 -- Other Recognised Anthropogenic Threats to the Ozone Layer Before 
1974 
During the early 1970s, individuals identified other threats to the ozone layer that 
could be potentially significant. One was the effects of nuclear explosions. 44 This 
issue would have received greater attention if international agreements to restrict 
above-ground nuclear tests had not been concluded during the 1960s. In 1976, it 
was noted that the 'effects of nuclear bomb tests around 1960 on ozone are only 
marginally detectable'. 45 With Test-Ban treaties being respected by the United 
States and the Soviet Union, the level of the harmful activity had decreased, and, 
thus, there was less reason for the issue to develop politically. 
At this time, fertilisers were also identified as a possible threat to 
stratospheric ozone. Because their use in agriculture causes nitrogen compounds 
to be released, some individuals were suggesting that they could be a potentially 
42 Allen L. Hammond, 'Public Credibility on Ozone', Science (Vol. 187, 28 March 1975), p. 1182. 
43 See, for example, Keith Hayward, The British Aircraft Industry (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1989), p. 106; and British Airways official, London, personal communication, 1 April 
1992. 
44 See, for example, National Academy of Sciences, Long-Term World-Wide Effects of Multiple 
Nuclear-Weapons Detonations (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1975), cited in 
Rowland, op. cit., in note 37, p. 82. 
45 Noted in CTAP, op. cit., in note 36. 
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significant cause of ozone layer depletion. 46 Their likely impact was still, however, 
a matter of much debate, and the fertiliser-ozone layer link did not substantially 
impact the political agenda. 
During the early 1970s, the proposition that chlorine could be a cause of 
ozone layer depletion was also forwarded. A potentially large source of chlorine 
was the hydrogen chloride that would be discharged from the engines of the space 
shuttles that were being developed by the United States National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) at this time. The first significant elaboration of this 
hypothesis was offered at a scientific gathering in Kyoto, Japan on 10-12 
September 1973, when Richard Stolarski and Ralph Cicerone, two scientists from 
the University of Michigan, presented the findings from their research. Responding 
both to pressure from outside the academic community (in particular, NASA47) 
and to their own uncertainties (neither were 'true' atmospheric chemists -- the 
former had trained in physics, the latter in electrical engineering 48), however, they 
did not mention the space shuttle, but instead framed their ideas within a broader 
discussion about the impact of volcanic eruptions (which are the most significant 
natural sources of chlorine). Because no one was expecting a meaningful increase 
in the incidence of volcanic eruptions, many considered their suggestions to be 
curious, at best. Nevertheless, others did recognise the significance of their 
remarks, and in the report of the proceedings of the conference, two papers 
examined the potential role of chlorine in the destruction of stratospheric ozone. 49 
 Although the hypothesis had potentially explosive political implications, 
NASA's adept ability in public relations, 5° coupled with the fact that shuttles were 
46 See Deborah Shapley, 'Will Fertilisers Harm Ozone As Much As SSTs?', Science (Vol. 195, 
18 February 1977), p. 658; Harold Johnston, 'The Fertiliser-Ozone Connection', Science (Vol. 195, 
18 March 1977), p. 1280; and 'WMO Statement on Modification of the Ozone Layer Due to Man's 
Activities and Some Possible Geophysical Consequences', WMO Bulletin (Vol. 25, No. 1, January 
1976), p. 61. 
47 NASA became involved in much of the research into this hypothesis during 1972 and 1973, 
because the Agency wanted to avoid the same sort of politics that had helped to kill the SST project 
(Gribbin, op. cit., in note 25, pp. 34-38). 
48 Dotto and Schiff, op. cit., in note 24, p. 125. 
49 H.I. Schiff (ed.), Special Issue of Canadian Journal of Chemistry on 'Aeronomy of the 
Stratosphere and Mesosphere' (Vol. 52, No. 8, Part 2, 15 April 1974), pp. 1381-1634. The papers are 
by Steve C. Wofsy and Michael B. McElroy of Harvard University ('HOR, NOR, and CIOR: Their Role 
in Atmospheric Chemistry', pp. 1582-91); and R.S. Stolarski and R.J. Cicerone ('Stratospheric 
Chlorine: A Possible Sink for Ozone', pp. 1610-15). 
50 	. 	. Gribbin, op. cit., in note 25, p. 38. 
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not expected to be used extensively (like had been initially envisioned for the 
SSTs), effectively thwarted the issue's emergence upon the political agenda. 51 
 Thus, the 
chlorine issue was dropped. Other than volcanic emissions and exhaust 
produced by the space shuttle, which wasn't even built yet, there was no 
other known source of free chlorine in the stratosphere. 52 
Once again, without any scientific estimates of the harmful consequences of any 
everyday human activities, the ozone layer question did not take on significant 
political dimensions. Nevertheless, the space shuttle issue is notable, because it 
marked the first time that the issue of chlorine was raised during the ozone layer 
depletion discussions. In this way, it helped to set the stage for the ensuing debate. 
2.1.4 -- Initial Propositions Identifying Chlorofluorocarbons as a Threat to the 
Ozone Layer, 1974-1979 
The scientific debate about the ozone layer entered new territory after the 1974 
publication of a paper in the scientific journal Nature. 53 In this paper, Mario Molina 
and Sherry Rowland, two scientists at the University of California at Irvine, 
hypothesised that the chlorine found in chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) had the 
potential to destroy substantial amounts of stratospheric ozone. With this 
supposition, the international political debate about the ozone layer was also 
launched into a new dimension. 
Because of the potentially significant consequences for international society 
of Molina and Rowland's initial calculations, 54 there was a demand for high-quality 
51 By 1977, NASA had gathered sufficient evidence to conclude that the effect upon the ozone 
layer of 60 shuttle launches a year would be negligible (NASA, Chlorofluoromethanes and the 
Stratosphere (Greenbelt, MD: NASA Reference Publication 1010, 1977)). This conclusion was 
independently supported by the US National Academy of Science (Gribbin, op. cit., in note 25, p. 
37). 
52 Sharon L. Roan, Ozone Crisis: The 15 Year Evolution of a Sudden Global Emergency 
(Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1989), p. 18. 
53  Mario J. Molina and F. S. Rowland, 'Stratospheric Sink for Chlorofluoromethanes: Chlorine 
Atom-catalysed Destruction of Ozone', Nature (Vol. 249, 28 June 1974), pp. 810-12. 
54 
 ' Itseems quite clear that the atmosphere has only a finite capacity for absorbing [chlorine] 
atoms produced in the stratosphere, and that important consequences may result. This capacity is 
probably not sufficient in steady state even for the present role of introduction of 
chlorofluoromethanes.' (Ibid., p. 812.) At this time, substantial quantities of CFCs were being 
discharged into the atmosphere by many everyday activities -- including aerosol spray cans, 
solvents, refrigeration and foam manufacturing. See Chapter 3.1 of this thesis for a fuller discussion. 
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scientific information. Despite the substantial research that had been undertaken 
on the SST issue, however, Dotto and Schiff note that the stratosphere was still 
'dubbed the "ignorosphere" because aeronomers had paid so little attention to it 
in the past'. 55 There was a lack of data describing this part of the Earth's 
atmosphere, and thus the Molina/Rowland hypothesis was based only upon 
theoretical assumptions and limited laboratory observations. This prompted many 
scientists to adopt divergent positions about the validity of the two chemists' 
work. 58 
The first major investigation into the CFC 57 theory was ordered by the US 
government in January 1975, and a report was released in June 1975. 58 The 
report noted that: 'Thus far, the validity of the theory and the predicted amounts 
of ozone reduction have not been seriously challenged. More research is required 
... but there seems to be legitimate cause for serious concern.' 58 This report also 
placed particular emphasis upon another study that was being carried out by the 
US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) at this time. (The NAS was a private, 
nonprofit society, which was mandated to advise the US federal government on 
scientific and technical matters.) That study, convened under the Academy's 
'Climatic Impact Committee' (later renamed the 'Committee on Impacts of 
Stratospheric Change') had been initiated in April 1975 and was due to be 
completed in 1976. Anticipation of its publication was high, and 'it is certainly true 
that [the NAS] essentially became the scientific Supreme Court in the case of the 
fluorocarbon debate'.8° 
The much-awaited NAS report was finally released in September 1976. Its 
conclusions were somewhat unclear, for it confirmed the hypothesis (it predicted 
55 Dotto and Schiff, op. cit., in note 24, p. 206. Also, interview with Peter Usher, Co-ordinator, 
Global Environmental Monitoring Service (Atmosphere), United Nations Environment Programme, 
Nairobi, Kenya. 
56 For a sceptical view at the time, see R.S. Scorer, 'Freon in the Stratosphere (Letters)', New 
Scientist (Vol. 64, 10 October 1974), p. 140. 
57 At this time, the terms 'fluorocarbons' (FCs) or `chlorofluoromethanes' (CFMs) were also being 
used for CFCs. 
58 Report of Federal Task Force on Inadvertent Modification of the Atmosphere (IMOS), 
Fluorocarbons and the Environment (Washington, DC: Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and 
the Federal Council on Science and Technology (FCST), June 1975), p. 
59 Quoted in Constance Holden, 'Federal Task Force Supplies Fuel for Fluorocarbon Debate', 
Science (Vol. 188, 27 June 1975), p. 1286. 
so Dotto and Schiff, op. cit., in note 24, p. 198. 
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an eventual 2 to 20 per cent depletion of stratospheric ozone, with a most likely 
depletion level between 6 and 7.5 per cent), but it did not recommend any 
immediate ban upon the use of CFCs.61 Rather, its members simply asserted that 
`selective regulation of CFM uses and release is almost certain to be necessary at 
some time and to some degree of completeness'. 62 Effectively reflecting this 
ambiguity, two major American newspapers reported the National Academy's study 
differently. The headline in the New York Times was 'Scientists Back New Aerosol 
Curbs to Protect Ozone in Atmosphere', while the Washington Post's headline was 
'Aerosol Ban Opposed by Science Unit'. 63 One fact that was clear, however, was 
that the Report had found nothing to disprove the original hypothesis. Thus, its 
findings ensured that ozone layer depletion remained a political issue of some 
importance in the United States." 
In November 1979, a second report was published by the NAS in the United 
States. It highlighted the potential significance of the CFC-ozone link, estimating 
eventual ozone layer depletion at 16.5 per cent. 66 This report from the Academy 
further argued that a 'wait-and-see' approach was not advised, and it encouraged 
the United States both to foster and to lead international efforts to protect the 
ozone layer. In this way, its findings suggested that the issue should be addressed 
by politicians with some degree of urgency. 
Although the NAS reports were essentially endorsing the CFC theory and 
suggesting that the issue should be considered seriously, scientific consensus 
within the US was still absent at this time. Scientists employed by the major CFC 
producers were the most vocal individuals in opposition. Although their interest in 
challenging the Molina/Rowland hypothesis is self-evident, the strength of some 
61 Committee on Impacts of Stratospheric Change, Halocarbons: Environmental Effects of 
Chlorofluoromethane Release (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1976). 
62 Noted in Peter Gwynne, 'Aerosols Lost in the Ozone', New Scientist (Vol. 71, 23 September 
1976), p. 627. Emphasis added. 
63 Both newspapers were from 14 September 1976 (noted in Dotto and Schiff, op. cit., in note 
24, p. 262). 
64 Indeed, the findings did contribute to the 1978 US decision to implement a ban upon the use 
of CFCs in non-essential aerosols. See Chapter 3.1.1 of this thesis for a further discussion. 
65 Panel on Stratospheric Chemistry and Transport, Stratospheric Ozone Depletion by 
Halocarbons: Chemistry and Transport (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1979). See, 
also, `US Scientists Double Estimates of Ozone Depletion Rate', Nature (Vol. 282, 15 November 
1979), p. 220. 
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of their assertions was not in doubt. 66 For example, in 
a 1979 statement, Du Pont officials stated: 'No ozone depletion has ever 
been detected despite the most sophisticated analysis ... All ozone-depletion 
figures to date are computer projects based on a series of uncertain 
assumptions.' 67 
These weaknesses in the scientific case that were highlighted by industry's 
representatives were unassailable at this time. 
Further, the significance of substantial eventual ozone depletion was not 
being stressed as strongly throughout the rest of the world during the late 1970s. 
Although most of the scientific investigations into the problem were being 
conducted in the United States, 68 some research was being carried out in other 
locations, with the most substantial being in Europe in genera169 and in the United 
Kingdom in particular. 7° A review of the British studies on ozone layer depletion 
from this time suggests that the degree of nonconsensus, worldwide, was even 
greater than the degree of nonconsensus within the United States. 
Although scientific reports emanating from various British groups were 
drawing attention to potential stratospheric ozone depletion, such possible 
developments were considered to be highly uncertain and, even if true, not of great 
consequence. A report released by the UK government in late April 1976, for 
example, foresaw a potential 8 per cent depletion of stratospheric ozone in 100 
years; yet it did not view this potentiality as significant. 71 Another British report 
was even more dismissive of the entire CFC-ozone issue. The Environment 
Secretary's Clean Air Council (an advisory body) found the evidence linking CFCs 
and ozone depletion to be tenuous and inconclusive and therefore recommended 
66 For a fuller discussion of the role of industry in this debate, see Chapter 3.1 of this thesis. 
67 Roan, op. cit., in note 52, p. 96. 
era Peter Haas notes that 80 to 90 per cent of all atmospheric science is conducted in the United 
States (Peter M. Haas, 'Obtaining International Environmental Protection through Epistemic 
Consensus', Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1990), p. 356). Also, 
interview with Usher, op. cit., in note 55. 
69 See, for example, Commission of the European Communities, Evaluation of the Effects of 
Chlorofluorocarbons on Atmospheric Ozone: Present Status of Research (Brussels: European 
Economic Community, 1981). 
70 Interview with Usher, op. cit., in note 55. 
71 Department of the Environment, Central Unit on Environmental Pollution, Chlorofluorocarbons 
and their Effect on Stratospheric Ozone (London: HMSO, Pollution Paper No. 5, 1976). See, also, 
`The Official View on CFCs and the Ozone Layer', New Scientist (Vol. 70, 29 April 1976), p. 213. 
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the continuation of the British Government's 'wait and see' approach. 72 In a 
remark that is oft-cited, the UK Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution's 
Chairman, Prof. Hans Kornberg, said that although the CFC-ozone link 
... may give rise to concern, there is certainly no need for panic. ... We feel 
that, even if production were to continue at the present rate, the evidence 
suggests that, at worst, over the next ten years the decrease in the ozone 
layer would result in an increase in ultraviolet radiation of biologically harmful 
wavelengths which would roughly correspond to moving from the North of 
Scotland to the South of England. 73 
In 1979, additionally, the British government published a follow-up report, which 
suggested that basic scientific understanding, 'although progressing rapidly, is still 
inadequate in many respects'. 74 As this suggests, reports from the UK 
government were, at this time, highlighting the need for more research, rather than 
action. 
This view was echoed by representatives of industry. 'Fluorostrat '78', a 
conference organised by the Society of Chemical Industry, was held in Brighton in 
October 1978. Speakers at this meeting argued that improvements in almost every 
aspect of the scientific investigations, which encompassed both theoretical and 
empirical considerations, were needed in order to reduce the numerous 
uncertainties about the science of the ozone layer that remained. 75 
Similarly, there was no sense of urgency prevalent among members of the 
British independent scientific community at this time, for they too felt that much 
more research needed to be done in order to resolve the many uncertainties. In 
1978, James Lovelock, arguably Britain's foremost scientist in this field, 76 
 maintained that `no one can be sure which if any of the reported analyses of 
72 'Aerosols Can Continue', New Scientist (Vol. 75, 15 September 1977), p. 655. 
73 Quoted in 'Mixed Response to Aerosol Propellants', New Scientist (Vol. 76, 15 December 
1977), p. 685. Emphasis added. 
74 Department of the Environment, Central Directorate on Environmental Protection, 
Chlorofluorocarbons and their Effect on Stratospheric Ozone (Second Report) (London: HMSO, 
Pollution Paper No. 15, 1979), p. 209. 
75 A Threat from Fluorocarbons?', Nature (Vol. 276, 16 November 1978), pp. 215-16. 
76 Lovelock had, in 1971, been the first person to detect CFCs in the atmosphere, 'using a new 
measurement technique he had developed' (Environment Directorate, Fluorocarbons: An 
Assessment of Worldwide Production, Use and Environmental Issues (First Interim Report) (Paris: 
OECD, 1976), p. 6, note 1). 
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atmospheric concentrations in the published literature are correct'. 77 These 
observations thus suggest that British government, industry and independent 
science were in agreement that, although the ozone layer depletion issue was 
worthy of more research, many significant uncertainties precluded any accurate 
predictions. 78 We can speculate that they would have agreed with a writer from 
the British journal New Scientist who, in 1979, argued that: 'On balance, the 
evidence that is now available suggests that nothing mankind is now doing will 
have a disastrous effect on the ozone layer 
Thus, by the end of the 1970s, no worldwide scientific consensus on ozone 
layer depletion was in existence. Instead, the situation was such that: 
Regulatory agencies in [countries other than the United States] continue to 
accept the industry position that there remains major uncertainties in a 
number of key assumptions in the theory, [and] that there have been some 
discrepancies between measured concentrations of reactants in the 
stratosphere and calculated values ... 8° 
In turn, this scientific nonconsensus affected the international political negotiations. 
In December 1978 in Munich, for example, representatives from 14 countries met 
to discuss the possibilities of internationally regulating CFCs. One account of that 
meeting reports that: 
In particular, the British and French representatives referred to 'new 
developments' not yet reported in the scientific literature and given little 
credence at [a meeting of technical experts the previous week in Bonn] ... 
If European scientists had been more closely involved in assessment of 
fluorocarbon risks since 1974 Britain and France might not have felt so free 
to disregard the scientific consensus. 81 
Quoted in John Gribbin, 'Ozone Passion Cooled by the Breath of Sweet Reason', New 
Scientist (Vol. 80, 12 October 1978), p. 94. See, also, Michael Allaby and J.E. Lovelock, 'Controversy 
Buried (Letters)', Nature (Vol. 285, 26 June 1980), p. 610. 
78 Warr argues that there was 'an attitude prevalent among British scientists that the US was 
overreacting in the urgency of its response' (Kiki Warr, 'Ozone: The Burden of Proof', New Scientist 
(Vol. 128, 27 October 1990), p. 37). 
79 John Gribbin, 'Disappearing Threat to Ozone', New Scientist (Vol. 81, 15 February 1979), p. 
474. Maugh notes that governmental attitudes around the world at this time generally suggested that 
'present understanding of ozone depletion is limited and based on model assumptions which have 
not been adequately identified' (Thomas H. Maugh II, 'Ozone Depletion Would Have Dire Effects', 
Science (Vol. 207, 25 January 1980), pp. 395). 
so Thomas H. Maugh II, 'The Threat to Ozone Is Real, Increasing', Science (Vol. 206, 7 
December 1979), p. 1167. 
81 Thomas Stoel, 'Fluorocarbons as a Global Environmental Case Study', New Scientist (Vol. 81, 
18 January 1979), pp. 166-67. 
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These observations appear to strengthen our original hypothesis -- namely, that 
different scientific views may give rise to divergent political positions among states' 
representatives.82 
Therefore, at the turn of the decade, there were many different views about 
the science of the CFC-ozone link evident in international society. 83 Although it 
82 Just as nonconsensus can arise from the fact that different scientists come from different 
institutions (op. cit., in note 28), nonconsensus can also stem from the fact that different scientists 
come from different countries. Indeed, Ernst Haas recognises that scientific terms may be contested, 
because they are embodied in specific (mainly Western) cultures and because each particular 
society 'decodes' them in a different way (Haas, op. cit., in note 28, p. 47). A different idea, yet on 
a similar plane, comes from Brian Wynne, who notes that different political cultures place science 
and scientists in different institutional roles (Brian Wynne, 'Uncertainty -- Technical and Social', in 
Brooks and Cooper (eds.), op. cit., in note 4, p. 106). Indeed, in different states, scientists may pose 
different questions, employ different 'methods' and undertake different data search patterns, which 
may well lead to divergent scientific conclusions. This may hinder the chances for political co-
operation, particularly if decision-makers base their decisions upon the advice of their 'own' 
scientists. This may often be the case, for Helge- Ole Bergesen notes that: 'All too often we have 
seen in the area of resource management that scientific results produced by institutions in one 
particular country involved in the political process are not recognised as valid by other countries.' 
(Helge Ole Bergesen, 'The Credibility of Science in International Resource Management', in Andresbn 
and Ostreng (eds.), op. cit., in note 3, p. 126.) Peter Haas arrives at a similar conclusion -- looking 
explicitly at the differences between the North and the South in this regard (Peter M. Haas, Saving 
the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1990), p. 209). Thus, nationalism may have some role to play in the persistence 
of nonconsensus within the scientific community. 
In light of this concentration upon the drive for a 'scientific consensus', we should not 
overlook the fact that 'knowledge is power' in international society and thus information should be 
regarded as a `significant systemic variable in world politics' (Haas, op. cit., in note 28; and Robert 
0. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 245). In other words, we should not fall into the trap of 
assuming that a scientific consensus, once achieved, is either 'correct' or `good'; we should keep 
in mind the fact that the evolution of any scientific consensus may be manipulated by a hegemonic 
power in order to further its own goals (in either a Gramscian interpretation of 'hegemony', whereby 
the language, ideas and other cultural elements are the key variables; or the more-popular (at least 
in international relations) sense of hegemony as military power, as discussed in Chapter 1.2.1 of this 
thesis). Although this issue is not pursued to a significant degree in this work, it could, nevertheless, 
have importance. (See, also, the Conclusions of this thesis.) 
ss 	. 	. Scientific research was not, however, just being undertaken under 'national' auspices at this 
time. The World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the International Council of Scientific 
Unions (ICSU) had been concerned with ozone for a number of years. (See, for example, WMO, 
'Atmospheric Ozone -- A Survey of the Current State of Knowledge of the Ozone Layer', in Asit K. 
Biswas (ed.), The Ozone Layer, (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1979), pp. 75-76.) The possibility of 
stratospheric ozone depletion was not, however, upon their agendas before 1975. At the WMO's 
Seventh Congress, in May 1975, it was agreed that 'there was an urgent need for more studies (and 
for a definite review of these studies) to determine the extent to which man-made pollutants might 
be responsible for reducing the quantity of ozone in the stratosphere' (ibid. p. 76). In addition, the 
WMO issued its first statement on the issue (which called for more data collection and research) in 
September 1975 ('WMO Statement on Modification of the Ozone Layer ...', op. cit., in note 46, pp. 
59-63). The primary component of the WMO's efforts on the issue was the Global Ozone Research 
and Monitoring Project, which was established in 1976 to investigate further the science of the issue, 
with an emphasis upon monitoring and data collection (Research and Development', WMO Bulletin 
(Vol. 25, No. 4, October 1975), p. 247). The other important international body operating at the end 
of the 1970s was the 'Co-ordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer' (CCOL). Created after an 
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was an issue on the agendas of a number of states (because their leaders 
recognised that the depletion of stratospheric ozone had the potential to decrease 
levels of human welfare) and although discussions were taking place at the 
international level, the emphasis was placed primarily upon the need for more 
scientific investigations.84 In this way, the hypothesised precondition for 
international regime formation remained unsatisfied at the end of the 1970s. 
2.1.5 -- Diminishing Concern Regarding Chlorofluorocarbons as a Threat to 
the Ozone Layer, 1980-1985 
As improvements in both the theoretical modelling and the data collection process 
occurred during the late 1970s and early 1980s, 86 scientists were able to improve 
their estimates of future ozone levels. 86 As a consequence, the predictions for 
eventual ozone depletion were constantly.being revised during the early 1980s. The 
estimates, however, were being revised downwards. Table 2.1 presents a 
longitudinal comparison of the predictions of the two most important scientific 
bodies -- the CCOL and the US NAS 87 -- in which the downward trend is clearly 
evident. 
international conference in Washington, DC in 1977, it met for the first time in Geneva in November 
1977 (UNEP Report to Governments (No. 10, September/October 1977)). While it was recognised 
that the WMO would conduct most of the 'science', the CCOL was expected to co-ordinate that 
effort at the international level. 
See, for example, the opening paragraphs of the World Plan of Action agreed at the 1977 
Washington conference, where delegates emphasised the need for an 'intensive and well 
coordinated monitoring and research programme' (reprinted in Biswas (ed.), op. cit., in note 83, p. 
377). For information about both the theoretical and the empirical uncertainties at this time, see, for 
example: Michael A.A. Clyne, 'Destruction of Stratospheric Ozone?', Nature (Vol. 263, 28 October 
1976), pp. 723-26; Allen L Hammond and Thomas H. Maugh II, 'Stratospheric Pollution: Multiple 
Threats to Earth's Ozone', Science (Vol. 186, 25 October 1974), pp. 335-38; and Thomas H. Maugh 
II, 'The Ozone Layer: The Threat from Aerosol Cans is Real', Science (Vol. 194, 8 October 1976), 
pp. 170-72. 
as For information about advances in the theoretical modelling at this time, see: J.A. Pyle, 'A 
Simple Calculation of Ozone Depletion by Chlorofluoromethanes Using a Two-Dimensional Model', 
Nature (Vol. 271, 5 January 1978), pp. 42-43; and H.I. Schiff, 'Ups and Downs in Ozone Prediction', 
Nature (Vol. 305, 6 October 1983), pp. 471-72. For information about the improvement in both the 
breadth and quality of the data collection, meanwhile, see: John Gribbin, 'Monitoring Halocarbons 
in the Atmosphere', New Scientist (Vol. 81, 18 January 1979), pp. 164-67; John Maddox, 'The Great 
Ozone Controversy', Nature (Vol. 329, 10 September 1987), p. 101; 'Ozone Wisdom from SAGE', 
New Scientist (Vol. 81, 1 March 1979), p. 652; and 'Sniffing the Air for Aerosol Propellants', New 
Scientist (Vol. 78, 11 May 1978), p. 348. 
86 Thomas H. Maugh II, 'What Is the Risk from Chlorofluorocarbons?', Science (Vol. 223, 9 
March 1984), pp. 1051-52. 
87 Interview with Usher, op. cit, in note 55. 
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Bakken notes the impact that this scientific trend had upon the political 
process: 
This new information ... reduced national concern about the whole issue. ... 
The more or less annual reports from the CCOL became more diffuse and 
uncertainty became the dominant impression. Policy-makers were waiting 
for scientists to come up with a clear answer before further action was 
taken . 89 
Even within the US, the nation which had displayed by far the greatest concern 
(both scientific and political) about the issue, this trend served to diminish interest. 
Anne Gorsuch, the first head of the US Environmental Protection Agency under 
President Ronald Reagan, said that the ozone theory was 'highly controversial', 
and that . 'apparently there is a need for additional scientific data before the 
international scientific community would be willing to accept the ozone layer 
depletion theory as the basis for additional government action'. 9° There were 
those who fought this view (Sherry Rowland was one of the strongest proponents 
of the CFC-ozone theory throughout the history of the issue), however, and thus 
the debate persisted. Nevertheless, James Lovelock caught the dominant 
88 Sources: Robin Clarke and Uoyd Timberlake, Stockholm Plus Ten: Promises, Promises? 
(London: Earthscan for the IIED, 1982), p. 44; Roan, op. cit., in note 52; UNEP, Annual Review 
(Nairobi: UNEP, 1979), p. 30; UNEP, Annual Review (Nairobi: UNEP, 1981), p. 41; and UNEP, Annual 
Report of the Executive Directory (Nairobi: UNEP, 1983), p. 43. 
89 Bakken, op. cit., in note 13, p. 200. 
90 Quoted in David Dickson, 'Congress Faces Decision on CFC', Nature (Vol. 293, 3 September 
1981), p. 4. 
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perception during the first half of the 1980s by noting: 'Had we known in 1975 as 
much as we know now about atmospheric chemistry, it is doubtful if politicians 
could have been persuaded to legislate against the emission of CFCs'. 91 
Indicative of the findings emerging from much research at the time, two 
Belgian scientists claimed, in 1985, that the threat to the ozone layer from CFCs 
was `distant' and `that time can be allowed without risk for further scientific 
evaluation of theory.' 92 Their research reinforced EC opposition to a proposed 
global ban on aerosols propelled by CFCs that was being put forward by the 
Americans at this time.93 Although the EC position was informed by a number of 
considerations, 94 the presence of conflicting scientific evidence contributed to the 
EC's reluctance to impose any significant regulatory controls. 95 In similar 
manners, the Japanese and the Soviets were also arguing that international 
regulation should be postponed until scientific proof of a cause-effect link became 
available. 96 Thus, the hypothesised precondition for international regime formation 
remained unsatisfied at this time. 
2.1.6 -- Increasingly Consensual Opinion Regarding Chlorofluorocarbons as 
a Threat to the Ozone Layer, 1985-1988 
The entire debate, however, changed dramatically with the detection of a significant 
`crater' in the ozone layer above the Antarctic continent by the British Antarctic 
91 James E. Lovelock, 'Report on Reports: Causes and Effects of Changes in Stratospheric 
Ozone: Update 1983', Environment (Vol. 26, No. 10, December 1984), p. 26. 
92 The two scientists were Guy Brasseur and A. de Rudder (Anna Lubinska, 'Europe Takes a 
Cheerful View', Nature (Vol. 313, 28 February 1985), p. 727). 
93 For more information, see Chapter 3.1.3 of this thesis. 
94 The economic factors were particularly important in their policy formulation. See Chapter 3.1 
of this thesis. 
95 Lubinska, op. cit., in note 92, p. 727. 
96 Peter H. Sand, 'Protecting the Ozone Layer: The Vienna Convention is Adopted', Environment 
(Vol. 27, No. 5, June 1985), p. 40. Indeed, the lack of a scientific consensus was one factor which 
hindered efforts to have an international protocol opened for signature in 1985. In March of that year, 
some members of internationa! society could agree only a framework convention on the issue of 
ozone layer depletion, in which they recognised 'the need for further research and systematic 
observations to further develop scientific knowledge of the ozone layer and possible adverse effects 
resulting from its modification' (Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Nairobi: 
UNEP, 1985), p. 11). Only in a resolution that encouraged the protocol-building process was the 
scientific link between CFC emission and modification of the ozone layer acknowledged. Even there, 
however, delegates could only agree that there was a 'possibility' of such a link -- definitely not a 
scientific certainty (`Resolution on a Protocol Concerning Chlorofluorocarbons', Vienna Convention 
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Nairobi: UNEP, 1985), p. 7). 
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Survey.97 Publishing their results in May 1985, the group had discovered that 
ozone levels had dropped significantly -- up to over 30 per cent -- during the 
Antarctic spring. There had been discoveries of ozone depletion just a couple of 
years before. (In August 1980, NASA had, using satellite data, discovered a slight 
drop in global ozone levels.98) The figure cited at that time of 0.5 per cent, 
however, paled in comparison with the significant depletion that the British team 
had detected. Indeed, what made it even more unexpected was that the American 
satellites that had been gathering data over the Antarctic since 1979 had not 
detected any significant change in the ozone levels. The reason being, it was 
discerned later, was that the satellite's computers had been programmed to 
discard any data that were outside of an anticipated range. When the computers 
were reprogrammed, with this condition removed, they revealed the same pattern 
of springtime depletion that had been discovered by the British ground-based 
stations. 99 As John Gribbin notes: 
The point is that in the late 1970s and early 1980s atmospheric scientists 
were increasingly confident that they understood, more or less, what was 
going on in the atmosphere. Both the chemistry and the dynamics of air 
movements were being analysed in more detail than ever before, and a 
coherent picture was emerging. But nowhere in that coherent picture was 
there even a hint that a dramatic change like the development of a huge 
hole in the ozone layer could occur. 10° 
The importance of having some tangible scientific evidence of actual ozone layer 
depletion had a powerful impact upon not only the scientific community, but also 
the political process. This should not surprise us, because, as Oran Young notes, 
anyone 'who has studied the politics of regime formation cannot help being struck 
by the role of crises (real or imagined) in breaking logjams and persuading 
reluctant parties to accept new institutional arrangements'. 101 In this case, the 
multi-colour time-series computer plots of satellite data, which showed the ozone 
97 J.C. Farman et al, 'Large Losses of Total Ozone in Antarctica Reveal Seasonal CLO x/NOx 
 Interaction', Nature (Vol. 315, 16 May 1985), pp. 207-10. 
98 Dickson, op. cit., in note 90, pp. 3-4. 
99 R.S. Stolarski et al, 'Nimbus 7 Satellite Measurements of the Springtime Antarctic Ozone 
Decrease', Nature (Vol. 322, 28 August 1986), pp. 808-11. 
100 
 Gribbin, op. cit., in note 25, p. 95. 
101 Oran R. Young, '°Arctic Waters": The Politics of Regime Formation', Ocean Development and 
International Law (Vol. 18, No. 1, 1987), p. 105. See, also, Ernst Haas's comments on the 
importance of 'urgency' (Haas, op. cit., in note 28, p. 28). 
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crater opening during the Antarctic spring, effectively demonstrated the severity of 
the issue. 102 
Although crises can do much to catalyse political action by illuminating the 
importance of the issue, they do not necessarily resolve nonconsensus among 
scientists, for we must recognise that one dramatic occurrence will not necessarily 
prove one scientific view nor disprove another one. Such was the case in this 
instance, because there was still disagreement about the explanation for the 
observed depletion. At the time, three contending theories -- the CFC or chemical 
theory, the natural or dynamic theory and the solar cycle or 'odd-nitrogen' 
theory lm -- were popular with significant sections of the scientific community. 
Indeed, it was noted that 
Theorists are offering explanations, almost as many as there are workers in 
the field. ... [These other explanations] involve normal chemical and 
meteorological processes interacting in unforeseen but innocuous 
ways. 1°4 
Although the validity of this dramatic empirical evidence was agreed, consensus 
about the cause of the ozone depletion over Antarctica remained elusive at this 
time. In light of these conflicting views, scientists intensified their efforts. 
As investigations continued after mid 1985, new data were collected which 
suggested not only that 'global ozone depletion has been far more severe than 
originally predicted', 105 but also that an ozone crater could be forming over the 
Arctic as wel1. 1°6 Indeed, the contents of a WMO report published in 1986 
suggest that there was substantial consensus at this time that damage to the 
Earth's ozone layer had in fact occurred. 107 Moreover, the findings from a 
gathering of atmospheric modellers in Wurzburg, West Germany showed that there 
102 I am grateful to T.M.L. Wigley, Climatic Research Unit, University of East Anglia, for a 
technical clarification on this point (personal communication, 17 December 1990). 
103 For a clear, primarily non-technical, discussion of the three theories, see Roan, op. cit., in 
note 52. 
104 Richard A. Kerr, 'Antarctic Ozone Hole is Still Deepening', Science (Vol. 232, 27 June 1986), 
p. 1602. 
105 NASA scientist Donald Heath, reported in Kathy Johnston, 'Agreement Nears on Protection 
of the Earth's Ozone Layer', Nature (Vol. 328, 2 July 1987), p. 7. 
106 Kathy Johnston, 'Europe Agrees to Act for Protection of the Ozone Layer', Nature (Vol. 326, 
26 March 1987), p. 321. 
107 World Meteorological Organisation, Atmospheric Ozone 1985 (Geneva: WMO, Global Ozone 
Research and Monitoring Project -- Report No. 16, 1986). 
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was a further consensus growing that ongoing human activities could cause 
significant levels of ozone layer depletion. 108 
These developments -- mounting empirical evidence, coupled with 
increasingly-accepted ozone depletion projections -- were starting to influence the 
political process. As a case in point, it has been speculated that the shift in the EC 
position -- their negotiators were becoming more receptive to the idea of 
regulations -- was due, in no small part, to the emerging scientific consensus. 109 
 Nevertheless, there was at least one significant point of contention that still 
remained -- namely, the question of causality. Although a trip to the Antarctic 
continent by 13 American scientists in August 1986 110 had effectively killed the 
odd-nitrogen theory, 111 different interpretations of this group's findings sustained 
a variety of chemical and dynamical theories, and the proponents of each were 'as 
yet not giving an inch'. 112 Therefore, in order to try to arrive at a scientific 
agreement over causality, there were calls for the creation of an international panel 
of atmospheric scientists. 
The Ozone Trends Panel was therefore set up in October 1986 'in response 
to claims made before [the US] Congress by Donald Heath, of the NASA/Goddard 
Space Flight Center, that ozone levels were decreasing globally at an inexplicably 
high rate'. 113 The NASA-sponsored group had over 100 scientists from 10 
countries. Keeping in mind the hypothesis about national science, 114 it is 
instructive to note that Robert Watson, a NASA scientist and one of the leaders of 
108 UNEP, 'Ad Hoc Scientific Meeting to Compare Model-Generated Assessments of Ozone 
Layer Change for Various Strategies for CFC Control, Wurzburg, 9-10 April 1987' 
(UNEP/WG.167/INF.1). See, also, Peter M. Haas, 'Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic 
Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone', International Organization (Vol. 46, No. 1, Winter 
1992), pp. 211-12; and Gribbin, op. cit., in note 25, p. 137. Furthermore, one report argues that the 
organisation of informal workshops during the summer of 1986 helped to develop consensus about 
the underlying seriousness of the problem (Daniel A. Lashof and Dennis A. Tirpak, Policy Options 
for Stabilizing Global Climate: Report to Congress, Main Report (Washington, DC: US EPA, Office 
of Policy, Planning and Evaluation, December 1990), p. VIII-23). 
109 Interview with Fiona McConnell, Department of the Environment, London, England, 27 March 
1990. See, also, Johnston, op. cit., in note 106, p. 321; and Haas, op. cit., in note 68, p. 356. 
110 This mission was called the National Ozone Expedition (NOZE) (Richard A. Kerr, 'Taking 
Shots at Ozone Hole Theories', Science (Vol. 234, 14 November 1986), pp. 817-18). 
111 Roan, op. cit., in note 52, p. 178. 
112 Kerr, op. cit., in note 110, p. 817. 
113  David Lindley, 'CFCs Cause Part of Global Ozone Decline', Nature (Vol. 332, 24 March 1988) 
p. 293. 
114 Op. cit., in note 82. 
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the investigation, 
invited scientists from around the world to participate on the Trends Panel 
report. He felt that the involvement of several countries might mean that the 
results of the report -- whatever they turned out to be -- would be accepted 
by all countries. This, in turn, could assist in the international negotiations 
on protecting the ozone layer. 115 
The centrepiece of the Panel's efforts was a second trip to the Antarctic, 
which was called the Airborne Antarctic Ozone Experiment (AAOE). Preparations 
for this journey began soon after the completion of the NOZE expedition in 
November 1986; and in the Autumn of 1987, 150 travelled to the south of Chile, 
from where they launched their experiments in the Antarctic. Their efforts were, in 
the end, rewarded, for they found the elusive 'smoking gun' that implicated CFCs 
in stratospheric ozone depletion -- namely, they discovered an anti-correlation 
between chlorine monoxide and ozone levels. Thus, the journey's results 
demonstrated 'an undoubted chemical cause in the destruction of ozone by 
atmospheric chlorine ... ).116 
These results were formalised on 15 March 1988, when the Ozone Trends 
Panel called a press conference to publicise their findings. 117 The group's 
members found both evidence of ozone layer depletion and substantial proof of its 
cause. Richard Benedick notes the impact that the weight of this evidence had: 
The panel's conclusions made headlines around the world. Ozone layer 
depletion was no longer a theory; at last it had been substantiated by hard 
evidence. And CFCs and halons were now implicated beyond reasonable 
doubt. 118 
With this pronouncement, the cause of stratospheric ozone depletion was no 
longer a major point of contention. Although there remained some dissension from 
115 Roan, op. cit., in note 52, pp. 180-81. Not only was the Panel cross-national, it was also 
cross-sectoral, for the manufacturer's association played a key role. For similar reasons, therefore, 
their participation might contribute to the emergence of a broad-based scientific consensus (David 
Lindley, 'Ozone Hole Deeper than Ever', Nature (Vol. 329, 8 October 1987), p. 473). 
116 Their discoveries were announced less than a month after the terms of the original Montreal 
Protocol had been agreed (ibid., p. 473). 
117 See, for example, Kevin E. Trenberth, 'Report on Reports: Executive Summary of the Ozone 
Trends Panel Report', Environment (Vol. 30, No. 6, July/August 1988), pp. 25-26. 
118 Richard Elliot Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet 
(London: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 110. 
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this view, 119 the evidence suggests that significant worldwide scientific consensus 
about both the causes and consequences of the problem were in place. 129 Thus, 
in March 1988, the first hypothesised precondition for international regime 
formation on ozone layer depletion was satisfied. 
2.1.7 -- Steady Solidification of the Scientific Consensus, 1988-1991 
After March 1988, evidence about the severity of the problem continued to mount, 
thereby strengthening the international consensus. 
At a series of UNEP meetings held in the Hague, Netherlands in October 
1988, the world's leading scientists were of the consensus viewpoint that the 
antarctic hole is here to stay unless we reduced the emission levels of 
controlled CFCs by at least 85% from 1986 levels and addressed the 
adverse effects of other contributing ozone depleting substances such as 
methyl chloroform. 121 
During the winter of 1988-89, furthermore, a number of reports were published 
which speculated that significant destruction of stratospheric ozone over the Arctic 
was possible as well. 122 Although a multi-national investigation did not discover 
any ozone depletion, its members did detect conditions which suggested that 
Arctic ozone was 'primed for destruction'. 123 NASA's Robert Watson emphasised 
119 After this time, Rogelio Maduro, for one, argues that natural sources of chlorine are a major 
source that is overlooked and notes that: 'Fortunately for mankind, Rowland's theory has more holes 
than the ozone layer.' (Rogelio Maduro, 'CFCs are not Depleting the Ozone Layer', EIR, 9 June 1989, 
p. 19.) See, also, Rogelio A. Maduro, 'Ozone Depletion is Proven to be a Scientific Fraud', EIR, 28 
April 1989, pp. 20-27; and S. Fred Singer, 'My Adventures in the Ozone Layer', National Review, 30 
June 1989, pp. 34-38. 
12° There was, nevertheless, one significant deviation from the consensual view -- namely, that 
of the Soviet Union's representatives during late 1988 and 1989. At a conference in London in March 
1989, for example, the Soviets suggested that Arctic ozone depletion 'was primarily caused by 
weather and climate, and not by man's emission of gases'. At this time, the leader of the Soviet 
delegation, stressed that any moves to strengthen the Montreal Protocol must be based upon 
scientific knowledge (John Ardill and Tim Radford, 'EEC Official Pledges to Speed up Ozone Fight', 
The Guardian (London), 6 March 1989, p. 1; and Richard North, 'Appeal for Fund to Help Third 
World Cut CFCs', The Independent (London), 7 March 1989). The Soviet delegation, nevertheless, 
had re-endorsed the scientific consensus by the Helsinki meeting in May 1989. 
121 G. Victor Buxton, 'International and Canadian Progress on Implementing the Montreal 
Protocol', presented at the Air and Waste Management Association Meeting, Annaheim, CA, 26-30 
June 1989, p. 3. 
122 Joseph Palca and Philippa Lloyd, 'Ozone Hole Looms Large', Nature (Vol. 337, 9 February 
1989), p. 492. 
123 Tim Radford, 'Ozone Talks Need Action, Not Words', The Guardian (London), 4 March 1989, 
p. 2. See, also, Fred Pearce, 'Plugging the Hole in Our Sun-Roof', The Sunday Times (London), 5 
March 1989, p. Fl ; and Nicholas Schoon, 'Arctic Ozone Layer "Set for Destruction"', The 
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that there was: 
strong evidence that the atmospheric chemistry in the Arctic, although not 
as important as in the Antarctic, plays an important and hitherto 
unacknowledged role in the destruction of global stratospheric ozone. He 
pointed out that the models used to determine restrictions on 
chlorofluorocarbons adopted in the Montreal Protocol did not take into 
account heterogeneous chemistry now shown to be occurring at both 
poles. 124 
Regardless of the scientific detail, the sheer possibility of ozone depletion over the 
Arctic, which would have direct implications for the highly populated, northern 
latitudes, affected the policy positions of many industrialised states. Geoffrey Lean 
notes how the direct consequences for national interests were not lost on some 
policy-makers at this time: 'Governments have been shaken by evidence disclosed 
last month that a new ozone hole may be opening up in the Arctic, over many 
northern countries.' 125 
At conferences in London in March 1989 and Helsinki in May 1989, concern 
about the increasingly astonishing scientific evidence led many policy-makers to 
push for controls that went beyond those embodied in the Montreal Protocol. 
Indeed, Michael Oppenheimer and Robert Boyle argue that 'the telltale signs of an 
ozone hole in the Arctic ... prompted a change in the European Community's 
position [and] led to the May [1989] agreement in Helsinki to eliminate CFCs 
altogether'. 126 Regardless of the motivation -- although the link with the science 
is very suggestive -- it is clear that the consensus about the findings arising from 
the scientific investigations generated a sense of urgency at these meetings. 127 
Independent (London), 13 July 1989. 
124 Reported in Joseph Palca and Philippa Uoyd, 'Arctic Chemistry May Cause Significant Ozone 
Loss', Nature (Vol. 337, 23 February 1989), p. 677. 
125 Geoffrey Lean, 'Ozone: UN Acts to Tighten Controls', The Observer (London), 5 March 1989, 
p. 2. 
126 	. Michael Oppenheimer and Robert Boyle, Dead Heat The Race Against the Greenhouse 
Effect (London: I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd., 1990), p. 160. 
127 Although some questions remained (see, for example, Robert Watson's remarks at this time, 
quoted in Tim Radford, 'If Only They'd Known What We Know Now', The Guardian (London), 5 May 
1989), it was nevertheless clear that the scientific evidence was compelling. Indeed, at the Helsinki 
conference, 
[a representative from the] EPA made a special presentation to the conference of its latest 
estimates of future chlorine loading of the atmosphere under various assumptions of 
emissions of CFCs, halons, carbon tetrachloride, methyl chloroform, and HCFCs. 
Governments that two and a half years earlier had resisted going beyond a freeze of only 
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The scientific assessment continued to dominate the discussions as they 
moved away from the limelight of the international, ministerial-level conference to 
the uncelebrated surroundings of the closed-door, working group -- four of which 
were formed in May 1989 in order to recommend amendments to the Montreal 
Protocol. Benedick notes: 
The discussions of the Open-Ended Working Group would prove to be 
dominated by the findings of the science panel. The scientists had become 
increasingly concerned about the inability of their models to predict 
accurately the actually measured depletion of the ozone layer. Their 
misgivings were heightened by the new elements in the science since 
Montreal: the unexpectedly large ozone losses measured over northern 
latitudes, the effects of the annual Antarctic ozone hole on southern 
populated latitudes, the potential for precipitous ozone depletion over the 
Arctic, and the ominous new factor of possible consequences from volcanic 
eruptions. 128 
Once the negotiations returned to the international stage (namely, at the Second 
Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, which was held in London in June 
1990), the urgent and consensual scientific view again informed the high-level 
political process. Indeed, it appears that the mounting scientific concern about 
ozone layer depletion 129 was a significant force which pushed the Parties' 
representatives to agree to an accelerated timetable at this time. 13° 
Finally, because apprehension also continued to escalate during the second 
CFCs 11 and 12 now joined in calling for early phaseout of a broad range of chemicals. 
(Benedick, op. cit., in note 118, p. 125.) Also, interview with Usher, op. cit., in note 55. The 
declaration agreed at that conference noted: 
Aware of the wide agreement among scientists that depletion of the ozone layer will threaten 
present and future generations unless more stringent control measures are adopted ... [and] 
... Mindful that some ozone depleting substances are powerful greenhouse gases leading 
to global warming. 
(Reprinted in: Environmental Policy and Law (Vol. 19, Nos. 3/4, July 1989), p. 137.) The certainty 
reflected in the wording is significant. 
128 Benedick, op. cit., in note 118, p. 129. 
129 A report of the British Stratospheric Ozone Review Group, released in June 1990, for 
example, found ozone depletion levels to be between 5 and 10 per cent in the northern hemisphere 
(quoted in Andrew Morgan, 'Ozone Alarm for Europe', The Sunday Correspondent (London), 27 May 
1990, p. 1). 
130 Author's conclusion after attendance at this conference. 
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half of 1990 and all of 1991, 131 it is evident that the consensus steadily solidified 
during this period as well. Thus, in summary, the findings from this investigation 
into the emergence of a scientific consensus suggest that the first hypothesised 
precondition for international regime formation on the ozone layer depletion issue 
was satisfied in March 1988. They also reveal that this consensus was 
subsequently strengthened during the ensuing four years. 
2.2 -- Scientific Consensus and Global Warming 
2.2.1 -- Initial Concerns About Climate and Fossil Fuel Combustion 
The weather has always been a concern for human beings, because the amount 
of sunshine, precipitation and so on that a land-area receives determines, to a 
significant extent, the type of activities in which people can engage. Indeed, there 
are references through much of recorded history which reflect this concern -- even 
as far back as the ancient Egyptians132 and Greeks. 133 
Additionally, humans have also been concerned about the damage that may 
be caused by the production of energy. This concern has been in evidence for at 
least 2,000 years, for James Lodge notes that the 'Romans complained of the foul 
air of Rome, possibly recording the first documentation of the problem'. 134 
 Moreover, during the first 800 years of the second millennium, laws were 
131 On 22 October 1991, for example, 'WMO and UNEP released the Executive Summary of the 
latest Scientific Assessment of Stratospheric Ozone, ... The report caused a wave of shock through 
governments and industry worldwide, by revealing that the destruction of the ozone layer has 
advanced far more rapidly than predicted.' (Cited in Brundtland Bulletin (Issue 14, December 1991), 
p. 26.) See, also, Guy P. Brasseur, 'A Deepening, Broadening Trend', Nature (Vol. 352, 22 August 
1991), pp. 668-69. 
132 The first climate model, according to one report, was 'that of the Egyptian scribe who said, 
around 3000 BC, "the Sun warms the Earth"' (T.M.L. Wigley and P. Brimblecombe, 'What is 
Climatology?', Nature (Vol. 276, 16 November 1978), p. 214). 
133 Theophrastus and others in classical Greece wrote about the possibility of widespread 
artificially-induced climate change (J.D. Hughes, 'Theophrastus as Ecologist', Environmental Review 
(Vol. 4, 1985), pp. 296-307, cited in Richard Grove, 'Threatened Islands, Threatened Earth; Early 
Professional Science and the Historical Origins of Global Environmental Concerns', in David J.R. 
Angell, Justyn D. Comer and Matthew L.N. Wilkinson (eds.), Sustaining Earth: Response to the 
Environmental Threat (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), p. 15). 
134 James P. Lodge, The Smoake of London: Two Prophecies (Elmsford, NY: Maxwell Reprint 
Co., 1969), pp. ix-x. 
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passed 135 and books were written, 136 which were concerned with the 
deterioration of the quality of the local atmosphere by the use of, in particular, fossil 
fuels. 
The relationship between these two concerns -- that is, changes in the 
weather and fossil fuel combustion -- was not, however, identified until the 
nineteenth century. In 1827, French mathematician Baron Jean-Baptiste-Joseph 
Fourier set out the analogy between the behaviour of heat in the atmosphere and 
its behaviour in a greenhouse. 137 Thirty-eight years later, John Tyndall built upon 
these ideas by further developing the concept of the 'atmospheric envelope' and 
the notion of 'greenhouse' retention of radiation heat by particular gases in the 
atmosphere. 138 The theory that rising concentrations of atmospheric carbon 
dioxide would increase this effect and lead to global warming was first advanced 
by Svante Arrhenius, a Swedish scientist, in 1896. He postulated that an effective 
doubling of the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere would cause the 
average global temperature to rise by 5 °C. Despite the facts that Arrhenius 
was a well-respected scientist (he won a Nobel Prize in chemistry in 1903) and that 
subsequent work in the area effectively bore out his conclusions, his work was 
largely ignored for over 50 years. 143 Instead, throughout the first half of the 
135 In 1273, 'the first air pollution law was passed to counter the nuisance of smoke from 
domestic fires in [London]' (Matthew Wilkinson and Sarah Woodin, 'Acid Precipitation', in Angell et 
al, op. cit., in note 133, p. 43). 
136 In 1661, John Evelyn wrote that human health and well-being, as well as plants, buildings, 
monuments and waters, were being ruined by coal smoke (John Evelyn, Fumifugium: The 
Incovenience of the Aer, and the Smoake of London Dissipated, reprinted in Lodge, op. cit., in note 
134). 
137 Jean-Baptiste Fourier, 'Les Temperatures du Globe Terrestre et des Espaces Planetaires', 
Memoires de L'Academe Royal des Sciences de L'Institut de France (Vol. 7, 1824), pp. 569-604. 
138 J. Tyndall, 'On Radiation Through the Earth's Atmosphere', Philosophical Magazine (Vol. 4, 
1863), pp. 200-07. 
139 Svante Arrhenius, 'On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air Upon the Temperature on the 
Ground', Philosophical Magazine (Vol. 41, April 1896) pp. 237-76. 
140 We should recognise, however, that at least two individuals did pursue the question. First, 
during the beginning of the twentieth century, Thomas C. Chamberlin, an American geologist, 
studied climatic variations throughout later geological time (cited in Roger Revelle, 'Introduction: The 
Scientific History of Carbon Dioxide', in E.T. Sundquist and W.S. Broecker (eds.), The Carbon Cycle 
and Atmospheric CO 2: Natural Variations, Archean to Present (Washington, DC: American 
Geophysical Union, 1-085), p. 3). Second, G.D. Callendar, a British meteorologist, gathered 
temperature records from over 200 weather stations around the world and discovered that a global 
warming had occurred between the 1880s and the 1930s. In 1938, he tried to persuade the members 
of the Royal Society in London that this was the result of increasing carbon dioxide levels in the 
atmosphere. His argument, however, was greeted with scepticism. Nevertheless, for at least one 
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twentieth century, the conventional wisdom remained that 'climate is essentially 
constant, apart from short-term fluctuations, some of which might involve shadowy 
cyclic changes'. 141 Indeed, with little scientific interest being shown in the 
question, 142 the issue did not take on political dimensions of any kind during this 
period. 
However, two important advances in the study of atmospheric science -- one 
theoretical and one empirical -- were made during the 1950s. The theoretical one 
was achieved by Roger Revelle and Hans E. Suess of the Scripps Institute of 
Oceanography in 1957. Up until that time, most scientists had believed that the 
oceans, which have a large capacity to store carbon, would harmlessly absorb 
almost all of the carbon dioxide that was being emitted by human activities. 
Challenging this view, these two scientists wrote a paper in which they reported 
that the oceans had not absorbed as much carbon dioxide as previously assumed. 
They argued that: 
human beings are now carrying out a large scale geophysical experiment 
of a kind that could not have happened in the past nor be reproduced in the 
future. Within a few centuries we are returning to the atmosphere and 
oceans the concentrated organic carbon stored in the sedimentary rocks 
over hundreds of millions of years. This experiment, if adequately 
documented, may yield a far-reaching insight into the processes determining 
weather and climate. 143 
The empirical advance, meanwhile, was the establishment, also in 1957 and as part 
commentator, Callendar's paper had significant political implications: Kenneth Hare marks 
`Callendar's 1938 paper as the point at which climate began to move centre-stage in world affairs' 
(F. Kenneth Hare, 'The Global Greenhouse Effect', in The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for 
Global Security, Conference Proceedings (Geneva: WMO, No. 710), p. 59). See, also G.D. 
Callendar, The Artificial Production of Carbon Dioxide and Its Influence on Temperature', Quarterly 
Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society (Vol. 64, 1938), pp. 223-40; and William R. Moomaw, 
`Scientific and International Policy Responses to Global Climate Change', The Fletcher Forum of 
World Affairs (Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 1990), pp. 252-53. 
141 H. H. Lamb, 'Fluctuations in Climate', Nature (Vol. 251, 18 October 1974), p. 568. 
142 	
is i It s mportant to recognise that the climate question was not a concern of most scientists 
at this time. At an international symposium on 'Man's Role in Changing the Face of the Earth' (in 
Princeton, NJ in June 1955), for example, the only mention of hydrocarbon combustion was with 
regard to the quality of the air. See, for example, Paul B. Sears, The Process of Environmental 
Change by Man', in William L Thomas Jr., Man's Role in Changing the Face of the Earth (Chicago, 
IL: The University of Chicago Press for the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research 
and the National Science Foundation, 1956), pp. 471-84. 
143 R. Revelle and H. E. Suess, 'Carbon Dioxide Exchange Between Atmosphere and Ocean and 
the Question of an Increase of Atmospheric CO 2 During the Past Decades', Tellus (Vol. 9, 1957), 
pp. 18-27. 
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of International Geophysical Year, of an atmospheric carbon dioxide measuring 
station at the Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii. Situated at an elevation of 11,000 
feet, far from any human-made sources of pollution, this represented the first major 
attempt to construct a longitudinal record of measurements of background carbon 
dioxide concentrations.'` 
Once speculation about climatic change was accompanied by an observed 
increase in carbon dioxide concentrations, as was being recorded in Hawaii, 145 
 the apparent urgency of the issue rose and a governmental response, at least in 
the United States, was encouraged. 146 In 1964-65, Roger Revelle led a US White 
House study into the relationship between the burning of fossil fuels and climatic 
change. The members of Revelle's task force concluded that the expected 25 per 
cent increase in carbon dioxide concentration by the year 2000 might be 'sufficient 
to produce measurable and perhaps marked changes in climate, in the 
temperature and other properties of the stratosphere'. 147 Such natural changes, 
they concluded, could be 'deleterious from the point of view of human beings', 148 
 and they therefore called for exploring the possibilities of bringing about
countervailing climatic changes. 149 The significance of this report, William 
Kellogg argues, is that it was the 'first public recognition in a United States 
government document that climate change could be caused by human activities 
144 See, for example, C.D. Keeling, The Influence of Mauna Loa Observatory on the 
Development of Atmospheric CO2 Research', in J. Miller (ed.), Mauna Loa Observatory 20th 
Anniversary Report (Washington, DC: NOAA Special Report, 1978), pp. 36-54. 
145 Hare, op. cit., in note 140. 
146 Kellogg reports that one of the first reports on possible global warming was by an American 
NGO: 
In 1963, the Conservation Foundation sponsored a meeting, and its report stated the 
situation more succinctly than anyone had before: 'It is estimated that a doubling of the 
carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere would produce a temperature rise of 3.8 degrees 
[Celsius]' -- the timescale involved is left unspecified, however. 
(The Report is 'Implications of Rising Carbon Dioxide Content of the Atmosphere' (New York: The 
Conservation Foundation, 1963); while the quotation is from William W. Kellogg, 'Theory of Climate: 
Transition from Academic Challenge to Global Imperative', in Terrell J. Minger (ed.), Greenhouse 
Glasnost: The Crisis of Global Warming (New York: The Ecco Press, 1990), p. 99.) 
147 President's Science Advisory Committee, Restoring the Quality of Our Environment: Report 
of the Environmental Pollution Panel (Washington, DC: The White House, 1965), pp. 126-27. See, 
also, R. Revelle, Report of the Task Force on Carbon Dioxide Production (Washington, DC: The 
White House, 1965). 
148 President's Science Advisory Committee, op. cit., in note 147, p. 127. 
149 Ibid., p. 127. Emphasis added. 
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and that this would have important consequences for the world'. 150 
This report appears, however, to have been the only response by a 
governmental organisation before 1970. No other political interest was evident at 
this time, because much of the science remained unexplored. During the late 
1960s, only a `handful of scientists on both sides of the Atlantic were beginning to 
develop a physical theory to explain the behavior of the complex system that 
determines climate'. 151 Without sufficient understanding of carbon dioxide-
atmosphere interactions, scientists were in no position to draw attention to any 
harmful consequences that might have arisen from the continued activities of 
human beings. Accordingly, the issue of global climatic change remained primarily 
apolitical during this period. 
2.2.2 -- Climate Change as a Political Issue, 1970-1985 
Climate change first appeared on political agendas as a significant issue during the 
early 1970s. Discussions about both weather and climate became the concerns of 
policy-makers at this time, because, at least in part, there was a general feeling that 
something was `going wrong with the weather. 152 Variations in the `Indian 
monsoons and temperatures and rainfalls in middle latitudes of both 
hemispheres' 153 had led to world-wide droughts during the early 1970s. 154 
 Because `the growth of population and the rationalisation of agriculture towards 
specialisation in one-crop economies in various regions [had] increased 
vulnerabilities to weather', 155 global food supplies had fallen to dangerously low 
amounts. 156 With welfare levels thus being threatened by changes in both 
weather and climate, the issue became a concern for politicians, and there were 
150 William W. Kellogg, 'Mankind's Impact on Climate: The Evolution of Awareness', Climatic 
Change (Vol. 10, 1987), p. 117. 
151 Ibid., p. 119. 
152 John Gribbin, 'Weather Warning: You are now Experiencing a Climatic Change', Nature (Vol. 
252, 15 November 1974), p. 182. 
153 P.M. Kelly and H.H. Lamb, 'Prediction of Volcanic Activity and Climate', Nature (Vol. 262, 1 
July 1976), p. 5. 
154 Robert M. White, 'Our Climatic Future: Science, Technology, and World Climate 
Negotiations', Environment (Vol. 33, No. 2, March 1991), p. 19. 
155 Kelly and Lamb, op. cit., in note 153, p. 5. 
156 White, op. cit., in note 154, p. 19. 
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calls for scientific studies. 157 
One of the first influential inquiries into the possibility of global warming was 
undertaken by a group at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in July 
1970. Researchers attending a conference on 'The Study of Critical Environmental 
Problems' concluded that the likelihood of climatic change during the twentieth 
century was small. However, they also stressed that 'the long-term potential 
consequences of CO2 effects on the climate or of societal reaction to such threats 
are so serious that much more must be learned about future trends of climate 
change', 158 and they therefore called for more data collection. Reflective of the 
predominantly dismissive attitude at the time, however, an observer, commenting 
upon the MIT report, argued that the greenhouse effect had been a greatly 
exaggerated topic for anxiety: 'In short, half a degree by the end of the century (by 
which time nuclear power should have taken the load off the fossil fuels) is much 
more than sober men should worry about.' 158 
We should recognise, furthermore, that those involved in the climate change 
debate were not only considering the possibility of a CO 2-induced global warming. 
Indeed, most of the members of the international community -- if interested in 
climatic change at all -- were more concerned with global cooling. Average global 
temperatures had decreased from 1945 to 1970, 160 and this had initiated a spell 
of investigations into the prospects of a coming ice-age. In 1971, for example, 
Ichtiaque Rasool and Stephen Schneider, two prominent climatologists, were 
arguing that, in spite of the 
... obvious uncertainties in estimating and predicting the effects of carbon 
dioxide and aerosols in the atmosphere, it seems that, on balance, man's 
continued pollution is likely to lead to a reduction rather than an increase 
in global temperature. Thus, far from there being a melting of the ice caps, 
it is [their] view that the triggering of an ice age is more likely. 161 
157 See, for example, Henry Kissinger's call, at the UNGA in April 1974, for an investigation by 
the ICSU and the WMO (cited in H. H. Lamb, 'Fluctuations in Climate', Nature (Vol. 251, 18 October 
1974), p. 568). 
158 Man's Impact on the Global Environment Report of the Study of Critical Environmental 
Problems (London: MIT Press, 1970), p. 12. See, also, Luther J. Carter, 'The Global Environment: 
M.I.T. Study Looks for Danger Signs', Science (Vol. 169, 14 August 1970) pp. 660-62. 
159 The Great Greenhouse Scare', Nature (Vol. 229, 19 February 1971), p. 514. 
160 Lamb, op. cit., in note 157, p. 568. 
161 
`CO2 Versus Aerosols', Nature (Vol. 232, 23 July 1971), p. 225. Emphasis added. 
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Thus, there was by no means any consensus about the direction that any climatic 
change would take, let alone if it would even occur. 162 
Nevertheless, in 1975, the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) 
launched an investigation into the causes and consequences of carbon dioxide 
accumulation. 163 Under the chairmenship of W. Lawrence Gates and Yale Mintz, 
a Panel on Climatic Variation produced a report which highlighted the need for 
more research -- in both data collection and theoretical modelling. 164 Although 
the Panel's members placed their primary emphasis upon the need to improve the 
science, they also argued that climatic change could have potentially major 
economic and social impacts. 165 
Another NAS report, prepared by a committee headed by Roger Revelle, 
was published in July 1977. 166 According to Colin Norman, this report constituted 
`the first major attempt to assess the validity and potential consequences of the so-
called "greenhouse effect".' 167 Like their predecessors, the members of this 
committee called for more research to try to 'address some of the major unknowns 
in the climatic models and measurements on which the projections are based'. 165 
 Nevertheless, despite the uncertainties and the qualifications, the committee's 
162 The question of purposeful, human-caused changes in the weather -- for both military and 
civilian purposes -- was also becoming more political at this time. At the Seventh World 
Meteorological Congress in 1975, for example, the first item of attention under the general heading 
of 'Weather and Climate Modification' was the question of `participation enhancement' (Seventh 
World Meteorological Congress: Review of the Main Decisions', WMO Bulletin (Vol. 24, No. 4, 
October 1975), p. 219). 
163 The 1975 study was not the first investigation during the 1970s, for the National Research 
Council (NRC), under the chairmanship of Thomas F. Malone, had issued a report in 1973. Its 
primary concern, however, was with deliberate weather modification. In the very brief section about 
carbon dioxide accumulation, the authors observe the then-recent global cooling and conclude that 
`changes in global temperatures cannot be solely attributed to changes in the composition of the 
air' (National Research Council, Committee on Atmospheric Sciences, Weather and Climate 
Modification: Problems and Progress (Washington, DC: National Academy of Science, 1973), p. 
155). 
164 What it called `data' and 'understanding' (United States Committee for the Global 
Atmospheric Research Program, National Research Council, Understanding Climate Change: A 
Program for Action (Washington, DC: National Academy of Science, 1975), pp. 2-4). 
165 Ibid., p. 5. See, also, John Gribbin, No Title, Nature (Vol. 254, 10 April 1975), p. 476. 
166 National Research Council, Panel on Energy and Climate, Geophysics Study Committee, 
Assembly of Mathematical and Physical Sciences, Energy and Climate (Washington, DC: National 
Academy of Sciences, 1977), See, also, National Academy of Sciences, Climate, Climatic Change, 
and Water Supply (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1977). 
167  Colin Norman, `Assessing the "Greenhouse Effect"', Nature (Vol. 268, 28 July 1977), p. 289. 
168 Cited . a' ed in ibid., p. 290. 
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members made it clear that 'if use of fossil fuels continues to increase at present 
rates, average global temperature could rise by about 6 °C over the next 200 years, 
with potentially dire consequences for agriculture and fisheries'. 169 They also 
argued that 'the implications warrant prompt action'. 170 
Subsequent reports published in the United States in 1979, 1982 and 
1983 171 confirmed the hypotheses that global warming could occur, over some 
period, and that it could have significant impacts for human societies. Scientists, 
however, continued to disagree about the level of urgency that was warranted by 
these suppositions. Authors of reports published by the NAS and the EPA in 1983, 
for example, reached different conclusions from similar findings -- the former noting 
that the `CO2 issue [was] reason for concern, but not panic...'; while the latter 
adopting a much more anxious tone, arguing that the projected 'temperature 
increases are likely to ... [disrupt] environmental and economic systems, and 
[stress] political institutions'. 172 In light of these two reports, George Keyworth, 
US President Reagan's science advisor, denounced the EPA study as 
`unnecessarily alarmist', and 'what appears to have irritated [him] is not EPA's 
projections themselves but its warning that early planning is necessary to deal with 
the disruptive effects of a global rise in temperature'. 173 These comments 
suggest that during the first half of the 1980s, there were significant differences 
among the scientific studies being undertaken in the United States. 
As in our previous investigation of the ozone layer depletion issue, the focus 
of this section has been, thus far, upon scientific research that was being 
conducted in the United States. The reason for this emphasis is, once again, that 
169 Cited in ibid., p. 289. 
170 	. 	. Cited in ibid., p. 289. 
171  National Academy of Sciences, Carbon Dioxide and Climate: A Scientific Assessment 
(Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, Climate Research Board, 1979); National Academy 
of Sciences, Carbon Dioxide and Climate: A Second Assessment (Washington, DC: National 
Academy Press, 1982); National Academy of Sciences, Changing Climate: Report of the Carbon 
Dioxide Assessment Committee (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1983); and Stephen 
Seidel and Dale Keyes, Can We Delay a Greenhouse Warming?: The Effectiveness and Feasibility 
of Options to Slow a Build-Up of Carbon Dioxide in the Atmosphere (Washington, DC: Office of 
Policy and Resources Management, US EPA, September 1983). 
172 Ibid., p. i. 
173 Peter David, 'Two Views on Whether More Means Doom', Nature (Vol. 305, 27 October 1983), 
p. 751. 
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the vast majority of atmospheric science was being undertaken in the US. 174 
 There were, nevertheless, other organisations -- both national and international --
that were also studying the climate change issue during this period. 
Along with the NAS, the most important body undertaking, co-ordinating and 
summarising research into climatic change was the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO). 175 The WMO had been concerned, at least nominally, with 
the issue since the creation of its predecessor, the International Meteorological 
Organization (IMO), in 1873. 176 Significant consideration of the climate issue, 
however, did not take place until the 1960s, when the WMO, along with UNESCO, 
sponsored a meeting on climate issues in Rome. 177 During the 1960s and 1970s, 
climate change continued to occupy a position upon the WMO's broader agenda, 
with conferences being convened 178 and statements being issued. 179 
The most significant international gathering on climate change, to that date, 
was the First World Climate Conference, which the WMO convened in Geneva in 
February 1979. 180 Much of the discussion at this conference centred around the 
174 Op. cit., in note 68. 
175 In its work on climatic change, the WMO was often joined by ICSU and/or UNEP (US 
Environmental Protection Agency, Assessing the Risks of Trace Gases That Can Modify the 
Stratosphere, Volume 1: Executive Summary (Washington, DC: EPA, December 1987), p. 62). 
176 The acquisition of information on climate was identified as one of the IMO's original 'major 
concerns' (World Climate Programme', WMO Bulletin (Vol. 28, No. 1, January 1979), p. 42). 
177 UNESCO and WMO, Changes of Climate: Proceedings of the Rome Symposium Organized 
by UNESCO and WMO (Paris: UNESCO -- Arid Zone Research Series XX, 1963). 
178 In 1975, for example, the WMO (along with the International Association of Meteorology and 
Atmospheric Physics) sponsored an 'International Symposium on Long-Term Climate Fluctuations' 
in Norwich, England. This meeting is significant, because its findings effectively challenged the 
viability of the global cooling hypothesis and, according to one observer, 'left the greenhouse 
warming to dominate the stage' (Kellogg, op. cit., in note 150, p. 122). See, also, H.H. Lamb, 'Long-
Term Climate Fluctuations: Symposium at Norwich, 18-23 August 1975', WMO Bulletin (Vol. 25, No. 
1, January 1976), pp. 3-9; and the proceedings of the conference, which were published as World 
Meteorological Organisation, Proceedings of the WMO/IAMAP Symposium on Long-term Climatic 
Fluctuations: Norwich 18-23 August 1975 (Geneva: WMO -- No. 42, 1975). 
179 In 1976, for example, the WMO released a statement on climate change. The wording of this 
document suggests that the prospect of a possible global warming was starting to become the 
dominant concern in the climate change debate ('WMO Statement on Climatic Change', WMO 
Bulletin (Vol. 25, No. 3, July 1976), pp. 211-12). 
180 We should recognise, however, that one of the first international meetings of scientists to 
look at the problem was held in Wijk, Sweden in July 1971. At this meeting, the participants' aim was 
to produce an authoritative assessment of the then-present state of scientific understanding of the 
possible impacts of humankind's activities upon regional and global climates. They could not, 
however, reach agreement about many of the projected effects of climatic change. At this time, there 
were 'just too many honest differences of opinion and not enough facts at hand to resolve them' 
(Kellogg, op. cit., in note 150, p. 122). The report is Inadvertent Climate Modification: Report of the 
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debate between the ice-age prophets and those who saw global warming as being 
more important in the medium-term. It seemed that a consensus was slowly 
building in favour of the latter view. The final declaration agreed that: 
We can say with some confidence that the burning of fossil fuels, 
deforestation, and changes of land use have increased the amount of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere ... and it appears plausible that [this] can 
contribute to a gradual warming of the lower atmosphere, especially at high 
latitudes ... It is possible that some effects on a regional and global scale 
may ... become significant before the middle of the next century. 181 
In such international fora, however, the issue was being discussed primarily by 
scientists. Kenneth Hare notes that at the time of the First World Climate 
Conference, the response was 'little or none from politicians.' 182 
Nevertheless, scientific activity continued, and in the wake of this 
conference, the Eighth World Meterological Conference created the World Climate 
Programme (WCP). 183 The first major initiative to result from its establishment 
was an international conference to address climate change in Villach, Austria, from 
17 to 22 November 1980. 184 Under the chairmanship of Prof. B. Bolin of the 
University of Stockholm, the delegates issued a warning that the accumulation of 
greenhouse gases posed a great risk to the earth's natural equilibria; they declared 
that the issue therefore had to be addressed with some urgency. 186 Although 
their pronouncement drew some attention, its political impact was by no means 
dramatic. 186 
In addition to the US Government and the WMO, investigations were also 
Study of Man's Impact on Climate (London: The MIT Press, 1971). 
181 Cited in W.W. Kellogg, 'Prediction of a Global Cooling', Nature (Vol. 280, 16 August 1979), 
p. 615. 
182 Hare, op. cit., in note 140, p. 60. 
183. 'Eighth World Meteorological Congress: Review of the Main Decisions', WMO Bulletin (Vol. 
28, No. 4, October 1979), p. 277. For more information about the WCP and its various offshoots, see 
Thomas D. Potter and Lars E. Olsson, 'An Overview of International Developments, Trends and 
Actions', in H-J Karpe, D. Often and S.C. Trinidade (eds.), Climate and Development: Climatic 
Change and Variability and the Resulting Social, Economic and Technological Implications (London: 
Springer-Verlag, 1990), pp. 448-70. 
184 'World Climate Programme', WMO Bulletin (Vol. 30, No. 2, April 1981), p. 126. 
185 Ibid.; and 'UNEP's Role in Combatting Climate Change', Our Planet (Vol. 3, No. 4, 1991), p. 
vii of supplement. 
186 Interview with Usher, op. cit., in note 55. 
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being carried out by organisations in Europe during this period. 187 Although the 
reports of these groups were highlighting the fact that global warming could 
become significant during the twentieth-first century, they did not inspire any 
significant parallel inquiries by European governments. 188 Thus, the climate 
change issue did not occupy a prominent position upon political agendas in 
Europe at this time. 
During the first half of the 1980s, a number of scientific uncertainties about 
global climate change -- particularly with respect to theoretical modelling and data 
coverage -- remained unresolved. 189 Although the potential socio-economic 
impacts of global warming were being discussed by scientists in national and 
international fora, they were not able to demonstrate conclusively any harmful 
outcomes arising from everyday human activities. Nevertheless, it was believed that 
the time-horizons associated with global warming safely provided ample time for 
further scientific investigations. 190 The issue was therefore not highly political at 
this time, because it was thought that decision-makers' consideration of climate 
questions could wait until the science had advanced sufficiently. The evidence cited 
in this section thus suggests that, since consensus about global warming was not 
evident among members of the scientific community, the hypothesised precondition 
for international regime formation remained unsatisfied during the first half of the 
1980s. 
187 See, for example: the report of the summer meeting of the Royal Meteorological Society, 
which took place in Norwich on 15-16 July 1982 and was entitled 'Climatic Effects of Increasing 
Atmospheric CO2' (John G. Lovelock, 'Increasing Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide and Its 
Consequences', Nature (Vol. 299, 16 September 1982), p. 203); Wilfrid Bach, Jurgen Pankrath and 
William Kellogg (eds.), Man's Impact on Climate: Proceedings of an International Conference held 
in Berlin, June 14-16, 1978 (Oxford: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, 1979); and W. Bach et 
al, Carbon Dioxide: Current Views and Developments in Energy/Climate Research, 2nd Course of 
the International School of Climatology, Eftore Majorana Centre for Scientific Culture, Erice, Italy, 
July 16-26, 1982 (Lancaster: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1983). 
188 Although in 1984, for example, a United Kingdom Royal Commission did consider the global 
warming question, its only recommendation was 'that all necessary steps should be taken to ensure 
that there is the best chance of an early resolution of the uncertainties surrounding the effects of 
increasing concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere' (Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution (Chairman: Sir Richard Southwood), Tenth Report, Tackling Pollution —
Experience and Prospects (London: HMSO, February 1984), Chapter 5.130, p. 160). 
189 See, for example, John Maddox, 'Great Greenhouse in the Sky?', Nature (Vol. 306, 17 
November 1983), p. 221. See, also, infra, in note 204. 
19° A commentator in Nature at this time noted the long-term time horizons associated with the 
issue: 'The uncertainties beyond that are, however, so great that a greenhouse effect expected, on 
present trends, to become apparent only halfway through the next century might in fact not become 
apparent for a century after that.' (Maddox, op. cit., in note 189, p. 221.) 
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2.2.3 -- Global Warming as an International Political Issue, 1985-1988 
Scientific investigations into the global warming issue continued during the second 
half of the 1980s. In October 1985 and as part of the ongoing WCP, the WMO 
hosted another meeting in Villach, Austria. 191 Scientists from 29 countries 
reviewed the then-current state of understanding about the greenhouse effect. One 
subsequent report notes the significance of this meeting: 
[The participants] agreed for the first time that global mean surface 
temperatures will rise. There was also agreement that this temperature rise 
was caused by man-made increases in atmospheric concentrations of 
radiatively active greenhouse gases... 192 
In light of this consensus about the severity of the scientific aspects of global 
warming, the participants at this meeting also recommended a 'start on policy 
analysis to identify the widest possible range of social responses for limiting or 
adapting to climatic changes'. 193 
The gravity attributed to the issue by some scientists is not only revealed by 
their declaration at this particular gathering, but also by the fact that they felt it 
necessary to increase the frequency of their meetings. Thus, instead of next 
gathering in 1990 (as the original WCP plans had dictated), two further workshops 
were held in Villach and Bellagio, Italy in 1987. 194 Stewart Boyle and John Ardill 
note that: 
The Villach-Bellagio workshops were significant for two main reasons. Not 
only were global warming trends confirmed, but, for the first time, policies 
to respond to climatic change were discussed in detail and agreed. 195 
From these meetings, a cross-national agreement about climate change emerged. 
Although many aspects of the debate were still enwrapped by uncertainties, these 
191 The International Conference on the Assessment of the Role of Carbon Dioxide and Other 
Greenhouse Gases in Climate Variations and Associated Impacts, Villach, Austria, 9-15 October 1985 
(Geneva: WMO-No. 661). The scientific papers prepared for the conference, along with the 
conference statement, appear in The Greenhouse Effect, Climatic Change, and Ecosystems (SCOPE 
29) (Chichester: Wiley, 1986). 
192 German Bundestag (ed.), Protecting the Earth's Atmosphere: An International Challenge 
(Bonn: German Bundestag, 1989), p. 340. 
193 World Climate Programme, Developing Policies for Responding to Climatic Change (Geneva: 
WMO and UNEP, WCIP-1, WMO/TD-No. 225, April 1988), p. 2. 
194 Interview with Usher, op. cit., in note 55; and World Climate Programme, op. cit., in note 193. 
195 Stewart Boyle and John Ardill, The Greenhouse Effect: A Practical Guide to the World's 
Changing Climate (Sevenoaks: New English Library, 1989), p. 41. 
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scientists noted that ongoing human activities would cause substantial changes in 
the natural environment and, therefore, in the social environment as well. With the 
potential severity of these societal consequences being illuminated, national leaders 
began to consider the issue. 
Global warming first appeared on the international political agenda as a 
significant issue in 1988. in June of that year, over 300 individuals from 46 
countries attended a conference on The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for 
Global Security' in Toronto. With a mandate to 'consider the threats posed by the 
changing global atmosphere and how they might be addressed', this conference 
was the first major international political gathering to have global warming as one 
of its principle foci. 196 It is instructive to recognise that the state of the scientific 
debate was summarised by the Norwegian Prime Minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland, 
when she said: 'Scientists still have no unanimous view on the magnitude of the 
climate change problem, but it is established beyond any doubt that we will 
experience a global change in climate.' 197 Although individuals had flagged the 
potential dangers of a 'business-as-usual' policy, no 'unanimous' or consensual 
view about global warming had emerged. 
On both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, tangibility played a key role in the 
science-politics relationship at this time. First, in North America, the summer of 
1988 will be remembered as one of the hottest on record. The drought conditions, 
although not necessarily manifestations of global warming, galvanised interest in 
the issue for both policy-makers and the general public. 198 At this time, a writer 
for the scientific journal Nature noted that: 
[US] congressional attitudes about chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and carbon 
dioxide emissions are influenced far more by the fact that the corn in most 
of Iowa is nowhere near as high as an elephant's eye, and that outside the 
House and Senate chambers it has been stiflingly hot, than any number of 
scientific treatises on the subject. 199 
196 World Meteorological Organisation, The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global 
Security, Conference Proceedings (Geneva: WMO, No. 710, 1988). 
197 Quoted in Craig McInnes, 'Climate Change Called One of Mankind's Biggest Challenges', The 
Globe and Mail (Toronto), 28 June 1988, p. A5. 
198 Compare with the impact of the discovery of the ozone crater (op. cit., in note 97 and 
accompanying text). 
199 'Summer Heat Fires Policy Hares', Nature (Vol. 334, 11 August 1988), p. 457. 
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Second, erratic weather in the United Kingdom did much to increase speculation 
in that country that the climate was somehow changing. 20° More generally, the 
1980s was also proving to be one of the hottest decades of the century. 201 In 
these ways, some empirical evidence was being gathered which, at least 
superficially, appeared to support the scientific case that the global warming 
problem was genuine. 
Additionally, in response to policy-makers' demands for scientific 
investigations, the findings of the climatologists were being more widely heard 
within the political process at this time. One of the most significant statements in 
this regard was delivered on 23 June 1988. On this day, James Hansen of NASA's 
Goddard Institute for Space Studies in New York appeared before the US Senate 
Energy and Natural Resources Committee and declared that he was 99 per cent 
certain that the warming of the 1980s was not a chance event. 202 He went on to 
argue that it was time to stop stalling on the basis of scientific uncertainty and time 
to start taking action to address global warming. This statement attracted 
widespread attention, illuminated the importance of the issue and proclaimed a 
causal link. 
Even given both empirical evidence and expert testimony, however, scientific 
consensus about global warming remained elusive at this time for a number of 
reasons. First, there was no agreement that the observed changes in the weather 
had been caused by some larger global climatic shift. Second, many other highly-
respected atmospheric scientists in the US challenged Hansen's remarks and 
explicitly challenged the link between the warming trend and global warming. 203 
 Indeed, during the late 1980s, a number of uncertainties about the science of 
200 See, for example, the British press reports following the hurricanes of 1987 and 1988. 
201 By the end of the decade, it had been calculated that 6 of the 10 warmest years during the 
twentieth century had occurred in the 1980s (Nicholas Schoon, 'Scientists find Evidence of Global 
Warming', The Independent (London), 13 January 1990, p. 2). 
202 He said: 'The probability of a chance warming of that magnitude is about 1 percent. So, with 
99 percent confidence, we can state that the warming during this time period [the past 30 years] 
is a real warming trend.' (Statement of Dr. James Hansen, Director, NASA Goddard Institute for 
Space Studies, Greenhouse Effect and Global Climate Change (Hearing Before the Committee on 
Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, One Hundredth Congress, First Session on 
the Greenhouse Effect and Global Climate Change, Part 2) (S.Hrg 100-461 Pt. 2, 23 June 1988).) 
203 Stephen H. Schneider, Global Warming: Are We Entering the Greenhouse Century? (San 
Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books, 1989) pp. 194-98. 
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global warming remained2°4 and there was no agreement among members of 
the scientific community about what the ramifications of 'business-as-usual' would 
hold for the Earth's natural systems. Accordingly, the hypothesised precondition 
for international regime formation remained unsatisfied in the middle of 1988. 
2.2.4 -- Increasingly Consensual Opinion Regarding Global Warming, 1988-
1990 
Nevertheless, with such devastating predictions of both natural changes and their 
impacts upon socio-economic systems being voiced, the issue could not be 
ignored by politicians. Given the divergent scientific predictions, however, decision-
makers were finding it difficult to formulate policy. Martin Parry of Birmingham 
University noted that the politicians were saying to the scientists: 'You have to 
come clean. Is the greenhouse effect happening or not?'2°5 Thus, demands for 
a clearer scientific picture were being made in an increasingly urgent manner. 
In response, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was 
formed by UNEP and WMO in 1987. This group, which brought together most of 
the world's preeminent climatologists, met for the first time in Geneva in November 
1988. It was 'subsequently charged by [the UN General Assembly] with the task 
of preparing a comprehensive review of options and recommendations in response 
to global warming'. 2°6 For our purposes, the most important of the IPCC's three 
Working Groups was the one which investigated the science (IPCC I). Its Terms 
of Reference were that it should consider: 
factors affecting climate change, including greenhouse gases, responses to 
these factors of the atmosphere-ocean-land-ice system, assessment of 
current capabilities of modeling global and regional climate change and their 
predictability, past climate record and presently observed climate anomalies, 
204 Not only was the global climate system not fully understood, but there were a number of 
other phenomena that might have been responsible for the observed changes in the weather. For 
more information, see, for example: 'Holes in Data May Stall "Greenhouse" Remedies', The Globe 
and Mail (Toronto), 6 January 1989, p. D4; William Stevens, 'High-Minded Study of Mother Earth', 
The Globe and Mail (Toronto), 29 July 1989, p. D4; and Nigel Williams, 'Heat and Dust-ups', The 
Guardian (London), 25 May 1990, p. 25. For two sceptical views of the science of global warming 
that received much attention at the time of their respective publication and transmission, see Warren 
T. Brookes, 'The Global Warming Panic', Forbes (Vol. 144, No. 14, 25 December 1989), pp. 96-102; 
and The Greenhouse Conspiracy: An Edited Transcript (London: Channel 4 Television, 1990). 
205 Amit Roy, 'Hot News from the Pacific', The Sunday Times (London), 12 February 1989. 
205 Glen Plant, 'Institutional and Legal Responses to Global Climate Change', Millennium: Journal 
of International Studies (Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1990), p. 415. 
101 
projections of future climate and sea level and the timing of changes. The 
reports should identify the range of projections and their regional variations, 
gaps and uncertainties. The Working Group should reduce the uncertainties. 
A peer review should be incorporated in the preparation of the reports. 207 
In this way, the aim was to discover whether a consensual scientific view on global 
warming existed. 
Heeding the lesson of, among other past episodes, the ozone layer 
experience, there was a conscious effort to include scientists from as many 
different states as possible. Particular effort was expended in order to ensure the 
active participation of representatives from the developing world. 2°8 Prof. G.O.P. 
Obasi, head of the WMO, was one of the most vocal advocates of such a 
transnational approach. He notes that Southern states: 
wish to take part in the systematic observations, research and analysis. That 
means some need help, scientifically and financially. They require support 
for training and research. In addition, WMO & UNEP must provide 
'information packages' to create informed awareness in developing 
countries. The global observing networks on climate and greenhouse gases 
are inadequate in tropical regions and the southern hemisphere. WMO is 
seeking wide support for a special fund to assist countries in these regions 
to establish and operate observations stations. 209 
To further this objective, 'a Special Committee on the Participation of Developing 
Countries was created, chaired by France', in 1989 in order to try to ensure that 
participation would be as universal as possible. 21° By this means, the 
international group, under the chairmanship of John Houghton of the United 
Kingdom, began its deliberations on the science of global warming. 
While the scientific jury was out -- the IPCC did not present its first report 
until May 1990 -- scientific consensus remained lacking in international society. 
This, in turn, provided justification for policy inaction in the international system, for 
207 Quoted in Kilaparti Ramakrishna, North-South Issues, Common Heritage of Mankind and 
Global Climate Change', Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1990), 
p. 445, note 52. See, also, Jack Fitzgerald, 'The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Taking 
the First Steps Towards a Global Response', Southern Illinois Law Journal (Vol. 14, Winter 1990), 
pp. 231-55. 
208 For a further discussion of the role of the developing world in these issues, see Chapter 4 
of this thesis. 
209 'Global Warming: Progress on Strategies', Environmental Policy and Law (Vol. 19, No. 5, 
September 1989), p. 149. 
210 Ramakrishna, op. cit., in note 207, p. 442. 
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many actors publicly proclaimed that more needed to be learnt about global 
warming before any decisions could be taken. Some explicitly cited the IPCC 
deliberations, arguing that they would postpone political actions until their report 
was published. Others, meanwhile, simply cited the 'lack of science' rationale 
without explicitly anticipating the IPCC report. 
The state of the scientific deliberations played a particularly important role 
in policy-making in the United States at this time. US President George Bush often 
pointed to the gaps in the scientific knowledge as a rationale for advocating an 
intensive scientific response (i.e., more research), coupled with a cautious political 
response (i.e., do little or nothing). Indeed, in at least one instance, the Bush 
Administration even went so far as to 'rewrite the science', so that their policy-
rationale would appear to remain defensible. More specifically, a much-publicised 
episode, which did much to illustrate the intimate links between science and 
politics, occurred on 8 May 1989. On that day, 
a spokesman confirmed that the Office of Management and Budget had 
altered congressional testimony by Mr. James Hansen, director of the 
[NASA] Goddard Institute of Space Studies, on the so-called greenhouse 
effect, weakening his conclusion that enough is known about the 
phenomenon to justify immediate action. . The White House defended the 
editing as an effort to avoid the appearance of policy disagreements within 
the Administration, but the effect has been the reverse, within highly 
publicized congressional criticisms of the decision. The scientist himself said 
that the changes 'had amounted to altering the science', and added that he 
had been forced by the budget office to make changes that raised 
questions about the reliability of scientific advice on expected climate 
changes. Hansen believes the greenhouse warming may have already 
started. 211 
The political fallout from this episode was considerable, not only within the United 
States, but internationally as wel1. 212 
The US Administration brought its scientific scepticism to the international 
negotiations later that same year. At a ministerial conference in the Netherlands in 
November of 1989, the Americans claimed that there was insufficient scientific 
evidence to know by how much the emissions of greenhouse gases needed to be 
2111 Opposition to Global Warming Convention', Environmental Policy and Law (Vol. 19, Nos. 
3/4, July 1989), p. 116. See, also, 'Senators Press Bush on Global Warming Threat', International 




cut. 213 They therefore successfully blocked the inclusion of any timetables for the 
stabilisation of trace gas emissions, preferring a statement which maintained that 
'such stabilisation should be achieved "as soon as possible"'. 214 
The Americans continued to use the enduring scientific nonconsensus to 
justify policy inaction at a conference in April 1990. Following President Bush's 
election promise to implement the 'White House Effect', the President gathered 
international decision-makers for The White House Conference on Science and 
Economics Research Related to Global Change'. Bush opened the 17-nation 
conference by saying: 'What we need are facts.' 215 He continued:  
to emphasize scientific differences, citing a recent television interview in 
which scientists disagreed on the extent of temperature change. 'Two 
scientists, two diametrically opposed points of view,' Bush said. 'Now where 
does that leave us?'216 
Instead, Bush proposed a 60 per cent increase in spending for climate change 
research and called for further study to 'advance the scientific understanding we 
need if we are to make decisions' on remedial action. 217 In addition, an 
Administration paper on 'Talking Points' that was leaked was quite revealing of 
White House policy: 
Under the heading 'Debates to Avoid,' the paper advised delegates that it 
is 'not beneficial to discuss whether there is or is not warming, or how much 
or how little warming. In the eyes of the public we will lose this debate. A 
better approach is to raise the many uncertainties that need to be better 
understood on this issue:215 
Indeed, the US delegates even avoided the use of the term 'global warming', 'in 
213 'Global Warming Conference Falters', International Herald Tribune, 7 November 1989, p. 2; 
and Glenn Frankel, 'U.S. Leads Way to Weaker Global Warming Plan', International Herald Tribune, 
8 November 1989. 
214 Robert E. Morrison, Global Climate Change, CRS Issue Brief (Washington, DC: Cogressional 
Research Service, Library of Congress, 5 January 1990), p. 13. 
215 Quoted in Michael Weisskopf, 'Bush Says More Data On Warming Needed', The Washington 
Post, 18 April 1990, p. Al. Another report had the quotation in more vintage Bushesque: 'President 
Bush demanded "facts, the stuff that science is made of'.' (Myles Allan, 'No Time for Dead Certs', 
The Guardian (London), 9 November 1990, p. 29.) 
218 Weisskopf, op. cit., in note 215, p. Al. 
217 Ibid., p. Al. 
218 Michael Weisskopf, 'Climate Meeting Ends in Controversy', The Washington Post, 19 April 
1990, p. A19. 
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favor of the more innocuous "climate change". 219 
During the period of the IPCC's deliberations, other actors in international 
society also highlighted the scientific uncertainty in the global warming debate. With 
regard to other states' representatives, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union's 
officials were the ones who were most often citing gaps in the scientific knowledge, 
using this to explain their inaction. 223 Additionally, and perhaps most stridently, 
a number of representatives from the fossil fuels industry were articulating the need 
for a better scientific understanding before the conclusion of any international 
agreements. 221 
On the other side of the debate, however, a number of actors had endorsed 
the view that global warming was, indeed, happening and that its future impact, if 
unabated, would be significant. Officials from the Netherlands and West Germany 
were putting this view forward most emphatically. Indeed, the Dutch were the first 
to take policy action on global warming, setting a target in 1989 to stabilise carbon 
dioxide emissions at the 1989/1990 level by the year 2000 at the latest. 222 Their 
view about the authenticity of global warming first confronted the aforementioned, 
more tentative position at the Noordwijk conference in November 1989. 223 This 
meeting did not generate as much friction or controversy as did the subsequent 
White House Conference in April 1990. At this time, European representatives were 
frustrated by the US dependence on scientific nonconsensus. German 
environmental minister Klaus Topfer articulated the view of a number 'of states' 
decision-makers by noting that 'gaps in information should not be used as an 
219 Weisskopf, op. cit., in note 215, p. Al. 
220 They echoed the Americans' position with regard to the state of the scientific knowledge 
during the Noordwijk conference in November 1989 (op. cit., in notes 213 and 214). Moreover, the 
major recommendation from the UK government at this time was that 'additional funding be provided 
for research on the greenhouse effect' (House of Commons Environment Committee, First Report, 
Air Pollution, Volume 1 (Report and Appendices together with the Proceedings of the Committee 
Relating to the Report) (London: HMSO, 25 May 1988), p. xlvii). 
221 See, for example, a 'Discussion Paper on Potential Global Warming' published by Imperial 
Oil Ltd. (Canada) in early 1990. Although it was more forward-looking than many similar reports 
produced by other businesses, it nevertheless maintained that 'the first critical step is to improve 
scientific knowledge' (noted in Frank Dabbs, 'Imperial Adds Fuel to Global Warming Debate', The 
Financial Post (Toronto), 22 May 1990, p. 20). See, also, the discussion in Chapter 3.2 of this thesis 
on industry's position. 
222 Karen Schmidt, 'How Industrial Countries are Responding to Global Climate Change', 
International Environmental Affairs (Vol. 3, No. 4, Fall 1991), pp. 292-317. 
223 Op, cit., in note 213, and accompanying text. 
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excuse for worldwide inaction'. 224 They felt that there was sufficient scientific 
evidence to warrant serious policy consideration. 225 
Meanwhile, the presence of a variety of views regarding the persuasiveness 
of the collected evidence seemed to hamper what could be agreed in international 
declarations on global warming, for only cautious and tentative declarations about 
the state of the science were passed at this time.226 Until the middle of 1990, 
national leaders were able to advance the argument of scientific nonconsensus in 
a palatable manner by referring to the then-imminent report of the IPCC science 
working group. In other words, some members of international society viewed it as 
`acceptable' to delay further decisions until this scientific report had been tabled. 
The IPCC's first Working Group released its interim report in May 1990, 
finalised its report at a meeting in Sundsvall, Sweden in August 1990 and presented 
its findings to the Second World Climate Conference in Geneva in November 
1990. 227 The group's members were particularly eager to stress the fact that their 
findings represented the prevailing international scientific consensus on glolol 
warming: 
In the preparation of the main Assessment most of the active scientists 
working in the field have been involved. One hundred and seventy scientists 
from 25 countries have contributed to it, either through participation in the 
twelve international workshops organised specially for the purpose or 
through written contributions. A further 200 scientists have been involved in 
the peer review of the draft report. Although, as in any developing scientific 
topic, there is a minority of opinions which we have not been able to 
accommodate, the peer review has helped to ensure a high degree of 
consensus amongst authors and reviewers regarding the results presented. 
Thus the Assessment is an authoritative statement of the views of the 
international scientific community at this time. 228 
The Group was able to report that it was certain that 
224 Quoted in Weisskopf, op. cit., in note 215, p. Al. 
225 Other actors in international society were also arguing that the science warranted policy 
action. Representatives of some nongovernmental organisations were some of the most vocal in this 
regard. See Chapter 5.3 of this thesis for a further discussion of their role. 
226 See, for example, the resolution of the 15th UNEP Governing Council from the summer of 
1989, which notes that 'further scientific studies are needed' (reprinted in Environmental Policy and 
Law (Vol. 19, Nos. 3/4, July 1989), p. 118). 
227 J.T. Houghton, G.J. Jenkins and J.J. Ephraums (eds.), Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific 
Assessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for WMO and UNEP, 1990). 
228 Ibid., p. 
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emissions resulting from human activities are substantially increasing the 
atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide, 
methane, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and nitrous oxide. These increases 
will enhance the greenhouse effect, resulting on average in an additional 
warming of the Earth's surface. The main greenhouse gas, water vapour, 
will increase in response to global warming and further enhance it.229 
Additionally, the group's members were able to predict, based upon then-current 
models, the consequences of ongoing human activities: 
... a rate of increase of global mean temperature during the next century of 
about 0.3°C per decade (with an uncertainty range of 0.2 °C to 0.5°C per 
decade); this is greater than that seen over the past 10,000 years. This will 
result in a likely increase in global mean temperature of about 1 °C above the 
present value by 2025 and 3 °C before the end of the next century. The rise 
will not be steady because of the influence of other factors. 23°  
With this report, a substantial level of scientific consensus had been achieved 
among members of the worldwide community of atmospheric scientists. In this 
way, the first proposed precondition for international regime formation was, during 
the second half of 1990, satisfied on the global warming issue. 
The report was greeted with trepidation by some members of international 
society, for the scientists predicted, to the best of their abilities, global climatic 
change of unprecedented rates. The United Kingdom government was quick to 
respond to the interim report's publication, and in May 1990, its officials changed 
their position on the science -- most notably for the first time at a conference in 
Bergen, Norway. At this time, it was reported that: 'Britain has until recently been 
allied to the United States on this issue but over the last few weeks has been 
distancing itself from the United States.' 231 More generally, between May and 
December 1990, 14 of the OECD's 24 member-states initiated policies to stabilise 
or reduce emission levels of greenhouse gases. Additionally, three other states had 
already done so, and five other states, though not proclaiming unilateral goals, 
nevertheless endorsed the European Communities' target of the stabilisation of 
carbon dioxide emissions at the 1990 level by the year 2000. 232 Although 
229 Ibid., p. xi. 
230 Ibid., p. xi. 
231 Paul Brown, 'Global Warming Report Throws Down the Gauntlet', The Guardian (London), 
25 May 1990, p. 24. See, also, Nicholas Schoon, 'Experts Say the World Must Be Led by Example', 
The Independent (London), 26 May 1990, p. 3. 
232 Author's calculations from Schmidt, op. cit., in note 222. 
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numerous factors undoubtedly influenced these decisions, the timing suggests that 
the IPCC's findings had at least some bearing upon the course of policy adopted. 
2.2.5 -- Challenges to the Scientific Consensus, 1990-1991 
Members of the IPCC also, however, acknowledged that a number of uncertainties 
remained. This fact, coupled with the absence of any unqualified proof that 
greenhouse-induced global warming was happening, left the door open for 
politicians and others to continue to cite conflicting scientific advice as a reason for 
a cautious political programme. American officials were one such group that 
adopted this tactic. At the conference in Sundsvall, Sweden in August 1990, the US 
delegation proposed a number of amendments that claimed that the scientists' 
forecasts of global warming were still highly uncertain. 233 Although most of these 
were successfully opposed, some American changes were adopted, including one 
saying there were formidable difficulties for policy-makers in drawing up °a 
response to climate change and that information available for sound policy 
analysis was inadequate. It emphasised what it termed the remaining 
scientific uncertainties and also uncertainty about the costs. ... However, the 
amendment was countered with an Australian amendment underlining the 
wide scientific consensus on climate change. 234 
United States' officials were not the only ones to highlight the scientific 
discrepancies. In Sundsvall, the Soviet Union's delegates also questioned the 
findings and 'complained that some of the figures were "fictional".' 235 
United States' representatives continued to question the consensual view 
during the lead-up to the Second World Climate Conference in Geneva in 
November 1990. Just one week before the meeting began, US President George 
Bush was asked about the validity of the IPCC's report. He was reported to have 
replied: 'My scientists are telling me something very different.' 236 He was referring 
233 John Hunt, 'US Stand on Global Warming Attacked', The Financial Times (London), 30 
August 1990. 'The US, which was attending the conference for the first time, had until then 
[yesterday morning] opposed the use of the term "global warming" and proposed 46 pages of 
amendments to an executive summary only 31 pages long.' (Paul Brown, 'World Treaty on Climate 
Mapped Out', The Guardian (London), 31 August 1990, p. 20.) 
234 Hunt, op. cit., in note 233. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Quoted in David Nicholson-Lord, 'Bush Defies Alert on Global Warming', The Independent 
on Sunday (London), 4 November 1990, p. 6. 
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to a report from the George C. Marshall Institute in Washington, DC, which argued 
that other natural factors would offset global warming by cooling the Earth's 
atmosphere.237 Although most climatologists dismissed the report's validity, 238 
 its mere existence is evidence that some continued to question the scientific 
consensus on the issue. Furthermore, its covert-endorsement by President Bush 
also helps to explain the subsequent position advanced by the Americans at the 
Second World Climate Conference: 'The draft US ministerial resolution [for this 
conference said] that human action "may" be altering the atmosphere but "the state 
of our knowledge is imperfect -- many important uncertainties remain". 1238 
 Responding to this position, one NGO campaigner complained: 'Instead of the 
politicians working according to the answers they have been given by the 
scientists, they are moving the goalposts.' 24° 
Despite mounting evidence that appeared to confirm the consensual 
scientific position during 1991 241 -- an NAS report in the US went so far as to 
argue that 'even given the considerable uncertainties in our knowledge of the 
relevant phenomena, greenhouse warming poses a potential threat sufficient to 
merit prompt responses' 242 -- some actors continued to highlight the remaining 
uncertainties in the international negotiations. The Americans, in particular, still 
questioned the scientific consensus, 243 and they used this as a justification for 
237 Scientific Perspectives on the Greenhouse Problem (Washington, DC: George C. Marshall 
Institute, 1989). 
238 See the critique in John Gribbin, 'An Assault on the Climate Consensus', New Scientist (Vol. 
128, 15 December 1990), pp. 26-31. 
239 Nicholson-Lord, op. cit., in note 236, p. 6. Further, at a `private briefing last month, Robert 
Reinstein, a senior official at the US Department of State, complained that Continental European 
countries tended "to make the political commitment first, then gather the information". Anglo-Saxons, 
he said, did things the other way round.' (Ibid.) 
240 Steve Elsworth, Greenpeace's atmosphere campaigner, quoted in ibid., p. 6. 
241 After publishing its report, the members of the IPCC continued to meet to discuss the state 
of scientific knowledge of global warming (interview with Usher, op. cit., in note 55). 
242 United States Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy, Policy Implications of 
Greenhouse Warming — Synthesis Panel (Washington, DC: National Academy Press for the National 
Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering and the National Institute of Medicine, 
1991), quoted in Robert Pool, `NAS on Global Warming: "Insurance Needed", Nature (Vol. 350, 11 
April 1991), p. 449. Emphasis added. 
243 See, for example, the report of the second session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating 
Committee on a Framework Convention on Climate Change (Geneva, June 1991), in Sebastian 
Oberthur, 'Climate Negotiations: Progress Slow', Environmental Policy and Law (Vol. 21, Nos. 5/6, 
December 1991), pp. 193-95. 
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refusing to introduce any specific targets for stabilising or reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions.244 Such observations suggest that although a substantial consensus 
about the science of the global warming phenomena was in place at the end of 
1991, the nature of this consensus -- particularly, its emphasis upon uncertainty, 
together with the general lack of tangible evidence -- meant that it was susceptible 
to challenge in an (arguably) politically-acceptable fashion. In this way, the manner 
in which scientific information informed the political discussions was still an 
important part of the broader debate. 
2.3 -- Summary 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to explore the hypothesis that there must 
be a scientific consensus with regard to the issue under consideration before an 
international regime can possibly be formed. To achieve this aim, the emergence 
of a scientific consensus on issues of global atmospheric change, along with the 
way in which it influenced political processes, are examined. 
On the ozone layer issue, laboratory hypotheses during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s placed the problem upon the scientific agenda. The recognition that 
then-present and planned human activities could exacerbate the effect 
subsequently prompted its appearance upon the political agenda as well. While 
scientific activity intensified, however, different groups of scientists proposed 
different explanations of ozone layer depletion. Although the discovery of the ozone 
crater over Antarctica in 1985 highlighted the urgency of the issue, an agreed 
causal explanation also had to be in place before a broad scientific consensus 
could be formed. The 1987 AAOE trip to the Antarctic implicated CFCs in ozone 
destruction, and, with the publication of a report by the Ozone Trends Panel, the 
scientific consensus finally emerged in March 1988. In this way, the first 
hypothesised precondition was satisfied at this time. 
Although speculation about anthropogenic-induced climate change had been 
evident for centuries, significant scientific activity on the issue did not begin until the 
244 In its policy announced in February 1991, the US Government declared that as a result of 
currently planned actions, US greenhouse gas erKssions in the year 2000 would be equal to or 
below 1987 levels; it did not, however, make a commitment to any kind of target (America's Climate 
Change Strategy: An Action Agenda (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 
1991)). 
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1970s, when erratic variations in the weather encouraged such research. 
Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, feelings grew not only that a global 
warming was more likely than a global cooling, but that a 'business-as-usual' policy 
could bring about significant natural changes. In response to this speculation, the 
members of international society formed a multinational panel of experts to 
investigate further the phenomenon. Their report, published in 1990, confirmed that 
ongoing human activities would bring about enhanced global warming. In this way, 
it represented a significant worldwide scientific consensus on the issue, leading us 
to conclude that the first hypothesised precondition for international regime 
formation -- scientific consensus -- was satisfied by the middle of 1990. 
Nevertheless, the particular nature of the consensus -- which was based to a 
significant extent upon uncertainty and qualified evidence -- meant that science 
remained a viable negotiating tool in the .political deliberations. 
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Chapter 3 -- Tolerable Domestic Economic Costs 
In this chapter, the second hypothesised precondition for international regime 
formation is examined.' It is proposed that before an international regime can be 
formed, the leaders of the world's major industrialised states must conclude that 
any policy action prescribed by emerging principles in international society has a 
tolerable domestic economic cost. This proposition is inspired by the work of state-
centred scholars in international relations. 2 Building upon their ideas, let us 
consider the evolution of any sort of problem within international society. 
Initially, we can assume that an individual or a group of individuals has 
identified a difficulty in international society by drawing attention to the 
consequences of ongoing human activities. 3 Upon promulgation of their findings, 
other individuals or groups will be motivated to suggest and to table a number of 
new proposals for change that attempt to avoid the costs of policy inertia.. These 
new recommendations for policy action, however, will not automatically be taken 
up by states' leaders. Rather, it is hypothesised that the state's policy-makers 
(operating as a single entity, usually in the form of the national government) will 
estimate the costs and benefits associated with a recommended course of policy 
action. They, it is further suggested, will not be moved from their present course 
of policy until the net costs of a new proposal are perceived to be tolerable. If all 
of the leaders of the world's industrialised states find the costs of such policy 
action to be tolerable, then the formation of an international regime will be possible. 
In this way, it is proposed that tolerable domestic economic costs are a necessary 
(though not sufficient) condition for international regime formation. 
The use of the word 'tolerable' in this proposition, rather than, in particular, 
'rational', is deliberate. Use of the phrase 'rational policy action' would suggest that 
in order for an international regime to be formed, the payoffs in the international 
issue under consideration would have to change to such an extent that the issue 
could no longer be modelled as a dilemma of collective action. I am not suggesting 
that such a transformation is necessary for international regime formation. Instead, 
See Chapter 1.3 of this thesis. 
2 See Chapter 1.2.2 of this thesis. 
This idea is elaborated in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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by using the phrase 'tolerable', the hypothesis can be understood to suggest that 
there is a negative correlation between the willingness of states' leaders to 
contribute to the formation of an international regime and the domestic economic 
costs of such action. Instead of trying to quantify either the independent or the 
dependent variables, we should attempt to discern the direction of movement of 
the underlying trends, because this is the most significant indicator. The uncovering 
of this information may serve to further our understanding about international 
regime formation on the issues of ozone layer depletion and global warming. 
There are a number of difficulties with this approach, and they can be 
divided into two significant groups. First, there are many problems with the 
conceptualisation of the state as a unitary, rational actor. These are examined 
elsewhere in this thesis. 4 Even if one accepts this abstraction, however, there is 
another set of problems that emerge from suggesting that states' leaders use 
some sort of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) while formulating policy on issues of 
global atmospheric change. Two in particular stand out. 5 
The first difficulty arises when the analyst attempts to calculate the costs and 
benefits arising from any policy that aims to reduce environmental damage. 
Computing the cost of action is straightforward enough, for it will be the total 
expense of adapting the industrial processes that are discharging the blameworthy 
gases. We can speculate that a price can be assigned to this industrial 
reorganisation, because prices are normally used in this sector of society. Greater 
difficulties are, however, encountered when we try to estimate the monetary value 
of the benefits, because the benefits themselves -- resulting from the preservation 
of a stable, habitable, global atmosphere -- have no prices attached to them per 
se. Indeed, many critics are offended by 'the attempt to apply the market-place 
philosophy to [such] non-market situations'. 6 Nevertheless, upon deeper 
consideration, some sort of price structure can be determined. More specifically, 
by taking action to stabilise the atmosphere, society will avoid costs that it 
4 See the discussion in Chapter 1.2.2 of this thesis. 
5 Pearce notes another potential problem with CBA: 	the changes that may occur may be 
"non-marginal", i.e. of significant size and with the potential for disrupting some economies at a large 
scale. Cost-benefit analysis is essentially about marginal changes in variables.' (David Pearce, 
'Evaluating the Socio-Economic Impacts of Climate Change: An Introduction', in OECD, Climate 
Change: Evaluating the Socio-Economic Impacts (Paris: OECD, 1991), p. 19.) 
6 D.W. Pearce, Cost-Benefit Analysis, Second Edition (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1983), p. 4. 
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otherwise would have to face. Despite the fact that the link between present policy 
action and the perceived benefit is more obtuse in environmental issues than in 
non-environmental issues, a link remains. (Whether or not policy-makers are aware 
of the link, however, is a separate issue and one that must be discerned from the 
data.') The benefits -- that is the value of the avoided costs -- can nevertheless be 
identified, summed and presented. 8 
Once the problems associated with pricing environmental benefits are 
recognised, however, the analyst realises that the costs and benefits have different 
time horizons attached to them. Generally, the costs of stabilising the atmosphere 
have to be paid in the present, while the major benefits are not immediately 
available. Because the benefits will be obtained in the future, there is necessarily 
some sort of discount rate attached to them.9 'Such problems are referred to as 
"paternalistic bias", or "intergenerational equity" problems.' 19 Although any policy 
analysis will involve costs and benefits spread over different time horizons, there 
are problems with time horizon that are peculiar to the issues of environmental 
change. As a 1977 report on the ozone layer notes: 
7 Bear in mind that we are primarily concerned with the costs and benefits as perceived by 
states' leaders. It is important to distinguish between decision-makers' psychological environment 
and their operational environment. (See the work of Harold and Margaret Sprout -- for example, 
Harold and Margaret Sprout, 'Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics', in James 
N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy, Revised Edition (London: Collier-
Macmillan Limited, 1969), pp. 41-56.) 
8 This encourages us to open, however, a potentially more explosive Pandora's Box. More 
specifically, whenever one undertakes an effort to examine the 'value' of environmental or natural 
resource considerations, the inadequacies of the present way that states calculate their national 
accounts become apparent. Demonstrating how environmental factors do not enter the calculation, 
one commentator noted that, for example, 'a country that cut down all its trees, sold them as wood 
chips and gambled the money away playing tiddly-winks would appear from its national accounts 
to have got richer in terms of GNP per person' ('Growth Can Be Green', The Economist, 26 August 
1989, pp. 14-15). Of the less radical challenges to economic orthodoxy (i.e., the attempt to place 
prices upon things that do not have prices determined by 'real' markets), the work of David Pearce 
has caught the attention of many decision-makers. See, for example, David Pearce, Anil Markandya 
and Edward B. Barbier, Blueprint for a Green Economy (London: Earthscan, 1989). More recently, 
the World Resources Institute has attempted to recalculate Costa Rica's national accounts, while 
incorporating changes in the country's natural wealth. See Robert Repetto et al, Natural Resource 
Depletion in Costa Rica (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute), cited in 'Wealth of Nature', 
The Economist, 18 January 1992, p. 77. To pursue this debate to the extent that it deserves, 
however, is beyond the scope of this study. It is sufficient to recognise that such difficulties do exist. 
Pearce, op. cit., in note 6, Chapter 4. 
10 The Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 'Protection of the Ozone Layer -- Some 
Economic and Social Implications of a Possible Ban on the Use of Fluorocarbons', in Asit K. Biswas 
(ed.), The Ozone Layer (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1983), p. 146. 
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[A] problem arises because depletion of natural resources, or the use of an 
environment as a waste disposal sump, may bring about changes which 
within a given time-scale (sometimes in terms of several centuries, 
sometimes in terms of millenia) are irreversible. It is argued by some that a 
simple cost/benefit analysis does not take into account the costs of 
foreclosing of options to future generations that such a policy represents. 11 
Both the uniqueness and the irreversibility of much environmental capital 12 
 suggest that a traditional CBA might not be able to take proper account of the 
benefits of actions to preserve the environment. In addition, a 1988 report on global 
warming highlights the concept of risk: 
A major problem is the current practice of 'discounting' the future, since it 
is inappropriate to discount into present monetary values the risk of major 
transformations to the world of future generations. ... Methods are needed 
that build on the best of risk-business analysis and intergenerational equity 
studies, in order to take into account the complex character of long-term, 
large-scale effects of climatic change. 13 
Some environmental benefits are not inevitable, but are only probable '(or 
sometimes simply possible), because it is not certain that ongoing human activities 
will bring about particular, large-scale, deleterious changes. 14 Once again, 
therefore, a standard CBA may not be able to take into account these aspects of 
the issues. 15 
Alas, with such significant strikes against the use of CBAs, should the 
hypothesis associated with this precondition really be pursued? The answer must 
be a tentative 'yes', because despite its problems, some sort of CBA is the method 
with which many decision-makers try to make sense of the world around them. As 
David Pearce maintains: 
Arguably, the explanation [of the success of CBA] is very simple. Those 
11 Ibid., p. 146. Emphasis added. 
12 David Pearce, 'Economics and the Global Environmental Challenge', Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies (Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1990), p. 366. 
13 World Climate Programme (Impact Studies), Developing Policies for Responding to Climatic 
Change, (Geneva: WMO/TD, No. 225, April 1988), pp. 27-28. 
14 Nuclear reactor accidents offer an interesting analogy in this respect. 
15 There is, at present, no sufficient rejoinder to these criticisms of CBAs. However, even though 
environmental developments are not subject to perfect prediction, nor are other forms of social or 
economic behaviour. Indeed, we can only speculate that these characteristics of global atmospheric 
issues enhance the uncertainties associated with various anticipated futures. Regardless, it is clear 
that these methodological challenges do not preclude the use of CBAs by policy-makers. See, also, 
infra, in notes 16 and 17, and accompanying text. 
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who practised CBA had a real-world task to attend to. Someone had to 
decide on the priorities within any sub-budget of government expenditure. 
The niceties of academic interchange in the learned journals did little to aid 
those who had these tasks. Instead, it seemed that not only did CBA offer 
a technique for aiding the evaluative process, albeit subject to many 
caveats, it actually offered the only reasoned technique. Founded, as it is, 
in a very simple concept of rationality ... CBA also had a fundamental 
attraction of reducing a complex problem to something less complex and 
more manageable. 16 
Moving from a theorist to a practitioner, the observations of a Canadian Member 
of Parliament also suggest that this approach has validity: 'When an environmental 
initiative reaches the political level, the first hurdle to be cleared is the financial one. 
Most significant initiatives require a substantial commitment of funds, often at a time 
when revenues are shrinking.' 17 These comments suggest that the use of this sort 
of analysis is somewhat justified by the fact that such a perspective is often 
employed, partly out of a desire for tangibility, by decision-makers in international 
society. 18 
Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to explore the proposition that leaders 
of the world's major industrialised states will not consider policies to facilitate the 
resolution of collective action problems unless the perceived cost-benefit analysis 
that they undertake yields a 'tolerable' outcome. 19 To achieve this aim, the 
chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, the evolution of the 
domestic economic costs to preserve the ozone layer, as perceived by the 
industrialised states' leaders, is studied. The second section of this chapter 
presents an examination of the progression of perceived domestic economic costs 
16 Pearce, op. cit., in note 6, p. 21. 
17 Charles Caccia, 'OECD Nations and Sustainable Development', in David J.R. Angell, Justyn 
D. Colmer and Matthew L.N. Wilkinson (eds.), Sustaining Earth: Response to the Environmental 
Threats (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), p. 125. 
18 It should be recognised at this point that the focus in this chapter is solely upon economic 
costs and benefits. Thus, while state-centred theorists suggest more subtle contributing factors --
for example, the reduction of transaction and information costs (see Chapter 1.2.2 of this thesis) --
the analysis here is cruder, considering only the economic ramifications of policy action prescribed 
by emerging international principles. 
19 Other scholars who have considered international environmental issues have put forth similar 
hypotheses. One group, for example, concludes that 'the greater the perceived benefits of 
participation and the lower the perceived costs, the more enthusiasm nations will show in joining 
and adhering to an agreement' (Peter M. Morrisette, Joel Darmstadter, Andrew J. Plantingu and 
Michael A. Toman, Lessons From Other International Agreements for a Global CO2 Accord 
(Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, October 1990), p. 49). 
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to address the global warming issue. By studying the two issues in such a way, it 
is anticipated that our knowledge about the process of international regime 
formation on issues of global atmospheric change can be advanced. 
3.1 -- Tolerable Domestic Economic Costs and Ozone Layer Depletion 
As is recounted in Chapter 2, the actions of several individuals placed the issue of 
ozone layer depletion upon the international political agenda during the 1970s and 
1980s. A number of scientific assessments published during this period suggested 
that ongoing human activities could have damaging ramifications for states' 
citizens. Many of these reports went on to recommend regulation of the chemicals 
that were suspected of depleting the ozone layer. In light of this demand for 
government intervention, states' leaders called for information about the net costs 
of various regulatory actions. 
During the 1970s, reduction in emissions of ozone-depleting chemicals was 
central to all of the proposals for government regulation. If a particular state's 
leaders decided to limit that state's production and use of such chemicals, 
however, that state -- and, in particular, its chemical industry -- would have to incur 
significant costs. First, there would be the tangible expense of replacing the 
indicted chemicals with ozone-benign substances. Second, there would be the cost 
of forgoing the use of those products that use (or that are manufactured with) 
ozone-depleting chemicals and for which there were no substitutes. Third, there 
could be a price to be paid in terms of the international competitiveness of the 
state's industry. More specifically, if regulation were to forbid a country's chemical 
companies from producing certain chemicals, then that state might have to 
sacrifice important export markets. Additionally, if a state's chemical industry were 
unable to provide substitute chemicals and/or technology, then that state would 
be forced to increase its level of imports in order to satisfy domestic demand. 
Accordingly, the trade balance would deteriorate and thereby cause economic 
harm to that state. In these ways, therefore, regulation of ozone depleting 
chemicals could be costly. 
The primary benefits of regulatory action would be the value of the costs 
that would have been caused by a thinner ozone layer -- these include the 
expenditures associated with human health care (treating cancer, cataracts and 
117 
other ailments), lost agricultural production (both animal-rearing and crops), 
replacing manufacturing materials (which would weaken prematurely) and, because 
some ozone-depleting chemicals also act as significant greenhouse gases, the, 
consequences of a warmer global climate. 20 Additionally and more tangibly, the 
state that introduces regulatory action could also accumulate benefits by reaping 
the rewards of developing alternative chemicals or technologies. It may be able to 
sell them internationally, improve its trade balance and thereby accrue a number 
of such secondary benefits. 21 Let us now consider the history of the politics of the 
ozone layer to discern how the perceived costs and benefits associated with 
proposed policy action evolved. 
3.1.1 -- Unilateral Aerosol Bans During the 1970s 
Because the threat to the ozone layer did not take on significant international 
dimensions before 1974, 22 the point of departure for this section is the publication 
of the landmark Molina/Rowland paper in that year. 23 These two scientists 
concluded that the continued release of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) presented a 
threat to stratospheric ozone. In this way, their unexpected findings challenged the 
continued use of CFCs and thereby threatened a large industry. 24 
The significance of the Molina/Rowland theory for US industry in particular 
20 See UNEP, Synthesis Report, UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.II(1)/4, 13 November 1989, report of the 
Environmental Panel. 
21 This is simply a rudimentary outline of potential costs and benefits. The identification of these 
elements precludes neither the inclusion of other factors nor the use of a more complex structure. 
For an alternative hypothesis about costs and benefits on this issue, see ICF Incorporated, An 
Analysis of the Economic Effects of Regulatory and Non-Regulatory Events Related to the 
Abandonment of Chlorofluorocarbons as Aerosol Propellants in the United States from 1970 to 1980, 
with a Discussion of Applicability of the Analysis to Other Nations (Washington, DC: Aerosol 
Working Paper Series, Paper 1, October 1984), particularly pp. 1-4. 
22 See Chapters 2.1.1 to 2.1.3 of this thesis. 
23 Mario J. Molina and F. S. Rowland, 'Stratospheric Sink for Chlorofluoromethanes: Chlorine 
Atom-catalysed Destruction of Ozone', Nature (Vol. 249, 28 June 1974), pp. 810-12. 
24 Between 1960 and 1974, the use and manufacture of CFCs had been growing at an average 
annual rate of 13 per cent (Richard Elliot Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in 
Safeguarding the Planet (London: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 25-26), and chemical 
companies saw no reason for this trend to change. Instead, the profitability of manufacturing this 
'wonder chemical' was becoming more widely recognised, and growth in the industry had even 
forced Du Pont 'to consolidate its Freon manufacturing capacity in one large, backward-integrated 
unit at Corpus Christi, Texas, to obtain the lowest-cost position in an increasingly competitive 
business' (David A. Hounshell and John Kenly Smith, Jr., Science and Corporate Strategy: Du Pont 
R & D, 1902-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 584. Emphasis added). 
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and society more generally did not go unnoticed within American policy-making 
circles. In order to help US leaders better assess the appropriateness of regulatory 
action, a number of studies, designed to evaluate the net costs of various policies, 
were commissioned during the mid-1970s. 25 Although the number of conclusions 
reached almost equalled the number of studies undertaken, most of the major 
reports published during the mid-1970s agreed that regulatory action would have 
an immediate detrimental effect upon the American economy. A study by the US 
Department of Commerce's Domestic and International Business Administration, 
for example, 'calculated that a ban on the use of fluorocarbons from 1978 could 
cost billions of dollars and adversely affect the jobs of millions of workers'. 26 
Another finding that was common to almost every investigation was more 
specific. Studies revealed that the order of magnitude of the cost of policy action 
to the United States' economy would be determined by one key factor: whether or 
not substitutes existed for the ozone-depleting chemicals that would be regulated. 
If restrictions were implemented upon uses that did not have available substitutes, 
then there would be significant costs to pay, because many important goods and 
processes would have to be eliminated. But if appropriate substitutes did exist, 
then the costs of switching over to alternatives, although still significant (because 
new plants would have to be constructed and existing production facilities would 
have to be redesigned and retooled), would pale in comparison to the first scenario 
outlined. 
At this time within the United States, the challenge of finding adequate 
substitutes for CFCs was much easier in the case of aerosol propellants than 
refrigerants. 27 The development of substitute chemicals28 and alternative 
technologies for CFCs as aerosol propellants had been accelerated by, specifically, 
25 A good review of these studies can be found in The Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, op. cit., in note 10, pp. 141-167. 
26 'Fluorocarbons and National Economics', New Scientist (Vol. 68, 2 October 1975), pp. 17-18. 
See, also, 'Fluorocarbon Ban Could Cost US "Millions of Jobs", New Scientist (Vol. 67, 17 July 
1975), p. 160; and Gerald Wick, 'Spray Can Dangers', New Scientist (Vol. 67, 7 August 1975), pp. 
338-39. 
27 See, for example, Council on Environmental Quality, Federal Council for Science and 
Technology, Fluorocarbons and the Environment: Report of Federal Task Force on Inadvertent 
Modification of the Stratosphere (IMOS) (Washington, DC, June 1975), p. 4. 
28 By 1977, the percentage of aerosol products propelled by CFCs was only 29 per cent, down 
from 50 per cent in 1974 ('US Ban Nearer for Aerosol Cans', New Scientist (Vol. 74, No. 1050, 5 May 
1977), p. 254). 
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a change in public habits after the initial publicity surrounding the CFC-ozone layer 
hypothesis and by, more generally, the 1974-75 economic recession. 29 Outside 
the aerosol industry, meanwhile, neither replacement chemicals nor alternative 
technologies were available for the other major uses of CFCs. 3° Therefore, if CFC 
emissions had to be reduced, then a ban on their use in aerosol sprays would be 
the least costly means of achieving immediate reductions. 
In the absence of any benefits, however, a laissez-faire policy would 
obviously be preferable to one that brought about economic costs, no matter how 
small. The magnitude of the primary benefits, and indeed their sheer existence, was 
dependent upon the scientific estimations of eventual stratospheric ozone 
depletion. Because there were a number of uncertainties attached to the state-of-
the-art scientific understanding at the time, 31 the value of the benefits was difficult 
to estimate. 
One group, however, that was keen both to highlight the costs and to 
question the benefits of government intervention was the chemical industry. 
Wanting to protect its steady inflow of profits from CFC production, the industry 
was vehemently opposed to any kind of regulation. Igor Sobolev of Kaiser 
Aluminum & Chemical, for example, said: `We may be about to extrapolate an 
unproven speculation, one open to serious question, into conclusions and laws 
that could disrupt our economy and indeed our way of life.' 32 Meanwhile, Du 
Pont, the world's largest CFC manufacturer, 33 undertook a massive publicity 
campaign, arguing that 'there is time to find the answer. 34 The existence of the 
29 ICF Incorporated, op. cit., in note 21, p. 1. 
30 In the early 1970s, about 28 per cent of American CFC production was used 'as refrigerants 
in residential and commercial air conditioning and refrigeration, food storage and display, and 
automobile air conditioning', making it the second most important application. In 1975, however, it 
was 'reported by industry representatives that no suitable alternatives are presently known for the 
majority of refrigeration uses...' (Council on Environmental Quality, Federal Council for Science and 
Technology, op. cit, in note 27, p. 4). 
31 See Chapter 2.1 of this thesis. 
32 Quoted in Sharon L Roan, Ozone Crisis: The 15 Year Evolution of a Sudden Global 
Emergency (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1989), p. 38. 
33 In 1989, it was reported that Du Pont made about 25 per cent of the world's CFCs and 
'dominate[d] the U.S. market' (Pamela S. Zurer, 'Producers, Users Grapple with Realities of CFC 
Phaseout', Chemical and Engineering News, 24 July 1989, p. 8). 
34 From a Du Pont advertisement in Science (Vol. 190, 3 October 1975), p. 9. In this 
advertisement, Du Pont also claim that `[b]efore a valuable industry is hypothesized out of existence, 
more facts are needed' (p. 8). 
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calculated benefits were too uncertain, industry representatives argued, to justify 
burdening the United States with the substantial economic costs of regulation. 
In the eyes of American policy-makers, however, the relative weights of the 
costs and benefits shifted significantly after the publication of the National Academy 
of Science's 1976 report, in which it was estimated that eventual ozone layer 
depletion would most likely be 7 per cent. 35 A wish to avoid the future costs of 
policy inaction, coupled with a desire to be seen to be doing `something', 
prompted the US government `to set in train [in May 1977,] legislation to enact [a 
ban upon ozone depleting chemicals] by the end of 1978'. 36 The legislation, 
however, stopped short of the total prohibition of CFCs. More specifically, decision-
makers only went so far as to ban all CFCs in 'non-essential' aerosols. 37 
 Americans policy-makers had, therefore, made a distinction between non-essential 
aerosols and all other uses of CFCs. The former were subject to regulation 
because the economic costs were tolerable, while it was perceived that regulation 
to the latter -- in particular, any regulation that affected refrigeration 38 would 
create a significant economic burden. 
Although the ban affected `nearly [US] $3 billion worth of sales in a wide 
range of products', 38 the disturbance to the US economy as a whole, and even 
to the chemical industry in particular, was not severe. A writer in the journal New 
Scientist noted at the time that: `The [US]$4700 million a year chlorofluorocarbon 
industry had received due warning of last week's action and has already converted 
many of its aerosol products to alternative propellants such as carbon dioxide, 
hydrocarbons and simple mechanical pressure.' 4° Thus, in the end, 
35 See Chapter 2.1.4 of this thesis. 
36 Kiki Warr, 'Ozone: The Burden of Proof', New Scientist (Vol. 128, 27 October 1990), p. 37. 
37 'US Finalises Aerosol Ban', New Scientist (Vol. 77, 30 March 1978), p. 839. 
as The US Department of Commerce's Domestic and International Business Administration study 
noted earlier (op. cit., in note 26, and accompanying text) also argued that if a near total ban on 
CFC use were to be implemented from 1 January 1978, then 'more than 466 000 employees could 
be directly affected either by layoffs or curtailed employment' in the refrigeration industry alone 
(quoted in 'Fluorocarbons and National Economics', op. cit., in note 26, pp. 17-18). 
39 Richard Elliot Benedick, Protecting the Ozone Layer: New Directions in Diplomacy', in Jessica 
Tuchman Mathews (ed.), Preserving 019 Global Environment: The Challenge of Shared Leadership 
(London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991), p. 116. 
40 `US Finalises Aerosol Ban', op. cit., in note 37, p. 839. See, also, ICF Incorporated, op. cit., 
in note 21, p. 16. 
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`[e]conomically, the aerosol industry was to suffer little' from the ban. 41 
The United States was soon joined by Sweden (1979), Norway (1979, taking 
effect from 1 July 1981) and Canada (1980) in the implementation of 'can bans'. 42 
 We can speculate that these countries' decision-makers conducted similar cost-
benefit analyses to those in the US. 43 The conclusions, however, were not 
reproduced by many others, and the anticipated domino effect throughout the 
world did not take place at this time. In this way, we can hypothesise that the 
leaders of the world's other major industrialised states did not undertake domestic 
action because they viewed the sums differently, perceiving the costs of regulatory 
action to be intolerable. An examination of European decision-makers' attitudes 
and perceptions during the 1970s substantiates this assertion. 
The European Community was the second largest producer of CFCs during 
the mid-1970s, with West Germany, the. United Kingdom and France being the 
most significant contributors. 44 Accordingly, the industries in these countries were 
also placed under threat by the Molina/Rowland hypothesis. There were, however, 
significant differences between the Europeans' and the Americans' decision-making 
environments -- both psychological and operational. Because of these differences, 
decision-makers in the major CFC-producing states of Europe believed that CFC 
regulation in their states would result in fewer benefits and greater costs. 
Their perception of smaller benefits emanated, at least partially, from their 
assessment of the scientific reports that were published during the 1970s. As in the 
United States, industry representatives, particularly in the United Kingdom and 
41 Roan, op. cit., in note 32, p. 85. Indeed, instead of bringing economic costs, the ban actually 
brought economic benefits. 'Hydrocarbons, the replacement propellant, are less expensive than 
CFCs and saved the U.S. economy [US]$165 million in 1983 alone.' (Cynthia Pollock Shea, 
Protecting Life on Earth: Steps to Save the Ozone Layer (Washington, DC: Worldwatch Paper No. 
87, December 1988), p. 24.) See, also, ICF Incorporated, op. cit, in note 21, p. 4. 
42 T. Bunge, 'International Agreements', in Responsibility Means Doing Without How to Rescue 
the Ozone Layer (Berlin: The Federal Environment Agency, 1989), p. 172. Also note that Denmark 
introduced a can ban in 1984, with effect from 1 January 1987 (which also included the regulation 
of CFCs in solvents), as did New Zealand (solely a can ban) in 1988. 
43 Nothing more will be stated, for these countries were neither major producers nor consumers 
of CFCs. In 1974, Canada, for example, produced about 2.5 per cent of the worldwide total of CFCs 
(author's calculations from Environment Directorate, Fluorocarbons: An Assessment of Worldwide 
Production, Use and Environmental Issues (First Interim Report) (Paris: OECD, 1976), pp. 30-31, 
Table II). 
44 In 1974, the US produced 44 per cent of the reported world total of 1,048,391 tonnes of CFCs. 
Western Europe, as a whole, accounted for 32 per cent (author's calculations from ibid., pp. 30-31, 
Table II). 
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France, were highlighting the scientific uncertainties associated with the CFC-ozone 
layer hypothesis. In 1978, for example, a report published by the British Aerosol 
Manufacturers Association noted that there was much scientific confusion, and 
therefore 'there is no hazard in waiting for more definite scientific conclusions, nor 
any reason to restrict manufacturers' choice of propellants for aerosol cans'. 45 
 Additionally, Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), Europe's largest CFC manufacturer, 
issued a statement 'stressing the balance of evidence which [in 1978 showed] that 
there is no need for a panic ban on FCs as propellants in aerosol sprays'. 46 
 Coupled with this, however, and making the situation in Europe distinct from that 
in the United States, government-sponsored research was also stressing the 
uncertainties and challenging the validity of some of the suggested catastrophic 
ramifications of eventual stratospheric ozone depletion. 47 Accordingly, the 
magnitude of the benefits as perceived in Europe were not as large as they were 
in the United States. 
In addition, the costs of regulation for Europeans were seen to be higher for 
at least four different reasons. First, the Europeans used more CFCs in aerosols, 
both absolutely and proportionately, 49 than the Americans did. Therefore, any 
ban by European governments upon the use of CFCs in non-essential aerosols 
would affect a greater proportion of its industry, and could thereby be more 
economically disruptive in Europe than it had been in the United States. As an 
acute example of this difference, note the unilateral action taken by a large 
multinational company , in 1975. At that time, Johnson Wax decided to replace the 
CFCs in its aerosol products with other propellants. This decision, however, applied 
to its products in the US, not in the UK. This uneven application of policy may have 
been partially 'connected with national differences, both in product formulation and 
45 Cited in 'Verdict Still Open on Fluorocarbons', New Scientist (Vol. 79, 21 September 1978), 
p. 830. 
46 Cited in 'ICI Lashes Ozone Econuts', New Scientist (Vol. 80, 7 December 1978), p. 750. 
47 See Chapter 2.1.4 of this thesis. 
48 In 1973, approximately 0.95 billion aerosol units were filled in the United States, while 
approximately 1.70 billion were filled in Europe (author's estimates from Patricia L. Layman, 'Aerosols 
Back on Road to Success', Chemical and Engineering News, 28 April 1986, p. 42). 
49 In 1976, the EEC's proportion of CFC-11 and CFC-12 sales that were aerosols were 73 per 
cent, while in the United States, the figure was 48 per cent (Frudolf J. Engelmann, 'A Look at Some 
Issues Before an Ozone Convention', Environmental Policy and Law (Vol. 8, 1982), p. 53). 
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in public reaction to the ozone scare'. 56 However, because this policy change 
affected less than 5 per cent of the company's American aerosol business, while 
20 per cent of Johnson Wax's British aerosol business was CFC-propelled, 51 it 
is probable that the motivation was also, at least partially, economic. 
Second, the international trade in CFCs was very lucrative for a number of 
European states during the 1970s. Compared with the US, the Europeans exported 
a greater proportion of the CFCs than they produced. 52 The British, for example, 
had exports valued at £70 million in 1975.53 Thus, if the European states were to 
implement a production ban, then substantial export markets would have to be 
forsaken. Explicitly citing this as a rationale for its laissez-faire policy on CFCs, the 
UK Minister of State for the Environment, Denis Howell, said in 1975 that an 
aerosol ban could cause 'a considerable loss to our balance of payments' and 
have 'far-reaching repercussions on the aerosol industry'. 54 
Third, the European industry was operating at only approximately two-thirds 
capacity, while American industry was operating at nearly full capacity. 55 If we 
assume that, given the substantial fixed costs of chemical production, profitability 
depends upon capacity, then we can speculate that, ceteris peribus, gradually 
increasing cuts in production levels would have pushed European firms into the 
'red' sooner than their American counterparts. 56 Once this consideration entered 
the calculations, therefore, the cost-benefit analysis further dissuaded the 
Europeans from introducing regulatory action. 
Finally, the British and French had their own particular reasons for being 
so Martin Sherwood, 'Johnson Waxes Eloquent -- in US but not UK', New Scientist (Vol. 67, 3 
July 1975), p. 34. See, also, the discussion in Chapter 5.4.1 of this thesis. 
51 Sherwood, op. cit., in note 50, p. 34. 
52 Alice Enders and Amelia Porges, 'Successful Conventions and Conventional Success: Saving 
the Ozone Layer', in Kym Anderson and Richard Blackhurst (eds.), The Greening of World Trade 
Issues (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), p. 132. 
53 Department of the Environment, Central Unit on Environmental Pollution. Chlorofluorocarbons 
and their Effect on Stratospheric Ozone (London: HMSO, Pollution Paper No. 5, 1976), p. 6. 
54 Quoted in 'MP Calls for British Fluorocarbon Ban', New Scientist (Vol. 67, 7 August 1975), p. 
336. 
55 Peter H. Sand, 'Protecting the Ozone Layer: The Vienna Convention is Adopted', Environment 
(Vol. 27, No. 5, June 1985), p. 41. Even in 1986, it was noted that European industry 'is probably 
at only about 70% of its full capacity' (Lois R. Ember et al, 'Tending the Global Commons', Chemical 
and Engineering News, 24 November 1986, p. 52). 
56 I am grateful to Richard Jerram, Economist Intelligence Unit, London, for a clarification on this 
point. 
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suspicious of the Americans' enthusiasm for CFC regulation. The US decision on 
landing rights for the Concorde was still fresh in the memories of French and 
British decision-makers, and they suspected that US policy on ozone layer 
protection 'was being motivated by economic concerns (the threat of European 
dominance in supersonic flight) rather than environmental concerns. ... [The British 
and French] were angered by what they saw as U.S. "environmental 
neocolonialism".'58 With the American Boeing programme shelved and the British 
and French continuing to develop, albeit on a limited scale, an SST, it was 
generally believed that the Europeans were overtaking the Americans in this 
strategic sector. 59 Thus, the Europeans suspected that the re-opening of the 
ozone layer debate, ostensibly by the CFC-route, was a backdoor method to 
sabotage the Concorde project, whose demise would damage the British and 
French economies. 
Although these four observations suggest that the commercial concerns 
strongly influenced policy-making in West European countries, 60 European 
legislators did, nevertheless, take some action. 
In August, 1977, the Commission of the European Communities drafted a 
proposal calling upon member states to increase the search for 
fluorocarbon substitutes, to halt the leakage of fluorocarbons, and to restrict 
production of fluorocarbons to 1975 levels. 61 
No regulation of any sort, however, was adopted in either 1977, 1978 or 1979. 62 
 Although some EC members were pushing for strong European regulation, 
specifically the West Germans63 (particularly towards the end of the decade), 
57 The US had only granted limited landing rights to the European SST (Lydia Dotto and Harold 
Schiff, The Ozone War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1978), Chapter 5). 
58 Peter M. Morrisette, 'The Evolution of Policy Responses to Stratospheric Ozone Depletion', 
Natural Resources Journal (Vol. 29, No. 3, Summer 1989), pp. 800-01. 
59 Within the United States, 'it was widely believed at the highest level of government and 
industry that the future of the U.S. aircraft industry as well as the prestige and dominance of U.S. 
technology rest with the successful development of an SST' (ibid., p. 801). 
so For a forceful argument supporting this view, see Benedick, op. cit., in note 39, pp. 116-18. 
61 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, 'International Regulation of Fluorocarbons', The Harvard 
Environmental Law Review (Vol. 2, 1977), p. 478. Research was also being undertaken, for the 
'European Commission [was also] studying the use of CFCs as well as the economic and social 
impacts of regulating their use in aerosols' ('Verdict Still Open on Fluorocarbons', op. cit., in note 
45, p. 830). 
62 A 'loose' production cap was agreed in 1980. See infra, in note 94, and accompanying text. 
ea 'ICI Lashes Ozone Econuts', op. cit., in note 46, p. 750. 
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British and French actions effectively thwarted any significant action." These two 
states' representatives 'opposed a wider negotiation mandate for the Commission. 
... As the Council had to decide unanimously, these countries determined the EC's 
position:65 Therefore, the EC action that was taken was primarily defensive, and 
mainly symbolic. 
The leaders of the major industrialised states perceived the costs and 
benefits of regulatory action on CFCs differently during the 1970s. In the United 
States, results of the analysis prompted the implementation of an aerosol ban in 
1978. Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, the British and the French 
interpreted the results differently and did not believe that any regulation would be 
economically tolerable. Their resistance in effect stymied any EC efforts. Thus, with 
some players not perceiving the costs of any form of regulation to be 'tolerable', 
the hypothesised precondition for international regime formation remained 
unsatisfied at the end of the 1970s. 
3.1.2 -- Declining Support for Regulation, 1980-1985 
During the latter part of the 1970s and the first part of the 1980s, many in the US 
wanted the regulations on CFCs to be extended. In particular, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), prompted by the National Academy of Science's 
predictions of higher levels of eventual ozone depletion, 66 was investigating the 
possibility of broadening the restrictions upon CFCs `to cover non-aerosol uses 
such as refrigerants, foaming agents and solvents'. 67 
Industry representatives, however, continued to oppose restrictions, 
demanding 'clear scientific evidence' that CFCs posed a threat to humans and the 
64 The United Kingdom government, for example, while calling for more investigation into the 
ozone layer question, only informally 'advised industry to intensify the search for substitutes and to 
reduce fluorocarbon leakage' (Vandevelde, op. cit., in note 61, p. 477). 
65 Markus Jachtenfuchs, The European Community and the Protection of the Ozone Layer', 
Journal of Common Market Studies (Vol. 28, No. 3, March 1990), p. 265; and interview with Tim 
Leah, Environment Canada, National Secretariat for UNCED, Ottawa, 2 January 1991. 
66 The NAS released a report in November 1979, which estimated eventual ozone depletion to 
be 16.5 per cent. See Chapter 2.1.4 of this thesis. 
67 David Dickson, 'Congress Faces Decision on CFC', Nature (Vol. 293, 3 September 1981), p. 
3. See, also, Colin Norman, 'Satellite Data Indicate Ozone Depletion', Science (Vol. 213, 4 
September 1981), pp. 1088-89. 
126 
environment. 68 This position was being articulated most directly by a coalition 
called The Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy ('the Alliance'). Formed in 
September 1980, it was organised 'to represent the interest of [CFC] user and 
producer industries in the United States'. 69 During the early 1980s, its most 
pressing task 'was to convince the [US] government -- Congress, the White House 
and anyone else -- that EPA's proposal to restrict CFCs is ill-advised'. 70 Although 
the conflict during the first half of the 1980s seemed to consist of the same two 
sides presenting, roughly, the same arguments as they had during the 1970s, other 
factors were shifting the benefits and costs as perceived by US decision-makers 
at this time and thus changing the complexion of the debate. The movement was 
such that government officials in the United States believed it not to be in the 
country's interests to impose further regulation upon ozone-depleting chemicals. 
The perceived value of the future. benefits was declining, because it was 
being predicted that eventual ozone layer depletion would be lower than originally 
envisaged. Two developments led policy-makers to reach this conclusion. First, the 
international scientific group that was studying the issue was steadily revising its 
calculation of ozone depletion -- downward. 71 Because a good 'rule of thumb' 
suggested that there was an inverse linear relationship between the quantity of 
stratospheric ozone and the incidence of cancer," the estimated cost of future 
health care was therefore also falling at this time. 
Second, primarily because of the US 'can ban', the use of CFCs was 
declining worldwide." With fewer CFCs being discharged into the atmosphere, 
the level of eventual ozone depletion was thought to be decreasing, and 
68 Robert W. Hahn and Albert M. McGartland, 'The Political Economy of Instrument Choice: An 
Examination of the U.S. Role in Implementing the Montreal Protocol', Northwestern University Law 
Review (Vol. 83, No, 3, Spring 1989), pp. 598 and 607. 
The Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy, The Montreal Protocol: A Briefing Booklet (Rosslyn, 
VA: The Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy, December 1987), p. 
70 Comments of an industry spokesman to The New Yorker magazine (quoted in Roan, op. cit., 
in note 32, p. 103). 
71 See Chapter 2 of this thesis, particularly Table 2.1. 
72 At this time, it was accepted that a 1 per cent decrease in stratospheric ozone levels would 
cause a 2 per cent increase in ultraviolet radiation (Department of the Environment, Central Unit on 
Environmental Pollution, op. cit., in note 53, p. 8). 
73 CFC production in the Western world dropped between 1976 and 1981 (Chemical 
Manufacturers' Association, Production, Sales, and Calculated Release of CFC-11 and CFC-12 
Through 1988 (Washington, DC: CMA, 1989)). 
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accordingly, the value of the perceived benefits of further regulation was also 
diminishing. Although the influence of declining production levels is being partially 
double-counted in the present analysis (because they were also being accounted 
for by the scientists in their predictions), it nevertheless did help to diminish the 
magnitude of the perceived benefits. More specifically, because the revised 
depletion estimates were generally held to be independent of the downward trend 
in CFC-use, the latter independently strengthened an increasingly-held view that the 
problem of ozone layer depletion was quickly receding. In this way, policy-makers 
perceived benefits to be falling more rapidly than the scientific evidence and the 
statistics perhaps justified. 
More generally, the new Reagan Administration's election in 1980 reflected 
a change in popular opinion within the United States. The 1980s was, in many 
ways, a period during which the importance of the individual and the free market 
were emphasised. Self-confidence was considered an admirable value, and it in 
turn motivated self-promotion and self-advancement. Consequently, the interests 
of others -- fellow citizens or future generations -- may have been accorded less 
importance. In this way, we can speculate that the perceived discount rate was 
increasing at this time -- thereby lowering the present-day value of any future 
benefits. 
Further, those diminished benefits that remained were being accorded less 
visibility during the early 1980s for two important reasons. First, the case advancing 
the benefits' values was not being pushed as firmly during this period as it had 
been during the 1970s. In particular, the US Environmental Protection Agency, 
whose members had done so much to highlight the value of regulatory action 
during the 1970s, adopted a different position. Owing to staffing changes in the 
organisation74 -- not least of which was the appointment of Anne Gorsuch as its 
head -- the EPA did not pursue the issue vigorously, with Gorsuch dismissing 
ozone layer depletion as just another environmental scare. 75 
Second, in light of President Reagan's Executive Order 12291, signed shortly 
74 Peter M. Haas, 'Obtaining International Environmental Protection through Epistemic 
Consensus', Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1990), p. 355. 
75 See Chapter 2, note 90 of this thesis. 
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after he took office, all major new regulations had to undergo benefit-cost 
analysis. 76 It was, however, quite difficult to quantify the benefits of regulatory 
action to restrict CFC usage. In a general sense, as Charles Caccia notes, 
proponents of regulation must 'search desperately for an assessment of the true 
cost to the economy of not taking action. Data are often not available and such 
costs are not easily calculated.' 77 More specific to the ozone layer issue, Anil 
Markandya notes that at this time, 'there were no studies showing how the damage 
attributable to these chemicals compared to the costs of limiting their use'. 78 
 Advocates stressing the benefits of regulatory action to save the ozone layer could 
thus only substantiate their case with 'soft', qualitative evidence. 79 Their 
assessments were therefore more susceptible to attack in the public debate. Thus, 
for a variety of reasons, the perceived benefits of regulatory action were falling 
during the early 1980s. 
Additionally in the United States, the perceived costs of regulation were 
increasing at this time. Members of the Alliance were highlighting these shifts, 
stressing the immediate economic costs of legislative action. The theme of the 
members' arguments was not new; industrial interests had issued similar dire 
warnings in the campaign against the aerosol ban during the second half of the 
1970s. This time, however, the arguments seemed to impress decision-makers to 
a greater extent. Three reasons are suggested for this change in perception. 
First, the Reagan Administration was averse to any sort of regulation at all, 
instead preferring to take government out of the homes and workplaces of the 
nation. 8° Second, the small-c conservative nature of the Administration made it 
keen to protect the interests of business. As Sharon Roan notes, the 'Reagan 
administration was also sympathetic to the idea that additional CFC regulations 
76 V. Kerry Smith, 'Environmental Policy Making Under Executive Order 12291: An Introduction', 
in V. Kerry Smith (ed.), Environmental Policy Under Reagan's Executive Order: The Role of Cost-
Benefit Analysis (London: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), p. 4. 
77 Caccia, op. cit., in note 17, p. 125. 
78 Anil Markandya, 'Economics and the Ozone Layer', in David Pearce (ed.), Blueprint 2: 
Greening the World Economy (London: Earthscan, 1991), p. 64. 
79 Titus notes that some EPA studies had to highlight seemingly peripheral matters, such as the 
price of replacing plastics damaged by increased ultraviolet radiation (James G. Titus (ed.), Effects 
of Changes in Stratospheric Ozone and Global Climate, Volume 1 (Washington, DC: US EPA, 1986), 
p. 7). 
8o Alan S. Miller and Irving M. Mintzer, The Sky Is the Limit: Strategies for Protecting the Ozone 
Layer (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, Research Report No. 3, November 1986), p. 21. 
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would cause grave economic hardships' 81 -- in particular, the effect that it would 
have on small businesses. 82 Finally, the predictions of dire economic straits were 
being made against the backdrop of a global economic recession. Hence, any 
policy that would cause layoffs and economic disturbance was held to possess a 
higher marginal cost (both economically and politically) at this time than had been 
the case during economically more buoyant periods. 
In addition to the prospects of unemployment and foreclosure of small 
businesses, members of the Alliance were also noting that the price of substitute 
chemicals was higher than the price of CFCs. Recall that any further regulation in 
the US at this time would have to be imposed upon applications other than 
aerosols. This would prove more difficult, for studies undertaken 'for the EPA from 
1978 to 1982 could find potential substitutes for only a third of CFC 
applications'.83 
It is instructive, at this point, to examine further the interesting relationship 
between government and industry. In a general sense, alternative strategies or 
substitutes will become less costly to produce only after substantial research has 
been undertaken. But private enterprise will not conduct such research into 
alternatives to destructive environmental activities unless it is in their economic 
interest to do so. It may be, at times, worth their while to develop environmentally-
sound products simply in order to improve their public image. But, in the vast 
majority of instances, such activities are not undertaken merely for considerations 
of good-will. Instead, research and development into alternatives and substitutes 
will only be funded if the price of substances used at present increases. Basic 
economic theory teaches us that the cost of present products will rise with the 
threat of scarcity (when either the commodity is being depleted or a regulatory 
body is threatening its future supply -- for example, an announcement that it will be 
banned, or its production restricted, by legislation). Thus, one condition that 
accelerates the development of alternatives is the prospect of government 
regulation. A study of the ozone layer depletion issue suggests that there is a direct 
81 Roan, op. cit., in note 32, p. 105. 
82 'In the spring of 1981, CFCs were a [US]$500 million industry. The Alliance claimed that 
260,000 businesses, most of them small, used CFCs, and that no substitutes were available for most 
applications.' (Ibid., p. 109.) 
83 Alan S. Miller, 'Policy Responses to Global Warming', Southern Illinois Law Journal (Vol. 14, 
Winter 1990), p. 201. 
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correlation between the threat of government regulation and the development of 
substitute chemicals. 
The threat and implementation of regulations during the 1970s prompted the 
major chemical companies in the West to undertake research and development 
into new, ozone-benign substances that could replace chlorofluorocarbons. In the 
UK during this period, for example, ICI spent £5 million developing benign 
alternatives. 84 Work progressed to such an extent that ICI patented some of the 
technology on HFC-134a (which eventually became one of the most significant 
replacement chemicals). 85 Similarly, in the US, Du Pont and the other major 
chemical companies were also undertaking research programmes, 86 and by 1979, 
`several substitute chemicals had been identified'. 87 Although none could be 
produced as cheaply as CFC-11 and CFC-12, 88 advances in research and 
development were nevertheless reducing the anticipated market price of the new 
chemicals. In this way, during the mid and late 1970s, the economic costs of 
further regulation were decreasing. 
As the 1970s ended and the 1980s began, toxicological and environmental 
tests were being carried out on these chemicals in order to prepare them for the 
marketplace. 89 Although costs were mounting, company officials were anticipating 
further regulation on ozone-depleting substances and thus substantial future 
markets for the new chemicals. These expectations justified the short-term 
expense. The situation, however, changed dramatically during the early 1980s. 99 
 For the reasons mentioned above, the threat of regulation receded. Consequently, 
84  United Kingdom House of Commons Environment Committee, First Report, Air Pollution, 
Volume 1 (Report and Appendices together with the Proceedings of the Committee relating to the 
Report) (London: HMSO, 25 May 1988), p. xl. 
85 Telephone interview with George Barnett, Senior Product Manager, responsible for HFC134a, 
ICI, Runcorn, UK, 4 April 1991. 
86 Michael Oppenheimer and Robert Boyle, Dead Heat: The Race Against the Greenhouse Effect 
(London: I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd., 1990), pp. 158-59. 
87 Roan, op. cit., in note 32, p. 100. 
88 Ibid., p. 100. 
89 'It usually takes the chemicals industry between 7 and 10 years to bring a new product onto 
the market.' (Hugo Steven and Andy Lindley, 'The Race to Heal the Ozone Layer', New Scientist 
(Vol. 126, 16 June 1990), p. 48.) 
so Interview with M. J. Flux, Group Environment Adviser, ICI Group Headquarters, Group 
Personnel Department, London, 1 March 1990. See, also, Meirion Jones, 'In Search of the Safe 
CFCs', New Scientist (Vol. 118, 26 May 1988), p. 57. 
131 
the anticipated existence of future markets for the alternative chemicals also 
diminished. Because industry could no longer be certain that it would recoup its 
research and development costs, continued expenditure into the substances could 
no longer be justified. 91 All of the major chemical companies, therefore, 
abandoned their investigations into CFC-alternatives. ICI's Chief Executive told the 
UK House of Commons Environment Committee in 1988 that had ICI continued its 
research programme, it 'would have been doing so in a complete commercial 
vacuum'.92 Similarly, Donald Strobach, director of Du Pont's Environmental 
Division, observed: 'No matter how good a material is, if no one will buy it, what 
good is it? ... The (research) program came to an end because there wasn't 
enough interest.' 93 Therefore, with research programmes stagnating, the costs 
of substitute chemicals ceased falling during the early 1980s. Thus, in the United 
States at this time, a combination of decreasing benefits and increasing costs 
contributed to a decision-makers' resistance to impose further regulatory controls. 
During the first half of the 1980s, the Europeans maintained the position that 
they had adopted during the 1970s. Citing the economic balance as a justification 
for a laissez-faire policy, they did not cut back their production of CFCs. Granted, 
they did adopt a very loose regulatory 'production cap' in 1980. 94 Although, on 
paper, this move may have appeared to have had a restrictive effect, Richard 
Benedick argues that its commitment to a 30 per cent cutback in CFC aerosol use 
from 1976 levels was really only 'a trivial target, since European sales of CFCs for 
91 'As ICI Americas, a subsidiary of a British chemical giant, put it, "Further studies [of the 
substitutes] would require major investment in new plants to produce sufficient material," investments 
the companies were not then prepared to make.' (Oppenheimer and Boyle, op. cit., in note 86, p. 
158.) If they continued to do so, then resources would have to be diverted from other areas -- this 
might give competitors an advantage. 
92 Quoted in Neil Kinnock, 'The Holes in the Ozone Policy', The Guardian (London), 4 March 
1989, p. 23. See, also, op. cit., in note 84. 
93 Quoted in Roan, op. cit., in note 32, p. 100. 
94 EC Decision (80/372) said that: 
1. Production capacity for CFC types Fl 1 and F12 should not be increased. 
2. By the end of 1981 the use of these substances in aerosol cans was to be reduced by 
at least 30% of 1976 levels. 
The concept 'production capacity' was defined in a subsequent Decision passed in 1982 
(82/795). 
(Quoted in Bunge, op. cit., in note 42, p. 165.) See, also, Nigel Haigh, EEC Environmental Policy and 
Britain, Second Revised Edition (Harlow: Longman, 1989), pp. 265-70. 
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aerosols had already declined by over 28 percent from their 1976 peak, mainly as 
a result of West German actions'.95 The interests of both the West European 
states' chemical companies and the same states' economic well-being overrode 
any perceived benefits that might have been obtained. Thus, with all of the major 
players perceiving regulatory action to be too costly, the satisfaction of the 
hypothesised precondition for international regime - formation did not advance 
during the early 1980s. 
The ozone layer issue entered a new dimension with the discovery of an 
ozone crater above Antarctica in 1985. 96 In the immediate aftermath of this 
discovery, however, industry's position did not change. Rather, the representatives 
of the major chemical companies greeted the findings with a fair measure of 
scepticism. Although the discovery did accelerate the feeling that something 
needed to be done, there had been so many contradictory findings in the past that 
no one in industry wanted to react in a 'knee-jerk' manner. 97 Caution was thus 
the order of the day. 98 
Internationally, cost-benefit analysis continued to inform the policy positions 
of the major states' representatives during the negotiations towards a Protocol in 
late 1985 and early 1986. The inability to resolve the debate about the availability 
of substitutes, a key economic determinant, had prompted a series of workshops 
to be convened in 1986. 99 At the first of these workshops, held in Rome from 26-
30 May 1986, 75 participants examined a wide range of issues. lw Any sort of 
consensus upon regulatory strategy, however, could not be reached, because the 
major players, informed by different perceptions of costs and benefits, adopted 
divergent policy stances. 
The Americans and their supporters (known as the 'Toronto Grou p'101) 
95 Benedick, op. cit., in note 24, p. 25. 
ss See Chapter 2.1.6 of this thesis. 
97 Interview with Barnett, op. cit., in note 85. 
98 Many believed that the hole was not 'a major factor in industry's [subsequent] reassessment' 
(Ember et al, op. cit., in note 55, p. 48). The industry position, instead, remained that there was both 
a need to reduce the scientific uncertainties and a need to develop cheap, safe substitutes (Roan, 
op. cit., in note 32, pp. 156-57). 
99 Telephone interview with G. Victor Buxton, Environment Canada, Hull, 3 January 1991. 
100 
 For more information, see UNEP, Annual Report of the Executive Director, 1986 (Nairobi: 
UNEP, 1986), p. 61. 
101 This group also included Canada, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries. 
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advocated global control of CFC usage in aerosols. Having implemented such 
bans during the late 1970s, this option was the economically most-preferable route 
for two important reasons. First, because this ban had already been undertaken, 
no further regulation would be necessary. And second, because their chemical 
industries had already had to eliminate CFCs from aerosols, they were well-
advanced in developing alternative technologies and substitute chemicals. Hence, 
a global ban could open up lucrative export markets for this group's (admittedly, 
primarily American) firms. 
Meanwhile on the other side of the Atlantic, the Europeans were still only 
willing to discuss a cap on production, because they argued that any ban on 
particular end uses would only be a temporary remedy. In addition, however, an 
economic analysis suggests that they also continued to place a high value upon 
the interests of their domestic chemical industries, for they recognised that an 
aerosol ban would allow the Americans, for the reasons outlined above, to 
capitalise upon an important comparative advantage. 102 
Thus, it should come as no surprise that the Rome meeting was 'a grave 
disappointment, characterised by bad temper and disagreement'. 103 One 
commentator notes that the Europeans 'still considered the ozone threat ... a big 
hoax, a way for the US, which had already developed alternative chemicals, to try 
and capture the marker. 104 In the middle of 1986, the major players perceived 
different costs and benefits associated with different courses of action. Because 
there was no policy that was perceived by all players to have 'tolerable' economic 
costs, satisfaction of this hypothesised precondition remained elusive at this time. 
3.1.3 -- Rapidly Shifting Perceptions of Costs and Benefits in the United 
States, 1986 
For individuals in the United States, however, the economic calculation shifted 
102 An aerosol ban would not only sacrifice important European export markets for CFCs, but 
could also force Europe to increase its levels of imports, in order to satisfy domestic demand for 
alternative chemicals. Obviously, this would be a double-blow to any country's trade balance 
(Benedick, op. cit., in note 39, p. 117). 
103 Geoffrey Lean, Action on Ozone (Nairobi: UNEP, 1989), p. 7. Also, interview with Peter Usher, 
Co-ordinator, Global Environmental Monitoring Service (Atmosphere), United Nations Environment 
Programme, Nairobi, Kenya. 
104 Anne Mcllroy, 'Can the Poor Pay'?', Our Fragile Future (Southam Publications, 7 October 
1989), p. 11. 
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dramatically during the second half of 1986. Perceived costs decreased and 
perceived benefits increased for American industry representatives at this time. This 
change was so great that a threshold was crossed, and the American chemical 
industry found it in its interest to support some sort of regulation for the first time. 
This shift in perception was articulated by a significant change in Alliance policy on 
16 September 1986. On that day, Alliance President Richard Barnett 'announced 
support for a "reasonable global limit" on CFC growth. Large increases in CFC 
emissions, said the Alliance, would be "unacceptable to future generations." 105 
 He cited the mounting scientific evidence of stratospheric ozone depletion --
particularly NASA's recent estimates and the continuing Antarctic mystery -- as the 
reasons for the change in policy. 106 Although the public declaration was that the 
policy shift was inspired by scientific evidence, the presence of increasing benefits 
and decreasing costs also suggest that the result of the economic analysis made 
a powerful contribution to the decision. 
The benefits of regulatory action were seen to be increasing on two fronts. 
First, in 1986, a draft study by the EPA estimated that the 'incidence of skin cancer 
could increase significantly if [CFC] emissions continue unchecked'. 107 Although 
industry members were quick to point out that the study had yet to be formally 
reviewed by the agency's scientific advisory board, 108 such health reports were 
nevertheless starting to enter their future planning in a more tangible way. 1°9 
 More specifically, chemical companies' representatives wondered if lawsuits might, 
one day, be brought against their organisations for causing skin cancer among 
humans. 11° The prospect of future legal action, meanwhile, had a persuasive 
105 	. Miller and Mintzer, op. cit, in note 80, p. 31. See, also, 'Statement of Richard Barnett, 
Chairman, The Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy, September 16, 1986, National Press Club, 
Washington, DC', pp. 1-1 to 1-2. 
1°6 Ibid. 
107 T im Beardsley, `US Gets Tough on CFC Emissions', Nature (Vol. 324, 13 November 1986), 
p. 102. 
108 Ibid., p. 102. 
109 The report, released in 1987, was the most detailed assessment of costs and benefits of 
policy action and inaction to that point undertaken (US Environmental Protection Agency, Regulatory 
Impact Analysis: Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 3 Volumes (Washington, DC: US EPA, 1987)). 
110 Lawsuits were starting to be brought against cigarette manufacturers, holding them 
responsible for lung-cancer cases. In 1991, for example, it was reported that nine 'US tobacco 
companies are facing a [US]$5 billion lawsuit filed by a group of flight attendants who say second-
hand smoke has endangered their health...' ('Smoked Out', The Independent (London), 2 November 
1991, p. 10). See, also, Jones, op. cit., in note 90, p. 59. 
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influence in the American corporate boardroom. As Richard North observes: 
In the US, companies know a lot about their environmental impact because 
they know they may be sued for damage caused by their actions. The 
environmental audit was designed precisely to give boardrooms a handle 
on how much risk they were exposed to. That mattered at least as much as 
ensuring they were complying with government regulations. Besides, a US 
firm cannot get insurance if its activities are likely to entail costly law 
suits. 111  
This potentiality, therefore, was not considered lightly at this time. 112 
Second, the major chemical companies in the United States were concerned 
about the damage that CFC production was doing to their corporate images, for 
they wanted to present themselves as good citizens in a community which was 
increasingly becoming concerned about the global environment. 113 Although 
CFCs were but one facet of a large business for most of these organisations, 
negative press about their CFC-activities could cast a shadow over their entire 
operation. 114 Therefore, the restriction of CFC production was perceived to be . 
a small price to pay in return for avoiding potentially disastrous consumer boycotts. 
On the other side of the analysis, the perceived costs of regulatory action 
were, once again, starting to fall. Du Pont and the other major chemical producers, 
in light of both the scientific discoveries and the renewed political activity at the 
international level, had resurrected their programmes that investigated substitute 
chemicals. Although, owing to the requirements of intra-industry secrecy, it is 
difficult to discover the exact direction that the companies' research and 
development programmes were taking, clues that progress was being made in this 
area had been revealed earlier in the year. Most notably, during one meeting early 
in 1986, `Du Pont admitted that substitute chemicals for CFCs as refrigerants and 
in other applications could be manufactured if the company were given sufficient 
incentive to do so'. 115 Thus, as during the 1970s, ongoing work was once again 
. Richard North, 'Markets and Law Push US Towards Voluntary Change', The Independent 
(London), 27 September 1989, p. 26. 
112 Benedick, op. cit., in note 24, p. 63. 
113 See the discussion about the influence of public opinion in Chapter 5.4 of this thesis. 
114 Roan notes that there were rumours that 'the CFC-ozone issue had been taken out of the 
Freon Division's hands at Du Pont and turned over to senior corporate manag9ment after the 
discovery of the Antarctic hole. At this level of the company, the issue would be looked at in a 
broader manner.' (Roan, op. cit., in note 32, p. 193.) 
115 Oppenheimer and Boyle, op. cit., in note 86, p. 46. 
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starting to lower the costs of alternatives and thereby also starting to decrease the 
net economic costs of regulation. 
Representatives of American industry recognised, however, that the laissez-
faire policy option was now almost completely precluded. Because demands for 
US domestic legislation were increasing, many observers believed that some sort 
of regulatory action by the US government was inevitable. 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was under a court order to 
promulgate regulations to control CFC emissions [this was launched by the 
Natural Resources Defense Council], and domestic legislation had been 
proposed to protect the ozone layer. 116 
Thus, the main alternative policies being examined by US industry officials (and by 
American policy-makers) were no longer the costs and benefits of certain forms of 
further regulation versus the costs and benefits of no further regulation. Rather, 
they were the costs and benefits of certain forms of further regulation in isolation 
versus the costs and benefits of certain forms of further regulation in concert with 
the other major states of the world. In this way, the impact that regulation would 
have upon a state's economy, vis-a-vis its major trading competitors, was 
becoming more significant. 
American industry representatives and policy-makers were quick to 
recognise that the American position would be much better off if regulation were 
indeed worldwide. Juchtenfuchs identifies the motivation for this type of approach: 
[The US] position was not motivated by purely environmentalist reasons but 
also by manifest trade interest on the part of the US chemical industry. The 
latter strongly favoured a world-wide agreement instead of national 
production cuts, because of its fear of an increase in the EC's already high 
share of the world market at the expense of American producers."' 
In this way, worldwide regulation might allow Du Pont, which was 'the world leader 
in developing the substitutes for CFCs, ... [to] move into the marketplace and clean 
up with sales of substitute'. 118 
116 Annette M. Capretta, 'The Future's So Bright, I Gotta Wear Shades: Future Impacts of the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer', Virginia Journal of International Law 
(Vol. 29, 1989), p. 221. See, also, Paul J. Allan, 'Overview', Environment (Vol. 32, No. 10, December 
1990), p. 3; and Chapter 5.3 of this thesis. 
117 Jachtenfuchs, op. cit., in note 65, p. 265. 
118 John Gribbin, The Hole in the Sky (London: Corgi, 1988), pp. 137-38. 
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In light of this, the European reaction at this time was cautious. 
Some European industrialists had suspected all along that the United States 
was using the ozone scare to cloak commercial motivations. They now 
believed that American companies had endorsed CFC controls in order to 
enter the profitable EC export markets with substitute products that they had 
secretly developed. 119 
Nevertheless, perceptions of costs and benefits among Europeans decision-
makers were also changing at this time. First, they recognised that there might be 
costs associated with retarding the Toronto Group's efforts to forge an international 
agreement. More specifically, as the formal international negotiations on the 
Protocol started up in late 1986 and early 1987, European officials 'feared that if 
there was no international agreement, the United States might take unilateral action 
and impose trade sanctions'. 129 Indeed, their fears came true when the 
Americans threatened such actions in February 1987. 121 
The Europeans also recognised that the Americans were at a competitive 
disadvantage because of the unilateral action that they had taken during the 1970s. 
Banning non-essential aerosols, as is argued above, was the economically least-
painful way of reducing CFC consumption. 122 Hence, if some sort of uniform 
percentage reduction in CFC usage were agreed by the international community, 
then it would be more easily achieved by the Europeans for two reasons. First, the 
Europeans would be able to cut back in the most cost-painless sector -- namely, 
aerosol usage -- while the Americans would have to achieve reductions in other 
applications. 123 And second, the Europeans used a higher percentage of 
119 Benedick, op. cit., in note 39, p. 123. Benedick goes on to note that: 	this suspicion was 
unfounded: to the dismay of environmentalists, du Pont had admitted in 1986 that it had ceased 
research on chlorofluorocarbon alternatives in 1981' (p. 123). Also, interview with Leah, op. cit., in 
note 65; interview with Serge Langdau, Environment Canada, Hull, 14 December 1990; and Gribbin, 
op. cit., in note 118, pp. 137-38. 
120 Morrisette, op. cit., in note 58, p. 811. 
121 Steven Dickman, 'US Call to End CFC Emissions', Nature (Vol. 325, 26 February 1987), p. 
748; and interview with John Kristian Atchley, Counselor of Embassy and Permanent Representative 
to UNEP, American Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya, 15 August 1991. 
122 In 1986, not only had substitutes for aerosol propellants been available for a number of 
years, but the US experience had further reduced their costs (interview with Kathryn Ranscombe, 
PR Manager, British Aerosol Manufacturers' Association, London, 27 March 1991). 
123 Capretta, op. cit., in note 116, pp. 221-22, note 70. 
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aerosols than even the pre-ban Americans. 124 Thus, even if the cutback were 
relatively high, all of the gains could be made in this type of usage. At the second 
workshop in Leesburg, VA in early September 1986, it was evident that the 
discussion was moving to focusing on a cap on global emissions, rather than on 
the restriction of end uses. This delighted the European delegations, and with this 
barrier removed, the states outside of the Toronto Group seemed to be no longer 
preoccupied with the American-market-share-conspiracy argument and began to 
view the economic costs of regulation as becoming increasingly tolerable. 125 
Nevertheless, the Europeans remained reluctant to impose ambitious 
targets, like those being advanced by the Toronto Group, and the EC position did 
not shift significantly until the summer of 1987, at which time Britain and France 
changed their policy stances. Although the reasons for the United Kingdom's volte-
face are unclear, it is probable that the economic factor played a major part in the 
policy decision. 126 As Markus Jachtenfuchs notes, `[o]nly after ICI, the UK's 
biggest producer, had lifted its total opposition to further reductions did the British 
government soften its position within the Council, thus following the policy of 
ICI.' 127 Similarly, the French government's position was greatly influenced by the 
wishes of Atochem, 128 although the government's political desires for an 
environmentally-friendly policy eventually eclipsed its economic concerns. 129 
The focus, thus far, has been upon the US and the members of the 
European Community, because they were the major CFC-producing states of the 
world. 13° By the mid-1980s, however, other industrialised states were starting to 
124 Op. cit., in note 49. Even in 1988, aerosol propellants accounted for 45 per cent of the CFCs 
used by the Europeans, as compared with 4 per cent by the US (R.D.B., 'Saving the Ozone Layer', 
WMO Bulletin (Vol. 38, No. 3, July 1989), p. 216). 
125 Interview with Usher, op. cit., in note 103. 
126 Haas notes the influence of a variety of factors, including the economic one (Peter M. Haas, 
`Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone', 
International Organization (Vol. 46, No. 1, Winter 1992), p. 217). 
127 Jachtenfuchs, op. cit., in note 65, p. 268. Also, interview with Vincent Cable, Commonwealth 
Secretariat, London, 8 February 1990. 
128 Haas, op. cit., in note 126, p. 217. 
129 Jachtenfuchs, op. cit., in note 65, pp. 268, 271 and 275. Although there was a consultative 
relationship between the French government and Atochem, one government official maintains that 
Atochem representatives did not dictate the French position (interview with Philippe Orliange, 
Representant Permanent Adjoint de la France, Aupres de l'Office des Nations-Unies a Nairobi, 
Ambassade de France au Kenya, Nairobi, Kenya, 15 July 1991). 
130 Op. cit., in note 44. 
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take greater interest in the progress of the discussions. The Japanese became 
particularly concerned with the negotiations in late 1986 and early 1987, because 
CFC-113, in addition to CFC-11 and CFC-12, became the subject of proposed 
regulation. The Japanese delegates initially objected vigorously to any regulation 
of CFC-113, because it was used as a solvent in the electronics industry, which 
was vital to the Japanese economy. 131 The Soviet Union, another major producer 
of CFCs, was also starting to take a more active part in the negotiations. 132 As 
is noted in the next section of this thesis, however, these countries' concerns about 
tolerable domestic economic costs were eventually addressed. 
The key developments were, however, the Europeans' acceptance that 
some form of regulation was 'tolerable' and the Americans' acceptance that 
regulation beyond solely banning CFCs as aerosol propellants was also 'tolerable'. 
Thus, with policy-makers from countries that were home to all nine of the world's 
largest chemical companies 133 perceiving the cost-benefit balance to be tipping 
in favour of regulatory action, the scene was set for this hypothesised precondition ' 
for international regime formation to be satisfied. 
3.1.4 -- Tolerable Domestic Economic Costs to all Industrialised States, 1987- 
1988 
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer was opened 
for signature on 16 September 1987. 134 Although it is difficult to overstate the 
significance of this path-breaking document, we should recognise that the 
members of international society could only agree its contents after each's 
demands for 'tolerable' domestic economic costs of policy action had been 
adequately addressed. Indeed, Lee Thomas, Administrator of the US Environmental 
Protection Agency, noted that the Protocol demonstrated an unprecedented degree 
of co-operation in balancing environmental protection and economic 
131 Roan, op. cit., in note 32, p. 198. 
132 Ibid., p. 198. 
133 Although the size of a chemical company does not necessarily reflect the size of its CFC 
production, the secrecy of disaggregated production information means that it is one of the best 
general indicators available (Hoechst, cited in deZoete and Bevan Chemicals Research, 'ICI --
Withdrawing from Heavy Chemicals?' (October 1986), p. 1). 
134  This document is reprinted in Appendix A.3 of this thesis. 
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development. 135 A closer examination of the terms of the Protocol reveal that a 
number of special provisions had to be included so that this balance could be 
achieved. 
First, industry insisted upon a number of mechanisms that were designed 
to encourage compliance. Kevin Fay, Executive-Director of the Alliance, expressed 
the concerns of industry representatives: 
[I]ndustry [is] concerned that if [compliance is] not widespread enough, 
there [will] be uneven competition with some companies in some countries 
restricted and other companies in other countries free to continue producing 
CFCs. 136 
Such fears were addressed in the Protocol: 
Nations that do not participate are penalized with trade restrictions in the 
form of import barriers. The trade restrictions are designed to make non-
compliance less profitable and to protect the economic interests of those 
nations that do become Parties to the Protocol. Parties to the Protocol also 
gain access to CFC-related environmental protection technologies that as 
non-Parties they would be unable to obtain. 137 
It was generally anticipated that non-participating countries would perceive the 
costs of non-participation to outweigh any perceived benefits. They would thus be 
convinced to accede to the agreement. At the time, David Wirth said: 'Faced with 
the loss of major U.S. markets, it is inconceivable that other countries will decline 
to [comply], ... a step [which has] trivial economic and political costs in 
comparison.' 138 
Second, at the insistence of the Europeans, the most restrictive measures 
were placed upon consumption, which was calculated to be the level of production 
minus exports plus imports. 139 Because production controls were slightly looser 
than consumption controls, the Europeans' lucrative export business was not 
curtailed as rapidly as it could have been. 
Third, the Soviet officials insisted upon the inclusion of Article 2.6. This article 
135 Noted in Capretta, op. cit., in note 116, p. 213. Emphasis added. 
136 Quoted in ibid., p. 231, note 136. 
137 Ibid., p. 231. See, also, Article 4 ('Control of Trade with Non-Parties') of the Montreal 
Protocol, op. cit., in note 134. 
138 Quoted in Capretta, op. cit., in note 116, p. 231, note 135. 
139 See Article 2 ('Control Measures') of the Montreal Protocol, op. cit., in note 134. 
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allowed the Soviet Union to complete two CFC plants then under construction and 
to increase per capita consumption (to 0.5 kg/capita) so as to account for the 
implementation of its five-year plan. 14° The economic cost of abandonment 
would, otherwise, have been intolerable. 
Finally, shifting the use of CFCs was, at Japan's insistence, permitted under 
the terms of the Montreal Protocol. 141 Once again, Japan was conscious of the 
importance of CFC-113 to the health of its electronics industry. 142 In these ways, 
the costs and benefits for the significant players had to be transformed so that the 
net costs were sufficiently decreased. 
Although industry representatives supported the Montreal Protocol, as they 
had the Vienna Convention, 143 they nevertheless continued to argue that the 
level of use of CFC compounds presented no immediate threat to either health or 
the environment. Rather, their members viewed the Protocol simply as an 
anticipatory response to computer model calculations of ozone depletion. 144 
 Furthermore, they also continued to highlight the economic costs of regulation. The 
Alliance's members estimated that implementing the Protocol in the US alone 
would cost between five and 10 billion US dollars. 145 More specifically, it was 
maintained that `[s]udden increases in prices will likely result in bankruptcy for 
marginal firms, a loss in U.S. productivity and competitiveness, increased social 
costs and could dissipate the societal consensus for CFC restriction'. 146 
Although these costs were based upon the prevailing higher prices of 
alternative chemicals, 147 a number of CFC substitutes were starting to appear on 
140 Haas, op. cit., in note 74, p. 357. 
141 Ibid., p. 357. 
142 The Japanese had also called for a transition period, so that the 'initial costs of converting 
equipment' would not be intolerable (Ember et al, op. cit., in note 55, pp. 50-51). 
143 Margaret E. Somerset, 'An Attempt to Stop the Sky from Falling: The Montreal Protocol to 
Protect Against Atmospheric Ozone Reduction', Syracuse Journal of International Law and 
Commerce (Vol. 15, No. 3, Spring 1989), pp. 409-10. 
144 'Remarks of Kevin J. Fay, Executive Director, Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy, Forum 
on the Impact of Ozone Layer depletion, House Chamber of the Massachusetts General Court, State 
House, Boston, MA, October 30, 1987', pp. 1-9 to 1-10. 
145 Benedick, op. cit., in note 39, p. 134. See, also, Somerset, op. cit., in note 143, p. 410, note 
126. 
146 Ibid., p. 411. See, also, Elliot D. Lee, 'Pending Treaty Worries Chlorofluorocarbon Industry', 
The Wall Street Journal, 15 September 1987, p. 6. 
147 For some examples, see Capretta, op. cit., in note 116, p. 241, note 185. 
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the market at this time. Many of these chemicals were initially displayed at a large 
chemical trade fair in Washington, DC in early 1988. One of the most significant 
was unveiled by A T & T: their representatives announced that they had, with the 
assistance of Petroferm, Inc., developed an environmentally-safe substitute for 
CFC-113. 148 `Eileen B. Claussen, director of the EPA's CFC program, called the 
development a "major breakthrough" as many Protocol participants were 
concerned that substitution would be particularly difficult for this compound.' 149  
Equally significant was the announcement in January 1988 that 'thirteen 
competing companies from seven nations [were] joining together to speed the 
testing of alternative, less-damaging compounds'. 15° Such a move was 
unprecedented among the major chemical companies, because `manufacturers, 
in trying to position themselves for a competitive advantage, [are not] too 
forthcoming about their research efforts'. 151 The programme focused upon 
testing the toxicity of two agents -- HFC-123 and HFC-134a. 152 In ways like 
these, progress on the development of substitutes was clearly being made. 
Many commentators maintain that the Protocol was the necessary impetus 
to prompt industry to develop substitutes. Peter Morrisette, for example, argues 
that: 
... the development of alternatives was dependent on economic and 
regulatory incentives to do so. An international protocol was seen by 
industry as a useful mechanism for providing the necessary economic 
incentive to develop and market suitable alternatives. 153 
Producers had to be confident that there would be a market for the substitute 
chemicals, and the Protocol ensured that. 154 
148 Pamela S. Zurer, 'Search Intensifies for Alternatives to Ozone-Depleting Halocarbons', 
Chemical and Engineering News, 8 February 1988, p. 19. 
149 Somerset, op. cit., in note 143, p.. 414. 
150 Alun Anderson, 'Depletion of Ozone Layer Drives Competitors to Cooperate', Nature (Vol. 
331, 21 January 1988), p. 201. They planned to spend [US] $8 million on testing the substances 
('Supplement 3', UNEP News (No. 21, August 1988), p. 3). 
151 Comments of Richard Barnett, paraphrased in Roan, op. cit., in note 32, p. 194. 
152 Anderson, op. cit., in note 150, p. 201. 
153 Morrisette, op. cit., in note 58, p. 816. 
154 James T.B. Tripp, 'The UNEP Montreal Protocol: Industrialized and Developing Countries 
Sharing the Responsibility for Protecting the Stratospheric Ozone Layer', New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics (Vol. 20, 1988), pp. 749-750. At the time, Michael Harris, 
manager of halon projects at ICI Americas, noted: 'The first one there [to develop substitutes] is 
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Although the original Montreal Protocol did not nail the coffin shut on the 
industry, 155 any expectations that CFCs would undergo any sort of resurrection 
soon disappeared. In spite of resistance to further restrictions on CFCs right up 
until the middle of March 1988 -- owing ostensibly to the scientific uncertainty 156 -
- Du Pont officials announced, in late March 1988, that their goal was `an orderly 
phaseout of fully halogenated CFC production'. 157 Citing the recently-released 
report of the Ozone Trends Panel, 158 Du Pont officials noted that 'new scientific 
evidence suggested more rapid global ozone change than previously reported, as 
well as the likely involvement of fully halogenated CFCs in that change'. 159 
In addition to this public justification based upon scientific discoveries, 16° 
 a cost-benefit analysis also offers some insight into the motivation for this shift in 
Du Pont's policy. First, it was becoming clear that the costs of adopting such a 
position were falling -- most significantly, as noted above, advances in alternatives 
were progressing rapidly. Additionally, the benefits of eliminating CFCs were also 
increasing. Not only was the scientific evidence that was implicating the chemicals 
in future wrongs contributing to the calculation, but the importance of cultivating a 
'green corporate image' was also perceived to be not only beneficial, but even 
vital. 161 For example, Jeffrey Eves, Vice President of Fort Howard Corp., the 
largest manufacturer of foam food containers in the United States, said: `More and 
more consumers have become knowledgeable. Every company that wants to stay 
in business wants to please its customers.' 162 Tim Leah contends that Du Pont 
going to win an enormous prize.' (Quoted in Christopher Joyce, 'AT&T Leads the Pack in Search 
for Safer Propellants', New Scientist (Vol. 117, 21 January 1988), p. 24.) 
155 ' If the Protocol imposed no limits and no post-1999 reduction schedule on the LCCs 
[Southern states], the major producers of CFCs could anticipate an expanding market for their CFC 
products until 1999 and a stable or expanding market thereafter.' (Tripp, op. cit, in note 154, p. 750.) 
See, also, the discussion in Chapter 4.2 of this thesis. 
156 See the story in Roan, op. cit., in note 32, particular Chapter 15. 
157 'Summary of the Chairman's Remarks (27 April 1988)', Du Pont: First Quarter Report, 1988, 
p. 4. 
158 See Chapter 2.1.6 of this thesis. 
159 `Summary of the Chairman's Remarks (27 April 1988)', op. cit., in note 157, p. 4. 
160 Joseph Steed, Du Pont's environmental manager, said: 'I hope it's clear that it's the science 
of the last week we're responding to.' (Quoted in Roan, op. cit., in note 32, p. 239.) 
161 See, for example, the findings from a study reported in Simon Pincombe, 'Environmentalist 
Pressure Changes Business Attitudes', The Independent (London), 3 July 1990, p. 17. 
162 Quoted in Roan, op. cit., in note 32, p. 240. 
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executives were particularly astute in recognising the shift in the prevailing public 
opinion. 163 They, therefore, found it in their interest to attempt to position 
themselves near the driver's seat of this bandwagon (or, at least, to appear to do 
so). 164 Finally, the profits that could be made from the international marketing of 
CFC-substitutes were not overlooked by the company's officials at this time. 165 
Du Pont's announcement had a 'profound ripple effect', 166 and the race 
for substitutes was soon proceeding at top speed. Calls for a full 100 per cent 
phase-out sparked investigations into replacement chemicals and technologies for 
all usages of CFCs. In this way, although substitutes were not yet available for 
every CFC application, it was anticipated that they would soon appear on the 
market. Thus, taken together, these observations suggest that the second 
hypothesised precondition for international regime formation was, by the middle of 
1988, fully satisfied. 167 
3.1.5 -- Steadily Declining Costs, 1988-1991 
Between the middle of 1988 and the end of 1991, both quantitative and qualitative 
remarks suggest that the costs of substitute chemicals were falling at an 
appreciable rate. In June 1988 and November 1989, for example, the US 
Environmental Protection Agency reviewed the projected costs of CFC reduction. 
They found that during the interim 17 months, significant scientific progress had 
163 For a further discussion of the role of public opinion in the process of international regime 
formation, see Chapter 5.4 of this thesis. 
164 Interview with Leah, op. cit., in note 65. 
165 At this time, one commentator maintained that: 
Three leading scientists, who requested anonymity in interviews with EIR, have insisted that 
DuPont Chemicals is behind the banning of CFCs. These scientists have pointed out that 
DuPont, the only company with patented chemicals that can replace CFCs, stands to profit 
billions if the CFCs are banned. It was only because DuPont suddenly decided to drop all 
opposition to a CFC ban that the environmentalists have gotten as far as they have. 
(Rogelio A. Maduro, 'Ozone Depletion is Proven to be a Scientific Fraud', EIR (28 April 1989), p. 20.) 
166 Roan, op. cit., in note 32, p. 240. Indeed, its volte-face helped to motivate, among others', 
ICI's change of heart (interview with Tom Burke, Director, Green Alliance, London, 4 June 1990). 
167 The importance of 'tolerable' domestic economic costs on the ozone layer issue is 
recognised by many in the literature. Mathews, for one, acknowledges that the ozone agreement 
'would not have been reached as quickly, and perhaps not at all, had it not been for the cooperation 
of the chlorofluorocarbon producers' (Jessica Tuchman Mathews, 'Redefining Security', Foreign 
Affairs (Vol. 68, No. 2, Spring 1989), p. 176). 
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been made, and this had allowed the Agency to lower its cost estimate. 168 
 Additionally, in late 1988, UNEP Executive-Director Mostafa Tolba 'estimated that 
research and development was five years ahead of what had been thought 
possible [in September 1987] in Montreal'.' 
Even once the hypothesised precondition had been satisfied, however, 
policy-makers and industry's representatives remained in close contact. The focal 
point of their interaction was the Technology Assessment Panel, established under 
the terms of the Montreal Protocol. This group brought together experts from 
governments, industry and research institutions, and was chaired by G. Victor 
Buxton. 17° It was charged with the task of monitoring the development of 
substitute chemicals and technologies. This information was to be made available 
to policy-makers for their deliberations on the Protocol. Irrespective of its influence, 
the mere existence of this panel further highlights the importance that the major 
states' leaders placed upon the desirability of 'tolerable' domestic economic 
costs. 171 
The Technology Assessment Panel reported on the state of development of 
alternative substances and technologies at the First Meeting of the Protocol's 
Parties in Helsinki in May 1989. They noted that the technology to eliminate all 
CFCs was not yet available, with the task of adapting industrial refrigeration being 
particularly difficult because of the large capital costs involved. 172 Nevertheless, 
the Technology Assessment Panel concluded that it was at least 'technically 
168 	. Miller, op. cit., in note 83, p. 201. 
169  'Saving the Ozone Layer', op. cit., in note 124, p. 216. 
170 See, for example, G. Victor Buxton, 'International and Canadian Progress on Implementing 
the Montreal Protocol', presented at the Air and Waste Management Association Meeting, Annaheim, 
CA, 26-30 June 1989, pp. 6-11. 
171 At this time, those states that made unilateral declarations of CFC reductions beyond their 
obligations in the Montreal Protocol cautioned that complete elimination could only occur once 
adequate substitutes became available. In February 1989, for example, 'Canada announced 
regulations that will reduce the use of CFCs and halons by 85 per cent over the next 10 years. 
Regulations to eliminate the remaining 15 per cent were promised as soon as the chemicals could 
safely be replaced.' ('Europeans Vow to Curb Ozone Killers', The Citizen (Ottawa), 3 March 1989, 
p. A6.) 
172 See, for example, Michael McCarthy, 'Doubts Arise on Ozone Timescale', The Times 
(London), 5 May 1989; and John Hunt, 'Ozone Layer Measures Debated', The Financial Times 
(London), 5 May 1989. 
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feasible' to phase out some of the chemicals by the turn of the century)" Policy-
makers responded to this information by agreeing a non-binding resolution to 
'phase out the production and the consumption of CFC's controlled by the 
Montreal Protocol as soon as possible but not later than the year 2000% 174 This 
commitment was not extended to halons, primarily because, a cost-benefit analysis 
would suggest, 'of the continued unavailability of prospective substitutes' 1" for 
these chemicals. Instead, an agreement to phase out 'as soon as feasible' could 
only be agreed)" 
The Helsinki Declaration also committed the Parties to 'control and reduce 
other ozone-depleting substances which contribute significantly to ozone depletion 
as soon as feasible'. 177 This vaguely-worded declaration referred primarily to 
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), which some thought should also be subject 
to controls under the terms of the Montreal Protocol. HCFCs were one of the 
potential substitute chemicals for the ozone-destroyers identified by the Annexes 
of the Montreal Protocol,1 78 and some estimated that they would replace up to • 
30 per cent of the controlled CFCs. 1 " The problem, however, was that HCFCs, 
although more ozone-benign than CFCs, nevertheless destroy some stratospheric 
ozone. In light of this fact, pressure mounted during the first half of 1990 to impose 
restrictions upon their use at the meeting of the Parties in London in June 1990. 
Industry officials resisted this pressure. They argued that without use of 
these 'bridging chemicals', the world would be unable to achieve a rapid phase-out 
of CFCs. 18° Because of the substantial capital costs needed to construct HCFC 
173 The Standing Committee on Environment, House of Commons, Canada, Deadly Releases 
CFCs (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Center, 1990), p. 21. 
174 'Helsinki Declaration on the Protection of the Ozone Layer', reprinted in Environmental Policy 
and Law (Vol. 19, Nos. 3/4, July 1989), p. 137. 
175 Benedick, op. cit., in note 39, p. 137. 
176 'Helsinki Declaration on the Protection of the Ozone Layer', op. cit., in note 174, p. 137. 
177 Ibid., p. 137. 
178 See, for example, the comments of the Alliance's Kevin Fay, quoted in AP in Helsinki, 
'Nations Seek Chemical Ban by Year 2000', The Globe and Mail (Toronto), 4 May 1989, p. A8. 
179 A Du Pont estimate, cited in Jamison Koehler and Scott A. Hajost, 'The Montreal Protocol: 
A Dynamic Agreement for Protection the Ozone Layer', Ambio (Vol. 19, No. 2, April 1990), p. 83. 
180 See, for example, the comments of Mr. Vogelsberg, a Du Pont environmental manager 
responsible for CFC alternatives, in Mary Fagan, 'Du Pont Plans Cfc-Alternative Plants', The 
Independent (London), 22 June 1990, p. 20. See, also, Debora MacKenzie, 'Cheaper Alternatives 
for CFCs', New Scientist (Vol. 126, 30 June 1990), pp. 39-40. 
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plants, industry representatives wanted assurances from policy-makers that these 
chemicals would be able to replace a significant share of the CFC market. 181 
In London in June 1990, decision-makers from low-producing chemical 
countries, like Norway, Sweden, Australia and New Zealand, pushed for a phase-
out date for HCFCs of between 2010 and 2020. 182 However, British officials, 
supported by representatives from other chemical producing countries, insisted that 
no firm date be Set. 183 The officials from these countries prevailed, and 'signatory 
nations called for producers to use them responsibly, and work towards eliminating 
them by 2040'. 184 With, however, proposals in the US Congress to phase out 
HCFCs by 2015, 185 it appeared that the issue could be at the centre of the 
discussions at the Protocol Parties' next scheduled review meeting in 1992. 
In some ways, it seemed that the international debate about HCFCs (and, 
perhaps, some other chemicals) was poised to bring about a repeat of the CFC 
experience. However, although at the end of 1991 it was not known how the costs 
and benefits as perceived by the major actors would continue to evolve, we could 
speculate that their views would be in greater harmony than they were during the 
1970s and 1980s. This statement can be substantiated by noting that the major 
states were working together in the same fora examining both the costs (i.e., 
industry consortia and the Protocol's Technology Assessment Panel) and the 
benefits (i.e., the scientific analysis). This boded well for the continued satisfaction 
of this second hypothesised precondition for international regime formation. 
181 See, for example, Hamish McRae (ed.), 'The Dilemma of Phasing Out CFCs', The 
Independent (London), 22 June 1990, p. 21; and Andrew Morgan, 'Ozone Pact In Jeopardy', The 
Sunday Correspondent (London), 24 June 1990, p. 6. Also, interview with Usher, op. cit., in note 
103. 
182 . Nicholas Schoon, 'Deal to Save Ozone Layer Agreed', The Independent (London), 30 June 
1990, p. 1. 
183 Ibid., p. 1. 
184 Ibid., p. 1. 
185 Fagan, op. cit., in note 180, p. 20. 
186 A new consortium was set up in 1989 to look at seven chemicals. The new group was called 
Alternative Fluorocarbons Environmental Acceptability Study (AFEAS) and was scheduled to run for 
3 years (Mary Fagan, 'Chemical Firms Join Forces to Find Substitute for CFCs', The Independent 
(London), 22 November 1989, p. 8). A parallel programme to examine toxicity was also established. 
It was called the Program for Alternative Fluorocarbon Toxicity Testing (PAFT). 
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3.2 -- Tolerable Domestic Economic Costs and Global Warming 
As outlined in Chapter 2 of this thesis, scientific investigations during the 1970s 
and, in particular, the 1980s, drew attention to the deleterious impact that 
continued greenhouse gas emissions could have upon human welfare. 187 A 
number of reports published during this period recommended that some form of 
regulation be placed upon the output of carbon dioxide and other trace 
substances. In light of these demands for controls, some states' leaders called for 
studies into the net cost of policy action. 
Attempts to halt, or at least slow or mitigate, global warming would 
necessarily entail a reduction in the quantity of greenhouse gases that are released 
into the earth's atmosphere. 188 If a state's leaders decided to decrease the level 
of greenhouse gases emitted, then that state -- and, in particular, its energy 
producers and users -- would have to absorb significant costs. First, there would 
be costs associated with developing and using cleaner sources of energy. Second, 
where the use of cleaner sources was not feasible, the costs of forgoing a certain 
level of consumption of particular goods and services would have to be incurred. 
Finally, changes in the composition of international trade transactions could 
introduce economic costs for the state that spread beyond merely domesticl 
considerations. 189 
The primary benefit of regulatory action to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions would be the value of the costs that would have been caused by a 
warmer global climate -- these include the expenditures associated with sea level 
rises (which would include constructing sea defences, relocating people and 
infrastructure, and safeguarding against salt water intrusion into fresh water 
supplies) and the expenses of dealing with climatic zone shifts (which would 
include adapting agricultural and forestry methods, repairing storm damage and 
dealing with the effects of the disruption in various ecological equilibria). 190 There 
187 See Chapter 2.2 of this thesis. 
188 Another method to reduce greenhouse gas concentrations involves the construction of new 
'carbon sinks' -- for example, reforestation. Although this could help to reduce greenhouse gas 
concentrations, its contribution would be relatively minor. 
189 See the argument developed for the ozone layer example in Chapter 3.1 of this thesis. 
190 See, more generally, W.J.McG. Tegart, G.W. Sheldon and D.C. Griffiths (eds.), Climate 
Change: The IPCC Impacts Assessment (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service for 
WMO and UNEP, 1990). 
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could, in addition, be a number of secondary benefits that would result from policy 
action. 191 Let us now consider the history of the politics of global warming to 
discern how the perceived costs and benefits associated with proposed policy 
action evolved. 
3.2.1 -- The Debate Up To 1991 
The first serious consideration of substantial policy action to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions was undertaken at a scientific conference in 1987. 192 To 
understand fully the rationale for the reaction of many policy-makers to the various 
proposals being advanced after this time, a debate that took place 15 years earlier 
must be recalled. 
During the early and mid 1970s, the controversy about the validity of the 
`Limits to Growth' (LTG) thesis raged: A report by this name, published in 
1972, 193 put forth the argument that there was a positive correlation between 
growth and pollution. The attention focused upon the debate meant that any 
subsequent suggestion to reduce pollution -- regardless of its faithfulness to the 
LTG theme -- was immediately identified as part of the LTG lineage and perceived 
as a recipe for zero economic growth. Consequently, when calls were made for 
reductions in greenhouse gas emission during the mid 1980s, decision-makers 
assumed that this would require the elimination of industrial growth and they 
therefore attached significant economic costs to such a policy. Indeed, at the 
outset of the global warming debate, members of the camp underscoring the 
substantial economic costs of greenhouse gas regulations were able to present a 
persuasive case, partially because intuition and common-sense seemed to support 
their arguments. 
A state's welfare (or, at least, its 'economic performance') is, in many cases, 
191 See the arguments developed on the ozone layer issue in Chapter 3.1 of this thesis -- these 
sorts of secondary benefits could also be achieved on the global warming issue. In addition, it 
should also be noted that what is presented here is simply a rudimentary outline of potential costs 
and benefits. The identification of these elements precludes neither the inclusion of other factors nor 
the use of a more complex structure. For a further discussion about the utility of cost-benefit 
analysis on the global warming issue, see, for example, Pearce, op. cit., in note 5. 
192 See Chapter 2.2.3 of this thesis. 
193 Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L Meadows, Jorgen Randers and William W. Behrens III, The 
Limits to Growth (New York: Universe Books, 1972). 
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measured primarily by its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) leve1. 194 This variable 
represents the value of all of the goods and services that are produced by a state's 
inhabitants during one year. In order to create a good or a service of some value, 
an input of at least a minimal quantity of energy is required. For reasons of cost 
efficiency, the most attractive means of producing that energy have been, since the 
Industrial Revolution, the burning of fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas). However, 
rudimentary logic suggests that if a reduction in carbon dioxide emissions is 
required, then the incidence of combustion should be reduced, which in turn 
means that less fossil fuels should be burned. With less fossil fuels being burned, 
however, less energy will be produced, which in turn means that fewer goods and 
services will be provided. The state will thus have a lower GDP and also a lower 
level of welfare. This elementary analysis is presented simply to demonstrate the 
dominant line of reasoning, inspired by the LTG debate of the 1970s, that ruled 
during the mid 1980s -- namely, that less greenhouse gas emissions necessarily 
meant higher net economic costs and therefore lower welfare. 195  
Given the magnitude of the potential consequences of global warming, it is 
not surprising to discover that the debate about the economic costs of action to 
deal with global climate change was spirited during the second half of the 1980s. 
Once specific targets for greenhouse gas emission reductions were voiced in 
international fora (for example, the 'Toronto target' of a 20 per cent reduction of 
1988 levels of carbon dioxide emissions by 2005 196), decision-makers demanded 
studies that would not only calculate the cost of the changes that would be 
194 Although some claim that GDP is not the most appropriate indicator of human welfare (see, 
for example, the reference in Pearce, op. cit., in note 12, p. 375), it is, nevertheless, one of the most 
commonly used indices to measure a state's 'development'. 
195  United States Environmental Protection Agency Administrator William K. Reilly recalls that: 
Twenty years ago, when the original Clean Air Act was being debated in the House of 
Representatives, one of the bill's opponents took the floor to insist that pollution control is 
incompatible with economic growth. The congressman quoted a constituent, a small-town 
mayor, as saying: `If you want this town to grow, it has got to stink.' 
(William K. Reilly, 'A World in Our Hands', The Washington Post, 20 April 1990, p. B1.) Although the 
quotation is from 1970, this idea persisted through the 1970s and (at least) the first half of the 1980s. 
196  See 'Conference Statement', The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security 
(Toronto: Environment Canada, 27-30 June 1988), p. 5. 
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necessary to achieve such goals, 197 but also estimate the value of the benefits 
that would thus be derived. 198 From these studies, two general, and opposite, 
sets of conclusions were reached. 
On the one hand, many reports suggested that the costs of the necessary 
changes in the economies of the world's major industrialised states would be 
significant, greatly surpassing the value of any benefits that might be accrued by 
avoiding a warmer world. 199 Capturing the general spirit of these conclusions, 
William Fulkerson of the US Energy Department's Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
noted: 'My overall view is that [reducing carbon dioxide emissions] will be very 
difficult and very expensive ... It's not any accident that the world depends on fossil 
fuel. We're still hooked on fossil fuel because it is marvellous.' 20° These studies 
served to reinforce the (as I have called it) 'traditional' view that the introduction of 
regulations reducing greenhouse gas emissions would be extremely costly. 
This assertion, however, did not go unchallenged, for there was a second 
group of reports that argued that environmental protection and economic growth ' 
could, indeed, be compatible. Perhaps the single most important document to put 
forth this view was the report of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED), entitled Our Common Future.201 In this report, the 
WCED's members argued for 'a new era of economic growth -- growth that is 
forceful and at the same time socially and environmentally sustainable'. 202 The 
Report's impact was substantial, and its popularisation did much to erode the 
automatic tendency to equate 'protection of the environment' with 'stagnation of 
the economy'. Instead, its focus on 'sustainable development' 2°3 brought the 
idea of economic growth that was compatible with environmental preservation to 
197 For a survey of some of these studies, see Peter Hoeller, Andrew Dean and Jon Nicolaisen, 
A Survey of Studies of the Costs of Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Paris: OECD Working 
Paper No. 89, December 1990). 
198 Some of these studies are cited infra, in note 258. 
199 Some of these studies are cited op, cit., in note 197. 
200 Quoted in William Booth, 'Carbon Dioxide Curbs May Not Halt Warming', The Washington 
Post, 10 March 1990, p. A8. 
201 The World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987). 
202 	p. xii. 
203 Ibid., Chapter 2 ('Towards Sustainable Development'). See, also, David Pearce et al., op. cit, 
in note 8, pp. 173-185. 
152 
the attention of decision-makers. 2G4 A number of studies released during the late 
1980s and 1990 attempted to further that notion by showing that a reduction in the 
level of greenhouse gas emissions would not be economically unbearable. 45 
 The authors of these reports argued that the costs of regulatory action inspired by 
emerging international principles were, indeed, tolerable. Moreover, they argued 
that the secondary benefits that could be gained justified policy action, even in the 
absence of any primary benefits that might be accrued by avoiding a warmer 
world. 206 Thus, during the mid and late 1980s, numerous studies were informing 
decision-makers' perceptions of the domestic economic costs of policy action to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
By the end of 1991, therefore, two different sets of attitudes with regard to 
policy action on global warming were evident among leaders of the industrialised 
world. On the one hand, decision-makers in some OECD countries had taken 
unilateral actions to regulate the emissions of greenhouse gases in their particular 
states. 207 On the other hand, decision-makers in other OECD states had not 
made any policy commitments on the global warming issue. Although numerous 
factors could have influenced their respective stances, let us look at the manner 
in which the cost estimates of policy action were being perceived, to see if cost-
benefit analysis helps to explain this difference. 
3.2.2 -- Tolerable Domestic Economic Costs to Some Industrialised States, 
1991 
Among those OECD countries that had made unilateral policy commitments on the 
global warming issue, the target set by the government of Germany was, at the 
204 There were, nevertheless, substantial critiques of some aspects of the Report. See, for 
example, Herman E. Daly and John B. Cobb Jr., For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy 
Towards Community, The Environment and a Sustainable Future (London: Green Print, 1990), pp. 
75-76. 
205 Some of these studies are cited op. cit., in note 197. 
206  This has been called a 'No Regrets Policy' (C. Boyden Gray and David B. Rivkin Jr., 'A "No 
Regrets" Environmental Policy', Foreign Policy (No. 83, Summer 1991), pp. 47-65). See, also, the 
work of Stephen Schneider -- for example, Stephen H. Schneider, Global Warming: Are We Entering 
the Greenhouse Century? (San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books, 1989). 
207 For a view that suggests that those who had set targets were, however, perhaps more 'talk 
than action', see Emilio Gerelli, 'Economic Responses to Global Warming: A European Perspective', 
in Rudiger Dornbusch and James M. Poterba (eds.), Global Warming: Economic Policy Responses 
(London: The MIT Press, 1991), pp. 167-90. 
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end of 1991, the most ambitious.208 We can hypothesise that German leaders 
took policy action because they viewed its net costs to be tolerable. An 
examination of the costs and benefits as perceived by German decision-makers in 
1991 substantiates this assertion. 
First, members of the German business community did not necessarily 
subscribe to the 'traditional' view that energy use and economic growth were 
positively correlated. 209 Indeed, their experience suggested that, in fact, the two 
had been decoupled to a significant degree. More specifically, because West 
Germany was primarily an importer of energy resources, the rising costs of 
imported oil in light of the crises of 1973-74 and 1979-81 had encouraged German 
industry to make more effective use of its energy inputs. 210 Although not referring 
specifically to the German experience, MacNeill, Winsemius and Yakushiji describe 
the evolution that took place in the market economies that were open to change 
in light of the challenges posed by the oil crises: 
Industries, pressed by the rising costs of energy, materials, and capital, 
found that they could invent products that use lighter and more durable 
materials and require less energy to produce. They found that they could 
redesign production processes to require less and more flexible capital plant 
and to recycle and reuse by-products internally -- with benefit to their 
bottom line. They also found that, when they reduced the energy and 
material content of their products, they saved on overall costs per unit of 
production and reduced environmental emissions and wastes. This often 
proved to be a far more effective way of reducing emissions than expensive 
end-of-pipe technologies that served no other purpose. Moreover, the 
environmental benefits of resource reduction and recycling extend back to 
the beginning of the production cycle. They manifest themselves in 
decreased mining and mining wastes, decreased water consumption and 
208 On 13 June 1990, the then West German Cabinet committed the country to a 25 per cent 
reduction in carbon dioxide emissions from 1987 levels by the year 2005. Moreover, on 7 November 
1990, the Cabinet of the recently-reunified German Republic announced that its original target would 
remain for the former West Germany, but that 'in view of the high potentials for CO 2 reduction which 
is possible' in the former East Germany, 'higher reduction' targets would apply to this area (Der 
Bundesminister fur Umwelt, Naturschutz and Reaktorsicherheit, 'Federal Cabinet Agrees on a 
National CO2 Reduction Programme for Climate Protection' (Pressemitteilung) (Bonn, 7 November 
1990)). 
209 By 1991, it was becoming increasingly accepted that there was not necessarily a positive 
correlation between GDP and energy consumption, as many had assumed (Bundesverband der 
Deuts'.then Industrie e. V., 'Industry's Attitude', in H-J Karpe, D. Otten, S.C. Trinidade (eds.), Climate 
and Development: Climatic Change and Variability and the Resulting Social, Economic and 
Technological Implications (London: Springer-Verlag, 1990), p. 298). 
210 Ibid., p. 298. 
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water pollution, and decreased air pollution, deforestation, and erosion. 211 
 The result for West Germany was not only that it became one of the world's most 
energy-efficient industrialised nations, 212 but German industrialists also began to 
believe that 'energy efficiency [was] an investment and not a bar to economic 
growth.'213  
It can therefore be suggested that German businesspeople simply saw the 
global warming challenge at the end of 1991 as an additional reason for travelling 
further along the path that they were already on. Reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions would not only mean lower, long-term, variable costs of production, 214 
 but it would also inspire more efficient industrial processes. William Reilly (US 
Environmental Protection Agency Administrator), for example, maintains that: 
Strong environmental programs, especially those that encourage the 
prevention of pollution before it's generated, can help stimulate the 
improvements needed to increase efficiency, productivity and 
competitiveness. 215 
In addition, industry representatives also accepted the view that action to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions today would increase the probability of a future in which 
there was environmental stability -- and thus of a future in which their company 
would be able to sustain operations. 216 Accordingly, the level of future benefits 
would be augmented by present policy action. Taken together, these observations 
suggest that there were economic incentives for German businesses to reduce 
211 Jim MacNeill, Pieter Winsemius and Taizo Yakushiji, Beyond Interdependence: The Meshing 
of the World's Economy and the Earth's Ecology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 24-25. 
Emphasis in original. 
212 In 1985, West German energy intensity was 0.31 TOE/US$1000 of GDP at constant 1980 
prices and constant exchange rates. This was 4th of the 21 IEA nations (IEA, Energy Conservation 
in IEA Countries, (Paris: OECD, 1987), p. 43). 
213 Andrew Warren, 'How Germany is Rising to the Carbon Challenge', The Guardian (London), 
19 October 1990, p. 31. See, also, Ulrich Steger, 'The Greening of the Board Room: How European 
Companies are Dealing with Environmental Issues', mimeo. (also published in Business and Society 
Review (1990)). 
214 Although the marginal costs of additional cutbacks in greenhouse gas emissions would 
obviously be higher than those already achieved (Hoeller et al, op. cit., in note 197, p. 17), the lower 
requisite input of energy would decrease costs over longer time periods. For more information about 
the short- and long-term costs of adaptation, see, for example, W.D. Nordhaus, 'Greenhouse 
Economics: Count Before You Leap', The Economist, 7 July 1990, p. 19. 
215 Reilly, op. cit., in note 195, pp. B1 and B4. 
216 Steger, op. cit., in note 213. 
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their levels of greenhouse gas emissions. 
A reduction in the level of greenhouse gas emissions would also have a 
number of secondary or `spin-off' benefits for society more generally. While 
considering a case-study of Norway, David Pearce draws attention to a number of 
these "'domestic" benefits' -- they include: reduced forest/lake damage due to acid 
rain; health improvements from reduced nitrous oxides, sulphur dioxide, carbon 
monoxide and particulates; reduced corrosion; reduced traffic accidents; reduced 
traffic congestion; reduced road damage; and reduced noise. 217 Because of 
geographical constraints, Germans were not easily able to externalise their societal 
costs of pollution. Therefore, these kinds of secondary benefits were also being 
accorded greater value by the country's leaders at the end of 1991. 218 
Moving beyond the national level, it is probable that potential international 
benefits also encouraged German decision-makers to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions at this time. The most significant benefit that could be obtained at the 
international level would result from gains made in international trade. By the end ' 
of 1991, many believed that an environmental juggernaut had been unleashed and 
that concern for the earth's natural systems would continue unabated. It therefore 
followed that substantial economic gains could be made by helping others to curtail 
their output of any harmful substances, including greenhouse gases. 219 As the 
histories of various environmental issues had shown, the 
greenest countries, indeed, can expect an added bonus. Their firms have 
to meet tough regimes at home, so they will be well poised to clean up (in 
both senses) when dirtier countries see the light. ... The country that 
pioneers the taxes and charges that make polluters pay will enjoy a boom 
as purveyor of greenness to a dirty world. 
Indeed, if we draw parallels with the findings from the ozone layer experience in 
217  David Pearce, 'The Global Commons', in Pearce (ed.), op. cit., in note 78, p. 21, Box 2.5. 
218 Steger, op. cit., in note 213. 
219 See, for example, Keith A.J. Hay, Colin A. Saravanamuttoo and David R. Avon, 
'Environmentally Sustainable Technology Transfer of Coal-Fired Energy Techniques: Canada and 
Asia', Energy Studies Review (Vol. 3, No. 2, 1991), pp. 178-83. 
220 'Growth Can Be Green', op. cit., in note 8, p. 15. It is significant that this comment was made 
by the writers at The Economist, a publication which had belittled the first environmental revolution 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s as 'fashionable nonsense'. See, for example, 'Changing 
Colour', The Economist, 15 October 1988, pp. 15-16. 
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particular, then two hypotheses can be suggested. First, wherever there were 
nationally-imposed greenhouse gas regulations, there would also be incentives to 
develop technologies and substitutes that could help both to reduce emission 
levels and to increase energy efficiency. 221 And, second, whatever company was 
able to manufacture new products successfully would subsequently have access 
to significant foreign markets, 222 and its home state's trade balance would thus 
be shifted positively. In reality, such opportunities for significant benefits in 
international trade were being increasingly recognised in Germany by the end of 
1991.223 Taken together, therefore, these domestic and international 
considerations suggest that the economic cost analysis was a key determinant of 
policy action in Germany. 
Although the focus here is, thus far, upon Germany, it is evident that, at the 
end of 1991, the economic cost-benefit calculation was moving in a similar direction 
in other countries. In October 1990, for example, the Japanese government set a 
target of stabilisation of 1990 per capita emission levels by 2000. 224 This was, • 
according to a representative of the Association for the Conservation of Energy, 
a 'signal that consensus between the Japanese industry and government has been 
reached, and that they do not feel that setting this target is something they cannot 
cope with economically'. 225 In this way, we can speculate that the values of the 
perceived costs and benefits in Japan were shifting for similar reasons. 226 
221 	. Findings from the ozone layer experience suggest that as the prospects for regulation 
increase, research into alternatives and substitutes for environmentally-destructive products and 
practices also increases (op. cit., in notes 84-93, and accompanying text). 
222 A study of the ozone layer issue reveals that the desire for international markets motivated 
US policy-makers to press for stringent international controls on CFCs (op. cit., in note 117, and 
accompanying text). 
223 Warren, op. cit., in note 213, p. 31. See, also, Steger, op. cit., in note 213; and, much more 
generally, the report of GLOBE '90 (a conference designed to integrate business and the 
environment): Barry Sadler and Brian Hull, In Business for Tomorrow: The Transition to Sustainable 
Development (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1990). 
224 Karen Schmidt, 'How Industrial Countries are Responding to Global Climate Change', 
International Environmental Affairs (Vol. 3, No. 4, Fall 1991), pp. 303-04. 
225 Quoted in Mary Fagan, 'Britain Further Isolated over CO 2 Controls', The Independent 
(London), 24 October 1990, p. 2. Emphasis added. 
226 	i It is nstructive to note that in 1990, the Japanese government announced plans to open an 
'Institute of Industrial Technology for the Global Environment' (David Swinbanks, 'Japan Looking for 
a Profitable Solution', Nature (Vol. 344, 15 March 1990), p. 182). 
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3.2.3 -- Intolerable Domestic Economic Costs to Some Industrialised States, 
1991 
Meanwhile, not every industrialised state had, by the end of 1991, agreed to take 
policy action to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases. The United States, which 
was the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases in absolute terms and eighth 
largest in per capita terms, 227 was the most significant country among this 
group.228 Once again, although many factors probably encouraged policy 
inaction, we can hypothesise that the American leaders viewed the economic sums 
differently, perceiving the costs of regulatory action to be intolerable. An 
examination of US decision-makers' attitudes and perceptions at this time 
substantiates this assertion. 
American officials often cited the significant costs of policy action as a 
reason for their cautious stance on the global warming issue. At a conference in 
Bergen, Norway in May 1990, for example, the American representative -- Timothy 
Atkeson, Assistant Administrator of the US Environmental Protection Agency --
referred to 'studies suggesting that it would cost between [US]$800 billion and 
[US]$3.6 trillion to cut America's carbon emissions 20% by the year 2000'. 229 
 Some degree of wariness was also in evidence during the formal negotiations 
working towards an international response. Most notably, the US's principal 
contribution to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change was its chairing of 
the third Working Group, on 'Response Strategies'. In May 1990, when the Working 
Groups' interim reports were released, one commentator noted: 
The United States stands accused of allowing its national interests to blind 
it to the need for international action to combat a global threat. US officials 
have been emphasising at a series of ministerial-level international 
conferences that cuts in emissions could cause severe damage to their 
227 Moreover, the US was third in per capita emissions among OECD countries (behind Canada 
and Luxembourg). These data are from World Resources Institute, World Resources 1990-91 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), Tables 2.2 (p. 15) and 2.3 (p. 17). 
228 Only one other OECD country (Turkey) had not, by this time, made any commitment to 
stabilise or to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Although five other countries (Greece, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain) had also not set unilateral targets, they had, nevertheless, agreed 
to the European Communities' target of the stabilisation of carbon dioxide emissions at the 1990 
level by the year 2000. See, Schmidt, op. cit., in note 224. 
229 Quoted in 'The World Through Green-Tinted Specs', The Economist, 19 May 1990, p. 94. The 
study is U.S. Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Report of the President (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1990). 
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economy.230 
Upon release of its final report in the summer of 1990, 231 further criticism was 
immediately forthcoming. Stewart Boyle, then of the Association for the 
Conservation of Energy, noted: 
The report appears to have been severely watered down in response to 
pressure from oil and coal-producing nations led by the US. The group's 
working practice has been weak and uncoordinated and failed to come up 
with an adequate response. 232 
Many placed the responsibility for the report's conservative pitch squarely upon the 
shoulders of the Americans. Nevertheless, United States' decision-makers 
maintained their position at the Second World Climate Conference in Geneva in 
November 1990, when they expressed concern that 'actions we agree to take do 
not unduly curtail economic growth'. 233 Taken together, these observations 
suggest that the economics were, at least superficially, an important part of the US 
policy calculation. Let us consider some of the elements of the Americans' ° 
perceived costs and benefits to try to discern the extent to which the economic 
factor actually influenced the policy position. 
The primary domestic consideration related to the general health of the US 
economy. Some American decision-makers believed that the policies that would 
have to be imposed in order to cut greenhouse gas emissions -- for example, taxes 
on energy consumption -- might cause inflation, 234 create unemployment235 
230 'Inquiry into Global Warming Condemned as a Climb-Down', The Independent (London), 24 
May 1990, p. 6. See, also, Peter Aldhous, 'Modest Response to Climate Change Threat', Nature (Vol. 
345, 31 May 1990), p. 373. 
231 Climate Change: The IPCC Response Strategies (Geneva: WMO and UNEP, 1990). 
232 Quoted in Andrew Morgan and Robert Matthews, 'Global Warming Plan "Watered Down"', 
The Sunday Correspondent (London), 22 July 1990, p. 2. 
233 Paul Brown, 'Still Poles Apart', The Guardian (London), 2 November 1990, p. 29. See, also, 
David Nicholson-Lord, 'Bush Defies Alert on Global Warming', The Independent on Sunday 
(London), 4 November 1990, p. 6. 
234 Former US White House Chief of Staff John Sununu explicitly expressed this fear. See, for 
example, Ian Guest, No Title, The Guardian (London), 9 February 1990, p. 23. 
235 Although often overlooked, it should be recognised that the US is a significant energy 
producer. A fall in demand would necessitate cutbacks in supply, and for reasons cited infra, in note 
255, and accompanying text, domestic supplies (rather than foreign supplies) would be the first to 
be reduced. 
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and thus increase the chances of economic recession or depression. 236 Indeed, 
one commentator noted that US President George Bush had 'assumed a cautious 
stance in office, bowing to advisers who view[ed] global warming as a scientific fad 
and [saw] proposals to curb greenhouse gases ... as potentially ruinous to the U.S. 
industrial base.' 237 
Second, in the US, there were also significant political costs associated with 
the policies that would be required in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
Although by the end of 1991, it had become fashionable to talk of 'market-based 
instruments' for reducing greenhouse gas emissions (e.g., tradeable permits), it 
remained that command-and-control mechanisms (i.e., direct government 
regulation) were still regarded as some of the most viable means of achieving a 
government-proclaimed goal. And one of the first targets of any regulatory policies 
would probably be the transport sector, because direct taxes upon petrol offered 
an immediate way of reducing emission levels. Taxes, however, are not particularly 
popular in the United States, 238 and it was generally acknowledged that any 'tax-
attack' upon private motoring would be a 'domestic electoral disaster', 239 akin 
236 Some studies that suggest that greenhouse gas abatement would be growth-retarding are 
noted op. cit., in note 197. In addition, Schelling maintains that, in the US, the magnitude of the 
potential costs were perceived as immense. He says 
'perceived' because estimates invite comparisons with something like the federal budget of 
the United States. At the present time 2 percent of GNP is 100 billion dollars per year, a 
currently unmanageable amount politically, even though a 2 percent loss of GNP through 
reduced productivity, phased in over a decade or two and maintained in perpetuity, would 
not be much noticed. 
(T.C. Schelling, 'Economic Responses to Global Warming: Prospects for Cooperative Approaches', 
in Dornbusch and James (eds.), op. cit., in note 207, p. 198.) One such investigation was undertaken 
in 1989. At that time, Alan Manne and Richard Richels published the first major study of the 
macroeconomic impact of structural changes to limit carbon dioxide emissions in the United States. 
Taking the period from 1990 to 2100, they found that the costs of restricting carbon emissions to 
the 1990 level through 2000, reducing them gradually to 80 percent of this level by 2020 and 
stabilising them thereafter to be US$3.6 trillion, discounting to 1990 at 5 per cent per year. (Cited 
in MacNeill et al, op. cit., in note 211. The study is: Alan S. Manne and Richard G. Richels, 'CO 2 
 Emissions Limits: An Economic Analysis for the USA', The Energy Journal (Vol. 11, No. 2, 1990).) 
237 . Michael Weisskopf, 'Bush Says more Data On Warming Needed', The Washington Post, 18 
April 1990, pp. Al and A23. Emphasis added. In 1989, it was noted that this sort of attitude reflected 
the views of the White House Science Adviser's Office, the Energy and Agriculture Departments and 
the Office of Management and Budget, which have argued that more needs to be known regarding 
the implications of a global convention or treaty for the domestic US economy' ('Opposition to 
Global Warming Convention', Environmental Policy and Law (Vol. 19, Nos. 3/4, July 1989), pp. 115-
16). 
238 George Bush's famous 1988 election pledge was: 'Read my lips, no new taxes.' 
239 Paul Brown, 'Global Slow-Step Trips Up', The Guardian (London), 18 May 1990, p. 27. 
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to committing 'political suicide'. 240 Thus, the political cost of policy action, in light 
of the anticipated reaction by individual Americans, was similarly viewed as 
significant by policy-makers. 
Third, powerful industrial interests -- particularly, energy producers --
perceived significant costs associated with reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions. Although the ozone layer experience might lead one to believe that 
initial opposition should be expected, significant differences between the two issues 
of global atmospheric change suggest that industry opposition was much more 
firmly entrenched on the global warming issue. Recall that, on the ozone layer 
issue, the large chemical companies eventually supported CFC regulation, because 
their representatives realised that they would be the ones that would manufacture 
the substitute chemicals. 241 In light of CFC restrictions, it was anticipated 
(correctly, as it turned out) that the collapse of one market would be compensated 
by the emergence of another. 
In contrast, much of the energy industry -- unless they venture radically into 
new areas -- will simply lose business. Apart from some investment in 
alternative technologies, the primary prescriptions to combat global warming 
do not involve replacement (as in the CFC case), but rather reduction. Thus, 
certain powerful organizations will have little incentive to advance the global 
commitment to slow climatic change. 242 
In the United States, energy interests had, by the end of 1991, mobilised effectively 
24° Paul Brown, 'Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea', The Guardian (London), 24 August 
1990, p. 19. It is instructive to note that the pump price of a litre of gasoline in 1989 was US$0.28 
in the United States and US$0.65 in Germany (author's calculations from IEA, Energy Efficiency and 
the Environment (Paris: OECD, 1991), Figure 111.20, p. 76). See, also, Michael P. Walsh, 'Motor 
Vehicles and Global Warming', in Jeremy Leggett (ed.), Global Warming: The Greenpeace Report 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 260-294. 
241 See the discussion in Chapter 3.1.3 of this thesis. 
242 Ian Rowlands, 'The Security Challenges of Global Environmental Change', The Washington 
Quarterly (Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 1991), p. 111. See, also, James K. Sebenius, 'Designing 
Negotiations Toward a New Regime: The Case of Global Warming', International Security (Vol. 15, 
No. 4, Spring 1991), pp. 133-34, where he identifies industry as a possible 'blocking coalition' on the 
global warming issue. In addition, Cairncross relates a telling story: 
While the CFC manufacturers have come to international conferences on CFCs to stiffen the 
resolve of governments to phase out their own product, an oil company representative at 
the Second World Conference on Climate Change in Geneva in November 1990 acted as 
go-between for the Saudi Arabian and American governments, two of the main opponents 
of targets to reduce carbon-dioxide output. 
(Frances Cairncross, Costing the Earth (London: Business Books, Ltd. in association with The 
Economist Books, Ltd., 1991), p. 129.) 
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in their fight against policies that would require reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions. 243 Not only had representatives from 60 US corporations and interest 
groups come together to form the Global Climate Coalition (which aimed 'to 
provide the business perspective' on the global warming issue), 244 but explicit 
threats about the political cost of restrictive policies had been made to decision-
makers.245 Thus, although some utilities in the United States were beginning to 
recognise the value of energy conservation, 246 the US energy industry did not 
support any kind of regulation. Therefore, the political cost of policy action, in light 
of the anticipated reaction by American industry, was also viewed as significant by 
policy-makers. 
Additionally, at the end of 1991, it was perceived that any action to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions would have substantial international costs, for primarily 
three reasons. First, the United States was one of the most inefficient users of 
energy in the industrialised world. 247 Although this suggests that the US would 
have had lower marginal costs (vis-a -vis other countries) in light of an across-the-
board percentage cut in greenhouse gas emissions, 248 the US, in reality, might 
have experienced significant costs in order to achieve any reductions. The US cut 
back much of its research and development into energy conservation and 
243 Allen and Christensen note that `[p]owerful vested interests are likely to oppose the 
necessary increases in energy prices' (Myles R. Allen and John M. Christensen, 'Climate Change 
and the Need for a New Energy Agenda', Energy Policy (Vol. 18, No. 1, January/February 1990), 
p. 23). 
244 . Nicholas Schoon, 'Delaying Tactics Feared on Global Warming', The Independent (London), 
17 April 1990, p. 8; and Khristine Hall, Nina Kogan and Jonathan Plaut, 'A Business Approach to 
Global Climate Change', International Environmental Affairs (Vol. 2, No. 4, Fall, 1990), pp. 298-302. 
Moreover, in July 1991, a 'coalition of US coal companies and electricity utilities [was] considering 
a national advertising campaign ... to reduce public support for energy policies designed to slow 
global warming' (Peter Aldhous, 'Power Lobby Pressure', Nature (Vol. 352, 4 July 1991), p. 3). 
245 In May 1989, `Mr. William Fay, who heads a coalition representing US coal and other firms, 
gave a warning that, if Mr. Bush supports a strong [Clean Air] Bill which adds to industry's costs, 
his chances of re-election in 1992 will be diminished' (Guest, op. cit, in note 234, p. 23). Moreover, 
it is instructive to note that US President Bush made much of the fact that Texas had become his 
'adopted home'. Texas, however, was also the home of the oil lobby. 
246 T im Woolf, Association for the Conservation of Energy, London, personal communication. 
247 In 1985, American energy intensity was 0.61 TOE/US$1000 of GDP at constant 1980 prices 
and constant exchange rates. This was 19th of the 21 IEA nations (IEA, op. cit., in note 212, p. 43). 
248 See op. cit., in notes 123-125, and accompanying text. 
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alternative energy sources during the 19805, 249 and, thus, compared with other 
major states, the US had had its competitive position in the manufacturing and 
marketing of key products eroded. Although the Administrator of its EPA 
recognises that 'there is money to be made in cleaning up the environment', 25° 
 there were suggestions that those helping to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in 
the US would be, among others, the Germans and the Japanese. 251 
 Consequently, the Americans foresaw substantial increases to its trade balance 
problems as a result of any policy to curb its level of greenhouse gas 
emissions. 252 
Second, studies suggested that an internationally-uniform carbon tax would 
cause end-use prices of energy to increase significantly more in the United States 
than, for example, those in Japan and Germany. The authors of one particular 
report contend that the 'large differences in end-use prices mainly reflect the effects 
of existing energy policies, which are only to a minor extent geared towards 
internalising the external cost of fuel use [in the United States]'. 253 Thus, the 
price of goods produced in the United States would rise more than the price of 
goods produced elsewhere. This would make American exports less attractive and 
foreign imports more attractive -- thereby adversely affecting the country's trade 
balance. 
Third, international financial difficulties in light of regulatory action would also 
249 For example, Oppenheimer and Boyle note that: 
Funding subsequently dried up when the Reagan Administration slashed the Department 
of Energy's efficiency-research budget by half and outlays for renewable energy by 82 
percent. For example, federal support for photovoltaics dropped from [US] $160 million in 
1981 to [US] $35 million in 1988, while most of the tax credits for renewable-energy systems 
were terminated in 1985. 
(Oppenheimer and Boyle, op. cit., in note 86, p. 164.) 
250 Reilly, op. cit., in note 195, pp. B1 and B4. 
251 'American industrialists might note that Germany has replaced the United States as the 
principle manufacturer of photovoltaic cells ...' (Norman Moss, The Politics of Global Warming 
(London: London Defence Studies No. 9, Brassey's for the Centre for Defence Studies, December 
1991), p. 33). 
252 In this way, we must recognise that international trade can, at times, be modelled as a zero-
sum game, because one country's trade balance surplus must come at the expense of another 
country's deficit. Therefore, with non-American firms being at the forefront of new technology to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, some American decision-makers were resistant to any regulation. 
253 Peter Hoeller and Markku Wallin, Energy Prices, Taxes and Carbon Dioxide Emissions (Paris: 
OECD, Economics and Statistic Department Working Paper No. 106, 1991), pp. 26 and 11. 
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result from the fact that the US was a substantial producer and consumer of 
coal.254 Because coal is the 'dirtiest' fossil fuel, to achieve a given reduction in 
carbon dioxide emissions from coal-fired power plants would require a greater cut 
in output than in either oil-fired or gas-fired plants. 255 Indeed, reports were 
suggesting that European countries would be able to adjust to carbon constraints 
more easily than the United States, because they had a 'relatively higher proportion 
of undiscovered oil and gas reserves, and their nuclear power industry is larger. 
Moreover, they have a lower energy/GDP ratio in the base year of 1990'. 256 
 Thus, if coal production and use had to be curtailed, the American trade position 
would be weakened not only by a decrease in the international demand for coal, 
but also by an increase in the domestic demand for imported oil and gas. Such 
comparisons did not go unnoticed in American policy-making circles. In 1990, for 
example, it was reported that the US 'president's men are impressed by a report 
from the Council of Economic Advisors, arguing that a uniform cut in emissions 
would bear more heavily on coal-intensive America than on its main 
competitors'. 257 
Two other factors seemed to be particularly persuasive in the calculations 
of American decision-makers at this time. First, because of the substantial costs 
254 In 1989, 530.0 MTOE of the American energy supply was met by 'solid fuels'. In West 
Germany, by comparison, the figure was 75.9 MTOE (OECD, Environmental Data Compendium 
(Paris: OECD, 1991), p. 183). 
255 The amount of carbon dioxide emitted by the production of one GW/hour of electricity 
depends upon the fuel used: 
Conventional coal 	 962.0 tonnes 
Oil 	 726.2 tonnes 
Gas 484.0 tonnes 
(Carlo LaPorta, 'Renewable Energy: Recent Commercial Performance in the USA as an Index of 
Future Prospects', in Leggett (ed.), op. cit., in note 240, p. 230, Table 11.2.) 
256 Alan S. Manne and Richard G. Richels, 'Global CO 2 Emission Reductions -- the Impacts of 
Rising Energy Costs', The Energy Journal (Vol. 12, No. 1, 1991), p. 99. 
257 
 'TheWorld Through Green-Tinted Specs', op. cit., in note 229, p. 94. In the carbon tax 
simulations that were undertaken at this time, coal was always the fuel that was taxed the most. In 
one scenario, 'the tax would raise coal prices by 263 percent, and oil and gas prices by between 
70 and 100 percent' (James Poterba , 'Tax Policy to Combat Global Warming: On Designing a 
Carbon Tax', in Dornbusch and Poterba (eds.), op. cit., in note 207, p. 86). In addition, there was 
also a fear that any nationally-based measure might be the 'thin edge of the wedge'. If, for example, 
there was eventually a global tax on carbon, which would then be redistributed by a global authority 
to poorer countries, then the US would have to pay large amounts. In one such study, net transfers 
out of states of the EC over the period 1990-2030 amounted to 3,222.2 billion 1990 US dollars; while 
the same figure for North America was 9,059.4 billion 1990 US dollars, almost three times as much 
(John Whalley and Randall Wigle, 'The International Incidence of Carbon Taxes', in Dornbusch and 
Poterba (eds.), op. cit., in note 207, Table 7.7, p. 252). 
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associated with reducing greenhouse gas emissions, policy action could only be 
justified on economic criteria if the benefits were perceived to be significant. 
Moreover, given the observations made above, it seemed that no major secondary 
benefits would be accrued by policy action; thus, the primary benefits would have 
to be large enough to 'tip the balance'. However, a number of reports published 
at this time258 suggested that the size of the primary benefits -- that is, the 
magnitude of the changes that a warmer world would bring about -- did not justify 
any policy action on global warming. 259 Thomas Schelling, for example, argues 
that, in the United States 'it will be exceedingly difficult to demonstrate serious 
adverse impacts of climate change'. 26° Indeed, not only were there questions 
about the magnitude of the estimated benefits, but there were also those who were 
questioning whether proposed policy action might bring about future costs, rather 
than benefits. Unlike the ozone layer experience, there were some who might 
actually be better off in a warmer world. 261 Although no politician was proposing 
(at least, in public) that his or her country was in favour of global warming, there 
were certainly those who were maintaining that the benefits of policy action (that 
is, the costs of policy inaction) were not large enough to warrant any significant 
disruption to their particular society. Instead, they argued that it might make more 
258 In 1988, for example, the United States Environmental Protection Agency released a study 
that estimated the costs of adapting to a rise in sealevels (Joel B. Smith and Dennis A. Tirpak (eds.), 
The Potential Effects of Global Climate Change on the United States, Volume 2: National Studies 
(Washington, DC: United States Environmental Protection Agency; Office of Policy, Planning and 
Evaluation; Office of Research and Development, Draft Report to Congress, October 1988), p. 9-1). 
See, also, the chapters in OECD, op. cit., in note 5; and Frank Rijsberman, 'Potential Costs of 
Adapting to Sea Level Rise in OECD Countries', in OECD, Responding to Climate Change: Selected 
Economic Issues (Paris: OECD, 1991), pp. 11-49. 
259 See, op. cit., in note 190. In addition, William Nordhaus argues that: 
In sum, the economic impact upon the U.S. economy of the climatic changes induced by 
a doubling of CO2 concentrations is likely to be small. The point estimate today is that the 
impact, in terms of variables that have been quantified, is likely to be around one-fourth of 
1 percent of national income. However, current studies omit many potentially important 
effects, so this estimate has a large margin of error. 
(William D. Nordhaus, 'Economic Approaches to Greenhouse Warming' in Dornbusch and Poterba 
(eds.), op. cit., in note 207, p. 44.) Beckerman puts forth a similar argument (Wilfred Beckerman, 
'Global Warming: A Sceptical Economic Assessment', in Dieter Helm (ed.), Economic Policy 
Towards the Environment (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 52-85). 
260 Schelling, op. cit., in note 236, p. 202. 
261  This relates to the so-called 'winners and losers' debate. See, for example, Allen and 
Christensen, op. cit., in note 243, p. 21; and Edward B. Barbier and David W. Pearce, 'Thinking 
Economically About Climate Change', Energy Policy (Vol. 18, No. 1, January/February 1990), p. 16. 
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sense to 'adapt' to global warming, rather than to 'prevent' global warming. 262 
In addition, the Americans were also concerned about the substantial 
uncertainties associated with the estimates of both costs and benefits. 263 On the 
one hand, the ozone layer experience suggests that the chances for co-operative 
action increase once policy-makers have an idea about, at the very least, the size 
of the projected costs associated with regulation. 264 Because the ozone-depletion 
theory challenged only one small part (CFC-production) of a single industry 
(production of industrial chemicals), it was relatively easy to identify, to isolate and 
to estimate the projected net economic costs of regulatory action. 265 The same 
was not true on the global warming issue. All industrial activity in a state would be 
affected by policies that reduced greenhouse gas emissions. 266 Therefore, it was 
necessary for policy-makers to consider the impact that regulation would have 
upon all of these organisations. In 1991, meanwhile, 
the economic costs and consequences of introducing those alternatives,, 
how to make them accessible, how to encourage their diffusion in industrial 
systems, and, most important, how to achieve international agreement on 
the technological, economic, and social impacts are all poorly known ... 
Now is the time for a broad international effort to explore the technological 
and economic ramifications of mitigation and adaptation strategies. 267 
Initial efforts revealed that the task of collecting the relevant data was, thus, much 
more daunting on the global warming issue than it had been on the ozone layer 
262 Haas, op. cit., in note 74, p. 359. 
263 Haas notes the importance that policy-makers in the global warming negotiations were 
placing upon accurate and reliable costing estimates (ibid., p. 363, note 27). 
264 See the discussion in Chapter 4.2.4 of this thesis, particularly notes 88-93, and 
accompanying text. See, also, Gerelli, op. cit., in note 207, p. 186; and interview with L.P.J. 
Mazairac, Ambassador and Permanent Representative to UNEP, Embassy of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, Nairobi, Kenya, 2 August 1991. 
265 Interview with Usher, op. cit., in note 103. In addition, individuals in the US White House 
maintain that they are willing to pursue environmental regulations when 'the resources needed to 
address the problem are reasonable and predictable' (noted in Scott Barrett, 'Economic Analysis 
of International Environmental Agreements: Lessons for a Global Warming Treaty', in OECD, 
Responding to Climate Change: Selected Social Issues (Paris: OECD, 1991), p. 135). 
266 Skolnikoff suggests that the first thing to realise is 'that global warming epitomizes the idea 
that everything relates to everything else' (Eugene B. Skolnikoff, 'The Policy Gridlock on Global 
Warming', Foreign Policy (No. 79, Summer 1990), p. 81). 
267 Robert M. White, 'Our Climatic Future: Science, Technology, and World Climate 
Negotiations', Environment (Vol. 33, No. 2, March 1991), pp. 40-41. 
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depletion issue. 268 
In addition, the uncertainties that were associated with the scientific 
understanding of global warming at the time 268 created significant uncertainties 
in the value of any primary benefits that were estimated at the time. 27° As 
Frances Cairncross notes: 
Calculations of the costs of curbing carbon dioxide may be difficult, but they 
are easy compared with the task of estimating the benefits. Here language 
can be muddling: a benefit of curbing greenhouse gases may take the from 
of avoiding some of the costs of adapting to a hotter world. Thus, while 
building sea walls is a cost of adapting to the rise in sea levels that global 
warming may bring, avoiding the need for the expense of building sea walls 
appears in the arithmetic as a benefit. 271 
These comments suggest that, at the end of 1991, there were substantial 
uncertainties involved in the analysis. Indeed, one commentator at this time argued 
that: 
The economic analysis of strategies to limit and adapt to a changing climate 
is also largely an uncharted wilderness -- such studies as there have been 
(mostly by advocates of one policy or another) have produced wildly 
different answers. 272 
Consequently, some used these uncertainties to justify avoiding a significant 
change in American policy. 
In these ways, a number of observations suggest that the domestic 
economic costs of regulatory action to reduce national emissions of greenhouse 
gases were not viewed as 'tolerable' by American decision-makers at the end of 
268 UNEP officials had attempted to converge the economists' estimates. (UNEP Executive-
Director Mostafa Tolba hosted a meeting in London in early 1991, which brought together many of 
the world's economists who were working on the costing issue. Although the differences in their 
estimates were reduced, large variations nevertheless remained (interview with Usher, op. cit., in 
note 103).) 
269 See Chapter 2.2.5 of this thesis. 
270 See, for example, Manne and Richels, op. cit., in note 256, p. 89. 
271  Cairncross, op. cit., in note 242, p. 132. Further, Skolnikoff maintains that '... if policies are 
especially costly, affected interests are apt to use the absence of a definitive analysis of effects as 
an argument to defer or prevent action' (Skolnikoff, op. cit., in note 266, p. 84). It should be 
recognised, however, that attempts were being made to cost these benefits. See, for example, op. 
cit., in note 258. 
272 '
Global Warming Makes Its Mark Everywhere', Nature (Vol. 349, 3 January 1991), p. 3. 
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1991. 273 We can further speculate that this calculation was a key determinant of 
their policy position on the issue. 
This focus upon the United States should not, however, lead one to believe 
that the US was the only industrialised state whose policy might be partially 
explained by use of a cost-benefit analysis. Indeed, any country that either had 
inefficient industry or was a producer of fossil fuels could well have found it in its 
domestic economic interest to avoid substantial unilateral regulatory action. 274 
 Consider, for example, the United Kingdom. In 1990, British officials announced 
that Britain would stabilise its 1990 level of carbon dioxide emissions by 2005 -- five 
years after many other members of the European Communities. 275 The hesitancy 
on the part of the British decision-makers to go beyond this target was directly 
motivated by fears about inflation, 276 job losses (particularly in the coal 
industry)277 and the disturbance that a stricter target might have caused to the 
privatisation of the UK electricity industry. 278 The mindset and priority of British 
policy-makers at the time are usefully captured by the comments of the UK 
Environment Minister, David Trippier, who said in 1990: 'We could go for 
[stabilisation in] 2000, if we wanted to close down half of the coal mines in Britain 
and go for no economic growth.'279 These few observations thus suggest that 
the economic costs might have been a key determinant of British policy on global 
30 A'''2-J '44 ,0 
6.5(Li 
•". 
273 is i It nstructive to note that a 1990 OECD report that compared the effects of four different 
policies to reduce emissions by 50 per cent over 1990-2030 found that North America was the only 
region to be worse off in every scenario. This finding helps to substantiate the argument being 
developed here (Hoeller et al, op. cit., in note 197, p. 42). 
274 Among non-OECD countries, there were also 'developed' states that might have found that 
a cost-benefit analysis did not yield 'tolerable' outcomes. Saudi Arabian officials, for example, voiced 
their doubts about the virtues of any policy changes to reduce greenhouse gas emissions --
concerned about their loss of oil revenues (David Thomas, 'Split Arises on Global Warming Action 
as Governments Meet', The Financial Times (London), 8 June 1990, p. 1; and Phillipe Sands, Centre 
for International Environmental Law, London, personal communication, 8 December 1991). 
275 United Kingdom Department of the Environment, This Common Inheritance: Britain's 
Environmental Strategy (London: HMSO, 1990). 
276 Colin Brown, 'Risk of Losing Votes Keeps Road Pricing out of "Green" Plan', The 
Independent (London), 29 May 1990, p. 3. 
277 Ibid., p. 3. 
278 Colin Brown and Nicholas .Schoon, "'Missed Chance" for Cleaner UK', The Independent 
(London), 26 September 1990, p. 1. 
279 Quoted in John Pieraar and Colin Brown, 'Britain and EC Head for Row over "Green taxes- , 
The Independent (London), 21 September 1990, p. 1. 
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Thus, at the end of 1991, two different sets of attitudes with regard to policy 
action on global warming were in evidence among leaders of the industrialised 
world. While some decision-makers in some OECD countries had taken unilateral 
actions to regulate the emissions of greenhouse gases in their particular states, 
others had yet to make any policy commitments on the issue. Although numerous 
factors could have influenced their respective stances, the findings suggest that the 
perception of costs and benefits were important contributing factors. Thus, 
because a few key players still regarded the domestic economic costs of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions to be 'intolerable', the second hypothesised 
precondition for international regime formation was, at the end of 1991, still 
unsatisfied. 
3.3 -- Summary 
In this chapter, a proposition about the need for 'tolerable' domestic economic, 
costs of policy action is initially put forth. An examination of the costs and benefits 
of policy action on the issues of ozone layer depletion and global warming, as 
perceived by the industrialised states' leaders, is subsequently undertaken in order 
to explore this hypothesis. The study of the ozone layer experience reveals that the 
potential impact upon the major states' domestic chemical industries was a key 
determinant of governments' willingness to take regulatory action, because the 
consequences for the individual states' wider economy as a whole were held to be 
important. By the middle of 1988, however, the perceptions had changed, and with 
net costs deemed to be tolerable by the industrialised states' leaders, the second 
hypothesised precondition was finally satisfied. Further, as regulatory controls were 
strengthened, up through to the end of 1991, communicatory links between 
government and industry were key requirements for continued policy co-ordination. 
On the global warming issue, meanwhile, the findings reveal that the 
economic costs of regulatory action to address global warming extend beyond a 
single business sector. Indeed, because greenhouse gases are produced by 
almost every industrial process, the ramifications of abatement policies would be 
all-pervasive. A study of the issue reveals that as of the end of 1991, although 
some states' leaders viewed the net economic cost of regulatory action to be 
'tolerable', this view was not shared by leaders of all of the world's major 
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industrialised states. Accordingly, the second hypothesised precondition for 
international regime formation remained unsatisfied on the global warming issue at 
the end of 1991. 
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Chapter 4 -- Global Equity 
In this chapter, the third and final precondition for international regime formation is 
examined.' Termed 'global equity', its presence is inspired by the 'global' writers 
in the literature on international regimes. 2 Like the propositions advocated by the 
Hegemonic Stability Theorists and the Dependency Theorists, the hypothesis 
examined here contends that an international regime cannot possibly be formed 
unless certain system-wide conditions have been satisfied. But unlike the 
propositions of these other theories' adherents, the hypothesis does not look for 
hegemonic action (either malevolent or benign) at the global level in order to 
explain international regime formation. Instead, it is proposed that demands for 
`equity' across international borders must be adequately met before the formation 
of an international regime is possible. 
Some scholars in the literature of international relations put forth the 
argument that equity is needed in order to build international arrangements. 3 The 
definition of the term 'equity' is, however, problematic. In the absence of a 
compilation of all of the difficulties that are unleashed by the application of such a 
value-laden term, the sheer recognition of its subjective nature is sufficient to warn 
us of the dilemmas that could arise from its use. This fact should not, however, 
deter us from examining the concept. Oran Young notes that: 
While it is important to recognize that there are no objective standards of 
equity which can be applied to human affairs, it is also worth noting that 
identifiable community standards regarding equity do exist in specific social 
settings. And there is much to be said for the proposition that satisfying 
these standards is a necessary condition for international regime formation, 
whatever outside observers may think of the long-term consequences of the 
resultant arrangements with respect to allocative efficiency. 4 
Because the world can be considered to be a community, we can try to identify 
1 See Chapter 1.3 of this thesis. 
2 See Chapter 1.2.1 of this thesis. 
3 While examining the prospects for regime formation, Oran Young, for example, contends that 
the 'availability of arrangements that all participants can accept as equitable (rather than efficient) 
is necessary for institutional bargaining to succeed' (Oran R. Young, The Politics of International 
Regime Formation: Managing Natural Resources and the Environment', International Organization 
(Vol. 43, No. 3, Summer 1989), p. 368). 
4 Ibid., p. 369. 
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some standards regarding equity. 
Equity is, of course, multidimensional. We can propose that actors in 
international society determine whether an arrangement is equitable by undertaking 
a comparative analysis of costs and benefits across all participants. Not only are 
tangible factors part of the calculation, 5 but immaterial elements, such as history 
and ideology, also enter the computation. Our study should be, therefore, both 
historical and aware of the fact that equity is perceived differently by different 
players. 
Given some sort of broad conceptualisation of the term, the next task is to 
determine which players in international society should be the focus of our study. 
If we did not impose any sort of restriction upon the analysis, then we might be 
overwhelmed by numbers, for there are many instances imaginable when one actor 
(or group of actors) might press for a more equitable arrangement vis-a-vis another 
actor (or group of actors) in international society. The examination in Chapter 3 of 
this thesis reveals, for example, how the term 'equity' was interpreted by various 
industrial interests. Additionally, we could think about the term not only across 
space, but also across time, for intergenerational equity problems are made more 
pressing by many environmental concerns. (This is a point to which I return in the 
Conclusions of this thesis.) Thus, because the issues of global atmospheric change 
are pervasive throughout international society, we can be sure that every actor will 
be concerned with the issue to at least some extent. Consequently, every actor will 
have their own interpretation of what would be a fair and equitable resolution to the 
problem. However, consideration in this study of every demand for equity would 
clearly be impractical. Instead, we should focus upon the dominant issue. 
To this end, therefore, it is suggested that the demands for equity as 
interpreted by `the state' are the most significant considerations of equity in the 
process of international regime formation. The justification for this qualification 
stems from an assumption that the decisions of countries' governments are not 
reached irrespective of transnational circumstances. Although notions of global 
`common futures' may, at times, be influential, it is maintained that the anarchical 
5 See the discussion in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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nature of the international system s means that competition among states still 
exists. A government is expected, therefore, not only to further the interests of its 
own people (hence the recognition, in Chapter 3 of this thesis, of the role that 
economic costs and benefits play in the process of international regime formation), 
but it is also not expected to afford other states a disproportionate share of any 
mutual benefit arising from an international arrangement. Accordingly, states will 
not form international regimes until their leaders expect not only to achieve an 
absolute gain, but also to avoid a relative loss. It is thus maintained that this will be 
the way in which states' leaders will call for arrangements that they perceive to be 
'equitable' at the international level. 
But, even with this seemingly restrictive qualification, we still find that 
numerous different calls for equity are apparent. In Chapter 3, for example, it is 
shown that transnational considerations of fairness were important factors in the 
negotiations among the leaders of the industrialised states.' On environmental 
issues, however, these kinds of debates that have arisen among small groups of 
states are not the most significant in the broader international negotiations. Rather, 
the most important questions of equity in the international negotiations on the 
ozone layer depletion and global warming issues have arisen across those groups 
of states that hold markedly different perceptions of the costs and benefits of global 
atmospheric change -- namely, the industrialised states ('the North') and the 
6 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1977). 
In this instance, I am referring to two different types of demands for equity. First, there were 
instances in which certain Northern states' representatives were opposed to the implementation of 
any policies that would leave their citizens at a competitive disadvantage in international society. In 
this situation, the demand for equity derived from a straightforward comparative analysis of costs 
and benefits across different states. (See, for two examples, the debate between the European and 
the American negotiators about end uses of CFCs (Chapters 3.1.1 and 3.1.3 of this thesis) and the 
similar debate between these two sets of negotiators during the early 1990s about the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions (Chapters 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 of this thesis).) Second, however, there were 
also instances in which one state's leaders felt that uniform standards should not be applied across 
all states, because such a policy would overlook the actions that that state had taken in the past. 
In these situations, the demand for equity also derived from a consideration of historical factors. 
(See, for two examples, the Americans' demand that their 1970s 'can ban' be taken into 
consideration in the formulation of international regulations during the 1980s (Chapter 3.1.3 of this 
thesis) and a similar call for consideration of historical action by the Japanese on the global warming 
issue during the late 1980s (Michael Grubb, 'The Greenhouse Effect: Negotiating Targets', 
International Affairs (Vol. 66, No. 1, January 1990), p. 75)). 
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developing world (`the South'). 8 
Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to explore the hypothesis that 
international regime formation on either the issue of ozone layer depletion or the 
issue of global warming is not possible until the demands for global equity, in terms 
of North-South issues, have been met to the satisfaction of all members of 
international society. In this way, it is proposed that global equity is a necessary 
(though not sufficient) condition for international regime formation. To consider the 
proposition, the chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, a brief 
overview of the North-South dimensions of the broader debate concerning the 
international politics of the environment is provided in order to help explain the 
absence of the North-South question from the agenda of global atmospheric 
change issues before the mid 1980s. In the second section, the manner in which 
the members of international society attempted to meet the calls for global equity 
on the ozone layer depletion issue is reviewed. Finally, the third section of this 
chapter provides an overview of similar aspects on the global warming issue. By 
considering the issues in these ways, it is anticipated that our knowledge about 
international regime formation on issues of global atmospheric change can be 
advanced. 
4.1 -- North-South Issues in International Environmental Politics 
North-South issues first became a significant component of the broader 
discussions concerning the international environment during the preparations for 
the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (which was held in 
Stockholm in June 1972). 9 In order to understand what took place both before 
and during this conference, it is helpful to recall the international setting at this time. 
First, the 1960s had witnessed a wave of decolonisation in the Third World. 
Leaders of the newly-independent states in the South, motivated by nationalistic 
8 By the end of 1991, it was becoming evident that the relationships between the countries of 
Eastern Europe and the West, and these same countries and the South, could become the dominant 
global equity issues in the negotiations. Although this question is not pursued in this chapter, its 
potential significance is nevertheless highlighted. For more information, see Craig ZumBrunnen, 'The 
Environmental Challenges in Eastern Europe', Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 19, 
No. 3, Winter 1990), pp. 389-412. 
9 See, for example, 'United Nations Conference on the Human Environment: Final Documents', 
International Legal Materials (Vol. 11, No. 6, November 1972), pp. 1416-69; and Peter Stone, Did 
We Save the Earth at Stockholm? (London: Earth Island Ltd., 1973). 
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feelings and a strong desire for state self-determination, were eager both to obtain 
a better deal in international society and to redress some of the perceived injustices 
instituted during the colonial period. Their aspirations are perhaps best exemplified 
by two particular demands. First, at the United Nations in 1967, the Maltese 
ambassador, Arvid Pardo, put forth the idea of the Common Heritage of 
Mankind. 10 Pardo argued that the vast resource potential that lay beneath the 
world's oceans beyond the limits of national jurisdiction should be shared among 
all states of the world; not just among those with the technological ability to exploit 
them. This concept was a source of much inspiration for Southern decision-makers 
during the subsequent international negotiations on the Law of the Sea. 11 Second, 
during the early 1970s, Southern states' leaders also issued calls for a New 
International Economic Order (NIEO). At meetings of the Non-Aligned Movement, 
the United Nations General Assembly and other international bodies, 
representatives from the developing world argued for reforms in the international 
economic and trade systems. 12 
Additionally, the late 1960s and early 1970s had witnessed a vigorous 
debate about global population growth and resource depletion, which was inspired 
in no small part by the image of 'Only One Earth'. 13 Perhaps the publication of 
the Club of Rome's Limits to Growth report14 -- a neo-Malthusian analysis, which, 
among other things, focused attention upon the dwindling supplies of the Earth's 
natural resources -- is the most famous of the many studies from this period. 
Although there were numerous methodological and technical problems with the 
10 UN Doc. 22 GAOR A/6695 (17 August 1967), cited in Markus G. Schmidt, Common Heritage 
or Common Burden?: The United States Position on the Development of a Regime for Deep Sea-
Bed Mining in the Law of the Sea Convention (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 22-23. 
For more information about the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (and, in 
particular, the proposed International Seabed Authority), see, for example, Kilaparti Ramakrishna, 
`North-South Issues, Common Heritage of Mankind and Global Climate Change', Millennium: Journal 
of International Studies (Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1990), pp. 429-45; and Mark W. Zacher and James 
G. McConnell, 'Down to the Sea with Stakes: The Evolving Law of the Sea and the Future of the 
Deep Seabed Regime', Ocean Development and International Law (Vol. 21, No. 1, 1990), pp. 71-103. 
12 See, for example, William G. Tyler (ed.), Issues and Prospects for the New International 
Economic Order (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1977). 
13 This is the title of a book written by Barbara Ward and Rene Dubos (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1972), which was commissioned by the Secretary-General of the Stockholm Conference. 
This term also gained greater popularity after the first photographs of Earth as seen from outer 
space were brought back by US astronauts during the 1960s. 
14 Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers and William W. Behrens III, The 
Limits to Growth (New York: Universe Books, 1972). 
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report, 15 it nevertheless drew further attention to the issues of resource depletion, 
pollution and overpopulation. The concerns raised in the Limits publication, which 
were given further gravity by the food and oil crises at this time, suggested that 
statespeople in the North could not afford to ignore the demands coming from the 
South. And the initial 'gains' made by the members of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries suggested that other resource-producing cartels 
might also be successful. 
Against this setting, two important themes emerged at the Stockholm 
Conference. First, it became clear that the perceived priority or importance of many 
environmental issues was not uniform throughout the world. Although Southern 
decision-makers were cognizant of the environmental problems afflicting their 
countries, 16 their primary objective (at least outwardly) was to achieve a higher 
standard of living for their peoples. At this time, it was clear that `the kind of 
environmental problems that are of importance in developing countries are those 
that can be overcome by the process of development itself." Worrying about 
international pollution and environmental problems that did not appear to impact 
their citizens' well-being directly was thought to be a luxury that leaders in the 
developing world could not afford. Indira Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister, best 
captured this sentiment when she said, in Stockholm: 'How can we speak to those 
who live in villages and in slums about keeping the oceans, the rivers and the air 
clean when their own lives are contaminated at the source?' 18 
Second, the Southern politicians were also suspicious of the Northern 
leaders' rhetoric about pollution control -- wondering if it was a disguise for 
Northern ambitions to retard their prospects for development. Citizens of the 
developed world had exploited their resources and damaged their environment in 
15 See, for example, H.S.D. Cole et al, Thinking About the Future: A Critique of The Limits to 
Growth Model (London: Chatto & Windus, 1973). 
16 The environmental issues that were perceived to be most significant were the ones associated 
with the Green Revolution in particular, and food and water security more generally. See, for 
example, Centre for Science and Environment, The State of India's Environment 1982: A Citizen's 
Report (New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment, 1982). 
17 Report of a Panel of Experts Convened by the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment Secretary-General, held at Founex, Switzerland in 1971 (quoted in Lynton Keith 
Caldwell, International Environmental Policy: Emergence and Dimensions, Second Edition (London: 
Duke University Press, 1990), p. 52). 
18 Quoted in 'What They Said -- Indira Gandhi, India', Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (Vol. 28, No. 
7, September 1972), p. 36. 
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order to obtain a higher standard of living, and therefore some Southern politicians 
wondered what gave the North the moral right to tell the South that they could not 
do the same. Thus, Southern states' leaders, in Stockholm and elsewhere at this 
time, forcefully enunciated their desire to exploit their natural resources in ways that 
they saw fit. The words from a speech by Tang Ke, from the People's Republic of 
China, are representative of this feeling among the South's decision-makers. In his 
address at Stockholm, he argued that no country whatsoever should undermine 
the interests of the developing countries under the pretext of protecting the 
environment.' 19 These two themes -- the question of the development and 
environment trade-off, and the concept of resource sovereignty -- dominated the 
North-South aspect of the Stockholm Conference and hence set the tone for 
ensuing political discussions about the international environment. 
The rise of the Second Cold War during the late 1970s and the first half of 
the 1980s served to decrease the visibility of both environmental and North-South 
issues. 20 During the mid 1980s, however, the relative standing of these issues 
again shifted; the Cold War waned, and environmental and North-South issues 
ascended the international agenda once more. Even more importantly for our 
discussion, however, North-South issues entered the politics of both ozone layer 
depletion and global warming during the mid and late 1980s. The reasons for this 
development are suggested in the next two sections. 
4.2 -- Global Equity and Ozone Layer Depletion 
The roles that global equity and North-South questions played in the politics of the 
ozone layer issue up to the end of 1991 can be examined most effectively by 
identifying two periods, with the time between the openings for signature of the 
Vienna Convention (1985) and the Montreal Protocol (1987) being a grey area 
which marks the boundary between the two. 21 
19 Quoted in 'What They Said -- Tang Ke, People's Republic of China', The Bulletin of Atomic 
Scientists (Vol. 28, No. 7, September 1972), p. 55. 
20 See, for example, Fred Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War (London: Verso, 1983). 
21 The 'Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer' is reprinted in International 
Legal Materials (Vol. 26, 1989), pp. 1516-40; while the 'Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer' is reprinted in Appendix A.3 of this thesis. 
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4.2.1 -- The Non-Involvement of Southern States Before 1986 
Before 1986, developing countries were not significant players in the international 
political negotiations on the ozone layer. A review of some of the key meetings' roll 
calls' goes some way towards substantiating this observation. For example, at a 
conference in Washington, DC in 1977, which was the first international gathering 
to examine the ozone layer issue explicitly, only 24 of the 65 participants were from 
the South -- and 20 of those 24 individuals were either from their respective 
country's embassy in Washington, DC or UN mission in New York. 22 An 
examination of the attendance records from subsequent meetings, right up to the 
Vienna Conference in March 1985, reveals similar patterns.23 
There are a number of explanations for this non-involvement. 24 First, it was 
thought that the only necessary participants in the negotiations were the leaders 
of the states that were producing the ozone-depleting chemicals. In 1977, the only 
Southern countries that manufactured chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) were Argentinal 
Brazil, India and Mexico. 25 Indeed, even in 1985, the developing world produced 
only a little more than 16 per cent of the worldwide total of CFCs. 26 In order to 
address the ozone layer depletion issue effectively, therefore, some believed that 
the primary objective should be to forge an agreement among the few states that 
22 Author's calculations from . 'List of Participants', in Asit K. Biswas (ed.), The Ozone Layer 
(Oxford: Pergamon. Press, 1979), pp. xiii-xviii. 
23 At the Vienna Conference, only one-third of the participating countries (12/36) were from the 
developing world (author's calculations from op. cit., in note 21, p. 1520). 
24 This is not to suggest, however, that there was no recognition of the North-South dimension 
of the issue at this time. One of the papers presented at the 1977 conference in Washington, DC, 
for example, was entitled 'Ozone Layer and Development'. It argued that the issue had potentially 
significant implications for developing states ('Ozone Layer and Development', in Biswas (ed.), op. 
cit., in note 22, pp. 137-39). Its impact was, however, minimal. 
25 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, 'International Regulation of Fluorocarbons', The Harvard 
Environmental Law Review (Vol. 2, 1977), p. 487, note 79. 
26 The absolute amount was 367 million pounds. This is a US Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) estimate, cited in Diane M. Doolittle, 'Underestimating Ozone Depletion: The Meandering Road 
to the Montreal Protocol and Beyond', Ecology Law Quarterly (Vol. 16, No. 2, 1989), p. 425, note 
152. Moreover, a study for the EPA demonstrated the wide difference in per capita use of CFCs 
among selected developed and developing nations: 
China 	0.02 	Japan 	0.48 	Egypt 	0.06 
USA 0.84 Mexico 0.07 EEC 0.85 
(All figure in kg/capita from either 1984 or 1985. Study cited in James T.B. Tripp, 'The UNEP 
Montreal Protocol: Industrialized and Developing Countries Sharing the Responsibility for Protecting 
the Stratospheric Ozone Layer', New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (Vol. 
20, 1988), p. 744, note 38.) 
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produced CFCs. 27 
This relates to the second possible reason for non-involvement -- namely, 
that the emerging problem of ozone layer depletion was viewed through the 
standard frameworks of the day. By 1977, only five years had elapsed since the I 
Stockholm conference had brought the idea of an 'international' environmental 
issue (versus merely a 'local' or, at most, a 'national' environmental issue) onto the 
political agenda. 28 We should not, therefore, assume that decision-makers might 
have been able to make another quantum leap in their understanding in order to 
grasp the concept of a 'global' environmental issue. Indeed, at this time, Southern 
decision-makers thought that the issue of ozone layer depletion was of no 
consequence to their citizens. 28 This suggests that the geographical reach of this 
class of environmental issue had, during the late 1970s, yet to be recognised fully. 
Finally, and in echo of one of the themes of the 1972 Stockholm conference, 
Peter Haas reports that between 1971 and 1990, many less-developed country 
spokespeople 'expressed concern that the new environmental issue area would 
reproduce the historical materialist patterns of political and economic dependency 
on the North, which they were seeking to reverse'. 30 Interpreting a concern for 
the environment to be a ploy by the North's leaders to attempt to retard the 
development plans of their governments, some decision-makers in the South 
sought to avoid this perceived trap. 
For these reasons, most leaders in the South did not take an interest in the 
ozone layer issue before the mid 1980s. Those few that did become involved 
perceived the efforts of Northern politicians in the debate to be an attack upon their 
sovereignty, and they argued that they 'did not want any restrictions whatsoever 
27 David Pearce, 'Economics and the Global Environmental Challenge', Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies (Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1990), p. 380. 
28 I attempt to develop this case further in Ian H. Rowlands, 'Environmental Issues in World 
Politics', in N.J. Rengger and John Baylis (eds.), Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues 
in a Changing World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 287-309. 
29 Usher recalls that when he discussed the ozone layer depletion issue with representatives of 
developing countries at this time, they responded that it was interesting, but obviously of no concern 
to their citizens (interview with Peter Usher, Co-ordinator, Global Environmental Monitoring Service 
(Atmosphere), United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi, Kenya). 
30 Peter M. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental 
Cooperation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 190-91. 
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placed on the use of CFCs'. 31 More often than not, their views were similar to 
those of the Bangladesh representative who spoke at the 1977 meeting of the 
United Nations Environment Programme's Governing Council. He seemed 
perplexed by the Council's preoccupation with the ozone layer issue: 
Bangladesh reminded the Governing Council of the real priorities as seen 
by a poor nation with repeated natural disasters such as floods and tidal 
waves. To us, said the Bangladesh representative, the controversy over 
harm caused to the ozone layer by spray products is simply not relevant. 
Increasing soil productivity, coping with natural disasters and meeting basic 
human needs are the areas in which the country must concentrate. 32 
The language of the documents being agreed internationally during this 
period also demonstrates that the North-South issue was not dominant. Even in the 
Vienna Convention of 1985, little attention is paid to any special needs that the 
countries of the developing world might have. Although Article 4, paragraph 2 
registers the necessity to take 'into account in particular the needs of the 
developing countries, in promoting, directly or through competent international 
bodies, the development and transfer of technology and knowledge', 33 such 
statements are, however, notably unexplicit; nothing more concrete is proposed. 34 
 It thus appears that North-South questions dominated neither the discussions 
working towards, 35 nor the final text of, this framework convention. At least until 
1985, therefore, global equity was not a point of political contention in international 
31 John Warren Kindt and Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, 'The Vexing Problem of Ozone Depletion in 
International Environmental Law and Policy', Texas International Law Journal (Vol. 24, No. 2, Spring 
1989), p. 277. 
32 Quoted in Allan L. Springer, The International Law of Pollution: Protecting the Global 
Environment in a World of Sovereign States (London: Quorum Books, 1983), pp. 23-24. It is 
instructive to recognise that the three concerns raised by the Bangladesh representative are all 
exacerbated -- quite directly -- by stratospheric ozone depletion, by 'spray products'. The fact that 
this particular individual did not make this connection helps to substantiate my 'second reason for 
non-involvement' made above -- namely, that the significant interdependent, and indeed global, 
nature of the issue was not generally perceived. 
33 'Vienna Convention', op. cit., in note 21. See, also, the Preamble of the same document. 
34 See, for example, Patrick Szell, 'Ozone Layer and Climate Change', in Winfried Lang, 
Hanspeter Neuhold and Karl Zemanek (eds.), Environmental Protection and International Law 
(London: Graham & Trotman Limited, 1991), p. 167. 
35 Clarke and Timberlake noted in 1982 that 'non-Western countries ... had paid little attention 
to the scientific debate' (Robin Clarke and Lloyd Timberlake, Stockholm Plus Ten: Promises, 
Promises? (London: Earthscan for the International Institute for Environment and Development, 
1982), p. 44); and Roan maintains that in the lead-up to the Vienna Conference, 'several Third World 
countries were merely not interested' (Sharon L. Roan, Ozone Crisis: The 15 Year Evolution of a 
Sudden Global Emergency (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1989), p. 154). 
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society. Although different states' leaders held different perceptions of what they 
thought would be equitable, 36 these divergent views did not clash at the level of 
policy during this period. 
4.2.2 -- The Emergence of Global Equity as a Political Issue, 1986-1988 
Nevertheless, as negotiations towards the Montreal Protocol proceeded during 
1986 and 1987, it became clear both that the situation of the Southern states 
posed special difficulties and that these problems would have to be resolved 
adequately in any Protocol. The recognition of these two priority concerns arose 
for a number of reasons, all of them related to the explanations offered for the 
developing world's previous non-involvement on the issue. 
First, not only was the level of production of ozone-depleting chemicals 
increasing in the developing world, but there were also plans for even greater 
future use. 37 Thus, CFC production and consumption, which was previously 
concentrated in the North, was gradually being diffused around the globe. 
Therefore, if one accepted the notion that any agreement should involve all CFC-
producing states, then officials from the newly-producing states in the South had 
to become participants in the negotiating process. 
Second, the true nature of the problem -- its global extent -- was beginning 
to be recognised. Decision-makers were starting to view environmental issues 
through new paradigms that stretched beyond their traditional, 'local' frameworks. 
The discovery of the ozone crater above Antarctica in 1985 clearly demonstrated 
36 Compare, for example, the comments in op. cit., in note 32, and accompanying text, with the 
efforts of Northern statespeople at this time to impose restrictions. 
37 In March 1989, for example, Cheng Zheng-Kang (professor of law at Beijing University, the 
scholar who drafted many of China's environmental laws) 'told an American meeting that his country 
planned a tenfold increase in the output of loaded refrigerators in the coming decade' (Fred Pearce, 
'Plugging the Hole in our Sun-roof', The Sunday Times (London), 5 March 1989, p. F1). Benedick 
also notes, in 1991, that 'China's CFC consumption had been rising by 20 percent annually in recent 
years, and the number of its refrigerators reportedly increased by over 80 percent in 1988 alone' 
(Richard Elliot Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet (London: 
Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 150). Finally, a Friends of the Earth report maintains that: 
By 2000, without controls, consumption by developing states is expected to be 28.8 per 
cent of the world total ... [rising to] around 43.5 per cent of the world total [in 2008] ... The 
key countries here are likely to be India and China, with an expected joint consumption of 
694,000 tonnes or around one third of the world total. 
(Friends of the Earth, Funding Change: Developing Countries and the Montreal Protocol (London: 
Friends of the Earth, June 1990), pp. 10-11.) 
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that hair-spray use in Europe did have a direct effect upon the incidence of skin 
cancer among the people of Chile (and vice versa). 38 Thus, it was gradually being 
accepted that all states of the world were affected by the ozone layer depletion 
issue. 
Because of the previous two facts, some suggested that the power 
capabilities in the international negotiations had been considerably transformed. 
Although the Southern states' leaders were still sceptical in their attitude to 
Northern pronouncements on 'sustainable development' and so on (because they 
viewed them suspiciously as excuses to retard development efforts in their 
countries), these leaders also started to recognise that they now possessed a 
significant 'bargaining chip' in the negotiations. It was well-known that any state 
could become a manufacturer of CFCs quite rapidly, because the production plants 
are typically small, they can be erected quickly and they can pay for themselves 
within a short time period as wel1. 39 The Southern states therefore had the 
potential to produce large quantities of ozone-depleting chemicals in the near 
future. For this reason, some Northern states' leaders felt that they had to ensure 
the participation of the Southern states in any future agreement. 4° 
In April 1987, the special situation of the developing world was recognised 
by specific recommendations for the first time. 41 A Canadian proposal 42 under 
3s The discovery of the ozone crater made it clear that the ozone layer problem could not be 
contained in spatial terms (J.C. Farman et al, 'Large Losses of Total Ozone in Antarctica Reveal 
Seasonal CLOX/NOX Interaction', Nature (Vol. 315, 16 May 1985), pp. 207-10). Additionally, the 
report published by the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987 argued that 
problems of this type could not be contained within any single issue-area either (World Commission 
on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987)). 
39 Annette M. Capretta, 'The Future's So Bright, I Gotta Wear Shades: Future Impacts of the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer', Virginia Journal of International Law 
(Vol. 29, 1989), p. 235, note 160. See, also, Richard Elliot Benedick, 'Protecting the Ozone Layer: 
New Directions in Diplomacy', in Jessica Tuchman Mathews (ed.), Preserving the Global 
Environment: The Challenge of Shared Leadership (London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991), p. 
140. 
40 Interviews with officials in Nairobi, Kenya, July and August 1991. 
41 By 'specific', I mean 'numerical' references. The evolution from vague prose to concrete 
numbers represents a significant step. This occurred at the Third Session of the Vienna Group, 
which met in Geneva on 27-30 April 1987; there is a general consensus that this was the first 
meeting at which Southern states became significant factors in the politics of ozone layer depletion 
(interview with Fiona McConnell, UK Department of the Environment, London, 27 March 1990; and 
Geoffrey Lean, Action On Ozone (Nairobi: UNEP, 1989), p. 8). 
42 James T.B. Tripp, Daniel J. Dudek and Michael Oppenheimer, 'Law: Equity and Ozone 
Protection', Environment (Vol. 29, No. 6, July/August 1987), p. 44. 
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consideration called 'for developing countries to be exempt from the provisions of 
the convention for five years, or until their annual use of CFCs reaches 0.1 kg per 
head of population'. 43 During the ensuing four months, special arrangements for 
Southern states were discussed, and they were the subject of `[m]any hours of 
intense discussions' during the conference proceedings in Montreal in September 
1987. Participants in the negotiations began to recognise that 'without some 
preferential treatment such countries [Southern states] would not become Parties 
to the Protocol. The result would be an unrestricted growth in [CFC] consumption 
outside the Protocol.' 45 
In the terms of the Protocol agreed at the Montreal meeting, two special 
provisions were made for Southern states. One permitted these states to delay 
their compliance with the control measures restricting CFC production and 
consumption for 10 years. 46 The other, spread over two paragraphs, asserted the 
need for an effort to facilitate access to both technology and financial schemes to 
enable developing countries to use alternative technologies and to introduce 
substitute products more easily. 47 These two devices -- a period of grace and a 
promise of future access to technology and money -- were the only special 
provisions made for the Southern states. 
On the day that the Protocol was opened for signature, eight Southern 
states' representatives signed the document. 48 Peter Usher speculates about the 
motivation that prompted their ascent: 
Developing countries were persuaded to sign the protocol because of the 
prospect of preferential treatment in the continued use of the suspect 
43 Kathy Johnston, 'Ozone Layer Protection Deal Still up in the Air', Nature (Vol. 327, 7 May 
1987), p. 3. Compare the figure of 0.1 kg/capita with the amounts noted op. cit., in note 26. 
Kathy Johnston, 'First Steps in Ozone Protection Agreed', Nature (Vol. 329, 17 September 
1987), p. 189. 
45 G. Victor Buxton, 'The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer', paper 
presented at the 81st Annual Meeting of the Air Pollution Control Association, Dallas, TX, 19-24 June 
1988, pp. 11. 
46 They could delay, that is, providing their annual level of consumption did not exceed 0.3 
kg/capita. See Article 5 of the Montreal Protocol, op. cit., in note 21. 
47 Ibid., Article 5. 
48 The Protocol was opened for signature on 16 September 1987. The Southern countries that 
signed the document on that day were Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mexico, Panamd, Senegal, Togo and 
Venezuela (author's calculations from Stewart Boyle and John Ardill, The Greenhouse Effect: A 
Practical Guide to the World's Changing Climate (Sevenoaks: New English Library, 1989), Appendix 
3, pp. 258-59). 
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chemicals, at least for the next twenty years, coupled with no trade 
discrimination and access to alternative technology and substitute safe 
chemicals. 49 
There was a feeling pervasive among the negotiators that the provisions contained 
in the Montreal Protocol would be enough to make other developing countries sign 
on to the document. Richard Benedick observes that: 'From the interest shown by 
developing-country delegates at Montreal, including even those who had not 
received authorization to sign on the spot, it seemed likely that most would 
eventually ratify.' 5° Winfried Lang, head of the Austrian delegation, believes that 
the Southern countries had only one choice: 'Unless you join, you won't get those 
substances you need to meet your domestic needs, ... [and because technology 
transfers are prohibited to non-Parties,] countries not signing the Protocol will be 
unable to produce their own.' 51 The problem of Southern state participation in the 
process and thus the dilemmas of global equity were, in these ways, thought to be 
resolved. 
Other observers in the North, however, soon began to recognise that the 
Southern states' involvement was not a foregone conclusion. A number of reasons 
were cited. First, there was an economic incentive for Southern states to fill the 
market niche created by the Protocol, which might lead them both to produce 
ozone-destroying chemicals and to discourage any future strengthening of the 
agreement.52 Second, the 'protocol's restrictions on international trade in these 
chemicals would have no inhibiting effect on China and India because of their huge 
potential domestic markets', 53 and therefore, the efficacy of the trade restriction 
incentives was placed in doubt. Finally, even if Southern states became Parties to 
the Protocol, but nevertheless increased the level of their production up to their 
allowable limits, then efforts to protect the atmosphere would still be hindered 
49 Peter Usher, 'Climate Change and the Developing World', Southern Illinois University Law 
Journal (Vol. 14, 1990), pp. 262. 
50 Benedick, op. cit., in note 37, p. 99. 
51 Quoted in Capretta, op. cit., in note 39, p. 232, note 138. 
52 One commentator contends that the '10-year exemption and the possible scarcity in the 
supply of chemicals likely could render it profitable for developing countries to invest in CFC 
industrial facilities for use during the 10-year waiting period' (ibid., p. 235). 
Benedick, op. cit., in note 37, p. 100. 
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considerably. 54 
Meanwhile, the predominant view among Southern analysts was also that 
the Protocol was unsatisfactory, but for different reasons. Many began to argue 
that the so-called 'concessions' in the Montreal Protocol did not address their 
special needs in a just manner. Kilaparti Ramakrishna notes that: 
Even among those countries that have signed on as parties to the 
agreements, a feeling that they were 'caught napping' before and during the 
negotiations is gaining ground. If another opportunity were to present itself, 
many believe that they should react differently. 55 
Southern decision-makers, therefore, became more interested in the politics of the 
ozone layer, because they realised that the text agreed in Montreal would have 
significant consequences for their countries: without changes to the document, 
their industrial production, their economies and their overall plans for development 
would be affected by the phasing out of CFCs. This was deemed to be 
unsatisfactory, because Southern decision-makers were not necessarily willing to 
forego the use of these chemicals without compensation. Promises of technology 
transfer and financial assistance from the North to the South were, meanwhile, 
exceedingly vague.56 
In 1988, therefore, starkly different conceptions of equity were held by 
different states' leaders in international society. This incongruity, coupled with the 
fact that new scientific evidence was suggesting that the Montreal Protocol would 
54 The terms of the original Montreal Protocol permit developing countries to increase their 
production of CFCs substantially. For example, if the Chinese were to take full advantage of their 
allowance, they could, in good faith of the Montreal Protocol, produce approximately 350,000 tonnes 
of CFCs per year in 1999 (greater than pre-Protocol, US production). Modelling runs performed at 
the Wurzburg seminar in 1987 (see Chapter 2.1.6 of this thesis) had effectively demonstrated that 
the continued growth of CFC use in the developing world (even to levels well below that of the 
developed world) would cause the destruction of large amounts of stratospheric ozone (Tripp et al, 
op. cit, in note 42, p. 43). 
55 Kilaparti Ramakrishna, North-South Issues, the Common Heritage of Mankind and Global 
Environmental Change', in Ian H. Rowlands and Malory Greene (eds.), Global Environmental Change 
and International Relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 152-53. Scott Hajost echoes this 
view (interview with Scott Hajost, Environmental Defense Fund, Washington, DC, 20 April 1990). 
56 Many in the South feared that the only products that would be transferred would be out-of-
date technology. (See, for example, V. Shiva, Transfer of Technology, Briefing Paper for UNCED, 
Third World Network, Penang, 1991, cited in Patrick McCully, 'The Case Against Climate Aid', The 
Ecologist (Vol. 21, No. 6, November/December 1991), p. 250.) Indeed, on the ozone layer issue in 
particular, the Indian Environment Minister notes that Allied Chemical (an American multinational 
corporation) sold CFC technology to India when CFCs were 'perceived as immoral' in the North 
(comments of Maneka Gandhi, press conference, London, 28 June 1990). See, also, Benedick, op. 
cit., in note 37, pp. 100-01. 
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need to be strengthened in order to preserve the ozone layer, 57 propelled the 
global equity issue up the general ozone layer agenda. 
4.2.3 -- Greater Calls for Global Equity, 1989 
The visibility accorded the global equity issue increased rapidly during the second 
half of 1988, and it came to be one of two dominant themes at two conferences 
during the first half of 1989. 59 In March of that year, the United Kingdom 
government and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) co-
sponsored a conference on 'Saving the Ozone Layer'. The primary purpose of this 
gathering, as outlined by British officials, was to encourage the developing states' 
representatives to sign and to ratify the Montreal Protoco1. 6° This was to be 
achieved by showing them that substitute chemicals existed and that 'it is in [the 
developing world's] own interests, as well as in the interests of the developed 
world, not to use chemicals that damage the ozone layer'. 61 This conference was 
unique for its 'unofficial status', something that was promoted: 
British government ministers have been going out of their way to emphasise 
that the conference is in no way intended to put any sort of pressure on the 
Third World but rather to inform these countries and give them greater 
57 The startling scientific discoveries (see the discussion in Chapter 2.1.6 of this thesis) had not 
escaped the attention of statespeople in the South. At a meeting of 70 leading atmospheric scientists 
in The Hague on 17-18 October 1988, for example, `[r]epresentatives of the developing countries 
expressed concern about the availability of food and other resources which will be adversely 
affected by ozone depletion' (`Scientists at Hague Meeting Find 1988 Ozone Hole is Smaller', 
Climate Alert (Vol. 1, No. 4, Winter 1988), p. 5). Peter Usher maintains that this is the same argument 
that UNEP officials employed to try to get developing countries involved in the international 
negotiations during the early 1980s (interview with Usher, op. cit., in note 29). 
ss The other theme was the need for accelerating the controls' timetable. 
59 At a conference in Toronto in June 1988, the idea of an 'international fund' was mooted for 
the first time at an international gathering of policy-makers (infra, in note 142, and accompanying 
text). Although most of the attention at this time was focused upon climatic change, it is also notable 
for its reference to the ozone layer issue (The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global 
Security' (Toronto, Canada, 27-30 June 1988), Conference Statement (Ottawa: Environment Canada, 
1988)). The first time, however, that the global equity issue emerged as a theme of a major 
conference specifically devoted to the ozone layer problem was in November 1988 (Ozone Depletion 
Conference, London, 28-29 November 1988). Although this meeting was formally organised for 
scientific matters, the North-South issue dominated much of the coffee-break chatter (author's 
observations). 
so At this time, only eight Southern states (Egypt, Kenya, Malta, Mexico, Nigeria, Singapore, 
Uganda and Venezuela) had ratified the Montreal Protocol (author's calculations from Boyle and 
Ardill, op. cit., in note 48, Appendix 3, pp. 258-59). 
61 Michael McCarthy, "Disaster Recipe" if Third World Uses CFCs', The Times (London), 6 March 
1989, p. 6. 
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awareness of the problem. 62 
The theme of the conference was firmly established in the opening address 
by Kenya's President Moi. He argued that the Northern states must be prepared 
to help the developing world 'make the right choice and order their priorities 
properly'.63 This point was picked up more specifically on the second day of the 
conference by the Chinese and Indian delegation heads. Each individual indicated 
that a fairer arrangement was a precondition of their countries' participation in the 
process. Liu Ming Pu, the Chinese vice-chairman of the state commission for 
environmental protection, called for an 'International Ozone Layer Protection Fund'. 
Paid for by the Northern states, this fund would sponsor research into alternative 
methods and would also transfer the technology, free of charge, to those Southern 
countries that agreed to limit their use of CFCs. 64 Further, Ziul Rahman Ansari, 
the Indian minister of environment and forests, said that: 'Lest someone think of 
this [fund] as charity, I would like to remind them of the excellent principle of 
"polluter pays", adopted in the developed world.' 65 Thus, representatives from the 
two largest states in the developing world made it clear that their governments 
would not accede to the Montreal Protocol process until there was 'a fairer deal on 
the use of CFCs and unless firm commitments [were] made to provide them with 
financial aid and technical aid for substitutes'. 66 In this way, the manner in which 
equity was perceived by leaders of the two largest Third World countries was 
forcefully made clear. 
The response from officials of the developed world can, at best, be 
described as evasive. Although they seemed to acknowledge that there was a 
greater responsibility upon the states of the North (because their citizens had 
62 Ibid. 
6.3 Quoted in Judy Jones, `Moi Appeals for West to Help the Third World', The Independent 
(London), 6 March 1989, p. 3. 
64 Richard North, 'Appeal for Fund to Help Third World Cut CFCs', The Independent (London), 
7 March 1989. 
65 Quoted in ibid. 
66 John Hunt, 'Solutions Elude Delegates but Event is "Success"', The Financial Times (London), 
8 March 1989. 
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damaged the ozone layer 67), specifics were not proposed. Indeed, the two sides 
seemed to be out of step: the developing world's delegates, as noted above, were 
calling for a new fund; while the developed world's representatives were looking 
simply to enhance existing institutions. 68 In the end, the delegates could only 
agree that 'ways of helping developing countries should be a major feature of the 
protocol review and urgently examined in all appropriate international contexts ... 
[and] ... technical solutions are needed to help solve Third World human 
problems'. 69 Leaving the conference, however, officials realised that the issue of 
global equity was now of the utmost priority. 70 
The global equity question was next considered in an international forum at 
the first official meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol in Helsinki in May 
1989. At this conference, the two sides on this pivotal issue were even more 
polarised. On the one hand, officials from the US, the UK, Japan, West Germany, 
France and other countries were opposed to the idea of any international fund, but 
instead continued to favour the use of existing mechanisms in order to address the 
problem!' Their representatives were afraid that any new institution to govern the 
proposed fund would be a bureaucratic nightmare: inefficient, unaccountable and 
out of the control of the developed world. This side's reservations were summed 
up by the British Environment Secretary, Nicholas Ridley: 
67 For example, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, in her closing remarks at the 
conference, acknowledged that: 'Clearly, it would be intolerable for the countries which have already 
industrialised, and have caused the greater part of the problem we face, to expect others to pay the 
price in terms of their peoples' hopes and well being.' (Quoted in Judy Jones, 'Thatcher Calls for 
Concerted World Action', The Independent (London), 8 March 1989.) 
68 Northern officials' ideas included: increasing bilateral development assistance, refocussing that 
assistance to environmentally-friendly projects or increasing the responsibilities of the World Bank 
('Saving the Ozone Layer', Environmental Policy and Law (Vol. 19, No. 2, April 1989), pp. 45-46). 
es From the conference's final communique, reprinted in Pearce Wright, 'Banning CFCs is Only 
Remedy', The Times (London), 8 March 1989, p. 6. 
70 Despite the rather vague conclusion of the final communique, organisers could claim success 
in the fact that, by the end of the conference, '20 additional countries said they would ratify the 
Montreal Protocol; more than a dozen others promised to seriously consider joining' (Doolittle, op. 
cit., in note 26, p. 441, note 268). The new signatories that were from the South were: Brazil, Chile, 
Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, the Philippines, Senegal, Tonga, Trinidad, 
Tunisia and Zambia (Tim Radford, '20 Nations to Sign Protocol', The Guardian (London), 7 March 
1990, p. 4). 
71 To demonstrate commitment to the view that there was a 'need to work through "existing 
institutions" and for bilateral direct help', the UK government, at the end of April 1989, announced 
that it would be sending a £40 million package to India -- to be spent on, among other things, 
'alternative technologies to CFCs' (Tim Radford, '80 Nations Agree to Phase Out CFCs by End of 
Century', The Guardian (London), 3 May 1989). 
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The major donors do not seem keen on the rather simplistic idea of a fund, 
even one limited to CFCs. No one has yet addressed a number of 
fundamental questions about this idea. It has not been suggested who 
would run such a fund, how it would operate, on what criteria funds would 
be raised, and from whom, and what would happen if they did not 
contribute. Nor have we heard how it would be administered. Would it not 
take too long to set up, let alone to start disbursing? These questions will 
take much time to answer ... I have no doubt that the donor nations 
recognise that there is an onus on us, but we must co-ordinate our 
policies. 72 
On the other hand, officials from China and other countries (including, from 
the North, Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Norway") urged the 
creation of a fund, and a motion was put forth that called for subsidies, aid, credits 
and insurance programmes to deal with the ozone layer problem. 74 Members 
holding this view argued that because such a large amount of money was needed, 
a single central organisation should be in charge. At the same time, many in the 
South were suspicious of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and 
other established organisations; they thought that a new institution might be more 
'neutral'. 
As in London two months earlier, however, no specifics could be agreed. 
The delegates did, nevertheless, recognise the special circumstances of the 
developing countries in the final declaration,75 and they established a committee 
to work on detailed proposals. This newly-formed working group was mandated: 
to develop modalities for such mechanisms, including adequate international 
funding mechanisms which do not exclude the possibility of an international 
Fund and to report the results of their deliberations to the Conference of the 
Parties at its second meeting in 1990 [in London in June]. 76 
Negotiations in preparation for the Second Meeting of the Parties in London in 
June 1990 thus proceeded in working group meetings in August and November 
72 Quoted in Tim Radford, 'Ridley Pledges CFC Aid for Third World', The Guardian (London), 
4 May 1989. 
73 Benedick, op. cit., in note 37, p. 126. 
74 Michael McCarthy, 'Working Party Will Consider World Fund to Save Atmosphere', The Times 
(London), 6 May 1989. 
75 The declaration agreed to phase out chemicals more quickly while 'taking due account of 
developing countries' ('Helsinki Declaration on the Protection of the Ozone Layer', reprinted in 
Environmental Policy and Law (Vol. 19, Nos. 3/4, July 1989), p. 137). 
76 UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5, p. 20. 
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1989, and February and May 1990. With regard to the major questions surrounding 
the quest for a satisfaction of every states' demands for global equity, the 
negotiators had a number of issues to resolve. 77 
4.2.4 -- The Satisfaction of Demands for Global Equity, 1989-1990 
Most fundamentally, the first issue to be resolved was whether or not a fund should 
even exist. Although the idea of an international fund, to help Southern states use 
substitute chemicals and ozone-friendly processes, was attracting more supporters, 
some US officials remained resistant to the idea. Evidently, John Sununu (White 
House Chief of Staff) and Richard Darman (Office of Management and Budget 
Director) were continuing to win bureaucratic battles with William Reilly 
(Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency) and top State Department 
officials. Although Reilly and the others supported the idea of some sort of fund, 
Sununu and Darman convinced the American Administration that the US should try 
to work through existing institutions, such as the World Bank. 78 They harboured 
fears about the precedent that any ozone layer fund might set for subsequent 
negotiations on global warming. 79 
As the Americans continued their defiance through the first five months of 
1990, the stakes in the issue increased, for it became even clearer that Southern 
states would not participate in the Montreal Protocol process unless an 
international fund was agreed. 8° US officials, meanwhile, reiterated their view that 
Benedick notes the way in which the negotiating stances of the developing countries had 
changed by the middle of 1989: 
By 1989 the objectives of the developing-country negotiators had undergone significant 
change. At Montreal their preoccupation, reflected in the negotiations over article 5, was 
primarily to maintain maximum usage of CFCs for the longest possible grace period. But 
with industrialized countries now on a fast track toward phaseout ... the grace period 
became almost irrelevant. [Their representatives wanted to] move as rapidly as possible to 
new technologies — and to ensure that help was available to accomplish this. 
(Benedick, op. cit., in note 37, p. 148. Emphasis added.) 
78 Michael Weisskopf, 'U.S. to Fight Aid to Halt Global Warming', International Herald Tribune, 
10 May 1990, p. 7. 
79 Infra., in note 175, and accompanying text. 
80 This view was most adamantly put forward at a conference in Bergen, Norway in mid-May 
1990. (See, for example, Paul Brown, 'Global Slow-step Trips Up', The Guardian (London), 18 May 
1990, p. 27.) Because of US resistance, however, only a vague and abstract reference to 'additional 
resources and technology' could be agreed in the final declaration ('Bergen: Weak Declaration 
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they 'simply believe that [the] use of existing, established institutions is a more 
appropriate course'. 81 
The US Administration finally, in mid June 1990, accepted the principle of a 
fund. What caused this vote-face is unclear, although the influence of pressure 
from Congress,82 environmentalists, S3 industry,84 British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher85 and the criticism of the wider international community all 
played a role. 86 Nevertheless, in London, the United States' representatives made 
it clear that they were not entering into anything that was open-ended and that the 
financial mechanism was 'without prejudice to any future arrangements that may 
be developed with respect to other environmental issues'. 87 
Given agreement upon a fund, another important question related to how 
much money would be necessary to help the states of the South meet their 
obligations as outlined in the terms of the Montreal Protocol. A number of different 
groups put forth a variety of estimates, ranging from US$2 billion to US$7 
billion. 88 Because the estimates being aired were so large and varied, it was 
Adopted', Environmental Policy and Law (Vol. 20, No. 3, June 1990), p. 84; and 'The World Through 
Green-Tinted Specs', The Economist, 19 May 1990, p. 94). 
81 US White House spokesman Roman Popadiuk, quoted in G. Christopher Anderson, 'US Says 
No to International Ozone Plan', Nature (Vol. 345, 17 May 1990), p. 193. 
82 'London Conference Agrees to Complete CFC Phaseout', Climate Alert (Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 
1990), p. 1. 
s3 See Chapter 5.3 of this thesis for a further discussion. 
Atchley notes that Du Pont officials pointed out to John Sununu (US White House Chief of 
Staff) that if the developing world did not have the money to buy the substitute products, then the 
markets for the chemical companies would not be as large as they potentially otherwise could be 
(interview with John Kristian Atchley, Counselor of Embassy and Permanent Representative to 
UNEP, American Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya, 15 August 1991). See, also, the discussion in Chapter 
3 of this thesis. 
She warned US President Bush that everyone would suffer if he maintained his position 
(Geoffrey Lean, 'British Cash Boost for War on Ozone Threat', The Observer (London), 24 June 
1990, p. 2). 
8s No US government wanted to be seen to scuttle the entire international process (interview 
with United Nations Environment Programme official, Nairobi, Kenya, July 1991). 
87 Quoted in Benedick, op. cit., in note 37, p. 184. Mateos recalls that the Americans were 
insistent that the issue not be viewed as any kind of precedent. Regardless of the Americans' 
position, however, he feels that it was generally agreed that a precedent had been set (interview with 
Juan Antonio Mateos, Ambassador and Permanent Representative to UNEP, Embassy of Mexico, 
Nairobi, Kenya, 31 July 1991). 
In a speech in early 1990, for example, UNEP Executive-Director Mostafa Tolba noted that 
the 'cost of using the substitutes will be high -- very preliminary estimates show that from [US]$2 
billion to [US]$5 billion will be needed over the current decade' ('Global Partnership and the Road 
to Save the Ozone Layer', statement by Mostafa Tolba, Penang, 21 February 1990 (Nairobi: UNEP)). 
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difficult to find a common starting point for negotiations. A turning point came, 
however, when it was decided to focus upon 'incremental costs', rather than 'full 
costs', 99 and when an initial three-year period was also considered. Given these 
more restrictive parameters, the estimates fell, and an initial UNEP suggestion of 
US$400 million annually was used as a starting point. 90 Even this figure, however, 
was questioned, and therefore studies of representative countries were contracted 
and undertaken. 91 The results of these investigations were presented at the 
second meeting of the Working Group, where it was revealed that the required 
amount of money to cover costs would not be astronomical. With this discovery, 
the issue ceased to be a source of conflict, 92 and in the end, a figure of US$160 
million over an initial three year period was agreed. This amount would rise to 
US$240 million in the event that China and India became Parties to the Protocol. 93 
 A third point of discussion related to the question of upon whom the burden 
of financing the fund should fall. One suggestion that was put forward was that the 
For their country alone, meanwhile, Indian representatives demanded US$2 billion -- 'a number 
related to its cost of using more ozone-friendly technology in the future -- as its price to join the 
1987 protocol' (James K. Sebenius, 'Designing Negotiations Toward a New Regime: The Case of 
Global Warming', International Security (Vol. 15, No. 4, Spring 1991), p. 146). Also, interview with 
Yusuf Ahmad, Senior Advisor to the Executive-Director, United Nations Environment Programme, 
Nairobi, Kenya, 14 August 1991. 
89 This was taken to be the difference between the cost of ozone-benign processes and the cost 
of processes that use CFCs. 
90 Benedick, op. cit., in note 37, p. 154. This figure is the same as the one arrived at in McKinsey 
and Company, Protecting the Global Atmosphere: Funding Mechanisms. Interim Report to Steering 
Committee for Ministerial Conference of Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change (The 
Netherlands, November 1989), 27 June 1989, p. 10. 
91 The German and the Japanese delegates were the two states that were most concerned with 
the cost estimates. Mateos nevertheless notes that this issue did not give rise to serious 
confrontation, because all Parties agreed that it was reasonable to want to have an idea about the 
magnitude of the figures under consideration (interview with Mateos, op. cit., in note 87). 
Consultants were therefore hired to do country reports, which helped reduce 'uncertainties regarding 
the required size of the financial mechanism' (UNEP/OzL./Pro.Bur. 2/2). 
92 Interview with United Nations Environment Programme official, Nairobi, Kenya, July 1991. In 
London in June 1990, however, Maneka Gandhi did, at one point, demand that India be allowed to 
draw UK£350 million from any fund in order to eliminate the use of CFCs totally (comments of 
Gandhi, op. cit., in note 56). 
93 One influential study was undertaken by an organisation called Metroeconomica (The Costs 
to Developing Countries of Joining the Montreal Protocol (Nairobi: UNEP, 1989), cited in 
UNEP/OzL.Fin.1.). Markandya notes that their figure was supported by an independent study 
carried out by the US Environmental Protection Agency (Preliminary Analysis of Capital Costs for 
CFC Reduction for the First Three Years (Washington, DC: EPA, 1990).) 'On the basis of a sector-by-
sector analysis, the study concluded that the total for the first three years would be between 
[US]$162 and [US]$262 million.' (Anil Markandya, 'Economics and the Ozone Layer', in David 
Pearce (ed.), Blueprint 2: Greening the World Economy (London: Earthscan, 1991), pp. 69-70.) 
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contribution to the fund should be dependent upon 1986 levels of consumption, 
weighted by ozone-depleting potential.' In the end, however, it was decided, for 
reasons of both precedence and simplicity, that the traditional UN scale of 
assessment would be used. 95 
Further, a fourth significant set of issues to be resolved related to the form 
that each country's contribution should take. For one, negotiators had to decide 
whether bilateral aid could be counted as part of a country's contribution to the 
fund; the larger donor countries supported this idea, for their officials were eager 
to keep close controls upon some of the aid. In the end, it was agreed that up to 
20 per cent of a country's obligation could be met by bilateral aid. 96 Second, the 
question of 'additionality' arose during the meetings of the Working Group. The 
Americans, in particular, were vocal on this issue, arguing that funds should come 
from existing resources and that `no additional funding should be required from 
donor countries, although voluntary contributions could be accepted'. 97 
 Additionality was, nevertheless, finally accepted by all Parties.98 This relates to a
third question about the form of each country's contribution that became an issue -
- namely, whether the contributions to the fund should be voluntary or 
obligatory.99 Benedick reports how this question was resolved: 
On the issue of mandatory versus voluntary contributions Tolba attempted 
to bridge the gap between developing countries and major donors by 
promoting the concept of 'voluntary contributions on an assessed basis,' 
which conveyed a sense of implicit obligation. lm 
Thus, by the time that ministers gathered in London in June 1990, these three 
questions about the form of each country's contribution had been resolved to the 
satisfaction of all participants. 
A fifth issue to be considered during this year-long process was with regard 
94 In 1989, one delegation had suggested a minimum contribution of US $1000 plus a premium 
on each kilogramme of CFCs produced equal to one cent (UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5, p. 8). See, also, 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.Bur. 1/2, p. 4. 
95 UNEP/OzLPro. 2/3, Annex IV, p. 51, Point C8. 
96 UNEP/OzLPro. 2/3, Annex IV. 
97 UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.II1(2)/3, p. 4. 
98 SzeII, op. cit., in note 34, p. 174. 
99 UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.II1(2)/3. 
100 Benedick, op. cit., in note 37, p. 161. 
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to how this money -- the new fund -- would be administered. 101 The question 
initially focused upon whether or not a new organisation should be established. As 
had been the case at the Helsinki meeting in May 1989, the South's leaders 
wanted a new organisation, while the North's representatives were opposed to this. 
Representatives of major donor countries stressed the difficult and time-
consuming process involved [in the establishment of a totally new 
institution]. Some donor governments favored only the establishment of a 
'clearinghouse' to provide objective information to article 5 [Third World] 
parties on the availability of aid from existing bilateral and multilateral 
sources and to facilitate requests for assistance. 1°2 
Although it appeared that the developing countries' officials would not withdraw 
their demand for the creation of a new administrating organisation, they eventually 
accepted the concept of a tripartite division of responsibilities among the 
World Bank, UNDP [United Nations Development Programme] and UNEP. 
UNEP would pursue 'political promotion of the objectives of the Protocol,' 
as well as research, data collection, and clearinghouse functions. UNDP 
would take charge of the feasibility studies and other technical assistance 
activities. Other multilateral agencies, including regional development banks, 
could be invited by the executive committee to cooperate with the fund. But 
the World Bank, and specifically the president of the bank, was clearly 
designated as the administrator and manager of the central function of the 
fund: financing projects and programs to meet the incremental costs of 
article 5 parties [developing countries]. 1°3 
Whereas negotiators were able to agree an arrangement for the day-to-day 
administration of the fund, disagreement about who would control the fund's 
executive council persisted throughout the working group's four rneetings. 1°4 The 
Americans, as potentially the largest contributor to the fund, said that they should 
have a permanent seat on the council as a right. The Southern states' 
representatives, in response, argued that no one country should have a unique 
101 Possibilities ranging from administration by the World Bank (UNEP/OzL.Pro.Bur. 3/2) to 
administration by a new organisation (UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.I(1)/3), and everything Inbetween', were 
being considered. 
102 Benedick, op. cit., in note 37, pp. 155-56. 
103 Ibid., pp. 161 and 186. See, also, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, Annex IV, p. 50, Paragraphs B2 and 
B3. 
104 Mateos argues that 'this issue proved to be the most difficult to resolve' (interview with 
Mateos, op. cit., in note 87). See, also, David Reed, The Global Environmental Facility: Sharing 
Responsibility for the Biosphere (Multilateral Development Bank Program, WWF-International, 1991), 
p. 5. 
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advantage -- rather, there should be a democratic executive. 105 By the beginning 
of the London conference in June 1990, a 14 member executive had been agreed, 
but just how the representatives should be chosen and how the voting should be 
weighted (if at all) remained unresolved. Agreement was finally reached which 
allowed representatives to be chosen from defined regions -- with, in total, seven 
from the North and seven from the South. Because the US was itself declared a 
'region', a permanent seat was thus assured in a face-saving manner. Within the 
council, 'it was decided that a two-thirds majority, comprising separate simple 
majorities among North and South, would apply both to votes of the 14-member 
executive committee and to votes of the parties as a whole concerning the financial 
mechanism. ' 1°6 
A sixth significant point of contention concerned the question of guaranteed 
access to technology for Southern states. In order for Southern states to reduce 
their consumption of CFCs, officials recognised that they had to be 'made privy to 
know-how and have easy access though subsidies, preferential loans or other 
means to acquire plant and equipment'. 107 This is, however, not assured, 
because there are strong forces that discourage the transfer of technology. 
Benedick identifies the dilemma faced by decision-makers in the Northern states: 
Entrepreneurs would be reluctant to invest sizable sums in research and 
development of new products, only to have their results given away to 
companies in developing countries that could then undercut potential 
markets. There was a principle involved here also: the private sector had to 
be able to recoup its costs in order to maintain an incentive for investment 
in technology development. In addition, it was puzzling for Western officials 
to contemplate how governments could enforce transfer of private-sector 
technology on noncommercial terms. The World Intellectual Property 
Organization agreed that in such matters governments have little influence 
with private companies beyond persuasion and incentives. 108 
Throughout the working groups' meetings, the representatives of Southern 
states made it clear that they wanted an assurance that, if they did not receive 
sufficient financial and technical assistance, then they would not be required to 
105 Comments of Mexican representative Juan Mateos, cited in John Hunt, 'US Clashes with 
Third World Over Ozone Fund', The Financial Times (London), 22 June 1990, p. 10. 
106 Benedick, op. cit., in note 37, p. 185. 
107 Mostafa Tolba, quoted in 'Cleaning up the Atmosphere: The Business World's View', Our 
Planet (Vol. 2 No. 1, 1990), pp. 4-5. 
108 Benedick, op. cit., in note 37, p. 157. See, also, the discussion in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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meet their obligations in the Montreal Protocol. At the conference in London in 
June 1990, furthermore, Indian Environment Minister Maneka Gandhi demanded 
explicit guarantees of technology for Southern states. She maintained that: 'Money 
is irrelevant if we don't have access to the knowledge. Survival is about the spread 
of knowledge, not money.' 109 
After late-night negotiation sessions in London, a compromise solution was 
finally agreed, and the Indian representative stated that she would recommend that 
her country accede to the Protoco1. 11° According to Benedick, resolution 'of the 
impasse was ingenious, realistic, and acceptable to all'. 111 The compromise 
could not guarantee technology transfer, but accepted that if Southern states had 
problems gaining the technology to make CFC alternatives and thus found it 
difficult to meet their obligations under the agreement, then a meeting of the Parties 
to the Protocol would be convened in. order to consider alternative paths of 
action. 112 
By tackling these major issues -- the fund's existence, size and other 
financial details, the structure of administration for the fund, and technology transfer 
-- negotiators in London made significant progress towards answering fully the 
109 Quoted in Paul Brown, 'India Insists on Recipe for Green Fridges', The Guardian (London), 
29 June 1990, p. 4. 
110 At the conclusion of the conference: 
Following the adoption of decision 11/2, the representative of India said that the original text 
of the Protocol had contained provisions which discriminated against developing countries: 
the amended text met many of their concerns. She would therefore recommend it to the 
Government of India for signature. 
(UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, p. 18.) The Chinese representative had, a day earlier, said that he would 
'recommend to the Chinese Government that it should ratify the amended text' (UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, 
p. 18). 
1 Benedick, op. cit., in note 37, p. 196. 
112 The new amended protocol states: 
A Meeting of the Parties shall review, not later than 1995, the situation of the Parties 
operating under paragraph 1 of this Article [5], including the effective implementation of 
financial co-operation and transfer of technology to them, and adopt such revisions that 
may be deemed necessary regarding the schedule of control measures applicable to those 
Parties. 
('Adjustments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer' (London: 27-29 
June 1990), Article 5, Paragraph 8, reprinted in International Legal Materials (Vol. 30, No. 2, March 
1991), pp. 539-554.) Although this development was termed 'revolutionary' by some, most officials 
recognised that there was still further work to be done on this issue (interview with Mateos, op. cit., 
in note 87; and Sebenius, op. cit., in note 88, p. 147). 
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developing world's calls for global equity on the ozone layer depletion issue. 113 
 The success of their work can be measured by the fact that at the conclusion of 
the London conference in June 1990, '59 nations had signed [the Montreal 
Protocol] and most of the other 39 [nations] at the conference were expected to 
[sign] soon'. 114 Even China and India, the two most significant antagonists 
during the negotiations, indicated that they would soon join the process. 115 
 Indeed, these observations suggest that the demands for global equity, as 
perceived by representatives of all states of the world, had been met at the London 
conference, and thus the third hypothesised precondition for international regime 
formation had been satisfied by the end of June 1990. 
4.2.5 -- Weakening Consensus About Global Equity, 1990-1991 
The story, however, did not finish with the conclusion of the London conference 
in June 1990, because it soon became evident that a number of issues remained 
outstanding with regard to global equity and the politics of ozone layer depletion. 
First, the agreed Multilateral Fund for the ozone layer had a less than auspicious 
start. The Fund, which began to take shape after a meeting in Canada in 
September 1990 and which had its administrative centre in Montrea1, 116 was, 
according to one report, 'bedevilled by bureaucratic arguments. By [May 1991] it 
had attracted only [US]$10m of its 1991 target of [US]$53m.' 117 By the end of 
1991, furthermore, it was not clear that the Fund would be able to function to the 
satisfaction of both the donor and the recipient countries. 115 
Second, at the London conference in 1990, the members of international 
113 See, also, the discussion in Szell, op. cit., in note 34, pp. 173-74. 
114 Paul Brown, 'World Unites on Ozone Deal', The Guardian (London), 30 June 1990, p. 1. 
115 Op. cit., in note 110. 
116 'Green Aid', Our Planet (Vol. 2, No. 4, 1990), p. 9. 
117  David Nicholson-Lord, 'Britain to Block Rainforest Fund', The Independent on Sunday 
(London), 9 June 1991, p. 4. Moreover, in June 1991, the UNEP Executive Director 'complained 
about delayed contributions to the Fund' (noted in David M. Miller, 'Montreal Protocol: Third Meeting 
of Parties', Environmental Policy and Law (Vol. 21, Nos. 5/6, December 1991), p. 200). 
118 To be fair, however, other reports expressed faith in the fund. Mateos, for example, notes 
that states are committed to the Fund, and thus he expects that it would be fully funded and would 
be successful (interview with Mateos, op. cit., in note 87). These thoughts are also echoed by some 
officials from the North (interview with Philippe (Mange, Representant Permanent Adjoint de la 
France, Aupres de l'Office des Nations-Unies a Nairobi, Ambassade de France au Kenya, Nairobi, 
Kenya, 15 July 1991). 
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society only committed themselves to the fund for an initial period of three years. 
This fact may seem of little consequence, particularly when placed alongside the 
sheer achievement of getting the members of international society to agree to the 
principle of the fund. Once attention is drawn to the size of the fund's future needs, 
however, it becomes evident that conflict in this area could resurface. More 
specifically, analysts suggest that the most significant costs of cutting CFC 
emissions will be incurred towards the end of the twentieth century. 119 Anil 
Markandya, furthermore, maintains that: 
In the longer term, assistance will also be needed to meet the higher costs 
of CFC substitutes. Estimating this is difficult, given that many of the 
substitutes are not even available in developed countries on a commercial 
basis. However, given estimates of expected market prices, and their fall 
over time as economies of scale came into operation, a figure of around 
[US]$1.8 billion over the period 1990-2008 was arrived at in the 
Metroceconomica Study. 12° 
He also points out that the bulk of these costs will be concentrated in the pericid 
between 1998 and 2010. 121 David Runnalls's view is even more dramatic, for he 
estimates that 'the annual costs of implementing the Montreal Protocol could run 
to [US]$400 million'. 122 Moreover, there were significant uncertainties associated 
with all of these future projections, which suggested that the actual amount of 
money needed might even be higher. In addition, there were those who were 
highlighting the fact that developing countries representatives might someday 
demand financing for the full costs of CFC replacements, rather than just the 
incremental costs: 
If, for example, a developing country wishes to build a refrigerator plant to 
take the place of an existing facility that makes CFC-based refrigerators, it 
must pay what a new CFC facility would have cost; the fund makes up the 
difference. But the developing nation must still invest a large amount of 
capital in the new plant -- and swallow the costs of shutting down the old 
119 The cost was put at US$995 million by the year 2000 by Metroeconomica (Debora 
MacKenzie, 'Cheaper Alternatives for CFCs', New Scientist (Vol. 126, 30 June 1990), p. 39). 
120 Markandya, op. cit., in note 93, p. 70. 
121 Ibid., p. 70. 
122  David Runnalls, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Institutional 
and Financial Options for Sustainable Development (Ottawa: United Nations Association in Canada, 
Briefing Paper No. 30, July 1991), p. 4. 
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one. 123 
Taken together, then, these comments suggest that possible demands for 
assistance in the future could place significant stresses upon the fragile consensus 
for an international fund, perhaps even causing it to disintegrate. 
Finally, the question of technology transfer remained unresolved at the end 
of 1991. Despite Benedick's encouraging report in the aftermath of the London 
conference in June 1990, 124 the amendment to the Protocol agreed at that time 
simply postponed the time at which Parties would have to deal with the issue until 
1995. 125 In December 1990 -- six months after the London conference -- a UNEP 
document reported that: 
The Working Group was of the opinion that the issues of technology transfer 
and intellectual property required careful attention and detailed discussion. 
It therefore decided to defer consideration of those issues to a subsequent 
meeting, when it could also take into account the results of the efforts 
undertaken under the interim financial mechanism established by decision 
11/8 of the parties and any deliberations under the auspices of GATT and 
WIPO [World Intellectual Property Organization]. 126 
The challenges facing international negotiators on this dilemma were, at the end 
of 1991, still substantial. 127  
In light of these facts, it is not surprising to find that the enthusiasm for the 
amendments to the Protocol diminished after the London conference in June 1990. 
Indeed, China did not immediately sign the document, as its representative had 
suggested it would. Instead, it was not until almost a year later, on 19 June 1991, 
that China announced, at UNEP Headquarters in Nairobi, its intention to accede 
to the Montreal Protocol. 128 This country's ratification was, at the end of 1991, 
still pending. India's story was even more striking. Despite the comments made by 
123 Robert Pool, 'A Global Experiment in Technology Transfer', Nature (Vol. 351, 2 May 1991), 
p. 6. 
124 Op. cit., in note 111. 
125 Op. cit., in note 112. 
126 UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.1/5/3, p. 5. 
127 See, for example, Jim MacNeill, Pieter Winsemius and Taizo Yakushiji, Beyond 
Interdependence: The Meshing of the World's Economy and the Earth's Ecology (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), p. 64; Pool, op. cit., in note 123; and the discussion in Chapter 4.3.4 of this 
thesis. 
128  `China Joins Fight Against Ozone Depletion', Our Planet (Vol. 3, No. 4, 1991), p. 14. 
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Maneka Gandhi in June 1990, India did not sign the Protocol during either 1990 or 
1991. More significantly, in September 1991, 
India's environment minister, Kamal Nath, ... said his government would not 
sign the Montreal Protocol, ... His stance is worrying many governments 
who have signed. Mr Nath said he was unhappy about the conditions 
governing aid to developing nations to help them develop alternatives to 
chlorofluorocarbons. He said the conditions may infringe India's 
sovereignty. 129 
This position, however, was further elucidated by Indian officials, who said that they 
would sign the protocol, but not until the London amendments had come into 
effect. 13° Thus, because this document had yet to be ratified, India remained 
outside of the process at the end of 1991. 
Taken together, these three sets of observations suggest that during the 
second half of 1990 and all of 1991, the strong worldwide consensus about the 
issue of global equity with respect to ozone layer depletion had weakened 
significantly. Although it had not decayed to such an extent that the third 
hypothesised precondition was no longer satisfied, it was nevertheless evident that, 
at the end of 1991, the global equity precondition for international regime formation 
was only precariously met. 
4.3 -- Global Equity and Global Warming 
Questions of global equity and North-South relations did not play significant roles 
in the politics of global warming until the late 1980s. 
4.3.1 -- The Non-Involvement of Southern States Before 1987 
The question of global equity in the broader global warming debate was not a 
significant concern for international negotiators before 1987. An examination of the 
declarations being agreed during this period helps to substantiate this assertion. 
For example, at one of the first major international gatherings on climatic change -
- the First World Climate Conference in Geneva in 1979 -- the North-South theme 
129 Nicholas Schoon, 'India Refuses to Sign Ozone Layer Protocol', The Independent (London), 
21 September 1991, p. 10. 
130 Indian High Commission official, London, personal communication, 20 March 1992. See, also, 
Peter Aldhous, 'Montreal Protocol Still Too Lax'?', Nature (Vol. 353, 24 October 1991), p. 688. 
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was not dominant. The Declaration that was agreed at this conference set forth an 
agenda for research into various issues surrounding climatic change, which 
included the socio-economic impacts of climatic variability. The closest reference 
to the North-South question, however, was a stated desire to improve the 
understanding of the 'characteristics of human societies at different stages of 
development and in different environments that make them especially vulnerable 
or resilient in the face of climate variability and change'. 131 Nevertheless, there 
were no explicit recommendations for political actions to address any special needs 
that the Southern states might have had. 
During the middle part of the 1980s, the concept of transnational assistance 
for developing countries in light of projected global climate change began to be 
mooted at international gatherings. At the Villach-Bellagio conferences in 1987, for 
example, it was recognised that `Nnternational assistance would be needed to pay 
for anticipatory adaptation in many developing countries, so additional bilateral and 
multilateral funding would be required'. 132 We should recall, however, that these 
meetings were attended mostly by scientists. 
The primary reason for the relatively small amount of attention accorded to 
the global equity question during the period before 1987 is that the broader global 
warming issue had yet to take on significant political dimensions. As is argued in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis, it was not until the wake of the 1987 Villach-Bellagio 
conferences that states' leaders began to be concerned with the global warming 
issue. 133 Thus, because the world's decision-makers were not discussing any 
political issues to a significant extent, it is clear why the question of global equity 
was not a focus of their attention. Granted, this disregard means that there was no 
disagreement about perceptions of global equity among the world's decision-
makers during the period before 1987, but neither was there any agreement. 
4.3.2 -- The Emergence of Global Equity as a Political Issue, 1987-1988 
The global warming issue became highly political at the international level during 
131 'Declaration of the World Climate Conference', reprinted in Environmental Policy and Law 
(Vol. 6, 1980), p. 103. 
132 World Climate Programme (Impact Studies), Developing Policies for Responding to Climatic 
Change (Geneva: WMO/TD, No. 225, April 1988), p. 31. 
133 See Chapter 2.2.3 of this thesis. 
201 
1987 and 1988. 134 More significantly for this discussion, however, the issue of 
global equity also appeared upon the broader global warming agenda almost 
immediately. There are a number of reasons for its rapid emergence at this time. 
First, Southern states' citizens were contributing to the problem to a 
significant extent, and their leaders' policy plans suggested that their share would 
increase in the future. In 1987, for example, Southern states were responsible for 
27.7 per cent of all carbon dioxide emissions in the world. 135 Moreover, the 
Chinese government had plans to expand its coal consumption fivefold between 
1990 and 2020. Realisation of this policy proposal would add nearly 50 per cent to 
the 1990 level of global carbon emissions. 135 In 1990, the significance of this type 
of policy was noted: 
[I]f China and India were to increase their greenhouse gas emissions to the 
global average per capita rate, today's global total would rise 28 percent; 
if these two countries matched France's per capita rate, the total would be 
68 percent higher. 137 
Ambitions like these, reflecting a desire for higher standards of living, suggested 
that, depending upon the path of development that they followed, citizens of the 
Southern states had the potential to contribute significantly to the global warming 
problem. 
Second, the mounting persuasiveness of the scientific evidence had 
increased awareness of the global nature of the problem. 135 Thus, given both the 
recognition that global systems were at work and the increased contribution of 
Southern states to the readjustment of these global systems, some analysts began 
to suggest that North-South issues were an indispensable component of the 
134 See Chapter 2.2.3 of this thesis. 
135 Geoffrey H. Kats, 'Slowing Global . Warming and Sustainable Development: The Promise of 
Energy Efficiency', Energy Policy (Vol. 18, No. 1, January/February 1990), p. 26. There is no general 
agreement with regard to the contribution that Southern states make to global warming. Another 
observer, for example, notes that about '40 percent of the expected warming now comes from 
activities in the developing countries' (Sebenius, op. cit., in note 88, p. 121). This higher value may 
be accounted for by the inclusion of methane emissions and deforestation in the calculation. A 
report from the South, meanwhile, suggests still different proportions (Anil Agarwal and Sunita 
Narain, Global Warming in an Unequal World (New Delhi: Centre for Science and Technology, 
1990)). Nevertheless, most observers agreed that the Southern contribution was significant. 
136 Sebenius, op. cit., in note 88, p. 129. 
137 James Gustave Speth, 'Toward A North-South Compact for the Environment', Environment 
(Vol. 32, No. 5, June 1990), pp. 16-17. 
138 See Chapter 2 of this thesis; and op. cit., in note 38 and accompanying text. 
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broader international discussions concerning worldwide climatic change. 139 
Third, the global equity issue arose rapidly at this time in the discussions on 
global warming, because North-South questions had already been raised in the 
political negotiations on other environmental issues. Not only was the global equity 
issue being discussed in the ozone layer negotiations, 14° but the broader 
'environment and development' debate that emerged in 1987 had pushed North-
South issues up the international environmental agenda. 141 Therefore, the global 
equity issue was already on the minds of decision-makers when they embarked 
upon the global warming negotiations. Thus, together, these three comments 
suggest why this element of the climate change issue gained prominence and 
became a significant concern during the late 1980s. 
4.3.3 -- Different Interpretations of Global Equity, 1988-1990 
In the spate of conferences during 1988, 1989 and 1990, the question of global 
equity with respect to North-South issues was a highly visible part of the 
discussions. The first time that the concept of a 'climate fund' to deal explicitly with 
global warming arose at a gathering of policy-makers was, as mentioned above, 
at the Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere in June 1988. 142 In the 
final conference statement, delegates agreed to establish a 'World Atmosphere 
Fund, financed in part by a levy on fossil fuel consumption of industrialized 
countries, to mobilize a substantial part of the resources needed for implementation 
of the Action Plan for the Protection of the Atmosphere'. 143 Further, the 
conference statement also recognised that the North had an obligation to bear the 
main responsibility to ensure that the problem was addressed, but not at the 
139 Sebenius argues that 'the developed world cannot solve the climate problem in the long run 
without the cooperation of the [South]' (Sebenius, op. cit., in note 88, p. 129). See, also, Peter H. 
Gleick, 'Climate Change and International Politics: Problems Facing Developing Countries', Ambio 
(Vol. 18, No. 6, 1989), p. 338. 
140 See Chapter 4.2 of this thesis. 
141 See, for example: the address of Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, President of the Maldives, to the 
United Nations General Assembly on 19 October 1987 (UN Doc A/42/PV.41); Resolution 42/187 
of the United Nations General Assembly, which highlighted the idea of sustainable development 
(UNGA 42/187, 'Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development', General 
Assembly — 42nd Session, 11 December 1987); and, more generally, the report of the Brundtland 
Commission (World Commission on Environment and Development, op. cit., in note 38). 
1422 The Changing Atmosphere', op. cit., in note 59. 
143 Ibid., p. 6. 
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expense of development opportunities in the South. 144 Although this declaration 
was not legally binding upon the participating states, it nevertheless set the terms 
of reference for the ensuing debate by putting forth the idea of a climate fund to 
assist the developing world. 
After the UN General Assembly approved its first resolution on climate 
change -- thus entrenching the global scope of the political discussions 145 -- a 
conference of legal experts was convened in Ottawa, Canada in February 1989 to 
discuss the possible legal responses to global warming. One of the principles 
identified in Ottawa endorsed the 
possibility of establishing a World Climate Trust Fund for use in initiating and 
supporting all necessary activities to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases 
and to mitigate effects of climate change. The beneficiaries of that Fund 
should be developing countries. The Trust Fund should be funded from 
three possible sources: contributions by countries (voluntary or assessed), 
`user fees' for activities causing climate change, and fines for violations of 
the convention. 146 
Although this declaration further reinforced the visibility of the equity issue, it is 
important to recognise that the proposals being mooted at this time only focused 
upon the validity of various principles, rather than upon detailed and specific 
recommendations. 
A month later, in March 1989, the governments of Norway, France and the 
Netherlands hosted an international conference in The Hague, the Netherlands. 
One commentator notes that this conference was 
the first public attempt to think through the effects on North-South relations 
of greenhouse warming, and its proposal for a new world environment 
authority with teeth, sets the agenda for an international debate on the 
international politics of the environment that seems certain to grow louder 
and louder. 147 
144 Ibid. 
145 UNGA Res. 43/53 (Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly During its 
Forty-Third Session, Volume I, 20 September- 22 December 1988 (New York: United Nations, 1989), 
pp. 133-34). Although demands for global equity were not explicit (like the Climate Conference 
Declaration agreed nine years earlier, the only hint at the North-South issue was an intent to study 
socio-economic effects), the declaration nevertheless ensured that the global warming issue was a 
subject of truly global debate. 
146 `Protection of the Atmosphere: International Meeting of Legal and Policy Experts', Meeting 
Statement (Ottawa, Canada, 20-22 February 1989), p. 11. 
147 Quoted in 'The Hague Environment Summit', Environmental Policy and Law (Vol. 19, No. 2, 
April 1989), p. 45. 
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The final declaration attempted to highlight the importance of the issue, for 'calls 
for help from industrialized nations to help developing countries in pollution 
abatement' were made. 148 But the importance of this conference should not be 
overstated. It did not have broad-based support (the Americans and the Soviets 
were not invited, and the British did not attend), and its haughty declarations again 
lacked specifics. 149 
In the introduction to this section, the political linkage between the two 
issues of global atmospheric change is flagged. 15° Mostafa Tolba, Executive-
Director of UNEP, is one of the individuals who identified this linkage in order to try 
to achieve agreements on the global warming issue by directing officials towards 
the wake left by the ozone layer negotiators. 151 At the 1989 Helsinki Meeting of 
the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, Tolba called for the creation of a climate fund, 
which would be similar to the ozone layer fund being called for at the same time. 
In response, the Northern states' decision-makers were non-committal on the issue 
(recall that they had sidetracked the ozone layer issue to a working group), and 
British Environment Secretary Nicholas Ridley not only mocked the idea as 
simplistic, but he also highlighted its perceived infeasibility 152 and argued that a 
climate fund 'implies a degree of sovereignty over sovereign nations which can 
never really be there'. 153 Although the establishment of a link between global 
warming and ozone layer depletion brought attention to the former, perceptions of 
equity on this issue were just as divergent as they were on the latter. 154 
148 Ibid., p. 45. 
149 Ibid.; and Glen Plant, 'Institutional and Legal Responses to Global Climate Change', 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1990), pp. 413-14. 
150 Op. cit., in note 140 
151 At the UK-UNEP conference to 'Save the Ozone Layer', in London in March 1989, Tolba used 
his concluding remarks to argue that the world's states should spend an agreed additional 
percentage of development assistance to deal with the broader issue of climate change (John Hunt, 
'Conference Urges Faster Action on CFCs', The Financial Times (London), 8 March 1989). Tolba 
said to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher: 'As the leader of the first industrial nation to use 
coal burning extensively, you may deem it appropriate for the UK to support -- or even take a lead -
- in an initiative of this nature.' (Quoted in Richard North, 'UN Chief Backs Aid for the Third World', 
The Independent (London), 8 March 1989.) There was, however, no response from any Northern 
decision-maker at this time. 
152 ' Nat ions Seek Chemical Ban by Year 2000', The Globe and Mail (Toronto), 4 May 1989, p. 
A8. 
153 Quoted in Radford, op. cit., in note 72. 
154 See op. cit., in notes 71-76, and accompanying text. 
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During the negotiations in intergovernmental fora about global equity in 1988 
and the beginning of 1989, the issues were only being discussed in a general 
manner; vague statements of intent were being made, but specific proposals were 
not the subjects of much debate. During 1989, however, there were signs that 
some statespeople in the North were becoming somewhat more receptive to the 
idea of a formal mechanism to attempt to satisfy demands for global equity, even 
going so far as to make concrete proposals. In April of that year, for example, the 
Norwegian government 'called for the establishment of a UN fund to support 
measures aimed at alleviating global climate changes, and pledged the equivalent 
of [UK]£60 million [0.1 per cent of its GNP] for the project.' 155 Their officials 
reiterated the fact, however, that any Norwegian policy action was conditional upon 
the concurrent involvement of other developed countries. Further, Jim MacNeill 
identifies two other unilateral proposals from Northern states: 
The 1989 budget of the Netherlands included provision for an annual 
contribution of 250 million guilders to a global climate fund, and the 
government is currently assessing the various options for financing and 
managing such a fund ... At the September 1989 meetings of the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund in Washington, DC, the French 
finance minister announced that France would contribute a similar amount, 
about US $140 million. 156 
But, in 1989, responses like these from statespeople of the North were rare. 
More indicative of the feeling of most of these decision-makers is the Declaration 
that emerged from the Group of Seven's (G7) Paris Summit in July 1989. Although 
many commentators have noted that the 'green issue' came upon the G7's agenda 
for the first time in Paris, 157 a closer look at the fine print provides insights into 
the group's primary priorities. The seven nations' leaders did recognise that some 
sort of assistance from the North to the South was needed -- they specifically 
noted 'economic incentives may include the use of aid mechanisms and specific 
transfer of technology [and] in special cases, ODA debt forgiveness and debt for 
nature swaps can play a useful role in environmental protection'. 158 In the section 
155 Tony Samstag, 'Climate Call', The Independent (London), 29 April 1989. 
156 Jim MacNeill, 'The Greening of International Relations', International Journal (Vol. 45, No. 1, 
Winter 1989-90), p. 32. 
157 See, for example, Larry Tye, The Citizen (Ottawa), 22 July 1989, p. B5. 
158 
	in 
 , Reprinted n Economic Declaration: Section on the Environment', Environmental Policy and 
Law (Vol. 19, No. 5, 1989), p. 183. 
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that elaborated specific recommendations, however, no mention was made of a 
climate fund. It is clear that they believed that the demands for global equity by 
Southern states should be met by use of traditional routes and channels, most 
notably bilateral aid. 
Decision-makers in the South, however, continued to perceive an adequate 
resolution of the calls for global equity in a different manner. Indian Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi, for example, put forward a proposition at the Non-Aligned 
Movement's meeting in Belgrade in September 1989. He proposed a 'Planet 
Protection Fund': this fund, under UN control, would promote the development of 
environmentally-friendly technologies, which would in turn be given, free of charge, 
to states. He argued that all UN members should contribute one-one thousandth 
of their GDP to the fund, and he thus arrived at the figure of US$18 billion per 
year. 169 
Because of Gandhi's party's subsequent defeat in the Indian parliamentary 
elections, he was not able to press his case at the Commonwealth Heads of 
Governments gathering at Kuala Lumpur in the following month. Nevertheless, the 
declaration agreed there did acknowledge that the North was responsible for a 
great deal of global pollution and should thus bear most of the burden of cleaning 
it up. 16° Further, MacNeill maintains that this 'was the first intergovernmental 
meeting, to my knowledge, at which world leaders talked about this question [a 
climate fund] using numbers that bear some relationship to the needs'. 161 British 
officials, however, were able to 'water-down' an original endorsement of a fund, so 
that the final declaration did not refer to specific sums. Instead, the Commonwealth 
Heads of Government agreed to 
strengthen and support the development of international funding 
mechanisms and appropriate decision-making procedures to respond to 
environmental protection needs which will include assisting developing 
countries to obtain access to and transfer of needed environmental 
technologies and which should take account of proposals for an 
international environment fund/Planet Protection Fund. 162 
159 'Gandhi Urges an Environment Fund', International Herald Tribune, 6 September 1989. 
160 Reprinted in 'The Langkawi Declaration on Environment', Commonwealth Law Bulletin (Vol. 
15, No. 4, October 1989), p. 1546, paragraph 5. 
161 MacNeill, op. cit., in note 156, p. 32. 
162 Reprinted in 'The Langkawi Declaration on Environment', op. cit., in note 160, p. 1546, 
paragraph 8, second 'programme'. 
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British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher noted that Britain was ready to contribute 
its share; however, she remained adamantly opposed to the creation of any new 
bureaucracy. 163 
Further calls for an international carbon fund were made at a ministerial 
conference in Noordwijk, the Netherlands, in November 1989. A consultant's report 
prepared for the conference estimated the 'costs of reducing CO 2 emissions 
significantly at roughly [US]$50 billion per year. 164 The report also recognised, 
however, the difficulties in estimating the specific price of assistance required for 
the developing world. Although the authors could place a figure upon the cost of 
forest management (which, at full potential, they calculated at US$10-15 billion per 
annum 165), there were greater problems in projecting costs in other areas, 
particularly the funding of fossil fuel conservation and methane emission 
reductions. 166 Although decision-makers seriously discussed the specific details 
of a fund to a greater degree, some Northern representatives, particularly the 
Americans, remained resistant to any substantive action (including movement on 
the question of global equity in North-South issues). 167 
The state of play on the global equity issue at the end of 1989 can be 
partially informed by examining a UN General Assembly resolution on 'the 
protection of global climate for present and future generations of mankind' from 
late December 1989. In this resolution, a number of general principles that had 
been voiced at previous meetings were identified, written down and adopted 
without a vote. 168 Generally, the resolution recognised that because the citizens 
of the North were responsible for causing global climate change, they should be 
primarily responsible for bearing the costs of combatting the problem. Any 
agreements, the resolution further noted, should also take into account 'the 
particular needs and development priorities of developing countries'. To this end, 
163 'Thatcher Shifts her Ground on Environment', The Independent (London), 23 October 1989. 
164 Runnalls, op. cit., in note 122, p. 4. 
165  McKinsey and Company, op. cit., in note 90, pp. 10-11. 
166 Ibid., pp. 11-13. 
167 See, for example, Glenn Frankel, 'U.S. Leads Way to Weaker Global Warming Plan', The 
International Herald Tribune, 8 November 1989. 
168 Although this should not suggest that the principles were necessarily agreed by all the states 
of the world, their articulation does, nevertheless, suggest that they were significant components of 
the broader debate at the time. 
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the resolution encouraged states 'to further the development of international 
funding mechanisms, taking account of proposals for a climate fund and other 
innovative ideas...' 16g This resolution stressed the global equity issue to a much 
greater degree than had been the case only one year earlier. 170 As such, it was 
beyond doubt that the North-South issue of global equity was, by the end of 1989, 
one of the dominant themes in the negotiations on global warming. 171 
At the beginning of the 1990s, however, there was no universal agreement 
as to what political actions should be taken in order to meet demands for global 
equity. In strong support of the just-passed UN General Assembly resolution, some 
statespeople from the South continued to call for a significant transfer of funds, to 
be administered by a new international organisation. In February 1990, 
the developing countries made it clear they would not agree to a convention 
limiting emissions of greenhouse gases until the developed countries state 
explicitly how they would help to sustain economic development in countries 
of the Third World. 172 
On the other hand, some statespeople in the North resisted these 
suggestions. The Americans were the primary force fighting any kind of new 
arrangement, and their opposition became more firmly entrenched in the beginning 
of 1990. Although in February of that year, US Secretary of State James Baker 
recognised that 'developing countries may need some additional aid in order to 
meet the incremental costs associated with fulfilling their international environmental 
obligations', 173 he nevertheless expressed doubts about 'dramatic calls by some 
for the establishment of new financial institutions or mechanisms to provide 
environmental assistance'. 174 Moreover, at the 1990 Bergen conference, 
American decision-makers disclosed that they 'feared being drawn into an "open-
ended commitment" for virtually infinite sums of aid money to cope with global 
169 UNGA Res. 44/207, 'Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of 
Mankind', 22 December 1989. 
170 Op. cit., in note 145. 
171 See, for example, Ian Guest, No Title, The Guardian, 9 February 1990, p. 23. 
172 Helen Gavaghan, 'European Nations Want Action Now on Global Warming', New Scientist 
(Vol. 125, 17 February 1990), p. 20. 
173 Secretary of State James A. Baker Ill, 'Diplomacy for the Environment' (Speech given in 
Washington, DC, 26 Feb 1990, p. 5), quoted in Speth, op. cit., in note 137, pp 40-41. 
174 Secretary of State James A. Baker Ill, 'Diplomacy for the Environment' (Speech given in 
Washington, DC, 26 Feb 1990, p. 5), quoted in ibid., pp. 40-41. 
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warming if they conceded the principle that environmental overseas aid should be 
in a separate category from other aid programmes'. 175 The Americans were, in 
part, hesitant about such commitments because they had, already in 1990, 
increased their contributions to the World Bank and the International Development 
Association -- both of which were intended to help Southern states. Timothy 
Atkeson, Assistant Administrator of the US Environmental Protection Agency, said 
that 'the American people have gone to the well twice already', and he believed 
that it would be bad political judgement to ask them to go again. 176 In addition, 
there was Stateside pressure (particularly from US Chief of Staff John Sununu) to 
avoid any sort of commitment on the question of funding. As Gus Speth notes, 
Baker's 'modest bow toward "additionality" [only three months earlier] seems to 
have lost out to competing views within the administration during May [1990]'. 177 
 In these ways, the Americans were leading the opposition to Southern calls for 
global equity. 
Although American action precluded ambitious proposals from being 
endorsed in the final declaration, the Bergen conference is nevertheless noteworthy 
for an investigation into global equity for two particular reasons. First, one 
commentator argues that it was the first time that the North's leaders accepted the 
fact that massive amounts of money would need to be transferred from the North 
to the South; 178 and second, the declaration acknowledged that the South might 
have to have higher emission targets than the North, in order to allow for economic 
growth. 179 One observer, however, argues that these facts did not indicate any 
significant change, for Tom Burke (then of the Green Alliance) said that the 
conference had been a setback: 'It will send a signal to the developing world that 
175 Michael McCarthy, 'Global Warming to Cost 'Trillions"', The Times (London), 16 May 1990, 
p. 22. 
176 . Richard North, `US Defends Stance on Global Warming Aid to Third World', The Independent 
(London), 16 May 1990, p. 6. 
177 Speth, op. cit., in note 137, pp. 40-41. 
178 'Facing up to Global Damage', The Independent (London), 17 May 1990, p. 26. Although 
there had been mention of 'specifics' at the 1989 Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting 
(op, cit., in note 162), this was the first time that a meeting open to all European and North American 
leaders had considered the issue. 
179 Quoted in 'The World Through Green-Tinted Specs', op. cit., in note 80, p. 94. 
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we don't care and that we will not take any measures that cause pain.' 180 
North and South next met in a major international forum to discuss the issue 
in August 1990, 181 when a meeting of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) was convened in Sundsvall, Sweden. Mostafa Tolba set the scene 
during his opening remarks by arguing that there was a need to provide assistance 
to the South: 
No individual can protect its patch of sky or lower the level of greenhouse 
gases overhead. We need a truly global partnership in which the developing 
countries and those in Central and Eastern Europe are compensated, 
financially assisted and ensured access to efficient technologies through 
unambiguous technology transfer accords. This assistance is not 
international philanthropy but an investment in our planetary survival. 182 
At this conference, the Southern states' representatives continued to press their 
demands for global equity, 183 and, at the end of the conference, all of the IPCC 
members could agree that there was a need to use existing multilateral agencies 
(for example, the World Bank and UNDP) and bilateral agencies (for example, the 
US Agency for International Development) in order to assist developing countries. 
When, however, a 'number of delegations ... strongly advocated the need for new 
institutions, such as a Climate Fund, ... there was no agreement'. 184 Resistance 
to new institutions on the part of the leaders of particular Northern states (most 
significantly, the United States) prevented this call from being unanimous. 188 
At the final significant international gathering on global warming in 1990, the 
180 Quoted in Richard North, 'Fight Against pollution "Will Cause Anguish - , The Independent 
(London), 17 May 1990, p. 8. 
181 Leaders of the seven richest industrialised countries had considered the question further at 
the Group of Seven's (G7) Houston Summit in July 1990. David Runnalls reports that the politicians 
appeared to have come close to approving a suggestion from German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to 
create a global fund of US$5 billion at this meeting, but, in the end, the proposal was blocked by 
the Americans (Runnalls, op. cit., in note 122, p. 4). 
182 Quoted in Paul Brown, 'Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea', The Guardian (London), 
24 August 1990, p. 19. 
183 Mexican officials, for example, demanded that, 'preferential terms for technology transfer to 
the developing world [be] built into any agreement' (ibid., p. 19). 
184 Jack Fitzgerald, 'The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Taking the First Steps 
Towards a Global Response', Southern Illinois Law Journal (Vol. 14, Winter 1990), p. 249. 
185 See, more generally, Chapter 10 on 'Financial Mechanisms', IPCC WG III, Climate Change: 
The IPCC Response Strategies (Geneva: WMO and UNEP, 1990). This working group (chaired by 
an American, F. Bernthal) was criticised for its conservatism. See, also, the discussion in Chapter 
3.2.3 of this thesis. 
211 
Second World Climate Conference in Geneva in November, Tolba again called 
upon industrialised states to help poorer ones. 186 The final declaration 
recognised that the net greenhouse gas emissions of developing countries 'must 
grow from their, as yet, relatively low energy consumption to accommodate their 
development needs'. 187 Further, it recommended that the South be given 
'adequate and additional financial resources ... [and that the] best available 
environmentally-sound technologies [should be] transferred expeditiously on a fair 
and most favourable basis'. 188 Significant resistance from the Americans, the 
Soviets and the Saudis, 189 however, prevented the delegates from doing more 
than giving 'consideration' to the need for funding facilities. 19° 
The history of the discussions on global equity and global warming to 1990 
suggests that the question was unfolding much as it had during the ozone layer 
negotiations: little attention initially paid to the issue; followed by its appearance 
upon the international political agenda; followed by demands for a fund, articulated 
by Southern states' leaders, but met with resistance or indifference by officials from 
the North. Taking the parallel to its furthest possible point, one might expect 
discussions on the global warming issue to have been heading towards the 
creation of some sort of massive, new 'climate fund'. Although up until the late 
1980s, such a progression seemed not only possible, but even probable, events 
in 1990 and 1991 show a significant deviation from this postulated route. 
More specifically, international attention about the means of addressing the 
global warming issue became primarily focused upon what is called the Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF). As mentioned above, 191 the GEF was first officially 
proposed by French and German representatives during the September 1989 
186 Frances Williams, 'UN Plea for Immediate Action to Curb CO 2', The Independent (London), 
30 October 1990, p. 2. 
187 Ministerial Declaration of the Second World Climate Conference (Geneva: SWCC, 1990), 
point 15, p. 5. 
188 Ibid., point 15, p. 5. 
189 Nicholas Schoon, 'International Law to Protect Climate "Ready by 1992"', The Independent 
(London), 8 November 1990, p. 6. 
190 Op. cit., in note 187, point 17, pp. 5-6. 
191 Op. cit., in note 156. 
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meeting of the World Bank's Development Committee. 192 Given the questionable 
interest accorded the environment by multilateral banking institutions during the 
1980s, 193 it might come as a surprise to find the World Bank at the forefront of 
this new initiative. David Reed, however, notes that by 'the late 1980s, multilateral 
lending institutions had changed from being cautious, if not resistant, to seeking 
a more central role in the search for new sources and forms of international 
environmental funding'. 194 In this way, proposals for dealing with global 
environmental problems -- particularly those originating in the North -- began to call 
for greater World Bank participation. 
The GEF was established by the World Bank, UNEP and UNDP. The fund 
financed projects and training programmes that would avert the ill effects upon 
global change of any development project. The original definition of 'global change' 
meant that the GEF was concerned with four specific areas: reducing the 
destruction of the ozone layer, countering global warming, halting the loss of 
biological diversity and preventing the pollution of the oceans. Valued at US$1.4 
billion over a three-year period, the Fund was not meant to address all problems, 
but simply to fund some projects during the initial demonstration phase (1991- 
93). 195 
Each of the three organisations that were running the GEF took 
responsibility for projects that would normally fall within its mandate. Therefore 
UNDP coordinate[d] and manage[d] project preparation and technical 
assistance work. ... UNEP provide[d] scientific and technological guidance 
in identifying and selecting projects ... [and the] World Bank administer[ed] 
the GEF trust fund and [was] responsible for appraising and supervising 
investment projects. 196 
The Fund's administrators met twice a year, and to be eligible to send 
representatives to take part in these meetings, a country must have contributed 
192 For more information, see 'World Bank: Documents Concerning the Establishment of the 
Global Environmental Facility', International Legal Materials (Vol. 30, No. 6, November 1991), pp. 
1735-77. 
193 Plant, op. cit., in note 149, p. 415. 
194 Reed, op. cit., in note 104, p. 4. 
195 'World Bank', op. cit., in note 192. 
196 ' Global Environmental Facility Prepares to Launch First Projects', World Bank News Release 
(Washington, DC: No. 91/S30, no date given). 
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about US$5.5 million to the Fund. 197 By 1991, more than 20 countries had 
contributed to the Fund and thereby taken a seat at the negotiating table. 198 
The focus here upon the GEF is not meant to suggest that it was the only 
means of addressing the calls for global equity that were being discussed at the 
time, for a number of other possible funding mechanisms were also being 
proposed. Intergovernmental organisations, such as the OECD's Group on 
Development Assistance and the Environment (which was operating under the 
auspices of the Organization's Development Assistance Committee), 199 were 
studying different alternatives. In addition, MacNeill, Winsemius and Yakushiji 
identify other proposals: 
A tax of 0.5 percent on the value of international trade has been suggested, 
which would yield about [US]$7 billion annually. Egypt has proposed a levy 
of 1 percent on international passenger and freight transport, which would 
provide approximately [US]$250 million per year, with a growth of 10 to 15 
percent per annum. Other proposals would place a small levy on the 
commercial value of ocean fish catches, toxic incineration at sea, and river-
borne wastes.4° 
Furthermore, nongovernmental organisations were also contributing to the 
discussions. In 1989, for example, the World Resources Institute in Washington, DC 
published a report which, one commentator argues, 'broadened the parameters 
of public debate on innovative financial mechanisms'. 201 In addition, other 
international environmental organisations were further expanding 'the menu of 
mechanisms for financing environmental programs through innovative approaches, 
including debt-for-nature swaps'. 202 Nevertheless, the GEF was the most 
197 Mohamed T. EI-Ashry, 'The GEF and its Future', Network '92 (No. 14, February 1992), p. 5. 
198 'Global Environmental Facility Prepares to Launch First Projects', op. cit., in note 196. The 
countries were: Austria, Brazil, China, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. See, also, lain Guest, 'Good Money After Bad', The Guardian 
(London), 29 November 1991, p. 32. 
199 See Paul Brown, 'Rich States Seek Green Curb on Market', The Guardian (London), 1 
February 1991, p. 9; and 'OECD: Agreement to Link Environment and Economy', Environmental 
Policy and Law (Vol. 21, No. 2, May 1991), pp. 57-60. 
200 MacNeill et al, op. cit., in note 127, p. 101. 
201 Reed, op. cit., in note 104, p. 4. The WRI report was entitled Natural Endowments: Financing 
Resource Conservation for Development. 
202 Reed, op. cit., in note 104, p. 4. For more information on debt-for-nature swaps, see, for 
example, Alan Patterson, 'Debt for Nature Swaps and the Needs for Alternatives', Environment (Vol. 
32, No. 10. December 1990), pp. 5-13 and 31-32. 
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significant proposal to deal with calls for global equity on global warming that was 
operational in 1991. As such, it had to be considered in any discussion of the 
issue. 
4.3.4 -- The Remaining Points of Contention, 1991 
In 1991, a number of different images of what arrangements would meet the 
demands for global equity were held by a number of different actors in international 
society. To examine further the major issues, it is useful to note that the dominant 
views in the debate about global equity in North-South terms were held by two 
sides: a group from the North (primarily individuals from OECD countries) and a 
group from the South (including, most significantly, Chinese and Indian 
governmental officials). 2°3 The differences were to do with five major issues: 
burden-sharing, transfer size, source of transfers, administration and technology 
transfer. Let us consider each of these issues in turn. 
An important question in the debate about global equity related to who 
would bear the burden in any international arrangement. Although there was 
agreement that some sort of transfers from the North to the South would be 
necessary, it had yet to be determined, by the end of 1991, how the costs would 
be divided. One proposed method of division involved the use of historical rates 
of emissions. Because of the significant lifetimes of greenhouse gases, the 
substances that were causing enhanced global warming in 1991 had been expelled 
over the previous 200 years. A number of studies used historical data in order to 
estimate each countries' relative contribution to the enhanced greenhouse effect 
that the world was experiencing in 1991. The major findings from one of these 
investigations are that: 
203 This bipartite division is performed for the purposes of analysis and is not meant to suggest 
that the `North' and the 'South' were coherent blocs. Indeed, within the South, a significant 'break 
of ranks' on the climate change issue occurred at fourth meeting of the Intergovernmental 
Negotiating Committee on a Framework Convention on Climate Change (INC) in Geneva in 
December 1991 (Daniel Bodansky, 'INC 3&4: Draft Convention on Climate Change', Environmental 
Policy and Law (Vol. 22, No. 1, February 1992), pp. 7-8). Nevertheless, the division helps us to 
identify the major points of contention with regard to the debate about global equity. 
204 Two of the more serious attempts are: the `Princeton Protocol' (Princeton Protocol on 
Factors that Contribute to Global Warming, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International 
Affairs Policy Conference on the Global Environment, Princeton University, December 1988); and 
a study by Yasumasa Fujii at the International Institute for Applied System Analysis, Laxenburg, 
Austria, reported in 'CO2: A Balancing of Accounts', Options (December 1990), pp. 10-13. 
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First, North Americans bear the largest historical responsibility for the 
present carbon problem. Second, some regions currently emitting high 
amounts of carbon per capita, notably the USSR, Eastern Europe and Asia 
have contributed relatively little historically to the problem. Third, historic 
rebalancing of carbon emissions would require only modest annual per 
capita cuts in emissions by most industrialised regions, but major cuts by 
North America. Fourth, expected high rates of population growth in 
developing regions would quickly overwhelm any emissions credits inherited 
from past generations, leaving them with CO 2 allocations no greater than in 
most developed regions. 2°6 
A pattern of burden based upon past emissions, rather than present emissions, 
would thus change the figures significantly. For example, Western Europe was 
responsible for 16 per cent of the carbon dioxide added in 1990, but 26 per cent 
of the carbon dioxide rise since 1800. Similarly, Asia was responsible for 19 per 
cent of the rise in 1990, but only 9 per cent of the rise since 1800. 2°6 Although 
there was resistance to this idea from some Northern officials," it was, 
nevertheless, an important negotiating tool for leaders of Southern states. 2°8 ' 
Another proposed method of calculation for burden-sharing was based upon 
per capita allotments. 2°9 Some analysts argued that countries should be allowed 
to release a quantity of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere that was 
proportional to their population. In this way, those states that were above their 
quota would have to compensate those that were below their quota. Once again, 
205 Ibid., p. 13 
206 Ibid., p. 12. 
207 Many highlighted the political problems associated with this kind of approach. Michael 
Grubb, for example, maintains that: 
In the context of the greenhouse effect this is a political non-starter. It would also be 
impossible to determine a consistent level. In past decades nations were barely aware that 
they were degrading a finite resource. Furthermore, technology has advanced greatly: the 
technology of the industrial revolution rarely used energy at much above 5% efficiency for 
mechanical work or, later, for electricity generation. The technologies available to nations 
developing today are many times more efficient. Even if the political will existed, it would 
thus be very difficult to determine a rational level of 'compensation'. 
(Michael Grubb, The Greenhouse Effect: Negotiating Targets (London: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1989), p. 24, note 47.) 
208 	. Philippe Sands, Centre for International Environmental Law, London, personal 
communication. 
209 
Agarwal and Narain, op. cit. in note 135; and Grubb, op. cit., in note 207. 
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decision-makers in the North were resistant to this sort of approach, 21° while 
those in the South felt that it was the most equitable manner in which the issue 
could be addressed. Thus, at the end of 1991, differences remained with regard 
to what a just form of burden-sharing should be. 
Additionally, the proposed size of the transfers was being hotly debated in 
1991. Although a wide range of cost estimates were being publicly voiced, it was 
clear that the agreed amount would make the ozone layer figure of US$240 million 
over three years pale in comparison. Even the GEF's US$1.4 billion over three 
years was perceived as only a starting point by some. 211 Indeed, a number of 
studies, from both the developed world and the developing world, attempted to put 
a price upon the potential transfers that would be needed. 212 Michael Grubb (UK) 
quotes a figure of US$100 billion annually, 213 while the Worldwatch Institute (US) 
proposed a US$28 billion fund to pay for 'massive investments in energy efficiency 
and reforestation in developing countries', 214 and Greenpeace advocated .`a 
[US]$30 billion fund to be made available to Third World signatories of a climate 
convention as well as to support the development of renewable energies'. 215 
 Meanwhile, in the South, a 1990 report published by the Centre for Science and 
Environment (India) argues that, under the scheme that they developed, the 'top 
15 polluting nations would have to pay individual developing countries a total of 
[US]$20 billion dollars annually'. 216 A further analysis, under a different scenario, 
yields a figure of US$90 billion annually. 217 Indeed, leaders in the South were 
210 This is in opposition to the principle of `grandfathering', which deems that 'rights to pollute 
are based on past emission levels' (Pearce, op. cit., in note 27, p. 376) and which was supported 
by statespeople in the North. 
211 `Bruce Rich of the Environmental Defense Fund notes that the [GEF] money is merely "a 
drop in the bucket" toward ameliorating the effects of projects.' (Quoted in 'World Bank Environment 
Fund', Science (Vol. 251, 22 February 1991), p. 870.) Additionally, another commentator argues that 
a 'new global fund of "only" a few billion dollars would be on the wrong scale, no matter how useful 
such a fund might be in its own right' (Skolnikoff, op. cit., p. 85). 
212 Note the proposal put forward in Noordwijk in November 1989 (op. cit., in note 164). 
213 Michael Grubb, Energy. Policies and the Greenhouse Effect. Volume One: Policy Appraisal 
(London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990), pp. 287-88. 
214 Christopher Flavin, Slowing Global Warming: A Worldwide Strategy (Washington, DC: 
Worldwatch Paper No. 91, 1989), pp. 70-71. 
215 '
Prevent Climate Holocaust -- Greenpeace', Geneva ECO NGO Newsletter (Vol. 3, 21 June 
1991), cited in McCully, op. cit., in note 56, p. 244. 
216  `Environmental Colonialism to the Fore', Ecoforum (Vol. 1 5, No. 1, February 1991), p. 13. 
217 Agarwal and Narain, op. cit., in note 135. 
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citing such figures to substantiate their claims that 'the international community 
must offer them funds and technological assistance'. 218 Among decision-makers 
in some Northern countries, meanwhile, the vision of an equitable quantity for 
transfer was closer to the GEF figure, which was only 1 per cent of some of the 
other amounts that were being mooted at the time. 219  Thus, at the end of 1991, 
there was no agreement among decision-makers as to what the size of the 
transfers should be. 
Another point of contention among some Northern and Southern 
statespeople was the source of the money for the fund. One commentator 
observes that this was one of the most contentious questions during the 
intergovernmental meetings of 1991. 220 On the one hand, in June of that year, 
a meeting of Ministers from 41 developing countries had reiterated their demand 
for 'new and additional financial resources to be able to address effectively the 
environmental and developmental problems confronting them'. 221 Some in the 
North, on the other hand, felt that 'the money should not come from governments, 
[but] that it should be provided by the private sector. 222 In the United States, in 
particular, not only were there demands upon financial resources from domestic 
sources,223 but there were also institutional hurdles that hindered the allotment 
of new and additional money.224 The issue of 'additionality' thus remained 
218 Comments of Chinese Premier Li Peng (quoted in John Vidal, 'Putting the Boot in', The 
Guardian (London), 21 June 1991, p. 33). 
219 One official in the North argues that people in the North were 'scared stiff to find out what 
the final bill will be' (interview with L.P.J. Mazairac, Ambassador and Permanent Representative to 
UNEP, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Nairobi, Kenya, 2 August 1991). 
220 'The Impasse on Financial Issues', Network '92 (No. 11, October 1991), p. 1. 
221 'Letter dated 1 July 1991 from the Charge d'affaires a. I. of the Permanent Mission of China 
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General', A/46/293, p. 4, note 9. Emphasis added. 
222 The Impasse on Financial Issues', op. cit., in note 220, p. 1. This concern was explicitly put 
forward at the second meeting of the INC (in Geneva in June 1991) (Sebastian Oberthur, 'Climate 
Negotiations: Progress Slow', Environmental Policy and Law (Vol. 21, Nos. 5/6, December 1991), 
pp. 15 and 16). 
223 Op. cit., in note 176. 
224 The United States could have difficulties in immediately fulfilling any financial commitment, 
because of the usual two-year lag-time between the time that any funds are requested and the time 
that the funds are available for dispersal (because of the forward-planning nature of the budgetary 
process). With regard to the Multilateral Ozone Fund, for example, 'supplementary appropriation' 
had to be employed in order to leapfrog the normal procedure and to secure the money: 'On 23 
May [1990], the US House of Representatives passed Section 159D, a Clean Air Act amendment 
which mandates US aid and authorises the appropriation of not more than [US] $30,000,000 to carry 
out this section in fiscal years 1991, 1992, 1993.' (Friends of the Earth, op. cit., in note 37, p. 21.) 
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contentious at the end of 1991. 
A fourth issue that continued to be a matter of debate between the North 
and the South at this time was the question of administration. Although it was 
earlier noted that the GEF was run by three international organisations, many argue 
that, in reality, the World Bank dominated the Fund during 1991. 225 
 Representatives from the developing world, meanwhile, were not satisfied with this 
arrangement. Not only did they have problems with the decision-making 
procedures that the Bank used (in particular, its use of weighted voting), 226 but 
given the World Bank's dubious environmental record, 227 many in the South 
questioned the Bank's new-found commitment to 'greenness'. Instead, they 
believed that the assessment of projects would still be primarily based upon 
economic criteria -- the talk of Environmental Impact Assessment, they claimed, 
was merely window-dressing. 225 Although the new Scientific and Technical 
Advisory Panel (STAP) was meant to curtail some of the World Bank's initial 
This was feasible, one official argues, because the ozone layer problem was a politically visible issue. 
If, however, a number of different funds (or even just secretariats) were to be set up (perhaps in 
June 1992 in Brazil), then the international negotiators' domestic supporters may not be able to 
secure the funds as readily (interview with Atchley, op. cit., in note 84). 
225 Ahmad notes that at a 1991 meeting of the implementation committee, there were 2 people 
from UNEP, 4 or 5 from UNDP and 25 from the World Bank. Thus, he said, 'you are swamped' 
(interview with Ahmad, op. cit., in note 88). In addition, Atchley notes that before the scientific 
committee which judged the worthiness of projects had been set up (the Scientific and Technical 
Advisory Panel, infra, in note 229, and accompanying text), the World Bank had committed about 
30 per cent of the entire GEF in the first tranche (interview with Atchley, op. cit., in note 84). 
226 Bodansky, op. cit, in note 203, p. 13. Southern states' representatives also claimed that the 
decision-making was 'untransparent, [because] there is no access to documents and meetings' 
(ibid., p. 13). 
227 For example, Sanchez claims that the World Bank's development policies -- boosted and 
funded by the international community -- encouraged some citizens of Latin American to clear 
forests in order to create grazing lands (interview with Vicente Sanchez, Ambassador and Permanent 
Representative to UNEP, Embassy of Chile, Nairobi, Kenya, 2 August 1991). See, also, infra, in note 
228. 
228 Sanchez argues that even after the World Bank's initial public declarations about policy-
changes (in light of the attack upon its environmental record), they still approved projects (Sanchez 
could think of two in particular) that were environmentally damaging (interview with Sanchez, op. 
cit., in note 227). Runnalls also notes that environmental groups believed that 'the Bank's own 
commitment to sustainable development is so weak, that the additional GEF funds may be used as 
an excuse not to make the necessary changes in the Banks underlying philosophy of investment 
in large scale, capital intensive projects' (RunnelIs, op. cit., in note 122, p. 4). Furthermore, others 
maintain that some of the approved GEF projects were not truly 'environment and development', 
but instead were projects that had been previously rejected by the World Bank and were simply 
reincarnated with new 'dressing' so that they would be accepted by the GEF. This seemed to 
confirm many peoples' fears that the GEF was 'being used to "grease the skids" for prospective 
loans by superficially "greening" otherwise environmentally-destructive schemes' (McCully, op. cit., 
in note 56, p. 251, note 25). 
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dominance, the majority of the members on the STAP came from the North. This 
fact did not escape the attention of some Southern decision-makers.229 They 
therefore, continued to assert that some sort of restructuring of the Fund's 
decision-making process in order to make it more transparent -- more akin to the 
Multilateral Ozone Layer Fund 23° -- was a minimum requirement for their 
participation. 231 Some even went further, demanding 'a completely new 
institution, separate from the World Bank and under the authority of the contracting 
parties'. 232 
The position among Northern decision-makers, meanwhile, was that all 
support should be given to the GEF as it was then structured, 233 because 
Northern decision-makers wanted one fund, administered by an established 
international organisation, to address a broad range of issues. In light of the 
ominous start for the multilateral ozone fund, 234 they were even more determined 
to make the GEF succeed. In response to the South's demands for new, all-
inclusive funds and organisations, statespeople in the North were frightful, at least 
in private, that the Southern politicians would try to place a multitude of issues 
under the broad environment umbrella, and thus demand a host of 
concessions. 235 Differences therefore persisted between decision-makers of the 
North and the South with respect to what an equitable form of governance for the 
financial mechanism should be. 
The fifth major issue that related to the question of global equity concerned 
the transfer of technology. Grubb notes that: 
Technology transfer is a more fundamental issue than many realise. The 
229 Interview with Sanchez, op. cit., in note 227. 
230 See the discussion in Chapter 4.2.4 of this thesis. 
231 Interview with Ahmad, op. cit., in note 88; interview with Sanchez, op. cit., in note 227; and 
interview with Mateos, op. cit., in note 87. Further, the Beijing Ministerial Declaration on Environment 
and Development notes that a new Green Fund should be established, which would 'be managed 
on the basis of equitable representation from developing and developed countries' (Letter dated 1 
July 1991', op. cit., in note 221, p. 7, note 23). 
232 Bodansky, op. cit., in note 203, p. 13. 
233 Interview with Mazairac, op. cit., in note 219. In addition, Guest notes that 'European 
governments, including Britain, ... are enthusiastic [about the GEF]' (Guest, op. cit., in note 198, p. 
32). 
234 See the discussion in Chapter 4.2.5 of this thesis. 
235 Interviews with officials in Nairobi, Kenya, July 1991. 
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dire predictions of future global carbon emissions cannot be avoided if the 
developing countries industrialise along the same broad path as the 
developed have done. They will need to 'leapfrog' directly to more advanced 
and efficient technologies than would occur naturally in the course of 
development. 236 
By the end of 1991, however, it remained unclear how developing countries would 
be able to obtain the relevant technologies. 237 During the Uruguay Round of the 
GATT negotiations, representatives from the Northern states -- in particular, the 
United States -- made it clear that they were eager to ensure that patents, 
copyrights or other trademarks were awarded to the owner or the investor in order 
to protect intellectual property. Their representatives continued to argue that such 
rights had to be conferred in order to provide incentives for research, development 
and innovation. Northern leaders also expressed their desires for all countries to 
adopt intellectual property laws, like those in the North, so that there could be one 
standard, which would be administered in the GATT. 238 
Developing countries' officials, for their part, were 
unhappy at that prospect. They [feared] that tighter protection for 
intellectual-property rights [would strengthen] the monopoly power of 
western multinationals, harm development by reducing technology transfer 
and hurt consumers who are already poor by raising the prices of essential 
medicines and other patented goods. ... Western arguments that stronger 
protection of ideas [would] boost foreign investment and technology transfer 
by reducing companies' fears of theft [did not convince] third-world 
sceptics. 239 
With 99 per cent of patents being held by citizens or companies in the North, 
Southern decision-makers remained sceptical that it would not just be the outdated 
and harmful technology that would be transferred to their countries. 240 A 
236 Grubb, op. cit., in note 207, p. 24. Moreover, technology transfer might also be needed in 
order to 'combat climate change' (Oberthur, op. cit., in note 222, p. 194). 
237 The forces that mitigate against the transfer of technology are described in op. cit., in note 
108, and accompanying text. 
238 See, for example, Martin Khor Kok Peng, 'The Uruguay Round and the Third World', The 
Ecologist (Vol. 20, No. 6, November/December 1990), pp. 208-13; and 'Thought Control: GATT and 
Intellectual  Property', The Economist, 7 July 1990, p. 80. Officials of Northern corporations were also 
'cautious about selling their latest and best technology to countries such as India and China, both 
of which have reputations for not being completely respectful of intellectual property rights' (Pool, 
op. cit., in note 123, p. 6). 
239 ,
Thought Control: GATT and Intellectual Property', op. cit., in note 238. These comments are 
echoed by decision-makers in the South (interview with Sanchez, op. cit., in note 227). 
240 See, for example, Peng, op. cit., in note 238; and op. cit., in note 56. 
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stalemate therefore resulted. Although the history of the politics of the ozone layer 
suggests that the global warming negotiators might have been able to learn from 
that experience, it was -- given that the pronouncement agreed in London in June 
1990 had, by the end of 1991, yet to be put to the test -- still too early to allow it 
to serve as some sort of instructive model. Thus, despite the fact that discussions 
were taking place on the issue -- within the INC and the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED) frameworks, and elsewhere -- it was 
still clear that by the end of 1991, all actors had yet to believe that calls for equity 
on this issue had been met. 241 
Taken together, these five points of contention -- burden-sharing, transfer 
size, source of transfers, administration and technology transfer -- thus suggest 
that a number of different images of what arrangements would meet the demand 
for global equity were held by a number of different actors within international 
society. Accordingly, the third hypothesised precondition for international regime 
formation remained unsatisfied at the end of 1991. 
4.4 -- Summary 
Worldwide interdependence ensured that calls for global equity in terms of North-
South issues were an important part of the broader international political debate 
about global atmospheric change at the end of 1991. An historical overview of the 
politics of both the ozone layer depletion and the global warming issues is 
presented in order to illuminate the major questions and debates that arose during 
the process of international regime formation. 
The North-South equity issue did not occupy a high position upon the 
broader ozone layer agenda until after the Montreal Protocol was opened for 
signature in 1987. At this time, leaders from the developing world maintained that 
the concessionary terms for their countries that were included in the Protocol were 
241 See, for example, The Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development, 'Charting the Course for '92', Environment (Vol. 33, No. 1, 
January/February 1991), p. 18; and Touche Ross Management Consultants for the UK Department 
of Trade and Industry and Overseas Development Administration, Global Climate Change: The Role 
of Technology Transfer (London: Touche Ross, February 1991). In addition, Maurice Strong also 
notes that the technology issue is one of 'the prime issues we will tackle at the [UNCED] 
conference'. He, further, identifies the crucial role of the International Council of Scientific Unions 
(ICSU) in this issue (Peter Lennon, 'The Man who Would Save the World', The Guardian (London), 
27 September 1991, pp. 29-30). 
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unsatisfactory. Thus, in working groups through the second half of 1989 and the 
first half of 1990, representatives from the North and the South negotiated 
amendments to the Montreal Protocol -- these were finalised in London in June 
1990. Although the framework established by these negotiators had, by the end of 
1991, yet to be tested fully, unprecedented proposals had -- at least 'on paper' --
been agreed. In this way, it appeared that the satisfaction of worldwide demands 
for equity on the ozone layer issue had been achieved, even if only precariously. 
On our other issue, meanwhile, the question of global equity in terms of 
North-South concerns emerged soon after the global warming issue took on 
political dimensions of any significance. Between 1988 and 1991, furthermore, 
North-South matters were the focus of much attention in the international 
negotiations. At the end of 1991, however, a number of points of contention 
persisted. Although an international fund -- the Global Environmental Facility -- was 
operational, different leaders still retained divergent visions of global equity. Thus, 
the third hypothesised precondition for international regime formation on global 
warming remained unsatisfied at this time. 
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Chapter 5 -- Four Catalysts 
In this chapter, the four proposed catalysts for international regime formation are 
examined) They are: political entrepreneurs, the solidity of the broader 
international political system, environmental pressure groups and the mobilisation 
of public opinion. The term 'catalyst', which is usually employed in the field of 
chemistry, is deliberately used to describe these four factors, 2 because it is 
proposed that the presence of any of them accelerates the rate at which an 
international regime is formed. 3 In contrast to the first three factors (preconditions) 
examined in this thesis, each of which, it is argued, is necessary (though not 
sufficient) for regime formation, it is hypothesised that no one of these four factors 
(catalysts) is a necessary element for the formation of an international regime. 
This chapter is divided into four major sections, so that each of the 
proposed catalysts can be discussed individually. In each of these sections, further 
justification is given for the identification of the particular factor as a catalyst in the 
overall framework for international regime formation. In addition, the relevant parts 
of the histories of the ozone layer depletion and global warming issues are 
scrutinised in order to assess the relative catalytic contribution of each factor. In 
this way, it is anticipated that the means and extent to which each factor drove the 
process of international regime formation can be discovered. 
5.1 -- Political Entrepreneurs 
There is something of a race on between the [1989 Economic] Summit 
leaders to see who can be the greenest. 
William K. Reilly 
Administrator of the US Environmental Protection Agency 4 
1 See Chapter 1.3 of this thesis. 
2 A catalyst is defined as a substance which when present in small amounts increases the rate 
of a chemical reaction or process but which itself is chemically unchanged by the reaction (adapted 
from The Concise Oxford Dictionary). 
3 These proposed factors for international regime formation satisfy fully only the first part of the 
catalyst definition, because they may be, indeed, changed by the reaction. But as with the analogy 
used for the preconditions (see Chapter 1 of this thesis, particularly note 143), this fact does not 
affect the argument being developed. 
4 Quoted in P. Shabecoff, 'U.S. to Urge Joint Environmental Effort at Summit', The New York 
Times, 6 July 1989, p. A9. 
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A 'political entrepreneur' is usually defined as a person who for 'career reasons, 
find[s] it in [her/his] private interest to work to provide collective benefits to 
relevant groups'. 5 To utilise the concept more usefully in this thesis, two important 
changes to this established interpretation must be made. 6 First, the geographical 
reach must be extended from the study of groups within a particular country to the 
study of groups across different countries (that is, we must represent world society 
or any international subsection thereof as the 'relevant group'). Second, a 
restriction must be placed upon the means by which an individual achieves the 
desired ends, because, in this study, not everyone who helps a group accrue a 
benefit while personally reaping a private gain is considered to be a political 
entrepreneur. Instead, political entrepreneurs, it is proposed, are distinguished by 
the special, personal characteristics that they bring to the particular position that 
they occupy. These attributes allow them to achieve ends that others in the same 
role might not be able to realise.' Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, a political 
entrepreneur is defined as a person who finds it in her/his private interest to use 
his/her distinctive personal qualities to facilitate the formation of an international 
regime. 
With the use of a little imagination, we can envisage numerous ways in 
which a political entrepreneur might accelerate the process of regime formation. 
Oran Young identifies four possible roles that the political entrepreneur could fulfil 
by answering his own question, 'What do individuals who act as entrepreneurial 
leaders do to help participants reap the bargainer's surplus in institutional 
bargaining processes?': 
5 Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), p. 
35. 
6  This section expands upon an idea about 'political eco-entrepreneurs' I originally put forward 
in Ian Rowlands, The Security Challenges of Global Environmental Change', The Washington 
Quarterly (Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 1991), pp. 112-13. 
7  In this way, it is clear that this catalyst is concerned with an individual-level influence. (Indeed, 
Young notes that his own motivation for including entrepreneurs in his analysis is 'to bring the 
individual back in to the study of an important area of international affairs, without in any way 
diminishing the role of collective entities...' (Oran R. Young, 'Political Leadership and Regime 
Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society', International Organization 
(Vol. 45, No. 3, Summer 1991), p. 281). I also identify the 'individualistic' inspiration for this catalyst 
in Chapter 1.3 of this thesis. However, this catalyst is distinct from the hypothesised, individual-level 
precondition (Chapter 2, 'Scientific Consensus') and other, proposed factors in this thesis by the 
focus that is placed upon the unique abilities that an individual brings to a position, not upon the 
individual's characteristics that can be considered prerequisites for his/her occupation of that 
position. 
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For the most part, they function as (1) agenda setters shaping the form in 
which issues are presented for consideration at the international level, (2) 
popularizers drawing attention to the importance of the issues at stake, (3) 
inventors devising innovative policy options to overcome bargaining 
impediments, and (4) brokers making deals and lining up support for salient 
options.8 
Political entrepreneurs thus perform tasks that, in turn, allow actors in international 
society to form international regimes more quickly. Obviously not just anybody will 
be able to act as a political entrepreneur, because in order to fulfil these functions 
successfully, the individual must possess particular skills. 9 
The political entrepreneur is willing to accept the costs associated with 
helping to advance the process of regime formation, because it is anticipated that 
these burdens will be smaller than `the net discounted value of the benefits that the 
entrepreneur expects to capture for itself' . 1° These private benefits might include 
intangibles, of either a professional or a personal nature. Professional benefits 
might be in the form of an enhanced standing -- for example, the entrepreneur's 
reputation as a skilful negotiator might be heightened." The personal benefits, 
meanwhile, might be more altruistic in nature -- for instance, the individual might 
profit simply by knowing that his/her actions have improved the welfare of 
others. 12 Alternatively, the benefits might come in the form of tangibles. These 
might include material gains or concessions in domestic or international matters 
that are outside of the issue-area of the potential regime. Finally, the entrepreneur 
might accrue benefits of both types. 
Many scholars in the literature note the value of having a political 
entrepreneur present in international affairs. Robert Keohane, for one, recognises 
that '[i]nstitutional development is affected by particular leaders...'. 13 Young, in 
8 Young, op. cit., in note 7, p. 294. 
9 In an earlier article, Young notes that 'it involves a combination of imagination in inventing 
institutional options and skill in brokering the interests of numerous actors to line up support for 
such options' (Oran R. Young, 'The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Natural 
Resources and the Environment', International Organization (Vol. 43, No. 3, Summer 1989), p. 355). 
10 Robert 0. Keohane, 'The Demand for International Regimes', in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), 
International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 155. 
Young, op. cit., in note 7, p. 297. 
12 Ibid., p. 297. 
13 Robert 0. Keohane, 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', International Studies 
Quarterly (Vol. 32, No. 4, December 1988), p. 389. 
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addition, points to 'the crucial role of entrepreneurship at the international level'. 14 
 Young strengthens this assertion in a more recent article, for he argues that 'the 
presence of leadership is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one, for 
success in reaching agreement on the terms of constitutional contracts in 
international society'. 15 This proclamation appears to contradict my hypothesis, 
because I am maintaining that political entrepreneurship is simply a catalyst, rather 
than a precondition, for international regime formation. We should note, however, 
that Young's definition of the term is much broader than mine, for he not only 
considers 'entrepreneurial leaders', but also 'structural leaders' and 'intellectual 
leaders' within his wider study of leadership'. 15 The presence of his last two 
categories means that his 'leadership' factor cuts across my hypothesised 
preconditions, 17 and thus we should not consider the two classifications to be 
interchangeable. Nevertheless, the different stress placed upon the factor by myself 
and Young is still consequential; this makes subsequent consideration that much 
more important. 18 
Moving from the theoretical to the empirical, let us turn our attention to the 
international politics of the two issues of global atmospheric change under 
consideration in this thesis to find out if any individuals acted as political 
entrepreneurs during the process of international regime formation up to the end 
of 1991. First, let us consider the ozone layer depletion issue. 
5.1.1 -- Political Entrepreneurs and Ozone Layer Depletion 
Throughout the history of the international political negotiations on the ozone layer, 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Executive Director Mostafa Tolba 
was undoubtedly the most visible and dominant individual. Mere evidence of 
14 Young, op. cit., in note 9, p. 373. See, also, Norman Frohlich, Joe A. Oppenheimer and Oran 
R. Young, Political Leadership and Collective Goods (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1971). 
15 Young, op. cit., in note 7, p. 302. 
16 Ibid., pp. 288-93 and 298-302. 
17 There is a close parallel between his 'intellectual leadership' and my ideas on 'scientific 
consensus' in Chapter 2 of this thesis; less so, although still evident, between his 'structural 
leadership' and my ideas in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis. 
18 Young invites more testing of his hypotheses (Young, op. cit., in note 7, pp. 307-08); I 
advance similar ideas in the Conclusion of this thesis. 
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visibility and dominance, however, does not necessarily demonstrate that he acted 
as a political entrepreneur. Indeed, these accomplishments may simply have been 
derived from his position as the head of a major UN organisation and not from his 
own, personal qualities. A closer investigation, however, reveals that Mostafa Tolba 
does indeed fit the theoretical model of a political entrepreneur quite closely. 
Young, for example, reports that 'Tolba played a key link in translating the 
rapidly evolving scientific picture regarding ozone depletion into terms that were 
relevant to processes of institutional bargaining at the international level', 19 thus 
identifying the UNEP head as a key 'agenda setter. 2° Richard Benedick, 
additionally, singles out Tolba for his unique efforts, particularly highlighting his role 
as a 'broker': 21  
U NEP's Mostafa Tolba provided overall personal leadership, initiating critical 
consultations with key governments, private interest groups, and 
international organizations. During the negotiations, he moved from group 
to group, arguing for flexibility, applying pressure, often floating his own 
proposals as a stimulus to the participants. 22 
Others echo these sentiments. Tolba's ability to find creative ways around 
negotiating obstacles, for example, is recognised as an important contribution to 
the process of international regime formation by government officials who were 
involved in the ozone layer negotiations. 23 Additionally, others acknowledge that 
his inspiration and obvious desire to find ways to preserve the ozone layer, 
something more intangible which might not be discerned from official records and 
reports, were also central to the success of the process. 24 These observations 
suggest that particular organisational and management skills built upon a 
background of deep, personal commitment helped Mostafa Tolba function as an 
19 Young, op. cit., in note 7, p. 294. 
- 20 See Young's definition of the term in Young, op. cit., in note 8, and accompanying text. 
21 See Young's definition of the term in ibid., and accompanying text. 
22 Richard Elliot Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet 
(London: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 208. 
23 Interview with Karen Jorgensen, United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi, Kenya, 23 
July 1991. In this way, Tolba could also be classified as an 'inventor' in Young's classification. (See 
Young's definition of the term in Young, op. cit., in note 8, and accompanying text.) 
24 Interview with Jorgensen, op. cit., in note 23; and interview with W-K. Hoogendoorn, Deputy 
Permanent Representative to UNEP, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Nairobi, Kenya, 
16 July 1991. 
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effective political entrepreneur. Indeed, some suggest that his actions not only 
accelerated the process of international regime formation, but were integral to it.25 
Richard Benedick, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for environment, 
health and natural resource issues, and lead negotiator for the United States during 
the international political negotiations on the ozone layer of the late 1980s, 26 also 
played an important role during the process. Although Young identifies him as a 
'structural leader', because of his role in using American power in order to 'urge' 
the Europeans to accede to an international agreement, 27 his performance was 
more multifarious than Young seems to give him credit for. Indeed, during the 
negotiations, there were a number of instances when Benedick drew upon his 
personal assets, rather than the power derived from the position that he occupied. 
At a small, informal meeting of delegation heads prior to the 1987 Montreal 
Protocol conference, for example, Benedick had suspected that the Soviet Union's 
representative was having difficulty with the group members' use of the Englisrt 
language. During a coffee break 
from the tense ... debate, which at that point looked hopeless, a Soviet 
delegate happened to overhear [Benedick] speak to an Austrian colleague 
in the latter's native tongue. With evident relief, the Soviet exclaimed, 'Ich 
habe's aber gar nicht gewusst, dass Sie Deutsch sprechen!' (I didn't know 
that you speak German). He was clearly more comfortable with German 
than English, the mystery of [a negotiating point of contention] unraveled, 
and thereafter informal communication on this and other issues improved 
dramatically. 28 
Evidently not every American representative would have been able to employ such 
linguistic skills in order to overcome negotiating stalemates. By providing a number 
of other such examples (in anecdotal form) in his own book on the ozone layer 
negotiations, Benedick's remarks suggest that he can also be considered, at least 
25 Interview. with Hoogendoorn, op. cit., in note 24; and interview with L.P.J. Mazairac, 
Ambassador and Permanent Representative to UNEP, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 
Nairobi, Kenya, 2 August 1991. Although these two officials suggest that Tolba's entrepreneurial 
talents were a necessary precondition for regime formation, this view was not widespread among 
interviewed officials. 
26  David D. Newsom, 'Foreword', in Benedick, op. cit., in note 22, p. x. 
27 Young notes that Benedick was able to make 'good use of threats to restrict access to the 
American market as a means of gaining acceptance of the principle of across-the-board cuts in the 
production and consumption of CFCs' (Young, op. cit., in note 7, p. 290). See, also, Chapters 3.1.3 
and 3.1.4 of this thesis. 
28 Benedick, op. cit., in note 22, p. 83. 
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partially, a political entrepreneur. 29 
On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, meanwhile, Laurens Brinkhorst, the 
European Communities' chief negotiator during the late 1980s, also played an 
important role. Although the Europeans were more hesitant about concluding an 
agreement than the Americans, 30 his ability to forge a common European view 
on the issue was a significant accomplishment that could not have been achieved 
by just anyone in his position. 31 Indeed, one European official feels that the 
Montreal Protocol was concluded owing, to a significant degree, to Brinkhorst's 
actions. 32 
Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is another individual whose 
efforts catalysed the process of regime formation on the ozone layer issue. Prior 
to her well-known speech to the United Kingdom Royal Society in September 
1988, 33 Thatcher was not thought to harbour much concern for the environment. 
In 1985, for example, she labelled environmentalists as 'the enemy within', 34 and 
during the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War, she remarked: 'when you've spent half 
your political life dealing with humdrum issues like the environment ... it's exciting 
to have a real crisis on your hands'. 35 Nevertheless, from the end of 1988 until 
the end of her tenure as British Prime Minister in November 1990, Thatcher 
adopted a noticeably different stance. She hosted two important conferences on 
the ozone layer depletion issue in March 1989 and June 1990, 36 at which 
significant progress towards regime formation and consolidation was made. The 
29 Ibid.; and interview with William Mansfield III, Deputy Executive Director of UNEP, Nairobi, 
Kenya, 13 August 1991. 
30 The reasons for this hesitancy are outlined in, primarily, Chapters 2.1 and 3.1 of this thesis. 
31 B . nnkhorst's identification as a political entrepreneur redresses an imbalance that is evident 
in Benedick's book (Benedick, op. cit., in note 22). In that work, it is suggested that Brinkhorst 
impeded the process of regime formation. Interviews with European officials revealed, however, that 
this was not the case. See also, more generally, the review of Benedick's book by a member of the 
British government's negotiating team: Fiona McConnell, 'Book Reviews', International Environmental 
Affairs (Vol. 3, No. 4, Fall 1991), pp. 318-20. 
32 Interview with Hoogendoorn, op. cit., in note 24. 
33 See, for example, Martin Jacques, 'Why Thatcher Turned Green', The Sunday Times (London), 
2 October 1988. 
34 	. Cited in Larry Tye, 'All Environmental Talk, No Action', The Citizen (Ottawa), 22 July 1989. 
35 Quoted in Jonathan Porritt, 'Can the Conservatives Go Green?', Earth Matters (No. 2, no date 
given), pp. 2-3. 
36 They were, respectively, the 'Saving the Ozone Layer Conference' and the 'Second Meeting 
of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol'. Both were held in London. 
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higher profile accorded these gatherings, 37 because of Thatcher's personal 
interest and involvement, was integral to their success. 38 
The list of individuals who acted as political entrepreneurs during the ozone 
layer negotiations up to the end of 1991 extends well beyond these four people. 
Indeed, a complete catalogue would include individuals who were not politicians 
associated with either national governments or international governmental 
organisations, for both pressure group leaders 39 and entertainment personalities 
played important catalysing roles. 4° Nevertheless, these four individuals were 
some of the entrepreneurs who contributed most to the formation of an 
international regime to preserve the ozone layer. 
There were, nonetheless, other individuals connected with governments who 
also played important roles during the ozone layer negotiations up to the end of 
1991. They are not, however, as easily identifiable by name, because they worked 
within the delegations of national governments. In contrast to the persons noted 
above, who were so dominant that they were identified not as part of state's 
delegations, but rather as individuals, these people worked more 'namelessly' while 
carrying out their duties on behalf of their respective governments. Their anonymity 
does not, however, reduce the importance of their involvement. 
On the ozone layer issue, Benedick highlights the work of the United States' 
representatives, for he notes that strong leadership by a major state can be a 
strong catalyst in the drive for an international consensus. 
The U.S. government reflected its concerns over the fate of the ozone layer 
through stimulating and supporting both American and international scientific 
37 Both conferences were at a high level of officialdom, with the second one in particular 
attracting a large number of government ministers. 
38 The focus up to this point has been upon the actions that these political entrepreneurs took 
in order to accelerate the rate of international regime formation. If, however, these individuals did 
not derive any private benefits from their efforts, then they would not be 'true' political entrepreneurs 
as defined earlier. Although political secrecy hinders us from finding out exactly what the benefits 
accruing from their actions were, we can speculate that they included both personal elements (for 
example, a feeling that they were acting responsibly for their constituents) and professional elements 
(particularly the political mileage that could be made from being seen to embrace environmental 
issues). 
39 See, in particular, Chapter 5.3 of this thesis. 
40 Among others, Benedick maintains that 	negotiators [and] environmentalists ... also 
provided ideas, decisions, and actions that proved vital to the final outcome' (Benedick, op. cit., in 
note 22, p. 208). Benedick also notes the roles of scientists and industry officials. Their impact is 
examined in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively, of this thesis. 
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research. Then, convinced of the dangers, it undertook extensive diplomatic 
and scientific initiatives to promote an ozone protection plan to other 
countries, many of which were initially hostile or indifferent to the idea. 41 
Although many of the actions of the American diplomats were, like their leader, 
`structurally-based', others were, nevertheless, `entrepreneurially-based'. 42 
Additionally, some Scandinavians and Canadians also acted as important 
political entrepreneurs on the ozone layer issue, particularly during the period of 
negotiations before September 1987. 43 Vic Buxton, for example, argues that the 
Canadians and the Scandinavians had to spend many hours both explaining the 
ideas of 'environmental heritage', 'responsible care' and 'stewardship', and arguing 
their validity before the major states' representatives began to take them on 
board." Without the Canadians' and the Scandinavians' active participation, the 
process of learning might have taken much longer and a consensus about the 
importance of preventative action on environmental issues might have formed more 
slowly. 
Additionally, Serge Langdau maintains that the Canadians and the 
Scandinavians did much to 'build bridges' between the opposing American and 
European delegations. 45 While the Canadians generally had had a particularly 
close relationship with the Americans since the nineteenth century, the warmth of 
this friendship increased significantly in 1984 with the election of a pro-US, 
conservative government to Ottawa. On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, 
meanwhile, the Scandinavians not only had had strong political, economic and 
geographical bonds with the states of the European Communities, but the fact that 
Denmark was a member of both the unofficial 'Nordic' grouping and the official 
'European Communities' organisation provided a more direct link between 
41 Benedick, op. cit., in note 22, pp. 205-06. Emphasis added. Peter Haas also recognises the 
role of 'able US diplomacy' in selling policy positions to other countries (Peter M. Haas, 'Obtaining 
International Environmental Protection through Epistemic Consensus', Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies (Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1990), p. 356). 
42 See the discussion in op. cit., in note 27, and accompanying text. 
43 Interview with Vic Buxton, Executive Director, National Secretariat, 1992 UNCED, Environment 
Canada, Hull, Canada, 3 January 1991; and interview with Serge Langdau, Environment Canada, 
Hull, Canada, 14 December 1990. 
44 Interview with Buxton, op. cit., in note 43. 
45 Interview with Langdau, op. cit., in note 45. The conflict between these two groups is 
discussed in Chapters 2.1 and 3.1 of this thesis. 
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Scandinavia and Europe. Although this dual membership might sometimes give rise 
to crises of identity for the members of the Danish government, it was often used 
by the Nordics as a conduit to feed both research and policy ideas into the 
discussions of the European Communities. 46 These respective links meant that 
the conflicting Americans and Europeans had intermediaries through which they 
could negotiate and communicate. 
Furthermore, the Canadians also forth put their own proposals in order to 
try to break the trans-Atlantic stalemate. A number of participants recognise that 
the Canadian compromise proposed during the Leesburg (VA) meeting in 1986 47 
 not only helped to resolve a negotiating impasse, but also helped to create a better 
atmosphere -- the 'Leesburg Spirit' -- in which the negotiations were subsequently 
conducted. 48 By drawing attention to important concepts, by building bridges and 
by inventing new policy options, particular individuals' creativity and ingenuity often 
helped the participants in the ozone layer discussions to clear negotiating hurdles, 
or simply to keep on track. 
An examination of the history of the negotiations on the ozone layer issue 
reveals that a number of individuals played important roles in helping the members 
of international society form a regime. Although the findings do not decisively 
demonstrate that their actions were necessary for international regime formation, 
it is evident that their particular contributions helped to accelerate the rate of 
progress. 
5.1.2 -- Political Entrepreneurs and Global Warming 
Moving on to our other issue under consideration, let us consider the politics of 
global warming up to the end of 1991 in order to discover if any political 
entrepreneurs, identified either as individuals or as states' representatives, played 
46 Interview with Mazairac, op. cit., in note 25. 
47 See G.V. Buxton et al, 'A Canadian Contribution to the Consideration of Strategies for 
Protecting the Ozone Layer', presented at the UNEP Workshop on Economic Issues Related to 
Control of CFCs, Leesburg, VA, 8-12 September 1986. 
48 Geoffrey Lean, Action on Ozone (Nairobi: UNEP, 1989), pp. 7-8; interview with Buxton, op. 
cit., in note 43; and interview with Peter Usher, Co-ordinator, Global Environmental Monitoring 
Service (Atmosphere), United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi, Kenya. We should also 
recognise that some UNEP officials fulfilled important entrepreneurial roles, particularly during the 
period when states' representatives were not extremely enthusiastic about the negotiations. 
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important catalytic roles. Because of the similar nature of the two issues, a logical 
place to begin the study is among the entrepreneurs from the ozone layer 
negotiations in order to find out if the same individuals acted in similar 
entrepreneurial fashions on the global warming issue. 
First, Mostafa Tolba is identified as a key political entrepreneur on the ozone 
layer issue, for there is wide agreement that his actions during the negotiations 
leading to an international regime were factors in the success of the process. His 
methods for achieving this end have, however, been questioned by some. While 
Benedick refers to his manner of 'applying pressure', 49 others refer to this 
technique as 'bullying' or teadbanging'. 5° Although Tolba's intelligence is 
recognised and respected, his overt involvement in the political process led some 
individuals, in hindsight, to resent his participation. Mark lmber describes the 
circumstances: 
Numerous individuals attest to the strong personality style of the Mostapha 
Tolba term of office, to his extraordinary work-rate, his reluctance to 
delegate authority, in particular in the matter of appointments, and to his 
single-mindedness in the promotion of the work and role of UNEP. Both 
praise and criticism have been applied to related characteristics of the Tolba 
style, most obviously to the consequences of his extended absences from 
Nairobi on UNEP business. A reluctance to delegate authority is acceptable, 
so is a pattern of frequent absences, however the two do not combine well 
together, but rather tend to limit the initiative of subordinates. A widely 
quoted anecdote asks 'What is the difference between God and Tolba? God 
is everywhere, Tolba is everywhere, except in Nairobi'. Very few UN staff 
keep company with the Almighty, if only in jest. 51 
Because many individuals -- particularly representatives of Latin American states -
- feel that they were cajoled and manipulated by Tolba during the ozone layer 
negotiations, they subsequently harboured a resentment towards the man. By 
1990, consequently, they had become automatically suspicious of any proposal 
that he put forward. This fact had important ramifications for the global warming 
issue, because, partially in order to minimise Tolba's involvement during the climate 
49 Op. cit., in note 22, and accompanying text. 
50 Interviews with officials from the United Nations Environment Programme and country 
missions, Nairobi, Kenya, July and August 1991. 
51 Mark Imber, 'The UNEP Mandate and Dilemma', paper presented at Conference on 
International Arrangements for Reaching Environmental Goals, Strathclyde, 10-12 September 1991, 
p. 11. 
234 
change negotiations, UNEP was marginalised in the new arrangements. 52 The 
UNEP Executive-Director, accordingly, had his personal influence significantly 
curtailed; by the end of 1990, he had lost his ability to 'tweak the process', as he 
had done during the ozone layer negotiations. 53 A significant political 
entrepreneur who catalysed the formation of an international regime to protect the 
ozone layer had thus, by the end of 1991, not been able to play a similar role 
during the global warming negotiations. 54 
In lieu of solely UNEP, a number of institutions became involved in the 
political negotiations on global warming. It seems logical, therefore, to direct 
attention to the bureaucratic summits of these organisations in order to discover 
if a surrogate political entrepreneur had arisen on the global warming issue. At the 
end of 1991, the most significant institutions were the Intergovernmental 
Negotiating Committee on a Framework Convention on Climate Change (INC) 
Secretariat (headed by Michael Zammit Cutajar, a Maltese national who had 
worked in the United Nations system for 20 years 55) and the Secretariat for the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) (headed 
by Maurice Strong, a Canadian national who was Secretary-General of the 1972 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm 56). In 
addition, similar claims of responsibility were being made by other international 
organisations, including UNEP. 57 Although no one doubted the capabilities of any 
of the individuals who headed these various bodies, the sheer fact that the climate 
change responsibilities were the concern of a larger number of international 
52 The climate change negotiations became the responsibility of the United Nations General 
Assembly during the latter part of 1990. See UNGA RES/44/207, 'Protection of Global Climate for 
Present and Future Generations of Mankind'; and interviews with officials from the United Nations 
Environment Programme, Nairobi, Kenya, July and August 1991. 
53 Interviews with officials from the United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi, Kenya, July 
and August 1991. 
54  Tolba's term of office was due to expire in 1992. Should he retire at this time, he may fall 
further away from the process. 
55 'UN Official Heads Climate Change Secretariat', Our Planet (Vol. 3, No. 2, 1991), p. 18. 
56 See, for example, Peter Lennon, 'The Man Who Would Save the World', The Guardian 
(London), 27 September 1991, pp. 29-30. 
57 Many analysts recognise that the international environmental agenda was becoming 
increasingly crowded during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Glen Plant reviews the numerous 
organisations involved in the climate change issue in particular (Glen Plant, 'Institutional and Legal 
Responses to Global Climate Change', Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 19, No. 3, 
Winter 1990), pp. 413-28). 
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organisations lessened the ease with which any single individual might be able to 
play a strong, entrepreneurial role. Indeed, this increased politicisation of the global 
warming process vis-a-vis the ozone layer negotiations ensured that the same 
forces that propel bureaucratic politics made it difficult for a single entrepreneur to 
arise from amongst the international organisations involved.58 
Political entrepreneurs during the ozone layer negotiations, however, also 
emerged from amongst the ranks of national governments. Once again, using this 
experience as a guide, we look to the United States to see if a significant individual 
had surfaced during the global warming negotiations by the end of 1991. Before 
we look at specifics, however, we should note that the question of whether 
American entrepreneurial efforts are needed in this area is addressed by Benedick: 
As the largest emitter of both ozone-destroying chemicals and greenhouse 
gases, the United States has enormous potential to influence the policy 
considerations of other governments in favor of environmental protection. 
In fact, because of the geographic size and population of the United States, 
its economic and scientific strength, and its international interests and 
influences, progress in addressing global environmental problems can 
probably not be achieved without American leadership. 59 
Although one may challenge his seemingly ethnocentric analysis, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that enthusiastic American participation would, ceteris 
paribus, quicken the rate of regime formation. 69 The chief negotiator for the 
United States on this issue, meanwhile, was William Reilly, who from 2 February 
1989 had been the Administrator of the US Environmental Protection Agency. Like 
some others in the international negotiations, he was generally recognised to be 
a highly competent individual. His ability to act as an effective entrepreneur, 
however, was hindered during this period by the US Administration's position on 
the issue. Although it was generally believed that Reilly supported a more active 
policy posture on global warming, 61 the reluctance of individuals in the US White 
58 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, MA: 
Little, Brown, and Company, 1971); and interviews with officials from United Nations Environment 
Programme, Nairobi, Kenya, July and August 1991. 
59 Benedick, op. cit., in note 22, p. 206. 
so Benedick's comments point not only to entrepreneurial leadership, but also to the need for 
the United States' leaders both to find it in their national interest to help to build a global warming 
regime and to exercise structural leadership. See Chapter 3.2.3 of this thesis for a further discussion. 
61 See the discussion in Chapter 4 of this thesis, particularly note 78, and accompanying text. 
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House to endorse any policy commitments effectively served to suppress Reilly's 
entrepreneurial talents. 62 Once again, where there was an effective political 
entrepreneur catalysing the drive towards regime formation on the ozone layer 
issue, none existed on the global warming issue through its early political days. 
The issue, nevertheless, was not totally devoid of such catalysts. The route 
that the negotiations had followed to the end of 1991, however, demonstrated that 
some of the most significant political entrepreneurs on this issue were European. 
More specifically, certain Dutch and French nationals took actions that suggest that 
they acted as political entrepreneurs during the process. With the Norwegian 
government, these two states' leaders hosted one of the first conferences to 
consider the issue of global atmospheric pollution, in The Hague in March 1989. 63 
 In addition, the Dutch, under the enthusiastic leadership of Ed Nijpels (Minister of 
Housing, Physical Planning and Environment), organised one of the most important 
gatherings to consider the global warming question -- namely, the 1989 Ministerial 
Conference on Atmospheric Pollution in Noordwijk, the Netherlands. The French, 
finally, by pushing for the creation of some sort of global environmental fund, 64 
 advanced a new idea that helped negotiators overcome some initial bargaining 
impediments. 66 By convening conferences and proposing policy options, 
therefore, these governments' officials helped both to create fora for discussions 
and to accelerate the process of negotiation. By their actions, both the leaders and 
the 'nameless' bureaucrats acted as political entrepreneurs. 
Thus, a number of political entrepreneurs did play some role during the early 
days of the process of regime formation on the global warming issue. The findings 
suggest, however, that, at the end of 1991, the greater breadth of the issue (vis-a-
vis the ozone layer issue) had hindered the ability of any single individual to attain 
62 See, for example, Michael Weisskopf, 'U.S. to Fight Aid to Halt Global Warming', International 
Herald Tribune, 10 May 1990, p. 7. More generally, the fact that the climate change issue became 
a highly-political issue 'earlier' than the ozone layer issue also meant that individuals were less able 
to exercise their own free will during the negotiations, but instead were being watched over more 
closely by their political superiors. Thus, spontaneity, ingenuity and creativity were suppressed and 
were replaced by standard-operating procedures (view derived from comments made by Peter 
Usher, in interview with Usher, op. cit., in note 48). 
63 Conference on the Protection of the Global Atmosphere. 
64 See the discussion in Chapter 4.3.3 of this thesis. 
65 Th is is not meant to suggest that, at the end of 1991, this question had been resolved to the 
satisfaction of all involved. See Chapter 4.3.4 of this thesis for a further discussion. 
237 
the level of entrepreneurial effectiveness that either Mostafa Tolba or Richard 
Benedick had achieved during the ozone layer negotiations. 
5.2 -- The Solidity of the Broader International Political System 
[P]rogress achieved in resolving some regional disputes and the general 
improvement in East-West relations offers promise of greater international 
co-operation on a wide range of issues. 
Javier Perez de Cuellar 
Former Secretary-General of the United Nations 66 
The proposition put forward in this section is that the rate of international regime 
formation in specific issue-areas is directly related to the solidity of the broader 
international political system. A simple analogy with house construction helps to 
elucidate this proposition. Let us draw a comparison between the broader issues 
of the day in international society, upon which negotiators attempt to construct a 
regime for their particular issue-area, and a plot of land, upon which a builder 
attempts to erect a dwelling. Although the solidity of either foundation will not be 
directly proportional to the chances for the successful erection of something upon 
it, it is suggested that there is a vaguely linear, and predominantly positive, 
correlation at work. Thus, just as the contractor's job is easier (and completed 
more quickly) when the bedrock is solid, so too is it maintained that the chances 
for international regime formation are increased when the broader international 
political system is relatively solid." 
The identification of this factor as a catalyst is by no means radical. Indeed, 
its omission would have caused us to overlook the fact that interdependence in 
international relations is evident not only within individual issue-areas, but also 
across different issue-areas. Oran Young maintains that: 
Contextual arguments provide a healthy reminder that regime formation in 
se Javier Perez de Cuellar, The United Nations System and Sustainable Development', in David 
J.R. Angell, Justyn D. Colmer and Matthew L.N. Wilkinson (eds.), Sustaining Earth: Response to the 
Environmental Threats (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), p. 171. 
67 , 	. , . th is Solid , in  nstance, is not analogous to 'stable' (which is a more commonly used term in 
international relations). Indeed, a system may be 'stable' (in the sense of no changes over time), but 
not 'solid' (in the sense of cross-cutting links, which serve to reinforce the stability of that system). 
For example, consider a multipolar world. If there exists a 'Cold War' amongst all of the members, 
there will be stability, but not solidity. If, however, there are co-operative links amongst all of the 
members, then there will be both stability and solidity. 
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international society never takes place in a vacuum. In fact, efforts to devise 
institutional arrangements are closely tied to an array of political, economic 
and scientific concerns that can, and often do, accelerate or block 
processes of regime formation. 68 
Some of the work in this area of the international relations literature is built 
upon the ideas about 'transnational and transgovernmental relations' developed by 
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye during the 1970s. 69 In their work, they attempt 
to permeate the realists' billiard-ball by highlighting the importance of informal ties 
among different national elites in international society. 7° They argue that 
transgovernmental links facilitate the creation and maintenance of international 
regimes. Keohane explains this notion: 
Governments no longer act within such regimes as unitary, self-contained 
actors. `Transgovernmental' networks of acquaintance and friendship 
develop, with the consequences that supposedly confidential internal 
documents of one government may be seen by officials of another; informal 
coalitions of like-minded officials develop to achieve common purposes; and 
critical discussions by professionals probe the assumptions and assertions 
of state policies. These transgovernmental relationships increase 
opportunities for cooperation in world politics by providing policy makers 
with high-quality information about what their counterparts are likely to do. 
Insofar as they are valued by policy makers, they help to generate demand 
for international regimes. 71 
The proposed reasoning is that if the representatives of different states' 
governments have more frequent contact, then there will be greater opportunities 
for them to attempt to bridge the differences in policy positions among states on 
a variety of issues. In a more 'recent publication, Keohane expands this idea: 
Close ties among officials involved in managing international regimes 
68 Oran R. Young, 'Global Environmental Change and International Governance', Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies (Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1990), p. 341. 
69 See, for example, Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, 'Transgovernmental Relations and 
International Organizations', World Politics, (Vol. 27, No. 1, 1974), pp. 39-62; and Robert O. Keohane 
and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston, MA: Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1977). In addition, this idea also relates to a notion arising out of social 
science inquiry more generally -- namely, the By-Product Theory, which predicts that groups 'that 
happen to have been organized previously for other reasons, for example, for sociability, can 
occasionally cooperate to promote their interests' (Hardin, op. cit., in note 5, p. 31). These 
observations suggest that the roots of the concept being put forward here run deep. 
70 At this point, the focus will be only upon the 'transgovernmental' aspect of this concept, 
because the role of other transnational actors is examined in Chapter 5.3 of this thesis. 
71 Robert 0. Keohane, 'The Demand for International Regimes', International Organization (Vol. 
36, No. 2, Spring 1982), p. 349. 
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increase the ability of governments to make mutually beneficial agreements, 
because intergovernmental relationships characterized by ongoing 
communication among working-level officials, informal as well as formal, are 
inherently more conducive to exchange of information than are traditional 
relationships between closed bureaucracies. 72 
Similarly, Stephen Krasner summarises part of Keohane's argument by noting that 
an interdependent world is more receptive to efforts to construct international 
regimes, because 'there is [already] a high level of formal and informal 
communication among states...'. 73 
High levels of contact among states' officials are, however, not necessarily 
guaranteed, because such communication may, at times, be deemed to be 
damaging in the international system. Indeed, in order to be able to have a high 
level of interaction among countries' officials, the officials' particular political 
masters must allow such interaction. There will be a better chance that this 
permission will be granted if the general state of relations between countries is 
good. Thus, Gail Osherenko and Oran Young contend that: 
The state of the broader political environment is a key determinant of the 
prospects for regime formation in specific issue areas. Sometimes the 
political environment is conducive to efforts at institution building; it may 
even provide a powerful impetus toward regime formation, regardless of the 
content or coherence of specific proposals. ... By the same token, the 
broader political environment may impose severe constraints on regime 
building in specific issue areas. 74 
With greater solidity in the international system, then, it is proposed that the time 
required to form an international regime will be reduced. 75 
72 Robert 0. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 97. 
73 Stephen D. Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables', in Krasner (ed.), op. cit., in note 10, p. 12. 
74 Gail Osherenko and Oran R. Young, The Age of the Arctic: Hot Conflicts and Cold Realities 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 260-61. 
75 One should recognise, however, that this idea is distinct from the notion of 'issue linkage': 
Issue-linkage in this sense involves attempts to gain additional bargaining leverage by 
making one's own behavior on a given issue contingent on others' actions towards other 
issues. Issue-linkage may be employed by powerful states seeking to use resources from 
one issue-area to affect the behavior of others elsewhere; or it may be employed by 
outsiders, attempting to break into what could otherwise be a closed game. Linkage can be 
beneficial to both sides in a negotiation, and can facilitate agreements that might not 
otherwise be possible. 
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In summary, then, some scholars suggest that if there are established 
governmental channels and contacts between states on one issue-area, then they 
can be more quickly and more easily co-opted and used in the effort to construct 
an international regime on another issue-area. In this way, they hypothesise, a 
generally warm climate in the international political system can accelerate the 
formation of an international regime. The converse is also likely to be true: as the 
international political climate cools, the chances for regime construction are 
lessened. This is because international channels are blocked or cut, making it 
necessary to construct new links. The effect is to cause an increase in both the 
cost and the time required for international regime formation.76 
5.2.1 -- The Solidity of the Broader International Political System and Ozone 
Layer Depletion 
Moving onto our two specific issues under consideration, let us first examine the 
ozone layer depletion issue. When political negotiations upon an ozone layer 
agreement commenced in 1982, they did so under the shadow of the Second Cold 
War. Although the international system at this time was fairly 'stable', there was no 
correspondingly high degree of 'solidity'. Our hypothesis suggests, therefore, that 
the rate of regime formation should not have been great at this time. The findings 
go some way towards confirming this prediction. 
Although the relatively apolitical nature of the activities of the Coordinating 
Committee on the Ozone Layer (CCOL) during the early 1980s meant that Cold 
(Robert Axelrod and Robert 0. Keohane, 'Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and 
Institutions', in Kenneth Oye (ed.), Cooperation Under Anarchy, p. 239.) The distinction is important: 
issue-linkage is primarily associated with conscious 'threats' or 'promises' (ibid., p. 240), while the 
concept of the 'solidity of the broader international political system' is meant to direct attention to 
the system itself, not one actor's ability to manipulate it. In this way, it is clear that the impetus for 
the inclusion of this catalyst is to recognise that the condition of the international system as a whole 
can have a bearing upon the rate of international regime formation. In this way, the debt owed to 
the 'global' theorists in international relations scholarship is suggested. (See Chapter 1.2.1 of this 
thesis for an examination of their ideas.) 
76 One of the most persuasive pieces of historical evidence to support this proposition is the 
experience of the calls for an New International Economic Order (NIEO) during the 1970s and 1980s. 
It is generally accepted that one of the contributing factors to the 'failure' of the NIEO was the 
outbreak of the 'Second Cold War'. (See, for example, Fred Halliday, The Making of the Second 
Cold War (London: Verso, 1983).) By the end of the 1970s, attention had reverted back to East-West 
security issues, and questions of economic development and justice were bumped down the 
international agenda. Thus, the efforts to form a new regime on one issue-area (economics) were 
hindered by the changes in an existing regime on another issue-area (security). 
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War politics did not occupy centre-stage in the group's proceedings, Peter Usher 
recalls that they did, nevertheless, play some role: 
At every meeting of the CCOL, the Soviet Union's representatives would ask 
for a participants' list to be published. Once the Soviet Union's delegates 
got hold of this list and observed that the location of the West German 
Environment Ministry (in West Berlin) was recorded on this document (as 
it always was), they would register a formal protest. 77 
Efforts to preserve the ozone layer would thus be deflected, because the four 
powers' representatives would have to be brought together and the obligatory 
procedure would have to be enacted. Because Usher knew that this was likely, the 
participants' list would not be released until the last possible moment. 
Nevertheless, Cold War politics would still disrupt the proceedings, which were 
primarily directed at preserving the ozone layer. 
The Cold War, however, dissipated during the middle of the 1980s, and the 
corresponding shifts in the attitudes of the Soviet Union's officials had important 
effects upon international relations. Sir Crispin Tickell, first of all, notes this 
transition: 
... the Soviet Union has made fundamental changes in its foreign policy, 
including a new attitude towards the United Nations, as expressed most 
vividly in President Gorbachev's speech to the General Assembly in 
December 1988. Cooperation of the kind envisaged in the Charter is not 
only possible but has effectively begun. 78 
Second, Jim MacNeill further speculates about the potential consequences of this 
transition: 
Glasnost, perestroika and the tidal shift in East-West relations have also 
opened the doors of opportunity. For more than forty years, world affairs 
have been dominated by the contest between East and West. The goal of 
each was to contain the expansion of the other. Recent changes have not 
only deprived both sides of their main enemy, they have begun to release 
the energies of the superpowers and their allies, and have made it possible 
for them to cooperate meaningfully on the critical issues of global change 
77 Paraphrased from interview with Usher, op. cit., in note 48. The Soviets would take such 
action, because, owing to the terms of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin (signed on 3 
September 1971), individual West German ministries were not allowed to operate out of West Berlin 
(Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1979), pp. 832 and 
825). 
78 	. 	. 	. 	, Crispin Tickell, Diplomacy and Sustainable Development', in Angell et al, op. cit., in note 66, 
p. 174. 
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and human survival. 79 
With regard to the ozone layer negotiations, there are examples to suggest that the 
general warming of East-West relations during the mid-1980s -- and the 
consequential increased solidity of the international system -- catalysed the process 
of regime formation. To cite a specific example, the policy of glasnost contributed 
to the Soviet Union's decision to release its CFC production figures for the first time 
in 1986. 80 This is an important technical pre-requisite for an international accord. 
Additionally, 'ties between U.S. and Soviet scientist were created in 1987, when 
representatives from the two countries met and agreed to begin collaborative work 
on the climate and ozone'. 81 Such interaction, Benedick argues, 'contributed to 
a gradual weakening of Soviet opposition to international controls on ozone-
depleting compounds'. 82 More generally, it is certainly clear that the political 
activities regarding the ozone layer during the second half of the 1980s, with their 
requisite ministerial level interactions, could not have been completed as quickly 
during the first half of the same decade. With regard to the politics of the ozone 
layer, therefore, the fundamental change in the solidity of the broader international 
political system derived from the thawing of the Second Cold War. The above 
reflections suggest that this thaw allowed the rate of international regime formation 
to quicken, at least in a minor way. 
5.2.2 -- The Solidity of the Broader International Political System and Global 
Warming 
Because global warming had the potential to affect so many areas of social activity, 
the process of international regime formation was influenced in its turn by other 
political and economic developments in the international system. Indeed, Stephen 
Schneider recognises the importance of building a 'diversity of political ties. Good 
rapport among nations will be absolutely necessary if an international consensus 
79 J im MacNeill, 'Sustainable Development: Meeting the Growth. Imperative for the 21st Century', 
in Angell et al, op. cit., in note 66, p. 192. 
813 Tim Beardsley, 'Global Limit for CFC Emissions', Nature (Vol. 323, 25 September 1986), p. 
286. 
81 Peter M. Haas, 'Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect 
Stratospheric Ozone', International Organization (Vol. 46, No. 1, Winter 1992), p. 193. 
82 Benedick, op. cit., in note 22, p. 101. 
243 
to limit the CO2 increase is eventually sought.' 83 His comments thus suggest the 
need for a solid international political system. Although, at the end of 1991, it was 
still too early to assess fully how broader developments in the international political 
system had influenced the negotiations, some initial observations could be made. 
First, because of the later emergence of global warming as a political issue 
(vis-a-vis the ozone layer depletion issue), the rate of regime formation was able 
to benefit from the changes in East-West relations that took place during the late 
1980s and that are described above. Thus, right from the time that global warming 
emerged as a significant international political issue, increasing solidity in the 
broader international political system drove the process of regime formation. 84 A 
consequence of the new detente, furthermore, had a more direct influence upon 
the process of regime formation on the global warming issue. 
More specifically, the new 'independence' achieved by the East European 
states after the 1989 revolutions gave rise to a striking shift among the attitudes of 
some East European representatives during the global warming negotiations. One 
official from the West notes that the East European representatives were 'talking 
now', which was very different from their posture prior to 1989. He notes that there 
had formerly been hesitation on their part and not the same degree of openness 
as there was after 1989. This apparent wariness, he argues, gave other delegates 
a feeling that the East Europeans were 'not quite with us'. In 1991, however, he did 
not perceive the same feeling; instead, the East Europeans were generally 
perceived to be colleagues with similar problems. This increase of openness 
83 Stephen H. Schneider, Global Warming: Are We Entering the Greenhouse Century? (San 
Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books, 1989), p. 257. 
84 It is nevertheless instructive to note that one of the most remarkable acts of international co-
operation, which (in a small way) helped to advance the process of regime formation, took place 
during the early 1980s:In 1980, an ice core, more than two kilometres long and thus covering more 
than an entire glacial cycle (160,000 years), was recovered from a drillhole at Vostok in the Antarctic 
(C. Lorius et al, 'A 150,000-Year Climatic Record from Antarctic Ice', Nature (Vol. 316, 15 August 
1985), pp. 591-96). From the Soviet station where it was drilled, the core was taken by a specially-
equipped American transport to a laboratory in France, where it was analysed during the following 
three years. This co-operative, tripartite effort took place at the height of the Second Cold War. Thus, 
just as small huts can be built upon swampy marshes, so too can efforts to construct international 
regimes take place at times of deteriorating international solidity. See, also, Cheryl Simon Silver with 
Ruth S. DeFries, One Earth One Future: Our Changing Global Environment (Washington, DC: 
National Academy Press, 1990), pp. 24-25. 
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consequently had a positive impact upon the general negotiating environment. 85 
A subsequent outcome of these changes that occurred in Eastern Europe 
at the end of the 1980s, however, was the apparent disintegration of some of the 
former sovereign states in the region. 88 This development in the broader 
international political system could subsequently have had important retarding 
influences upon the rate of regime formation for two important reasons. First, 
because of the need to sort out responsibilities between different levels of 
government (for example, between Russia and the C.I.S.), there might have been 
instances when it was unclear as to who had the authority or the power to discuss 
international environmental issues, to negotiate international treaties and to 
implement contractual obligations. 87 Second, findings brought to light by Mancur 
Olson suggest that the sheer fact that there are a greater number of states in 
international society could have made it more difficult to achieve co-operative 
agreements.88 At the end of 1991, furthermore, it was not clear if European 
'unification' would be able to offset this trend. Institutional disintergration in Eastern 
Europe might have had, therefore, arresting effects upon the rate of international 
regime formation. 
In summary, then, the investigation reveals that the unprecedented changes 
in the broader international political system that had occurred by the end of 1991 
helped to accelerate the rate of international regime formation on global warming, 
to at least some degree. Other findings, however, also suggest that subsequent 
changes in the make-up of the international political system might have influenced 
the process in an opposite manner. At the end of 1991, it was difficult to conclude 
85 Interview with John D. Friend, First Secretary, High Commission of the United Kingdom, 
Nairobi, Kenya, 25 July 1991. Others, however, are quick to point out that there were still difficulties 
in dealing with East European representatives, for many of these diplomats were new to international 
diplomacy, were unversed in the issues or were viewing matters through inappropriate models of 
the world (interview with Mazairac, op. cit., in note 25). 
86 By the end of 1991, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had become the Commonwealth 
of Independent States -- a new political grouping with constituent units which were individually 
sovereign, in contrast to the old Soviet republics. In addition, at the end of 1991, a civil war raged 
in Yugoslavia, where at least one group (the Croats) was fighting for the creation of its own 
sovereign state. 
87 Mazairac argues that such problems have affected the Belgium government's abilities to 
participate constructively in the international negotiations on environmental issues (interview with 
Mazariac, op. cit., in note 25). 
Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965). See, also, the discussion in Chapter 1.2.2 of this 
thesis. 
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which contributing factor (if either) might eventually dominate. 
5.3 -- The Elite-Level Activities of Environmental Pressure Groups 
The environment is too important to be left to the environmentalists. 
Helmut Sihler 
President of Henkel KGaA 
(a German chemical company) 89 
It is widely accepted that the state is not the only actor in international relations, for 
it is evident that other actors also influence the course of world politics. 90 
 Although the transnational or multi-actor perspective has deep roots, Robert 
Keohane and Joseph Nye are credited by many as being at the vanguard of its 
most recent re-emergence in the literature of international relations -- namely, in the 
form of the 'interdependence' school. 91  In 1971, they note that: 
The difference our world politics paradigm and the state-centric paradigm 
can be clarified most easily by focusing on the nature of the actors. The 
world politics paradigm attempts to transcend the 'level-of-analysis problem' 
both by broadening the conception of actors to include transnational actors 
and by conceptually breaking down the 'hard shell' of the nation-state. 92 
A number of writers associated with the literature on international regimes from the 
1980s also explicitly cite the importance of non-state actors. Stephen Haggard and 
Beth Simmons, for example, observe that 'coalitions that span national boundaries' 
can play important roles in international regime formation. 93 Oran Young 
reinforces this point by arguing that 'it would be a serious mistake to overlook the 
role of transnational alliances among influential interest groups in developing and 
89 	i Quoted n The Independent (London), 30 June 1990. 
90 See, also, the discussion in Chapter 1.2.3 of this thesis. 
91 See, for example, the work of the interwar idealists -- their ideas about international 
organisations in general and the League of Nations in particular. With regard to this re-emergence, 
meanwhile, see, for example, Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: 
World Politics in Transition (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1977); and op. cit., in note 
69 and accompanying text. 
92 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Robert 0. Keohane, 'Transnational Relations and World Politics: A 
Conclusion', in Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (eds.), Transnational Relations and World 
Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 380. 
93 Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, 'Theories of International Regimes', International 
Organization (Vol. 41, No. 3, Summer 1987), p. 513. 
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maintaining international regimes at the international lever. 94 These observations 
suggest the need to include actors other than states in any analysis of world 
politics. 
These remarks are, however, not meant to suggest that the present 
investigation has been blind, up to this point, to the role of non-state actors. The 
influence of international governmental organisations, for example, is explicitly 
acknowledged throughout this thesis, particularly in Chapter 5.1. In addition, the 
impact of nongovernmental bodies (either formal or informal) are also noted -- for 
example, transnational networks of scientists and industry representatives (in 
Chapters 2 and 3, respectively, of this thesis). One set of actors that is not, 
however to this point, studied is environmental pressure groups. They are therefore 
considered in this section. 95 
Environmental pressure groups (EPGs) are those organisations not tied 
directly to government, industry or university that have active programmes related 
to environmental protection. 96 In this section, 97 the activities of their members 
at the 'elite-level' are examined. It is proposed that by associating with scientists, 
industry officers, government officials, international civil servants and other political 
figures, members of EPGs could accelerate the process of international regime 
formation. I would like to suggest a number of ways in which they could do this, 
grouped generally into two categories. 98 These ideas are supported by specific 
94 Young, op. cit., in note 9, p. 364. 
95 Because of the important contributions of both the 'global' and the 'individualistic' 
approaches, these two are identified as inspiration for the inclusion of EPGs as a catalyst in the 
overall theoretical framework. (See the discussion in Chapters 1.2.1 and 1.2.3 of this thesis.) 
96 Adapted from Michael Oppenheimer, 'Responding to Climate Change: The Crucial Role of the 
NGO's', in H-J Karpe, D. Otten, S.C. Trinidade (eds.), Climate and Development: Climatic Change 
and Variability and the Resulting Social, Economic and Technological Implications (London: 
Springer-Verlag, 1990), p. 340. 
97 This section and the following section (Chapter 5.4 of this thesis) expand upon some ideas 
I originally put forward in Rowlands, op. cit., in note 6, p. 113. 
98 Another means by which EPGs are important is their role in monitoring, and thereby also 
promoting, compliance with international agreements. (See, for example, Lynton K. Caldwell, 
'Beyond Environmental Diplomacy: The Changing Institutional Structure of International 
Cooperation', in John E. Carroll (ed.), International Environmental Diplomacy: The Management and 
Resolution of Transfrontier Environmental Problems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 
pp. 22-24.) Indeed, the evidence from the ozone layer issue reveals their importance in this respect. 
(See, for example, Richard Elliot Benedick, 'Protecting the Ozone Layer: New Directions in 
Diplomacy', in Jessica Tuchman Mathews (ed.), Preserving the Global Environment: The Challenge 
of Shared Leadership (London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1991), p. 146.) Additionally, by the end 
of 1991, the need for bodies that could monitor and promote compliance on the global warming 
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examples from the histories of the politics of ozone layer depletion and global 
warming. The study of the EPGs' elite-level activities in this section is 
complemented by an investigation, in Chapter 5.4 of this thesis, of the ways in 
which EPGs help to educate and to mobilise public opinion (which, it is proposed 
in Chapter 5.4, can also catalyse the process). The present focus upon 
environmental pressure groups is thus intended to broaden further our recognition 
of the range of actors that are active in the process of international regime 
formation on both the ozone layer depletion and the global warming issues. 
5.3.1 -- Environmental Pressure Groups Creating or Cleaning Channels of 
Communication 
Environment pressure groups could accelerate the process of international regime 
formation by creating or cleaning channels of communication. These potential or 
actual channels might exist between any of a variety of actors in international 
society, and their quicker construction or clearing might hasten the process of 
regime formation by allowing signals to travel from one actor to another more 
swiftly. While considering the two most important such channels in theory, 99 I offer 
some examples from the experience of the international politics of both the ozone 
layer depletion and the global warming issues. 
First, channels of communication might be built between EPGs of different 
countries. Their use might, in turn, accelerate the rate of regime formation. 
Suppose that one state (A) is 'behind' another state (B) in the political development 
of a particular issue. The EPG in state A can provide information about the 
successes that it has had in its campaigning experience so as to assist the EPG 
issue was also recognised. (See, for example, Owen Greene, 'Building a Global Warming 
Convention: Lessons from the Arms Control Experience?', in Michael Grubb and Nicola Steen (eds.), 
Pledge and Review Processes: Possible Components of a Climate Convention (London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1990), pp. xxi-xxxiii.) Despite this importance, however, the role of 
EPGs as agents of compliance is not included as one of the two most important functions for EPGs, 
because their involvement in monitoring and promoting compliance has more to do with regime 
'maintenance' (or 'strengthening') than regime 'formation' (interview with Iwona Rummel-Bulska, 
Ozone Secretariat, United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi, Kenya, 1 August 1991). 
es A third important set of channels might be created between EPGs and officials of foreign 
countries. Scott Hajost, for one, notes that in Washington, DC, there are links between EPGs and 
the environmental attaches of various embassies. For these foreign diplomats, EPGs provide a 'bell-
weather indicator' of feeling in the host country and they can also provide important technical 
expertise to which the foreign diplomat may not have access (interview with Scott Hajost, 
Environmental Defense Fund, Washington, DC, 19 April 1990). 
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in state B to work towards the same ends. This would allow the EPG in state B to 
work more efficiently towards its goals. Consequently, the key actors in state B 
may 'learn' more quickly, and therefore the rate of regime formation in international 
society will be accelerated. This theoretical supposition was indeed played out 
during the process of international regime formation to preserve the ozone 
layer. 100 
To take one example, Buxton notes that in Canada, a public awareness 
campaign about the damage being done to the ozone layer was started well in 
advance of similar campaigns in the states of the European Communities. 
Therefore, once European EPGs started to campaign actively on the ozone layer 
issue, they were briefed and given information by their Canadian counterparts. 
More specifically, Buxton contends that the information that Friends of the Earth 
in Canada provided to Friends of the Earth International in the United Kingdom 
enabled, at least in part, the British group to promote the issue so 
successfully. 101 Oppenheimer identifies similar links between American and 
European EPGs. The construction of these channels of communication, he 
maintains, allowed 'technical information on ozone depletion and the potential 
availability of CFC substitutes [to be exchanged]'. 102 If these channels of 
communication between EPGs had not been constructed, then the European 
EPGs' campaigns might not have been as effective and an international regime 
might not have formed as quickly. 
With the expansion of the information network for nongovernmental 
organisations during 1990 and 1991, meanwhile, more channels of communication 
among EPGs were in place during the politically formative years of the global 
warming issue than had been the case during the same stage of the ozone layer 
issue. The growth of the 'GreenNet' electronic mail network 103 and the formal 
100 It should be noted that the involvement of environmental pressure groups on the ozone layer 
issue in the United States can be traced back to the original SST debate during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s (see Chapter 2.1.2 of this thesis). Douglas Ross highlights, in particular, the involvement 
of the Citizens League Against the Sonic Boom, the Friends of the Earth and the Environmental 
Defense Fund (Douglas Ross, 'The Concorde Compromise: The Politics of Decision-Making', The 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Vol. 34, No. 3, March 1978), p. 49). 
101 Interview with Buxton, op. cit., in note 43. 
102 Oppenheimer, op. cit., in note 96, p. 345. 
103  This was an international electronic communication network for 'environment, peace and 
human rights' (GreenNet promotional material, London). 
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organisation of an EPG conference in parallel to the 1992 United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development 104 are but two examples of this 
increase for environmental issues in general. Furthermore, Oppenheimer's 
observation that 'an incipient international [EPG] network on the atmosphere [was] 
in place [in 1990] which [could and did] serve as a mechanism for dissemination 
of information on climate warming' 105 demonstrates that there was also such 
expansion on the global warming issue in particular. Given these developments, 
EPGs were able to communicate among themselves more easily. Accordingly, the 
creation of such transnational links might have driven the process of international 
regime formation on the global warming issue as well. 
As a second hypothesis, significant channels of communication between 
states' representatives might be built or cleansed by EPG officials. An EPG's envoy, 
for example, might act as a liaison between high ranking governmental officials of 
two different states. These officials, who would otherwise require authorisation and 
other elements of protocol and officialdom in order to communicate, could 
correspond by means of an unofficial EPG intermediary. 106 In this way, views, 
opinions and positions could be transmitted between states' representatives, and 
the negotiating process could thereby be advanced. 
Tom Burke, for example, relates one such incident from the politics of the 
ozone layer that occurred in March 1989. 107 At the meeting of the European 
Communities at which it was decided to implement a 100 per cent ban on ozone-
depleting chemicals, 108 word of the proposed restriction was somehow leaked 
prematurely. Burke heard the news and, subsequently in Brussels, he mentioned 
it to Eileen Claussen of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). She 
consequently relayed this information to William Reilly, Administrator of the EPA, 
in a meeting. Reilly took this news to the White House, where individuals were 
104 The '92 Global Forum was scheduled to be 'a series of simultaneous events which [would 
provide] an opportunity for all sectors to express their independent views at the time of the Earth 
Summit [the UNCED]'. (See, for example, "92 Global Forum Underway', National Secretariat 
UNCED'92 Newsletter (Vol. 1, No. 4, Fall 1991), p. 3; and, more generally, the work of the 'Centre 
for Our Common Future' in Geneva.) 
105 Oppenheimer, op. cit., in note 96, p. 345. 
106 Interview with Tom Burke, Green Alliance, London, 4 June 1991. 
107 Ibid. 
108 See, for example, John Palmer, 'Total Ban on CFCs in Europe', The Guardian (London), 3 
March 1989, p. 1. 
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gathering to formulate the American position for the upcoming 'Saving the Ozone 
Layer' conference in London. US officials, not wanting to be overtaken at the 
forefront of this issue, also proposed a 100 per cent ban. 109 Thus, the United 
States joined the members of the European Communities in agreeing to eliminate 
ozone-destroying chemicals in a quite dramatic and sudden manner. Although this 
achievement cannot be solely credited to Mr. Burke, the actions of this EPG 
representative nevertheless did help to accelerate the process of international 
regime formation. 11° 
During the early 1990s, however, opportunities for EPG representatives to 
play a similar role on the global warming issue decreased for two reasons. First, 
there was a greater number of meetings at the intergovernmental level, which 
afforded representatives of different states more opportunities for interaction. 
Second, EPGs' representatives found themselves becoming increasingly involved 
in these formal negotiations directly, which meant that they were catalysing the 
process in a slightly different manner. 111 Nevertheless, there were, no doubt, still 
some opportunities for EPGs' representatives either to create or to clean channels 
of communication between states' representatives, although the investigation did 
not reveal an example as striking as the one on the ozone layer issue that is cited 
above. 
5.3.2 -- Environmental Pressure Groups' Involvement in the Technical Debate 
As a second possible means of speeding up the process of regime formation, 
members of environmental pressure groups (EPGs) could constructively engage 
in the international negotiations in two significant ways. First, they could contribute 
to both the technical and the political discussions by presenting the results of their 
109  David Dickson and Eliot Marshall, 'Europe Recognizes the Ozone Threat', Science (Vol. 243, 
10 March 1989, p. 1279). 
110 Although Ms. Claussen was unable either to confirm or to deny this particular incident, she 
noted that the US government receives 'information on various industry, government, and 
environmental group positions from a wide range of sources...'. Further, she maintains that 
'environmental groups, and for that matter industry groups too, have provided an extremely useful 
source of information. In performing this function these groups have disseminated information 
extremely effectively and in that way have helped shape government policies.' (Eileen B. Claussen, 
Director, Office of Atmospheric and Indoor Air Programs, US Environmental Protection Agency, 
Washington, DC, personal communication, 28 February 1992.) 
tri See Chapter 5.3.2 of this thesis for a further discussion. 
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independently-conducted research, thereby raising the standard of the debate in 
the international deliberations. In theory, their interventions could help negotiators 
reach particular insights in a shorter time-period or provide the participants with a 
greater quantity of information and, possibly, more independently-verified 
conclusions. Granted, these statements are based upon the assumption that 
deems that the accumulation of knowledge will bring one closer to the `Truth% 112 
nevertheless, as is argued in Chapter 2 of this thesis, more research can generate 
consensual knowledge more quickly and thereby accelerate the satisfaction of the 
first hypothesised precondition. Additionally, the EPGs' research would not 
necessarily have to be restricted to the scientific aspects of the issues. The 
research undertaken might concern policy and treaty drafting and analysis (for 
example, the effects and ramifications of various proposed paths of action). 
Second, members of EPGs could serve as appropriate `checks and 
balances', thereby helping to ensure that the analyses of the issues under 
consideration are both rigorous and peer-reviewed. Although this might slow the 
process in the early stages, perhaps by challenging a preferred view, it is 
hypothesised that, in the end, it might accelerate the process. Extensive early 
scrutiny of the issue could well circumvent the future derailing of the negotiations 
and avoid the need to start the process all over again. Thus, because pressure 
group leaders have `specialist knowledge of their subject' , 113 they could, 
theoretically, enrich the technical debate and thereby accelerate the process of 
international regime formation either by presenting their own ideas or by 
challenging the ideas of others. To move from the speculative to the concrete, I 
would like to consider the more general activities of environmental pressure groups 
before specifically examining our two issues of global atmospheric change. 
In 1991, the days when all environmental pressure groups-were made up 
of `fruit juice drinkers and sandal wearers' 114 appeared to have been long- 
112 
Indeed, Young notes the positive impact that a 'veil of uncertainty' may have upon actors' 
willingness to enter into collective arrangements (Young, op. cit., in note 68, p. 341). 
113 
Peter Willetts, 'The Impact of Promotional Pressure Groups on Global Politics', in Peter 
Willetts (ed), Pressure Groups in the Global System: The Transnational Relations of Issue -Orientated 
Non-Governmental Organizations (London: Frances Pinter, 1982), p. 185. 
114 
George Orwell, quoted in Editorial, The Independent (London), 26 May 1990, p. 18. 
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gone. 115 Instead, EPGs, at that time, were staffed by individuals who were well 
equipped -- both intellectually and materially -- to participate in the various debates. 
Lynton Caldwell contends that: 'Resources of money and appropriately skilled 
personnel have increased the ability of [EPGs] to influence the policy agendas of 
governments and to follow through to obtain action.' 116 In the United Kingdom, 
the appointment of a former Reader in Earth Science from Imperial College, Dr. 
Jeremy Leggett, as Director of Science at Greenpeace UK in 1989 demonstrates 
the increased importance that at least one EPG placed upon technical 
competence. 117 
A number of individuals have identified ways in which environmental 
pressure groups used their expertise effectively during the technical discussions 
on various environmental issues. Tom Burke argues that both by helping to 
separate the 'signal from the noise' and by building up constituencies for 
'unpopular' science, EPGs increased the rigour of the scientific investigations. 118 
 He also believes that the EPGs built support for scientific inquiry and demanded 
answers to questions that governments did not want asked. 119 Additionally, 
Arthur Norman maintains that: 
[EPGs'] influence in many countries is considerable, and is on the increase 
in promoting environmental protection and improvement. Shrill publicity and 
exaggerated alarms are sometimes the tools of a minority of [EPGs], but 
there is evidence of much powerful influence exerted by organisations which 
base their advocacy on careful scientific research and analysis. Where 
these conditions exist new partnerships are replacing old confrontations; 
partnerships are now being formed between governments and [EPGs] and 
between [EPGs] and industry and commerce, resulting in numerous 
practical projects and in effective remedies for identified ills. 12° 
115 North observes that, by the end of the 1980s, American environmentalists had abandoned 
their sandals for suits (Richard North, 'Markets and Law Push US Towards Voluntary Change', The 
Independent (London), 27 September 1989, p. 26), while Ingram and Mann support this hypothesis 
with more substantive evidence (Helen M. Ingram and Dean E. Mann, 'Interest Groups and 
Environmental Policy', in James P. Lester (ed.), Environmental Politics and Policy: Theories and 
Evidence (London: Duke University Press, 1989), pp. 152-53). 
116 Caldwell, op. cit., in note 98, p. 19. 
117 See, for example, Jeremy Leggett (ed.), Global Warming: The Greenpeace Report (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990). 
118 Interview with Burke, op. cit., in note 106. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Arthur Norman, 'Interpreting the Signals', in Angell et al, op. cit., in note 66, pp. 187-88. 
Emphasis added. 
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Oppenheimer, furthermore, contends that the EPGs had important roles to play in 
the 'development and implementation of specific solutions to problems'. 121 
The historical record lends credence to these views. During 1990, most 
importantly, EPGs began to take part in the formal, intergovernmental negotiations 
to a greater extent. The Bergen conference in May 1990 is particularly 
noteworthy. 122 At this meeting, Paul Brown notes that for `the first time industry, 
trade unions, environmental groups, women and youth groups took part in the 
conference and were consulted by ministers in an attempt to bring democracy to 
the Bergen Process'. 123 Richard North, meanwhile, speculates that this 'was not 
meant to set a precedent, but almost certainly has'. 124 Taken together, these 
remarks and observations suggest that EPGs' involvement in the technical debate 
on environmental issues in general increased during the period to the end of 1991. 
Moving on to the two specific issues under investigation in this thesis, let us 
first consider the politics of the ozone layer. Environmental pressure groups played 
a major role during these negotiations, particularly after the discovery of the ozone 
crater in 1985, 125 for they informed the technical debate, both in 'open' 
discussion and within the framework of the formal negotiations. Benedick 
recognises that environmental groups provided ideas, opinions and actions that 
`often proved critical to the successful outcome' of the negotiations, 126 while 
Oppenheimer argues that, during the Montreal Protocol discussions, the EPGs' 
`unique viewpoint probably swayed negotiators on not a few points'. 127 The 
groups that were particularly active in these regards were the Natural Resources 
121 Oppenheimer, op. cit., in note 96, p. 343. 
122 See, for example, 'Bergen: Weak Declaration Adopted', Environmental Policy and Law (Vol. 
20, No. 3, 1990), p. 84. 
123 Paul Brown, 'Global Slow-step Trips Up', The Guardian (London), 18 May 1990, p. 27. 
124 Richard North, 'Fight Against Pollution "Will Cause Anguish"', The Independent (London), 17 
May 1990, p. 8. 
125 Sand reports that 'no conservation NGOs attended the Vienna Conference [in March 1985]', 
and that while 'industry spokesmen were also official members of several national delegations (for 
example, those of Japan and West Germany), not one of the more than one hundred national and 
EEC delegates and observers came from the environmental NGO community' (Peter H. Sand, 
'Protecting the Ozone Layer: The Vienna Convention is Adopted', Environment (Vol. 27, No. 5, June 
1985), p. 42). 
126 Benedick, op. cit., in note 98, p. 146. 
127 Oppenheimer, op. cit., in note 96, p. 345. 
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Defense Council (US) 128 , the World Resources Institute (US) 129 and the Friends 
of the Earth (which was based in the United Kingdom, although it operated 
worldwide). 130 
On the climate change issue, meanwhile, the involvement of EPGs in the 
technical debate increased during the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. 
Substantially researched and documented materials published at this time by, for 
example, the Worldwatch Institute 131 and Friends of the Earth 132 demonstrate 
that these organisations' interest in contributing to the technical discussions on 
global warming was significant. Oppenheimer also notes that the EPGs had 'a 
pivotal role to play in advocating the appropriate technologies for the future'. 133 
 During the global warming negotiations, in addition, EPGs contributed to the 'social 
science' aspects of the technical debate (and thus not simply the natural-scientific 
issues), for various organisations analysed negotiating prospects 134 and 
proposed draft articles for a possible international convention on climate 
change. 136 These observations suggest that the range of the EPGs' participation 
in the global warming negotiations was substantial. 
In addition, the aforementioned increase in the level of participation by EPGs 
in the formal negotiations on the environment during this period 136 had particular 
128 The lawsuit against the EPA that the NRDC launched was instrumental in prompting US 
policy action. (See the discussion in Chapter 3.1.3.) In addition, Benedick notes particularly their 
contributions (Benedick, op. cit., in note 22, p. 166). See, also, Diane M. Doolittle, 'Underestimating 
Ozone Depletion: The Meandering Road to the Montreal Protocol and Beyond', Ecology Law 
Quarterly (Vol. 16, No. 2, 1989), pp. 435-36. 
129 Lois R. Ember et al, 'Tending the Global Commons', Chemical and Engineering News, 24 
November 1986, p. 56. 
130 Interviews with officials in Washington, DC, April 1990; and personal communications, officials 
in London, June 1990. 
131 Christopher Flavin, Slowing Global Warming: A Worldwide Strategy (Washington, DC: 
Worldwatch Paper 91, October 1989). 
132 Friends of the Earth, The Heat Trap: The Threat Posed by Rising Levels of Greenhouse 
Gases (London: Friends of the Earth, September 1989). 
133 Oppenheimer, op. cit., in note 96, p. 343. See, also, the book that he co-wrote: Michael 
Oppenheimer and Robert Boyle, Dead Heat The Race Against the Greenhouse Effect (London: I.B. 
Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1990). 
134 See, for example, Jessica T. Mathews et al, Greenhouse Warming: Negotiating a Global 
Regime (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 1991). 
135 See, for example, William A. Nitze, The Greenhouse Effect: Formulating a Convention 
(London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990). 
136 Op. cit., in notes 122-124 
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ramifications for the global warming issue. On the one hand, the constructive 
contributions that some of these representatives made during the meetings are 
recognised by a number of governmental negotiators who were participants in the 
discussions. 137 On the other hand, the actions of particular EPG representatives 
are not viewed so favourably by others. Andrea Imada reports on one such 
incident from the Second World Climate Conference in Geneva in November 1990: 
David McRobert, Pollution Probe's [a Canadian EPG] global warming 
programme coordinator, who attended some of the policy-making sessions 
[at the Second World Climate Conference in Geneva], caught Canadian 
bureaucrats red-handed trying to convince delegates from other countries 
to take a lenient line on the international response to global warming. At a 
drafting session for the ministers' statement, which all countries would sign, 
McRobert listened in disbelief as two Canadian delegates encouraged other 
countries to gut the wording of the final statement and eliminate all 
references to the Toronto target. McRobert, who released the details of the 
Canadian deception to the media, was later chastised by Kirk Dawson, a 
senior civil servant with Environment Canada. 138 
There was deep disappointment on the part of some Canadian government officials 
at this time. 138 To cite another example, Greenpeace's 'stunts' at the same 
conference irritated some of the other officials who attended. 14° By the end of 
1991, therefore, such actions had caused some governmental negotiators to 
distrust the actions of some EPG representatives. 141 One effect was that the 
access of EPGs' representatives to some states' officials was restricted, thereby 
decreasing their participation in the formal process. This, in turn, curtailed the ability 
of some EPG representatives to act as effective catalysts on the global warming 
issue. 142 
137 Interview with Philippe Orliange, Representant Permanent Adjoint de la France, Aupres de 
('Office des Nations-Unies a Nairobi, Ambassade de France au Kenya, Nairobi, Kenya, 15 July 1991; 
and interview with Usher, op. cit., in note 48. 
138 Andrea Imada, 'Canada's Cool Response to Global Warming', Probe Post (Spring 1991), p. 
27. 
139 Interviews with officials from Environment Canada, Hull and Ottawa, Canada, January 1991. 
140 Interview, for example, with Usher, op. cit., in note 48, 1 August 1991; and interview with 
Hoogendoorn, op. cit., in note 24. 
141 Interviews with officials in Nairobi, Kenya, July and August 1991. 
142 On the ozone layer depletion issue, meanwhile, Benedick expresses similar feelings about 
Greenpeace's 'confrontational' techniques. He does admit, however, that Greenpeace 'focused 
needed attention on problems of monitoring compliance and industry secretiveness about its data' 
(Benedick, op. cit., in note 22, p. 166). 
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5.3.3 -- A Summary of the Roles of Environmental Pressure Groups 
At the beginning of this section, a suggestion is made that environmental pressure 
groups (EPGs) might be able to accelerate the rate of international regime 
formation in two key ways. First, their members might be able both to create and 
to clean channels of communication, and, second, they might also be able to 
contribute to the technical debate. Indeed, the findings from the study of global 
atmospheric change reveal that there is at least some truth in these hypotheses. 
Not only do many governmental negotiators in international society recognise the 
valuable roles that EPGs play, but at least one even goes so far to suggest that 
they are the key ingredient in the process of regime formation. 143 
Although this finding would suggest that the presence of EPGs is not only 
a catalyst in the process, but is rather a precbndition, there are other findings that 
suggest that their identification as a catalyst is, indeed, appropriate. In an analysis 
specifically related to the issues of global atmospheric change, Peter Usher 
suggests that even without the presence of campaigning environmental pressure 
groups, an international regime could nevertheless have been formed to preserve 
the ozone layer. EPGs were simply another body pushing; they helped to keep the 
process on track.'` In support of this, Peter Haas argues that: 
In general, public sentiment and the activities of nongovernmental 
organizations such as Friends of the Earth had little impact on the adoption 
of CFC controls. Instead, they tended to merely reinforce government 
regulations that had already been introduced. 145  
Moreover, a number of officials note that governments were the key players during 
the formal negotiations on the global warming issue in 1990 and 1991. 146 In this 
way, they highlight the fact that although EPGs were influential in their ability to 
accelerate (or, at times, to retard) the rate of regime formation, they were not 
143 Interview with Oleg Alex Chistoff, Counsellor, Canadian High Commission, Nairobi, Kenya, 
26 July 1991. 
144 He also suggests that if there had not been an ozone crater, then EPGs might have had a 
more important role to play (interview with Usher, op. cit., in note 48, 1 August 1991). 
145 Haas, op. cit., in note 81, p. 218. 
146 Interview with Mazairac, op. cit., in note 25; interview with Usher, op. cit., in note 48; and 
interview with Orliange, op. cit., in note 137. Further, although some maintain that EPG participation 
in the global warming talks is guaranteed by precedence (op. cit., in note 124), Usher nevertheless 
believes that their right to participate could be quickly withdrawn (interview with Usher, op. cit., in 
note 48). 
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central to the process. This revelation also substantiates the assertion that EPGs, 
although important simulators in the process of regime formation, are not 
necessarily vital for its success. 
5.4 -- The Mobilisation of Public Opinion 
A well-informed public is vital in spurring governments to act to protect the 
environment. 
Stanley Clinton Davis 
former European Communities Environment Commissioner"' 
Changes in public opinion can have a considerable effect upon the process of 
international regime formation on particular issues. This would appear to be 
especially true in the cases of environmental issues, because individual activities 
both affect and are affected by the health of the environment. Unlike some other 
international issues -- for example, traditional forms of military security -- 'control' 
over the environment issue is not solely in the hands of a elite corps of the state's 
decision-makers, but is instead in the hands of every member of the general 
population. 148 Because environmental issues are perceived to have a more direct 
relationship with the general level of welfare of the individual, public opinion is 
considered as a factor in the process of international regime formation. 149  
By themselves, however, changes in individuals' views about certain issues 
might not necessarily be forces for regime formation. Therefore, the proposition put 
forward in this section is that the extent to which public opinion is mobilised might 
have a bearing upon the rate of international regime formation and thus have the 
potential to act as a catalytic factor. The rationale is that if public opinion is 
mobilised, then individuals will be able to use a variety of tools -- economic, political 
147 Stanley Clinton Davis, 'Environmental Advance and the European Community', in Angell et 
al, op. cit., in note 66, p. 160. 
148  While decisions about the deployment of weapons are in the hands of members of elites, 
decisions about the use of, for example, CFCs and automobiles, are in the hands of all members 
of the population (Daniel Deudney, 'The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and 
National Security', Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1990), pp. 464-
65). 
149 Dunlap notes that, in particular, `it has been argued that environmental issues have inherently 
broad appeal because environmental problems affect virtually everyone' (Riley E. Dunlap, 'Public 
Opinion in the 1980s: Clear Consensus, Ambiguous Commitment', Environment (Vol. 33, No. 8, 
October 1991), p. 15). 
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or social -- with which they can exercise leverage and can push actors in 
international society down the path of regime formation. 
This hypothesis, nevertheless, begs the question: if shifts in public opinion 
occur, what causes them? Two responses are suggested. First, there might be a 
traditional 'ground-swell' of change in public opinion, which might be spurred by 
changes in individuals' beliefs in the absence of outside prompting. By suggesting 
that the origins might be at such a grass-roots level, an imbalance that permeates 
a great deal of this thesis is (at least partially) redressed. More specifically, much 
of the focus in this work is upon what can be called 'top-down' processes -- that 
is, the analysis stresses the actions and initiatives of various elites in international 
society (for example, scientists, industry chief executive officers, government 
officials, international civil servants and pressure group leaders). To counter this 
view, I am suggesting here that not only could the individual matter, but that the 
`average individual' could matter, for s/he might accelerate the process of regime 
formation. 15° Granted, the feelings and associated actions of individuals could 
eventually spawn groups for implementing collective choice that could become 
elitist, but, in such instances, it would remain the case that the concern originated 
at the level of the individual. (See Figure 5.1.) 
FIGURE 5.1 -- The Mobilisation of Public Opinion 
(a) without outside impetus 
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150 Because of this focus upon the 'individual', one should not be surprised to discover that the 
inspiration for the inclusion of this factor is the work of the 'individualistic' scholars in international 
relations. (See Chapter 1.2.3 of this thesis for a discussion of their work.) 
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Second, shifts in public opinion could also be triggered by specialised 
groups in international society. Specific groups might act as educators, whose 
members help to change individuals' beliefs on a particular issue by illuminating 
certain facts. In this instance, the concern among individuals would not 
'spontaneously' arise without the participation of other actors. Once the general 
population was mobilised, however, public opinion would act as a catalyst for 
international regime formation in ways similar to those that are outlined above. 
(See, also, Figure 5.1.) Before we consider our two issues of global atmospheric 
change in particular, let us first consider the ways in which the mobilisation of 
public opinion has affected the process of international regime formation on 
environmental issues more generally. 
First, during the 'second environmental revolution' of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, 151 there was a general surge of concern for international 
environmental issues, not only in the developed world, but also in the developing 
world. 152 From 1990, Arthur Norman notes: 
[W]ithin the last few years the force of public opinion on environmental 
issues, particularly in the industrialised democracies of the northern 
hemisphere, has become manifestly stronger, better founded on scientific 
evidence of real hazards, and more insistent in its demands for action than 
at any time in the past. 153 
Thus, we should first recognise that there was a feeling that the environment was 
important and that something needed to be done to preserve it. 
As argued above, however, a feeling that one group wants change does not 
by itself have an impact upon another group, unless the group that desires change 
is able to influence the other group. Thus, the feeling among members of the 
public that action should be taken on the environment would only be important if 
151 It is generally recognised that the 'first environmental movement' took place during the late 
1960s and early 1970s. See, John McCormick, The Global Environmental Movement: Reclaiming 
Paradise (London: Belhaven Press, 1989); and Riley E. Dunlap, 'Public Opinion and Environmental 
Policy', in Lester (ed.), op. cit., in note 115, pp. 95-101. 
152 A number of polls and survey reflected this concern. See, for example, reports cited in 
Dunlap, op. cit., in note 149; Nay Htun, 'The Environmental Challenge and the Impact on the Oil 
Industry', Energy Policy (Vol. 18, No. 1, January/February 1990), p. 5; and Jim MacNeill, Pieter 
Winsemius and Taizo Yakushiji, Beyond Interdependence: The Meshing of the World's Economy 
and the Earth's Ecology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 68. 
153 Norman, op. cit., in note 120, p. 183. 
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they were able to make their sentiments known to the elites -- society's decision-
makers -- in a forceful way. 154 Only then would the latter take action, let alone 
notice. In international society during the late and the early 1990s, that connection 
between the governed and the governing was indeed made. Norman outlines how 
the mobilisation of public opinion had an impact at this time: 
There is now wider recognition that this tide of public opinion is still 
becoming more powerful and it has already demonstrated, in some 
countries, the ability to influence voting patterns, to halt a great new industry 
in its tracks, to change agricultural policies and practices and to strangle the 
markets for products which are known to be contributors to major 
environmental risks. 155 
By making particular choices, individuals effectively demonstrated their concern for 
environmental issues at this time. The choices that they made, more specifically, 
were politica1, 156 economic157 and social. 155 With a variety of tools available 
154 Friend maintains that government officials 'are too busy to look ahead and can, therefore, 
only respond to outside stimuli, such as public opinion' (interview with Friend, op. cit., in note 85). 
In a similar tone, Oppenheimer asserts that governments are 'constrained by the exigencies of the 
day. In some cases, these are imminent questions of survival.' (Oppenheimer, op. cit., in note 96, 
p. 343.) Norman, additionally, recognises that: 
No political party and few decision-takers in the business world can believe that they are 
insulated from the effects of this new pressure for changes which, if implemented, would 
change much else. Political and business leaders have always relied upon their ability to 
read, interpret and act upon the signals coming from their market places; few of them would 
deny that their most costly errors and lost opportunities can be attributed either to poor 
research and observation, or to false deductions leading to mistakes of concept or timing, 
which have handed competitive advantage to others. In practice political and business 
managements have begun to make adjustments to policy and practice -- optimism is 
justified. 
(Norman, op. cit., in note 120, pp. 183-84.) 
155 Ibid., p. 183. 
156 For example, the 15 per cent share of the vote that the Green Party received during the 1989 
European elections in the United Kingdom sent shock waves through the ranks of the other, 
established parties in that country. (See, for example, Michael Ignatieff, 'Why I Voted for the Greens', 
The Observer (London), 25 June 1989.) 
157 The power of 'green consumerism' increased during the latter part of the 1980s. In the United 
Kingdom, for example, the number of 'green consumers' (that is, those who had selected one 
product over another for environmental reasons) grew from 19 per cent in 1988 to 50 per cent in 
1990 (Frances Cairncross, Costing the Earth (London: Business Books, Ltd. in association with The 
Economist Books, Ltd., 1991), p. 155, Table 17). See, also, the discussion in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
158 The membership of 'green' organisations grew at a tremendous rate during the late 1980s. 
In the United Kingdom, for example, membership of the Friends of the Earth increased almost seven-
fold to 200,000 between 1985 and 1990. While in the United States, membership of Greenpeace 
more than quadrupled to 2 million during the same period (Cairncross, op. cit., in note 157, pp. 12-
13, Tables 1 and 2). 
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to them, decision-makers had to take some notice. 159 
As is noted above, however, an observation that public opinion exists begs 
one to question its origin. Thus, to examine this, let us take a step back for a 
moment in order to discern whence this interest came. As was suggested in the 
original hypothesis, we can speculate that some of this concern for environmental 
issues came from the individual himself or herself, while some of it was encouraged 
by outside factors. 
First, let us consider the linkage between personal action and environmental 
degradation. The environmental issues (or for that matter, any issues) that will be 
most prone to involve members of the general public are those that have direct, 
traceable links between present-day activity and the future level of welfare -- that 
is, when an individual's mind can make a link betiiveen the promulgated threat and 
the individual's own future well-being. 1 6° This hypothesis is supported by the 
history of the politics of dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane (DDT). The tangibility of 
the link between the use of DDT and its presence in birds' eggs, and throughout 
the food chain more generally, helped to give, rise to substantial public pressure in 
favour of its prohibition. 161 But, more generally, has such an interest arisen 
spontaneously, or has it required mobilisation by an outside body? 
The determining factor in answer to the question has to do with the visual 
and tangible characteristics of the perceived cause and effect. It is suggested that 
public attention will be self-mobilised if the particular environmental problem visually 
impacts the routine activities of individuals. Consider, for example, the case of an 
159 Charles Caccia argues that an 'informed public and mobilised public opinion can make a 
substantial difference in determining the behaviour of governments in response to sustainable 
development' (Charles Caccia, 'OECD Nations and Sustainable Development', in Angell et al, op. 
cit., in note 66, p. 127). Oppenheimer and Boyle, furthermore, cite a particular example -- namely, 
the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe. This experience, they maintain, suggests that 
'...environmentalism seems [to be] on the verge of becoming a new organizing principle' 
(Oppenheimer and Boyle, op. cit., in note 133, p. 193). Additionally, Holdgate highlights the ongoing 
importance of public opinion on environmental issues: 'It is clear that the future of the world's 
environment depends on how far collective awareness of our problems is reflected in individual 
action, and how far this in turn feeds through into collective action by local communities, industries 
and governments.' (Martin Holdgate, 'Changes in Perception', in Angell et al, op. cit., in note 66, p. 
94.) 
160 Interview with Brian Herman, Deputy Director, Energy and Environment Division, External 
Affairs and International Trade Canada, Ottawa, Canada, 2 January 1991; interview with Tim Leah, 
National Secretariat, 1992 UNCED, Environment Canada, Hull, Canada, 2 January 1991; and 
interview with Douglas Russell, Director, Climate Change Convention Negotiations, Atmospheric 
Environment Service, Environment Canada, 2 January 1991. 
161 See, for example, Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965). 
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annual family picnic. If, one year, the members of a family discover that their 
favourite picnic spot has become spoilt by pollution, then environmental 
deterioration will become a concern for them, because it has had an impact upon 
their traditional ritual. 162 When individuals are mobilised in this way, the general 
surge of public opinion about the cause of the pollution will increase. In this type 
of environmental issue, there will be no need of outside forces to prompt 
mobilisation. 163 
In the absence of such visibility, however, external forces might be needed 
in order to educate individuals and thereby to trigger change in public opinion on 
environmental issues. Martin Holdgate identifies the media as one such set of 
forces, noting that the press and electronic agencies can make people 'increasingly 
aware of the dependence of human societies on, the resources of the planet and 
the continuing maintenance of the essential processes of the biosphere'. 164 While 
both formal education and scientific research contributed to this sensitivity, he 
argues that 
modern environmental awareness has largely been created by journalists, 
radio commentators and television presenters. It has inevitably been built on 
`news stories' which touch the emotions of those they address. The vast 
majority of individuals alerted by those stories have neither the experience 
of nor involvement in the subject matter. The stories are commonly made 
memorable by catchy headlines like 'Black Tide of Death', 'Have We 
Poisoned the Sea?' or 'The End of the Forests'. Some stories are fair 
reflections of genuine underlying fact: others exaggerate or trivialise. They 
have all, however, performed the important task of getting the message 
across to the literate community that the world is in a mess and that people 
are responsible. 166 
Media attention upon disasters compelled people to recognise the link that existed 
between environmental degradation and the health and welfare of the individual. 
Therefore, public opinion demanded that 'something' be done. 166 
162 Interview with Juan Antonio Mateos, Ambassador and Permanent Representative to UNEP, 
Embassy of Mexico, Nairobi, Kenya, 31 July 1991. 
163 Dunlap, op. cit, in note 149, p. 14. 
164 Holdgate, op. cit., in note 159, p. 85. 
165 Ibid., p. 86. 
166 Leah goes on to argue that the public is not really 'informed'. Therefore, their sensitivity 
demands action, but their ignorance precludes them from knowing what action they want (interview 
with Leah, op. cit., in note 160). Russell puts forth a similar argument (interview with Russell, op. cit., 
in note 160). 
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Environmental pressure groups (EPGs) are another possible set of forces 
that could trigger shifts in public opinion. Findings from a study of environmental 
issues in general suggest that their members were perceived to be working in the 
public interest, and thus, when they highlighted the importance of a particular 
issue, members of the public took notice. 167 Furthermore, Peter Willetts maintains 
that the 'ability of NGOs to apply pressure is through the mobilization of legitimacy 
for their cause. Winning support by changing people's perception of the issues is 
done by presenting arguments and information.' 168 Oppenheimer supports this 
assertion by contending that only EPGs can, `through public information, force 
those issues in a coherent fashion onto the political agenda, and frame the range 
of responses'. 169 Willetts also suggests that EPGs' leaders are particularly adept 
at influencing public opinion, because `they gain skills in presenting their cause to 
the public and to the media'. 179 In such ways, it could be possible for EPGs to 
influence public opinion (by presenting their own views on an issue) and even to 
go so far as to modify or to change prevailing attitudes. 171 Without going beyond 
speculation about environmental issues in general, let us now turn to the ozone 
layer depletion to discern, first, the extent to which the mobilisation of public 
opinion played a catalysing role and to discover, second, what prompted the 
mobilisation of such public opinion (or, alternatively, discouraged the presence of 
any public concern). 
5.4.1 -- The Mobilisation of Public Opinion and Ozone Layer Depletion 
A number of scholars note not only the presence of significant levels of public 
opinion in the politics of the ozone layer depletion issue, but also its effective 
167 Burke argues that EPGs', representatives were trusted more than scientists, who in turn were 
trusted more than government officials, who in turn were trusted more than industry's employees 
(interview with Burke, op. cit., in note 106). Also, interview with Leah, op. cit., in note 160. 
168 Willetts, op. cit., in note 113, p. 186. 
169 Oppenheimer, op. cit., in note 96, p. 343. 
179 Willetts, op. cit., in note 113, p. 185. 
171 Interview with Herman, op. cit., in note 160. Additionally, a third possible mobiliser of public 
opinion might be government itself (see, for example, Dunlap, op. cit., in note 151, p. 119). 
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mobilisation. While examining its impact in Europe, 172 Markus Jachtenfuchs, for 
example, asserts that: 'It was the pressure of their respective national public 
opinion which has finally pushed the negotiators to forward-looking behaviour.' 173 
 In addition, the mobilisation of public sentiment in the United Kingdom, in the form 
of an economic boycott, contributed to the change in the British government's 
position. 174 Benedick supports this assertion: 
Stimulated by pressure from British environmental groups, especially 
national affiliates of Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, important 
parliamentary hearings were held in early summer 1988. Both houses of 
Parliament criticized the government's long-standing position and urged that 
the United Kingdom press the EC to endorse an 85 percent reduction. 175 
John Gribbin reinforces this general argument by specifically citing the importance 
of environmental issues for the West German 'electorate. 176 Oppenheimer and 
Boyle, in fact, suggest that pressure from the German public acted as the original 
catalyst in a process that culminated in the Europeans' change of policy during the 
late 1980s. 177 A report from the Canadian House of Commons, meanwhile, 
effectively demonstrates that the impact of public opinion on the ozone layer issue 
was by no means restricted to only one side of the Atlantic Ocean: 
Public pressure has been an effective force in accelerating the removal of 
CFCs from some products. The two most notable examples are the recent 
removal of CFCs from most aerosol products, and the substitution of an 
172 It should, nevertheless, be noted that public opinion did not have a substantial impact in 
Europe until much after it did in the United States, for some officials in Europe felt that the 
Americans were basing their policies on nothing more than emotion and scaremongering (interview 
with Fiona McConnell, UK Department of the Environment, London, 27 March 1990). Further, articles 
in the British press during the 1970s had titles like 'Ozone Passion Cooled by the Breath of Sweet 
Reason' (John Gribbin, New Scientist (Vol. 80, 12 October 1978), p. 94.), reflecting the British 
resolve to preserve sound judgment. 
173 Markus Jachtenfuchs, 'The European Community and the Protection of the Ozone Layer', 
Journal of Common Market Studies (Vol. 28, No. 3, March 1990), p. 275. 
174 Infra, in note 187, and accompanying text. A similar boycott was threatened on the European 
continent: 'Meanwhile, on 14 March [1988], the powerful European Bureau of Consumers' Unions 
(BEUS) warned it would boycott ozone-depleting spray cans unless firms speeded up plans to 
modify their products.' (Supplement 3', UNEP News (No. 21, August 1988), p. 3.) 
175 See ENDS Report 161, pp. 17-18; and UK House of Lords, 'Seventeenth Report', p. 12. Both 
sources cited in Benedick, op. cit., in note 22, p. 114, note 17. 
176 He says that: 'The reason [for action on ozone layer depletion] is simply public pressure, in 
a country [West Germany] where environmental politics matter ...'. (John Gribbin, The Hole in the 
Sky (London: Corgi, 1988), p. 146). 
177 They also note the importance of 'pressure brought by German greens' (Oppenheimer and 
Boyle, op. cit., in note 133, pp. 48 and 193). 
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HCFC and pentane for CFCs in some cups and packaging materials made 
from rigid foam. The public can do even more, for example, by choosing 
non-pressurized dispensers, or products packaged in non-petroleum-based 
material, or products with substantially reduced packaging. .... Just as 
consumers have been a driving force for industrial responsibility in the use 
of CFCs in the past, they can be a potent lobby for future initiatives to ban 
ozone-depleting substances and to control use of their substitutes. Public 
involvement is essential. That involvement in turn depends on a well 
informed public. 178 
Furthermore, Richard Benedick notes the influence of public opinion in the United 
States: 
[E]ducating and mobilizing public opinion can be a powerful force to 
generate pressure for action on often hesitant politicians. ... [On the ozone 
layer depletion issue, aroused consumers brought about the collapse of the 
CFC aerosol market. 1 ' 
Oppenheimer, in addition, echoes these sentiments, for he argues that the 
pressures exerted upon both government and industry accelerated the process of 
international regime formation by shifting American officials' perception of the 
issue. 18° Taken together, these comments suggest that the mobilisation of public 
opinion played an important role in accelerating the process of international regime 
formation on the ozone layer issue. We can propose, therefore, that in the absence 
of such public opinion, the process of international regime formation on the ozone 
layer depletion issue might have taken longer to complete. 
To gain a better understanding of the ways in which public opinion 
contributes to regime formation on this particular issue, however, we should inquire 
as to its origins. To achieve this end, let us follow in the footsteps of the previous 
discussion on environmental issues in general, and begin by inquiring whether the 
ozone layer depletion issue had a demonstrated cause and effect link for the 
individual. 
The answer to this question is 'yes', for it was perceived that an individual 
act (the use of certain aerosol sprays) would directly bring about harm to the 
178 The Standing Committee on Environment, House of Commons, Canada, Deadly Releases 
CFCs (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Center, June 1990), p. 45. 
179 Benedick, op. cit., in note 98, p. 145. 
180 Oppenheimer, op. cit., in note 96, p. 343. 
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individual (in the form of skin cancer). 181 Because of the relative intangibility of 
the process of ozone layer depletion, however, this public concern could not have 
arisen 'spontaneously' without some sort of outside impetus. Let us, therefore, 
ascertain whether the media or EPGs provided such impetus. 
The nature of the ozone layer depletion issue lent itself quite easily to media 
reporting, particularly after 1985. Stunning, dynamic and colourful pictures on the 
television evening news were able to demonstrate, both quickly and dramatically, 
how a hole in the sky was allowing destructive forces to hit the Earth's 
surface. 182 Similarly, the effects of such penetration -- increased incidence of skin 
cancer -- could also be displayed in an equally dramatic and alarming manner. 
Because the media were able to present three simple images -- a spray can, a 
map of Antarctica with a large crater over it and a person suffering from skin 
cancer -- to demonstrate cause and effect, they acted as important educators of 
the general population and thus mobilisers of public opinion. 183 In the United 
States, in particular, the 
interest of the media in the ozone issue and the collaboration with television 
and press by diplomats, environmental groups, and legislators had a major 
influence on governmental decisions and on the international 
negotiations. 184 
181 Interview with Leah, op. cit., in note 160. Although generally believed to be an uncontestable 
fact, the link between the recorded increase in rates of skin cancer and the recorded depletion in 
the ozone layer is not generally accepted. One reason for greater incidence of skin cancer may be 
changing habits among the populace. This led one researcher to label it 'the "yuppie disease" 
because it was to be observed more among affluent indoor workers who holiday in the sun' 
(Professor Mark Elwood of the University of Nottingham, quoted in Tim Radford, 'Ozone Loss Spells 
End of Sunbathing', The Guardian (London), 30 November 1988). Regardless, ozone layer depletion 
incited a fear among individuals of a tangible and personal harm. Indeed, the fact that President 
Reagan had two skin cancers removed (in 1985 and 1987) may have had an accelerating influence 
upon the process of regime formation (Benedick, op. cit., in note 22, p. 67). 
182 The shock discovery of the ozone crater in 1985 was, in this instance, crucial. Further, the 
similarity with the US Strategic Defense Initiative (the 'Star Wars' programme) -- that is, instead of 
a nuclear weapon penetrating a 'peace shield', the aggressive weapon is ultraviolet radiation 
penetrating an 'ozone shield' -- may have helped members of the general public in the United States 
envisage the issue more easily. 
183 The fact that a film about ozone layer depletion was able to come out of Hollywood serves 
to reinforce the argument that the issue could be easily represented by the media. (In 1977, a film 
entitled Day of the Animals was produced. A writer for The Financial Times describes it as follows: 
'An imbalance in the Earth's ozone layer causes animals living at high altitudes to become vicious -
- and a mountain trek turns into a nightmare for a group of hikers.' (The Financial Times (London), 
no date given.)) 
184 Benedick, op. cit., in note 22, p. 205. 
267 
EPGs were also able to make use of the cause-effect link in order to 
publicise the threats to possible ozone layer depletion by aerosol propellants and 
other human-made chemicals. In the United States, public campaigns, in part 
orchestrated by environmental organisations, illuminated the cause-effect link and 
mobilised public opinion. 185 Although public opinion was not as persuasive in the 
countries of the European Communities before 1987 (because, at least in part, 
EPGs were not as active in Europe), 186 the situation changed dramatically after 
the events of late 1987 and early 1988. Under the charismatic leadership of 
Jonathan Porritt, Friends of the Earth UK launched a 'CFC-aerosol boycott' in the 
United Kingdom in 1988. In the absence of any governmental regulation, this 
campaign did much to inform the general public about the causes and 
consequences of ozone layer depletion and thereby make it a concern of the 
British populace. 187 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, EPGs continued to play an important 
role in the strengthening of the international regime to protect the ozone layer by 
mobilising public opinion. 188 
Environmental organizations [demonstrated] more sophistication than had 
been the case during the process leading up to Montreal. Both before and 
during the London meetings [in June 1990], Friends of the Earth 
International, Greenpeace International, and the Natural Resources Defense 
Council (NRDC) held press conferences and circulated brochures and 
briefing sheets to the public, the media, and officials to match the customary 
public relations output of industry. 189 
By such means, both the media and the EPGs brought the issue to the attention 
185 Oppenheimer, op. cit., in note 96, p. 343. 
186 Interview with McConnell, op. cit., in note 172. 
187 Note the different tones of remarks made by the UK Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State 
for the Environment and the Director of the Friends of the Earth UK at the Ozone Depletion 
Conference in London in November 1988. The former said that the 'self-regulatory approach' for 
industry was fully justified on the ozone layer issue. The latter, meanwhile, said that change in 
industry's attitude had come because of consumer pressure. (Virginia Bottomley, 'Protecting the 
Ozone Layer -- A Challenge for the World Community' (London, Ozone Depletion Conference, 1988); 
and Friends of the Earth Press Release, 'Jonathan Porritt Calls for Tougher Measures' (London, 29 
November 1988).) 
188 A number of officials recognise the role that EPGs played in this issue (interview with 
Mazairac, op. cit., in note 25; interview with Shane Cave, Editor, Our Planet, United Nations 
Environment Programme, Nairobi, Kenya, 24 July 1991; and interview with Orliange, op. cit., in note 
137). 
189 Benedick, op. cit., in note 22, p. 165. 
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of the general public and prompted shifts in the course of public opinion. 
5.4.2 -- The Mobilisation of Public Opinion and Global Warming 
Let us now turn our attention to the global warming issue and repeat the same 
sequence that is executed for both the investigations of environmental issues in 
general and the ozone layer depletion issue in particular. Therefore, first let us note 
that public opinion played a catalysing role in the early days of regime 
formation. 19° As such, decision-makers were forced to consider this popular 
concern. The study reveals, however, that the driving power of public opinion was 
not as evident on the global warming issue as it had been at its height on the 
ozone layer depletion issue. To attempt to explain this difference, let us go on to 
consider if global warming had a demonstrated 'cause and effect' link for the 
individual. 
The answer to this question must be a tentative 'no', because the global 
warming issue was, as Atchley notes, more complex, more 'apocalyptic and 
diffuse' than, in particular, the ozone layer depletion issue. 191 Accordingly, 
individuals could not mentally link the individual act that enhanced global warming -
- for example, driving a car -- to the consequences of a warmer world -- for 
example, rising sea-levels. 192 Even if the link could be made, the perceived 
impact of the identified 'harm' upon the individual was not readily apparent. 
Although the consequences might eventually be personal, 193 the image of a sea 
that was three or four inches higher did not give rise to any significant level of 
190 By 1989, 75 per cent of Americans in one survey felt that the problem posed by the 
greenhouse effect was 'very serious' or 'somewhat serious' (Cambridge Reports and Cambridge 
Reports/Research International, cited in Dunlap, op. cit., in note 149, p. 36, Figure 8). See, also, 
MacNeill et al, op. cit., in note 152, p. 110; and interview with Vincent Cable, Commonwealth 
Secretariat, London, 8 February 1990. 
191 Interview with John Kristian Atchley, Counselor of Embassy and Permanent Representative 
to UNEP, American Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya, 15 August 1991. 
192 Dunlap cites survey evidence which suggests that individuals did not believe that they could 
do anything about mitigating the course of the greenhouse effect (Dunlap, op. cit., in note 149, p. 
34). 
193 	i It s, nevertheless, instructive to recall an observation from the late 1970s: 'Two severe 
winters and a period of prolonged drought in California have, like the proverbial hangman's noose, 
had a wonderful concentrating effect on the collective minds of US political administrators.' (David 
Dickson, 'A Bad Year for Weather, a Good One for Climate', Nature (Vol. 273, 11 May 1978), p. 388.) 
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personal concern among most people. 194 Thus, it is not surprising to find that 
Holdgate notes that, by 1991, most people 'in the developed countries [had] yet 
to recognise their own personal involvement in global systems of 
interdependence'. 195 Although a warm summer, or, more generally, any situation 
that suggests that there was something 'wrong with the weather' might (either 
correctly or incorrectly) be attributed to the global warming phenomenon, a visible 
link to personal well-being was not necessarily evident for a vast majority of the 
population. Cairncross maintains that the global warming issue was in this way 
'disadvantaged', vis-a-vis the ozone layer depletion issue: 'One reason for the 
successful negotiation of the Montreal agreement was the evidence that ozone 
depletion was dangerous to health. Global warming does not yet enjoy this 
perverse advantage. ° 96 
This hypothesis is further supported by experimental and survey work that 
suggests that, although people were concerned about climatic change, the 
complex scientific realities were making it difficult for people to comprehend the 
phenomenon fully: 
'Climate change is tricky,' said Baruch Fischoff, professor of social and 
decision science at Carnegie-Mellon University. 'People have a limited 
understanding of the scientific processes contributing to it. They may know 
a fair amount, but the pieces don't fit together.' A ... study by the Public 
Agenda Foundation found 'tremendous confusion' about the causes of 
global warming among lay people, said research director Nobel. 'People 
may think they know. But once you get beneath the surface, their 
understanding is very fragmentary, very unclear.' 197 
194 In addition, there was the question of 'winners and losers'. Some Canadians and 
Scandinavians might actually have been attracted by the idea of a warmer world. See the discussion 
in Chapter 3.2.3 of this thesis. 
195 Holdgate, op. cit., in note 159, p. 89. 
196 Cairncross, op. cit., in note 157, p. 128. Indeed, the perceived cause-effect link among the 
population of developing countries was even less direct. Hoogendoorn recalls a story to support 
this: at an international meeting in Nairobi, Maneka Gandhi (Indian Environment Minister at the time) 
told UNEP Executive-Director Mostafa Tolba of the difficulties she had in making the global warming 
issue 'real' for the people of her country. One of the difficulties, she explained, was that most of the 
800 million citizens of India could not actually picture a sea, let alone a sea-level rise! (Interview with 
Hoogendoorn, op. cit., in note 24.) Moreover, survey work in the developing world supports this 
assertion, for one study found that 'global warming is not a priority for them' (Maria Elena Hurtado, 
'Lukewarm Response to Controls', PS (Panoscope) (No. 24, May 1991), p. 14). 
197 Susan E. Davis, 'Greenhouse Effect: The Human Response', The Washington Post (Health 
Section), 17 April 1990, pp. 9-10. In the developing world, meanwhile, one study found that 
environmental concerns are 'highly coloured by [peoples'] personal experience. No room here for 
abstract concerns about the global environment.' (Maria Elena Hurtado, 'The People Speak Out', 
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This complexity did not allow international public opinion to force the process of 
regime formation at the pace that it did on the ozone layer issue. This meant that 
traditional mobilisers of public opinion were not able to act as effectively in the 
absence of a perceived cause-effect link: for the media, global warming could not 
easily be adapted to a 'sound bite'; 198 for EPGs, meanwhile, their members were 
not able to organise campaigns on the issue as easily as they had on the ozone 
layer depletion issue. Taken together, these comments thus suggest that the 
mobilisation of public opinion made only a relatively minor catalysing contribution 
to the rate of regime formation on global warming up to the end of 1991. 199 
5.5 -- Summary 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the four proposed catalysts for 
international regime formation. The four catalysts, which, it is suggested, could 
hasten the time it takes to construct a regime, are: political entrepreneurs, the 
solidity of the broader international political system, environmental pressure groups 
and the mobilisation of public opinion. Their identification is legitimated by 
theoretical support and their importance on the ozone layer depletion and global 
warming issues is subsequently investigated. In this way, initial ideas about the 
relative catalytic contribution of each factor on each issue is discerned. There are, 
however, particular problems associated with this assessment. Although a 
longitudinal deconstruction allows us to discern if the two variables (catalyst 
concentration and regime formation) mirror each other over time, they do not, 
however, allow us to judge whether the relationship was, in fact, causal. The 
findings should therefore be treated with some caution. Nevertheless, the 
investigation reveals that the presence of each of these factors was significant --
to varying degrees -- on each of the two issues. Not only did they accelerate the 
formation of an international regime to preserve the ozone layer, but they also, 
PS (Panoscope) (No. 24, May 1991), p. 8.) 
198 Interview with Atchley, op. cit., in note 191. 
199 Th is  finding concurs with a more general conclusion that Dunlap arrives at with regard to 
public opinion and environmental policy. He argues that environmental issues, though of concern 
to members of the public (particular in the United States), do not generate views with particularly 
strong intensity or salience. He contrasts this with some other issues, like employment or other 
economic matters, which may have more intense public involvement (Dunlap, op. cit., in note 151, 
p. 131). 
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during the politically-early days of the global warming issue, facilitated the building 
of an international regime on it as well. 
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Chapter 6 -- A Summary of the Findings 
The findings of this thesis can be best summarised by dividing them into two 
groupings. On the one hand, there are a number of specific observations that arise 
from the empirical investigations of the politics of ozone layer depletion and global 
warming. These are reviewed in the first part of this chapter, where each of the 
seven factors (the three preconditions and the four catalysts) are examined in turn; 
the empirical findings are also summarised in Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3. On the other 
hand, however, a second set of findings is much more general. These findings 
arise from the application of the theoretical framework to the two issues. They are 
presented at the end of this chapter. 
Before a closer scrutiny of each of the factors is undertaken, it is important 
to note that not all of the findings related specifically to one of the seven 
hypothesised factors. First, the findings revealed significant overlap among all of 
the factors. Indeed, the number of cross-references used in the work indicates that 
we were right to speculate that the apparent parsimony of the framework would not 
preclude the discovery of such connections) And second, the findings also 
showed that there were factors other than the seven hypothesised ones that 
affected the process of international regime formation, in at least a minor way. The 
implications of these findings are explored in the Conclusions of this thesis; for 
now, it is sufficient simply to note them. 
The examination in Chapter 2 considered the proposition that a scientific 
consensus is necessary before an international regime can be built. An analysis of 
the history of the ozone layer depletion issue revealed that once concerns were 
raised by scientists about the destruction of stratospheric ozone, the issue 
attracted the attention of some decision-makers. Agreement regarding the cause 
of ozone layer depletion among most of the world's foremost atmospheric 
scientists, however, had to be in place before any substantial action to regulate the 
implicated chemicals would even be considered. In addition, the ozone layer 
experience showed that unexpected and dramatic scientific evidence can shake 
politicians out of their doldrums, for they are eager to be seen to be doing 
'something' in the face of a visible problem. Thus, with both mounting theoretical 
See Chapter 1 of this thesis, particularly note 147, and accompanying text. 
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projections and dramatic empirical evidence of ozone layer depletion, the findings 
revealed that the first proposed precondition was gradually satisfied in the period 
between 1985 (discovery of the ozone crater above Antarctica) and 1988 (report 
of the Ozone Trends Panel). 
On the global warming issue, meanwhile, certain scientific estimates of the 
consequences of everyday human activities were dramatic enough to catch the 
attention of decision-makers during the second half of the 1980s. Governments 
responded by establishing the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; it met 
for the first time in 1988. This group's final report, which was presented in 1990, 
demonstrated that there was a significant degree of scientific consensus about the 
authenticity of the global warming problem. For this reason, therefore, it is evident 
that the first proposed precondition was satisfied at this time. The continuing 
absence of any unqualified proof of enhanced global warming, however, meant that 
rival explanations of climatic change could still gain attention in the political debate. 
Thus, the satisfaction of this precondition at the end of 1991 was not as solid as 
it was on the ozone layer issue. 
The study in Chapter 3 considered the proposition that the perceived 
national costs of policy action among the statespeople of the world's industrialised 
countries must be tolerable before international regime formation is possible. From 
the review of the ozone layer depletion experience, an inverse correlation between 
the threat of proposed regulatory action and the costs of proposed regulatory 
action was discovered. As the prospects of national legislation increased, industry 
intensified its efforts to find substitutes for the ozone-depleting chemicals. It was not 
until these chemicals became commercially available that the possibility of 
substantial regulation was seriously entertained by the governments of the world's 
industrialised states. In this way, it is apparent that the second proposed 
precondition was satisfied in the period between 1986 (when initial indications of 
co-operation from American industry emerged) and 1988 (when Du Pont, ICI and 
the other large chemical manufacturers endorsed regulatory action). 
A similar relationship between a government's willingness to regulate and 
its perceived costs was discerned on the global warming issue. However, because 
of the pervasive nature of the global warming problem, a significant proportion of 
every country's total economic activity would be affected by policies that restrict 
greenhouse gas emissions. The investigation revealed that no common set of 
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perceptions was held by all of the leaders of the world's industrialised states at the 
end of 1991. While some statespeople (particularly in Germany) felt that the costs 
of policy action were not unduly large, others (particularly in the United States) 
believed that such costs were too high to justify any significant change on the 
course of policy. In this way, it is evident that the second proposed precondition 
remained unsatisfied at the end of 1991. 
In Chapter 4, it was suggested that equity in terms of North-South issues is 
another precondition for international regime formation. The examination of the 
ozone layer history revealed that there was a price to pay to obtain the 
participation of Southern states in any international regime. The developing world's 
representatives argued that fairness dictated that money and technology must be 
transferred from the North to the South in order to help their countries industrialise 
without the use of ozone-depleting chemicals. The investigation demonstrated that 
this was a major issue of contention, but one that appeared (at the time) to have • 
been adequately resolved in June 1990 (at the Second Meeting of the Parties to 
the Montreal Protocol in London). An international fund was set up at this time to 
meet the calls for global equity, which led to the assertion that the third proposed 
precondition was thus satisfied at this time. Subsequent developments, however, 
suggested that its status may have become more precarious by the end of 1991. 
The review of the history of the other issue of global atmospheric change 
demonstrated that global equity became an issue in the politics of global warming 
at a very early stage. By 1991, moreover, it had become one of the most significant 
parts of the debate for statespeople of both the North and the South. The study 
revealed, however, that many individuals still held markedly different conceptions 
at this time concerning how the issue should be addressed. In particular, questions 
about burden-sharing, transfer size, source of transfers, administration and 
technology transfer remained contentious. Consequently, the third proposed 
precondition for international regime formation on global warming had yet to be 
satisfied by the end of 1991. 
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TABLE 6.1 -- The Results of the Investigation into International Regime Formation: 











(satisfied in 1985-88) 
high 
(satisfied in 1986-88) 
medium-high 
(satisfied in 1989-90) 
medium-high 





Finally, the hypothesised catalysts for international regime formation were 
examined in Chapter 5. Unlike the proposed preconditions, we were not trying to 
discover if a threshold had been crossed; instead, we were interested in the extent 
to which these factors were present. From this, we would then be able to find out 
if a positive correlation between catalyst concentration and the degree of regime 
formation was evident. 
The findings with regard to the concentration of each catalyst are outlined 
in two tables below. Table 6.2 presents the extent to which the catalysts had been, 
to the end of 1991, present in the process of regime formation for each issue; while 
Table 6.3 presents the extent to which the catalysts were, at the end of 1991, 
present in the ongoing process of regime formation (or, more accurately on the 
ozone layer issue, 'regime maintenance' or 'regime consolidation'). 
These two tables, though instructive, do not conclusively reveal the impact 
that each catalyst had at different times in the process of regime formation. Indeed, 
a longitudinal deconstruction would be necessary in order to determine if the two 
variables (catalyst concentration and regime formation) are mirroring each other 
over time. Even if such a relationship were evident, however, it might lead one to 
make unqualified conclusions: because international regime formation is a gradual! 
process, there may be varying lagtimes between the introduction of a catalyst and 
its impact upon the rate of regime formation. Nonetheless, in the absence of such 
observations, we can still report that the findings from Chapter 5 showed that the 
detected catalysts did contribute to international regime formation in the ozone 
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layer experience, as the framework suggested. Moreover, the detected catalysts 
on the global warming issue helped both to satisfy the first precondition and to 
advance the second and third preconditions. 
TABLE 6.2 -- The Results of the Investigation into International Regime Formation: 
The Extent to Which the Catalysts Affected the Rate of Reaction up to the End of 
1991 




















TABLE 6.3 -- The Results of the Investigation into International Regime Formation: 
























Finally, let us turn to the second type of findings that emerged from this 
thesis. With regard to the theoretical framework put forward in this thesis, the 
investigation has allowed us to perform two applications, neither of which has 
invalidated the original model. When applied to the ozone layer depletion issue, a 
positive correlation between the gradual satisfaction of the three preconditions and 
the evolution of an international regime was detected. More substantively, at the 
end of 1991, the three preconditions were satisfied and an international regime was 
in place. 2 Despite the fact that a similar positive correlation between precondition 
satisfaction and regime evolution was noticeable on the global warming issue, the 
findings suggest that the proposed preconditions on the global warming issue were 
not satisfied at the end of 1991. As the theoretical hypothesis predicts, an 
international regime had yet to emerge by this time. 3 In this way, the two issues 
evolved in manners in which the framework had predicted. Although the limitations 
of only two applications are self-evident, the findings from this thesis have, 
nevertheless, not invalidated the original theoretical proposition, but rather, have 
served to strengthen it. The implications of the use of this framework for the 
analysis of the politics of global atmospheric change are considered in the 
Conclusions of this thesis. 
2  This assertion is supported by the fact that many states had accepted the obligations outlined 
in three important international agreements: the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer (reprinted in International Legal Materials (Vol. 26, 1989), pp. 1516-40); the 1987 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (reprinted in International Legal 
Materials (Vol. 26, 1989), pp. 1541-61); and the 1990 London Adjustments to the Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (reprinted in International Legal Materials (Vol. 30, No. 
2, March 1991), pp. 539-554). 
3 Formal, international negotiations on a global warming convention began in Washington, DC 
in February 1991 (under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on a 
Framework Convention on Climate Change). By the end of 1991, however, no significant co-
ordinated policy action had been agreed. 
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Conclusions 
The findings that arise from the investigation in this thesis have a number of 
implications for the study and the practice of international relations. In this final 
section, I would like to identify and to develop these implications. By doing so, I 
hope to contribute to the broader discussion within the field concerning both the 
possible evolution of international affairs and the theories with which the academic 
discipline of international relations conducts its investigations. Thus, although this 
section serves as a conclusion to this thesis, one of its purposes is to support 
discussion about future policy and research. 
Although the first conclusion that I would like to identify is not new, its far-
reaching implications warrant its restatement here. This study revealed that despite 
the fact that every person in the world wanted a particular end, there was no 
guarantee that it would necessarily be achieved. More specifically, even though a 
stable atmosphere was desired by all, governments were, over many years, unable 
to escape sub-optimal outcomes on issues of global atmospheric change. Indeed, 
a number of substantial difficulties had to be resolved before national governments 
were finally able to modify their established policies, which were furthering the 
destruction of the earth's protective ozone layer. Meanwhile, the fact that the 
difficulties on the global warming issue had not been resolved by the end of 1991 
serves to strengthen this finding. In short, the thesis reinforces the belief that the 
members of international society will not necessarily co-ordinate their actions in 
order to prevent the destruction of collective goods. 
A second conclusion arises from the use of the framework for analysis 
devised for this thesis. The study revealed that the theoretical foundation of this 
work has wider application. In Chapter 1, a theoretical model about international 
regime formation on collective goods issues was proposed and defended; it was 
subsequently applied against the relevant historical evidence in Chapters 2 through 
5. The findings from this exercise have broader implications for international 
relations. 
The model was used twice in this thesis, being applied to the historical 
evidence of the ozone layer depletion and global warming issues. Because the 
model was not falsified in either instance, we can claim that it has successfully 
stood up to some empirical application. This gives the model sufficient weight to 
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justify an examination of its implications for policy and theory. With regard to policy, 
the research suggests that if the members of international society want to escape 
their sub-optimal position on the global warming issue, then they should be 
working towards a number of goals -- namely, the strengthening of the first 
precondition (scientific consensus), the satisfaction of the second and third 
preconditions (tolerable domestic economic costs and global equity) and the 
maximisation of the concentration of the four catalysts (political entrepreneurs, the 
solidity of the broader international political system, environmental pressure groups 
and the mobilisation of public opinion). The theoretical implication, meanwhile, is 
that the successful utilisation of the model on these two issues invites other 
scholars to apply it to other international issues that can be modelled as collective 
goods. Application of this model to a number of other issues would not only 
advance theoretical knowledge (by either falsifying or further strengthening the 
proposed model), but could also generate policy recommendations on these other 
particular issues (by drawing policy-makers' attention to any unsatisfied 
preconditions and any dilute catalysts).' 
If we accept the premises of the model, we can move on to consider a 
number of theoretical conclusions. First, the findings from this thesis suggest that 
it was correct to utilise a multi-level analysis in this study. In fact, a commitment to 
any single approach -- be it global, state-centred or individualistic -- would have 
constrained the analysis, and thereby obstructed our ability to gain the fullest 
understanding possible. In much of the international relations literature, however, 
multi-level approaches are not endorsed, let alone used in original research. 
Despite the fact that some theorists have sometimes made favourable references 
to multi-level analyses, they nevertheless contend that the scholar must exhibit a 
1 	It is, of course, recognised that the proposed model can and should be challenged. In 
particular, it might well benefit from a vigorous examination of alternative preconditions and 
catalysts. Although some justification is provided for those included in this study, this support is by 
no means incontestable. Some critics might, for example, judge that one or more of the 'catalysts' 
is of greater significance than its inclusion in that category would support, and that those factors 
should therefore be identified as 'preconditions'. Others, meanwhile, might argue that certain factors 
have been overlooked in this study. Still others might challenge not only the elements included in 
the model, but also the relationship among them. They may contend that there should not be only 
two levels (preconditions and catalysts) and suggest that instead there should be more subtle 
relationships between and amongst the factors. Such criticisms are welcome, for one of the reasons 
why the model is documented is so that others may challenge it and propose their own ideas. It is 
hoped that such criticisms will be forthcoming, for ventures of this kind would help to further our 
understanding of the process of international regime formation. 
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steadfast commitment to only one level during the analysis of any particular issue. 2 
 The results of the present investigation, however, imply that this conventional 
wisdom should be challenged. 
Following upon this discussion about levels-of-analysis, findings derived from 
this thesis also suggest that the decision to identify the state as a focus of attention 
in international relations is both justifiable and disputable. It is justifiable in the 
sense that the experience on environmental issues demonstrates that state policy 
is the primary determinant of the chances for regime formation in international 
society. An international regime will not be created until states' representatives have 
reached an explicit agreement about its form and substance. In support of this 
contention, we can point to the fact that those who wished for particular regimes 
to be constructed attempted to influence and to sway government officials' beliefs 
and ideas on environmental issues. These observations thus vindicate the focus 
upon the state that is employed in this thesis. 
What makes the state-centred approach disputable is the finding that states' 
representatives are predominantly reactive in the international system. In order to 
explain outcomes, therefore, we must look elsewhere so that the forces that 
precipitate state action and thus regime formation can be identified. This study 
suggests a number of possible places to begin our search -- they include 
scientists, industry representatives, individual political entrepreneurs, environmental 
pressure groups and the media. It is therefore evident that we should challenge 
any study that focuses upon the state as the primary independent variable, 
because a wide variety of inputs to state behaviour must be accounted for. 
The findings also provide support for a further review of studies that have 
a unitary, rational state as their primary focus of attention. Let me elucidate by 
identifying three particular elements. First, the investigation of scientific consensus 
in Chapter 2 revealed the importance of perceptions and interpretations. Intangible 
factors of this sort are often overlooked when international relations scholars 
employ cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in order to explain state behaviour. Indeed, this 
study has shown that scientific relativism at the level of the individual, organisation 
and state can contribute to scientific nonconsensus and thereby affect political 
processes in ways unanticipated by some rational choice theorists. 
2 See the discussion in Chapter 1.3 of this thesis. 
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Second, the study of global equity in Chapter 4 demonstrated that history 
is an important consideration in the formulation of policy. Actors in international 
society do not simply take snapshots of the present distribution of costs and 
benefits on any issue in order to determine a negotiating position. Instead, they 
look back over history to discern how events have structured the present 
arrangements. Once again, a traditional CBA, such as is used by some state-
centred scholars, does not usually consider such historical, and often non-
measurable, factors. Their method of analysis would consequently be unable to 
make sense of some of the politics of global atmospheric change. 
Third, findings from various parts of this investigation reveal that politics at 
the domestic level can be significant in the formulation of states' foreign policies. 
On issues of global atmospheric change, a number of different groups made their 
views known to decision-makers. Although this finding is not particularly new, this 
investigation has substantiated it. A related finding, however, is not as apparent. 
The study also found that although decision-makers still use some notion of 
`national interest' in order to arrive at their state's foreign policy, the concept is 
much more complex than suggested by traditional scholars who assume the 
existence of a unitary, rational state. First, not only did we discover that the 
interests of each individual state could not be separated from a broader, 'collective 
interest', but the evidence also demonstrated that considerations of equity, within 
national borders, made it more difficult to determine a specific 'national interest'. 
The evidence, in Chapter 3 in particular, suggested that different groups within a 
society can hold different conceptions of what would be most advantageous for 
their state. Additionally, it was also revealed that the currency with which 
governments attempt to measure national interest may be changing. Traditionally, 
`guns' and 'butter' (i.e., military power and economic output) have been the 
primary indicators of a state's well-being. Moreover, these variables have been able 
to be represented by tangible indices (e.g., levels of weaponry and Gross National 
Product (GNP)). This study, however, suggested that it may not be either 
appropriate or possible to assess the merits of environmental policy on such 
criteria. Thus, the discussions about the appropriate indicators with which a 
country's `performance' should be measured are given further urgency by the 
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findings from this thesis.3 Taken together, therefore, these critiques of 
unidimensional studies suggest a broader theoretical implication -- namely, that 
multidimensional approaches may sometimes be needed in the study of 
international relations. 
This paradoxical report of the importance of the state in international 
relations leaves one to wonder 'who makes regimes?' Together, the various 
findings from this thesis offer one possible answer. The evidence from the study 
of the politics of global atmospheric change suggests that states act as 'gate-
keepers' between, on the one hand, the desires for an international regime and, 
on the other hand, the tangible formation of an international regime. States will not 
initiate demands for regimes, but will nevertheless act as filters, with the result 
being that only some aspirations are fulfilled. This conclusion therefore suggests 
that the internal functioning of governmental organisations may indeed be 
significant determinants of regime formation. 4 Moreover, with an increasingly 
crowded international environmental agenda, coupled with increasingly scarce 
resources, not every call will be able to be answered. In this way, the state's ability 
to determine the success or failure of particular demands may mean that its role 
is further enhanced in the future. 5 
Moving beyond a specific consideration of the level-of-analysis question, 
another conclusion emerging from this work is that there appears to have been a 
change in the most important resources with which actors attempt to influence 
others in international society. To phrase this in more common international 
relations terminology, we should recognise that the tools of power are not the 
same as those traditionally used. This thesis demonstrated that an understanding 
of power as military might is not particularly significant in relation to the issues of 
global atmospheric change. Instead, it was shown that money was one of the most 
significant levers with which one actor was able to influence another. This was 
evident at all levels -- individual (e.g., green consumerism), inter-state (e.g., trade 
3 See the attention drawn to the inadequacies of the present ways in which states calculate their 
national accounts (Chapter 3, note 8, of this thesis). 
4 One of the classic works in this area is Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the 
Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1971). 
5 Additionally, given the fact that environmental issues now seem to cross a greater number of 
traditionally-defined issue-areas, the conclusion is given further weight. I return to this point later on 
in these Conclusions. 
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balance considerations) and global (e.g., resource transfers). Thus, the need to 
identify and to recognise the importance of economic power in the process of 
international regime formation -- a need which has been accepted in the study of 
some other issue-areas -- is reinforced by this investigation of global atmospheric 
issues. 
This thesis, however, also revealed that power went beyond merely 
economic considerations. The findings reinforce the view held by some scholars 
that 'knowledge is power-7 . 6 Those who were able to discover previously unknown 
natural relationships or physical changes (and thus environmental problems) were 
able to determine, to a significant extent, whether or not certain issues spilled over 
from the scientific agenda to the political agenda. In addition, those who were able 
to disseminate this new-found knowledge effectively were able to determine, also 
to a significant extent, the position to be occupied by that issue on the political 
agenda. Thus, those who could both gain and transmit knowledge exercised 
significant power in the international system. In this way, the study found that 
scientists in particular, and leaders of environmental pressure groups and members 
of the media in general, were able to exercise a new-found amount of power in 
international politics. 
This finding leads us into a closer consideration of the relationship between 
science and politics. One striking difference between the two issues of global 
atmospheric change is that the ozone layer debate developed in a serial manner, 
while the global warming debate progressed in a parallel fashion. In other words, 
the three preconditions were addressed, to a significant extent, in a sequential way 
on the ozone layer issue: scientists identified a problem; then domestic costs were 
brought down to a tolerable level; then questions of global equity were considered. 
This sequence parallels our traditional understanding of the way in which societies 
consider scientific problems: they are first addressed by scientists; then considered 
by politicians, but only at a domestic level initially; then examined by politicians with 
reference to the broader, international system. 
The global warming issue, however, unfolded quite differently. The issue 
became highly political -- both domestically and internationally -- soon after the 
6 Ernst B. Haas, When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models of Change in International 
Organizations (Oxford: University of California Press, 1990). 
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potential consequences of the natural science problem were recognised. Instead 
of a serial consideration of the preconditions, all three attracted significant political 
attention simultaneously. This suggests that any traditional distinction between 
either 'science' and 'politics', or 'domestic issues' and 'international issues', may 
no longer be valid. Thus, a widespread conclusion about increased global 
interdependence -- across both states and issue-areas -- is reinforced by new 
evidence. 
The findings of this thesis further demonstrate that significant boundaries 
have been broken down not only in the policy process, but also in the academic 
study of ozone layer depletion and global warming. Because every human activity 
is affected by global atmospheric change, a wide range of social science, applied 
science and natural science knowledge had to be utilised in order to understand 
fully the politics of these two issues. Indeed, in this work, ideas about the 
distribution of costs, capabilities, consciousness, clauses and chlorine were all 
critical, confirming the need for at least a measure of knowledge in economics, 
politics, sociology, law and chemistry. At the very least, this suggests that this 
research appeared to require a multidisciplinary approach. 
Terms like 'multidisciplinary' and 'interdisciplinary' have often been 
advocated with evident enthusiasm in academic discourse. In spite of this, 
however, there is little agreement about what they mean, let alone about what their 
full-scale and professional adoption might imply. This assertion is supported by the 
fact that borders between disciplines appear to be fervently defended in many 
institutions of higher learning, particularly in the United Kingdom. Even within 
international relations -- a subject that would seem to be a natural home to 
interdisciplinary efforts -- much time and energy seems to be spent upon works 
that set out the parameters of the discipline. Such efforts should not be criticised 
in their own right, and, indeed, those that seek to define the field of study may 
simply be responding to broader institutional pressures, not unlike those that are 
discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis.' Nevertheless, it appears that an important 
conclusion of this thesis is that research efforts that both draw upon and integrate 
traditional disciplines may be needed. It remains to be seen if such efforts will be 
encouraged, or even tolerated, for the present institutional regime would appear 
' See, in particular, Chapter 2, note 28. 
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to present significant obstacles to a wholly committed interdisciplinary approach. 
Finally, the findings of this thesis point to a new set of problems that may 
be of increasing significance in international politics. The two issues of global 
atmospheric change possess characteristics that are unprecedented: they are 
global in scope and systemic in nature. Let me consider each of these aspects in 
turn. 8 
First, these is the characteristic of 'global scope'. These issues have a 
geographical reach that is -- with the possible exception of nuclear war --
unparalleled. Because every person, and thus every state, has the means to 
exacerbate these atmospheric problems, an effective response to them requires 
the constructive participation of every national government in the world. The two 
issues therefore extend beyond 'the international' to 'the global'. They cannot be 
contained to either the local level, the national level or the international level 
narrowly defined -- that is, two or more, but nevertheless a limited number of 
states. Instead, all peoples and consequently all states play a role. This in turn 
means that the marginalisation of particular regions of the world can no longer take 
place. 9 Foreign policy must now consider the global dimension in addition to the 
international. The most striking implication of this characteristic to date is that 
countries of the developing world have been able to attain a greater degree of 
visibility and thus to a play more significant role in the international politics of global 
atmospheric change. 
Second, there is the quality of 'systemic nature'. Because of the extensive 
lifetimes of many gases in the atmosphere, these issues become systemic. The 
most significant repercussion of this is that current human activities are limiting 
society to only a restricted set of possible futures, no matter what actions humans 
might take in later years. The consequence for the practice of international relations 
is that decision-makers may be forced to consider issues, and perhaps to control 
activities, before the full consequences of society's actions have been 
demonstrated and perhaps even before full proof of causation is undeniably 
demonstrated. The requirement to act in this way may conflict with some traditional 
ideas about foreign policy-making. In the short term, customary conceptualisations 
8 Other examples of this type of issue include matters related to health and technology. 
This is not meant to suggest that all governments in the world will have significant leverage on 
these issues, but they will nevertheless have to be accounted for. 
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of crisis management and brinkmanship may have to be re-evaluated, because the 
inertial forces that drive the systemic issues are likely to become inexorable. They 
will curb the ability of humans to intervene, making it much more difficult to reverse 
decisions. In the longer term, meanwhile, questions of intergenerational equity will 
have to be considered much more deeply than heretofore. Indeed, not only do 
traditional policy-making procedures fail to address the past adequately, but 
evidence exists to suggest that they have difficulty in handling the future as well. 
Traditional 'discount rates' may not be able to deal with things that are `unique' and 
`irreversible', yet a high proportion of environmental capital has both these 
properties. In short, systemic issues pose unprecedented, and academically 
interesting, challenges to conventional policy practices. 
Indeed, this opens up a much broader discussion about humans' 
relationship with their surroundings. The traditional (at least, 'Western') 
understanding of this relationship is that it had 'long been widely accepted -- and 
essentially without question -- that humans have supreme authority over the earth 
and all of its living things, both plant and animal'. 10 This view may be under 
challenge, however, for the empirical findings from this study suggest that human 
society has disrupted equilibria in nature: while the system searches for its new 
equilibrium, humans no longer exercise supreme control over the system." Thus, 
political agendas and choices may, to some extent, be falling under the control of 
natural systems. If this is indeed taking place, then there may be profound 
implications for thinking about human beings' relationships with their 
surroundings. 12 
10 Arthur H. Westing, 'Constraints on Military Disruption of the Biosphere: An Overview', in Arthur 
H. Westing (ed.), Cultural Norms, War and the Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 
p. 6. 
See, for example, J.E. Lovelock, Gala: A New Look at Life on Earth (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1979). 
12 In this way, there may be important implications for our traditional Cartesian interpretation of 
the relationship between subject and object. Indeed, an interesting parallel with the study of 'Earth 
Science' is suggested by the comments of one of the world's foremost atmospheric scientists. 
Michael McElroy, of Harvard University, maintains that, unlike other 'traditional' scientists, earth 
scientists do not have the luxury of working in the laboratory, where they 'would have hypotheses, 
... would do experiments, ... would manipulate the experiment and ... would learn about the 
processes by the conventional iteration of theory and experiment' (quoted in Cheryl Simon Silver 
with Ruth S. DeFries, One Earth One Future: Our Changing Global Environment (Washington, DC: 
National Academy Press, 1990), pp. 20-21). Thus, just as applied and natural scientists are 
considering the need for a 'paradigm shift', social scientists might also be forced to reconsider their 
traditional worldviews. 
287 
This investigation into the politics of global atmospheric change has given 
rise to a series of conclusions regarding both the study and the practice of 
international relations. By exploring some of the wider implications, a broader 
discussion concerning both the possible evolution of international affairs and the 
study of international relations as an academic discipline has been initiated. In 
these ways, this thesis has attempted to advance knowledge both about particular 
issues and about theoretical conceptualising more generally. 
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Appendix A.1 -- A Chronology of the Politics of Ozone Layer Depletion 
1840 
- Ozone is first discovered. 
1879-81 
- Ozone is first detected in the earth's stratosphere. 
1930 
- British chemist Sydney Chapman puts forth the first theory of ozone generation 
and destruction. 
1957-58 
- The first significant amounts of data on stratospheric ozone are collected during 
the International Geophysical Year. 
1966 
- Hampson is the first to argue that hydrogen compounds may be able to alter, 
the ozone balance. 
1970 
- The first suggestions that nitrogen compounds may be able to destroy 
stratospheric ozone are proposed by Crutzen and Johnston. 
1971 
- The United States Congress orders a report on the potential damage to the 
ozone layer by supersonic transports (SSTs). 
1973 
- Delegates at a conference in Kyoto, Japan discuss the suggestions that free 
chlorine in the atmosphere may be able to affect ozone levels in the 
stratosphere (September). 
1974 
- The US Department of Transport's Climate Impact Assessment Program 
publishes its report, arguing that a large fleet of SSTs would have posed 
significant danger to the ozone layer. 
- A paper putting forth the theory that CFCs may destroy significant amounts of 
stratospheric ozone is published in Nature (June). 
1975 
- The report of the US Task Force on Inadvertent Modification of the Atmosphere 
finds that the CFC theory is a 'legitimate cause for concern' (June). 
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1976 
- At the fourth Session of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
Governing Council, initial steps are taken to convene an international meeting 
to consider the CFC-ozone link (March-April). 
- The United States National Academy of Sciences (NAS) releases its first report 
on the ozone layer, predicting most likely depletion to be between 6 and 7.5 per 
cent (September). 
- Together, the US Food and Drug Administration and the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) propose a phase-out of CFCs used in non-essential 
aerosols (October). 
1977 
In Washington, DC, the first international meeting to discuss ozone layer 
depletion is held (March). 
The United States hosts the first intergovernmental meeting in Washington, DC 
to discuss international regulation of CFCs (April). 
The first meeting of the UNEP-sponsored Co-ordinating Committee on the 
Ozone Layer is held in Geneva (November). 
1978 
- CFCs are banned as propellants in non-essential aerosols in the United States 
(October). 
- In Munich, the West German government hosts a second intergovernmental 
meeting to discuss international regulation of CFCs (December). 
1979 
- A second NAS report is released in the United States. It estimates eventual 
ozone layer depletion to be 16.5 per cent (November). 
1980 
- The European Communities, having reduced aerosol use by 30 per cent, enact 
a cap on capacity. 
- The UNEP Governing Council calls for reductions in the production of CFC-11 
and CFC-12 (April). 
1981 
- The UNEP Governing Council releases a statement which argues for 'the 
desirability of initiating work aimed at the elaboration of a global framework 
convention [for the protection of the ozone layer]' (May). 
- United States EPA Director nominee Anne Gorsuch testifies at her confirmation 
hearings that she considers the CFC-ozone theory to be highly controversial 
(May). 
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- National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) scientist Donald Heath 
announces that satellite records show that there has been a loss of some ozone 
in the stratosphere (August). 
1982 
- UNEP convenes the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and 
Technical Experts for the Preparation of a Global Framework Convention for the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer in Stockholm (January). 
- A third NAS report, which predicts eventual ozone layer depletion to be between 
5 and 9 per cent, is released in the United States (March). 
1983 
- Officials from Norway, Sweden and Finland propose both a worldwide ban on 
CFCs in aerosols and limitations on all uses of CFCs (April). 
1984 
- A fourth NAS report is released in the United States. It predicts an eventual level 
of ozone depletion to be between 2 and 4 per cent (February). 
1985 
Members of the Toronto Group continues to promote their proposals for a 
worldwide ban on CFCs as aerosol propellants (January). 
- The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer is opened for 
signature (March). 
- A paper presenting evidence of significant destruction of the ozone layer over 
Antarctica is published in Nature (May). 
1986 
A NASA-UNEP report finds evidence of reduced levels of stratospheric ozone 
(January). 
The First Part of the Workshop on the Control of CFCs -- part of a series of 
informal workshops designed to advance the drafting of a Protocol -- is held in 
Rome (May). 
CFC manufacturers suggest that safe substitutes for the chemicals might be 
possible, if the price were high enough (June). 
Thirteen US scientists depart for Antarctica on the National Ozone Expedition. 
Although they discover significant destruction of stratospheric ozone, their 
findings do not resolve the debate about causation (August). 
The Second Part of the Workshop on the Control of CFCs is held in Leesburg, 
VA (September). 
The Alliance (an industry group) announces that it will support limits on CFC 
production (September). 
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- The first session of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts 
for the Elaboration of a Protocol on the Control of CFCs to the Vienna 
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer is convened in Geneva 
(December). 
1987 
The second session of the working group that is developing a draft Protocol 
takes place in Vienna (February). 
A UNEP meeting of scientists -- convened to discuss models of ozone depletion 
-- takes place in Wurzburg, West Germany (April). 
The third session of the working group that is developing a draft Protocol is held 
in Geneva (April). 
The US shifts its negotiating position, and endorses the Europeans' idea of 
restricting end-uses (April). 
Informal Consultations toward the Elaboration of a Protocol on the Control of 
CFCs to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer are held 
in Brussels (June). 
After much discussion and debate, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer is opened for signature (September). 
Members of the Airborne Antarctic Ozone Experiment conclude that chlorine 
chemicals are the primary cause of ozone depletion in Antarctica (October). 
1988 
A trade fair, at which many new CFC substitutes are displayed, is held in 
Washington, DC (January). 
Members of the Ozone Trends Panel not only formalise the results of their 
Antarctic trip, but also announce that they have discovered ozone losses over 
the northern hemisphere (March). 
Du Pont announces that it will cease manufacture of CFCs as substitutes 
become available (March). 
Delegates to the Toronto Conference on The Changing Atmosphere call upon 
all countries to ratify the Montreal Protocol and to revise it in 1990 `to ensure 
nearly complete elimination of the emissions of fully halogenated CFCs by the 
year 2000' (June). 
The Vienna Convention enters into force (September). 
Scientists meeting in The Hague confirm the Ozone Trends Panel findings of 
ozone losses in the Northern Hemisphere (October). 
The Ozone Depletion Conference is held in London (November). 
1989 
- The Montreal Protocol enters into force (January). 
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European countries and the United Sates agree to faster CFC reductions, but 
developing countries oppose the new timetable, citing the prohibitive costs of 
substitutes. They call for a fairer arrangement (March). 
The 'Saving the Ozone Layer' Conference is held in London (March). 
The First Meeting of Parties to the Montreal Protocol takes place in Helsinki 
(May). 
Working groups are formed to consider revisions to the Montreal Protocol 
(August). They continue to meet through the second half of 1989 and the first 
half of 1990. 
UNEP publishes a Synthesis Report, incorporating results of scientific, 
environmental, economic and technical assessments (November). 
1990 
- The Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol is held in London, 
at which substantial amendments to the original terms of the Protocol are 
agreed (June). 
- The Multilateral Ozone Fund is established. Located in Montreal, its primary 
purpose is to provide assistance to countries of the developing world so that 
they can reduce their use of ozone-depleting chemicals (September). 
1991 
The Third Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol is held in Nairobi 
(June). 
The World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and UNEP release a report 
which suggests that destruction of the ozone layer has advanced far more 
rapidly than predicted (October). 
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Appendix A.2 -- A Chronology of the Politics of Global Warming 
1273 
- The first air pollution law to deal with the deleterious effects of fossil fuel 
combustion is passed in London. 
1661 
- John Evelyn writes about the harmful effects caused by coal burning. 
1827 
- Baron Jean-Baptiste-Joseph Fourier sets out the analogy between the behaviour 
of heat in the atmosphere and its behaviour in a greenhouse. 
1863-65 
- John Tysdall builds upon the theories originally put forward by Fourier. 
1896 
- Svante Arrhenius puts forth the theory that rising concentrations of atmospheric, 
carbon dioxide would lead to global warming. 
1938 
G.D. Callendar, a British meteorologist, tries to persuade an audience at the 
Royal Society in London that the global warming that had occurred since the 
1880s was the result of increasing carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere. His 
ideas attract little support. 
1957 
- An atmospheric carbon dioxide measuring station is established at Mauna Loa 
observatory in Hawaii as part of the International Geophysical Year. 
- A paper suggesting that the oceans had not absorbed as much carbon dioxide 
as previously assumed is published in Tellus. 
1965 
- The US White House initiates a study into the burning of fossil fuels and its 
relations to the steadily rising atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide. 
1970 
- 'The Study of Critical Environmental Problems', a symposium to investigate such 
issues, is held at MIT in Cambridge, MA (July). 
1971 
- The first international meeting of scientists to discuss long-term climate change 
is held in Wijk, Sweden (August). 
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1972 
- The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment is held in 
Stockholm, Sweden (June). 
1975 
A WMO-sponsored 'International Symposium on Long-Term Climate 
Fluctuations' takes place in Norwich, England (August). 
One of the first major governmental studies to investigate the causes and 
consequences of climate change is published by the NAS in the United States. 
It highlights the need to improve the science on the global warming issue. 
1977 
- Another report is prepared by the US NAS, and, like its predecessor, it calls for 
further investigations. Nevertheless, it also warns that the implications of 
projected climate change 'warrant prompt action' (July). 
1979 
- The First World Climate Conference is convened in Geneva by the WMO 
(February). 
- At its Eighth World Meteorological Congress, the World Climate Programme 
(WCP) is created by the WMO. 
1980 
As part of the WCP, an international conference to address climate change is 
held in Villach, Austria (November). 
1982 
- An NAS report in the US reinforces the emerging consensus that a doubling of 
carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere would cause a global warming 
of between 1.5°C and 4.5°C.. 
1983 
- Reports in the United States by the NAS and the EPA draw different conclusions 
from seemingly similar findings. 
1985 
- Participants in the International Conference on the Assessment of the Role of 
Carbon Dioxide and Other Greenhouse Gases in Climate Variations and 
Associated Impacts (held in Villach, Austria) agree that global warming could 
occur (October). 
1987 
- A workshop to investigate further the question of global warming is held in 
Villach, Austria (September-October). 
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- The previous month's Villach meeting is followed-up by another gathering in 
Bellagio, Italy. Together, the findings from these two conferences not only 
highlight the problem, but also put forward proposals for policies (November). 
- WMO and UNEP agree to establish an intergovernmental mechanism to assess 
the scientific data and to formulate response strategies for climate change 
(June). 
- The World Commission on Environment Report publishes its report, entitled Our 
Common Future (commonly referred to as the 'Brundtland Report'). 
1988 
- In testimony to the US Senate Energy Committee, NASA's James Hansen 
asserts that he is 99 per cent certain that the warming of the 1980s is not a 
chance event, but is, instead, causally linked to global warming (June). 
- A conference on 'The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security' 
is held in Toronto (June). Its delegates conclude that humanity is 'conducting 
an unintended, uncontrolled, globally pervasive experiment whose ultimate 
consequences could be second only to a global nuclear war' (June). 
- The first meeting of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is 
held in Geneva (November). 
- A United Nations General Assembly resolution charges the WMO and the UNEP 
to initiate a comprehensive review and to make recommendations on possible 
responses to mitigate the impact of adverse climate change, as well as on 
elements for inclusion in a possible future international convention on climate 
(December). 
1989 
- 'Protection of the Atmosphere: International Meeting of Legal and Policy Experts' 
is held in Ottawa, Canada (February). 
- 'Summit Meeting on the Protection of the Atmosphere' takes place in The 
Hague. Delegates call for the formation of new global institutions to meet the 
challenges of global atmospheric change (March). 
- The UNEP Governing Council requests that the heads of UNEP and WMO 
`begin preparation for negotiations on a framework convention on climate' 
(May). 
- At their annual meeting, leaders of the seven richest nations (G7) note the 
significance of the global warming issue (July). 
- 'The Langkawi Declaration on the Environment' is released by the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (October). 
- A 'Ministerial Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and Climatic Change' takes 
place in Noordwijk, the Netherlands (November). 
- The Dutch government, by introducing plans to stabilise carbon dioxide 
emissions at the 1989/1990 level by the year 2000, becomes the first to set a 
target on the global warming issue. 
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1990 
'The White House Conference on Science and Economics Research Related to 
Global Change' is held in Washington (April). 
The first reports of the IPCC's three working groups are released (May). 
A meeting of the United Nations Economic Commission on Europe, called as 
a follow-up to the report of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development, is held in Bergen, Norway (May). 
The West German government commits the country to a 25 per cent reduction 
in carbon dioxide emissions from 1987 levels by the year 2005 (June). 
G7 leaders consider a new fund for global warming, but American resistance 
prevents any agreement (July). 
The IPCC reports are finalised in Sundsvall, Sweden (August). 
The Second World Climate Conference is held in Geneva (November). 
With its resolution on the 'protection of global climate for present and future 
generations of mankind', the United Nations General Assembly takes primary 
responsibility for the climate change issue (December). 
1991 
The first meeting of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on a 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (INC) is held in Washington, DC 
(February). 
Meetings of the INC continue in Geneva (June), Nairobi (September) and 
Geneva once again (December). 
Leaders of over 40 developing countries issue the 'Beijing Declaration', in which 
they reinforce their demands for resource transfers on the global warming issue 
(June). 
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Appendix A.3 -- Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987) 
MONTREAL PROTOCOL ON SUBSTANCES THAT DEPLETE THE OZONE LAYER 
The Parties to this Protocol, 
Being Parties to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer, 
Mindful of their obligation under that Convention to take appropriate 
measures to protect human health and the environment against adverse effects 
resulting or likely to result from human activities which modify or are likely 
to modify the ozone layer, 
Recognizing that world-wide emissions of certain substances can 
significantly deplete and otherwise modify the ozone layer in a manner that is 
likely to result in adverse effects on human health and the environment, 
Conscious of the potential climatic effects of emissions of these 
substances, 
Aware that measures taken to protect the ozone layer from depletion 
should be based on relevant scientific knowledge, taking into account 
technical and economic considerations, 
Determined to protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary measures to 
control equitably total global emissions of substances that deplete it, with 
the ultimate objective of their elimination on the basis of developments in 
scientific knowledge, taking into account technical and economic 
considerations, 
Acknowledzins, that special provision is required to meet the needs of 
developing countries for these substances, 
No_ ting the precautionary measures for controlling emissions of certain 
chlorofluorocarbons that have already been taken at national and regional 
levels, 
Considerinr, the importance of promoting international co-operation in the 
research and development of science and technology relating to the control and 
reduction of emissions of substances that deplete the ozone layer, bearing in 
mind in particular the needs of developing countries, 
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS: 
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ARTICLE 1: DEFINITIONS 
For the purposes of this Protocol: 
1. "Convention" means the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer, adopted on 22 March 1985. 
2. "Parties" means, unless the text otherwise indicates, Parties to this 
Protocol. 
3. "Secretariat" means the secretariat of the Convention. 
4. "Controlled substance" means a substance listed in Annex A to this 
Protocol, whether existing alone or in a mixture. It excludes, however, any 
such substance or mixture which is in a manufactured product other than a 
container used for the transportation or storage of the substance listed. 
5. "Production" means the amount of controlled substances produced minus the 
amount destroyed by technologies to be approved by the Parties. 
6. "Consumption" means production plus imports minus exports of controlled 
substances. 
7. "Calculated levels" of production, imports, exports and consumption means 
levels determined in accordance with Article 3. 
8. "Industrial rationalization" means the transfer of all or a portion of 
the calculated level of production of one Party to another, for the purpose of 
achieving economic efficiencies or responding to anticipated shortfalls in 
supply as a result of plant closures. 
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ARTICLE 2: CONTROL MEASURES 
1. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 
the first day of the seventh month following the date of the entry into force 
of this Protocol, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated 
level of consumption of the controlled substances in Group I of Annex A does 
not exceed its calculated level of consumption in 1986. By the end of the 
same period, each Party producing one or more of these substances shall ensure 
that its calculated level of production of the substances does not exceed its 
calculated level of production in 1986, except that such level may have 
increased by no more than ten per cent based on the 1986 level. Such increase 
shall be permitted only so as to satisfy the basic domestic needs of the 
Parties operating under Article 5 and for the purposes of industrial 
rationalization between Parties. 
2. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 
the first day of the thirty-seventh month following the date of the entry into 
force of this Protocol, and in each twelve month period thereafter, its 
calculated level of consumption of the controlled substances listed in Group 
II of Annex A does not exceed its calculated level of consumption in 1986. 
Each Party producing one or more of these substances shall ensure that its 
calculated level of production of the substances does not exceed its 
calculated level of production in 1986, except that such level may have 
increased by no more than ten per cent based on the 1986 level. Such increase 
shall be permitted only so as to satisfy the basic domestic needs of the 
Parties operating under Article 5 and for the purposes of industrial 
rationalization between Parties. The mechanisms for implementing these 
measures shall be decided by the Parties at their first meeting following the 
first scientific review. 
3. Each Party shall ensure that for the period 1 July 1993 to 30 June 1994 
and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of 
consumption of the controlled substances in Group I of Annex A does ne, 
exceed, annually, eighty per cent of its calculated level of consumption in 
1986. Each Party producing one or more of these substances shall, for the 
same periods, ensure that its calculated level of production of the substances 
does not exceed, annually, eighty per cent of its calculated level of 
production in 1986.However, in order to satisfy the basic domestic needs of 
the Parties operating under Article 5 and for the purposes of industrial 
rationalization between Parties, its calculated level of production may exceed 
that limit by up to ten per cent of its calculated level of production in 1986. 
4. Each Party shall ensure that for the period 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999, 
and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of 
consumption of the controlled substances in Group I of Annex A does not 
exceed, annually, fifty per cent of its calculated level of consumption in 
1986. Each Party producing one or more of these substances shall, for the 
same periods, ensure that its .calculated level of production of the substances 
does not exceed, annually, fifty per cent of its calculated level of 
production in 1986. However, in order to satisfy the basic domestic needs of 
the Parties operating under Article 5 and for the purposes of industrial 
rationalization between Parties, its calculated level of production may exceed 
that Limit by up to fifteen per cent of its calculated level of production in 
1986. This paragraph will apply unless the Parties decide otherwise at a 
meeting by a two-thirds majority of Parties present and voting, representing 
at least two-thirds of the total calculated level of consumption of these 
substances of the Parties. This decision shall be considered and made in the 
light of the assessments referred to in Article 6. 
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	5. 	Any Party whose calculated level of production in 1986 of the controlled 
substances in Group I of Annex A was less than twenty-five kilotonnes may, for 
the purposes of industrial rationalization, transfer to or receive from any 
other Party, production in excess of the limits set out in paragraphs 1, 3 and 
4 provided that the total combined calculated levels of production of the 
Parties concerned does not exceed the production limits set out in this 
Article. Any transfer of such production shall be notified to the 
secretariat, no later than the time of the transfer. 
6. 	Any Party not operating under Article 5, that has facilities for the 
production of controlled substances under construction, or contracted for, 
prior to 16 September 1987, and provided for in national legislation prior to 
1 January 1987, may add the production from such facilities to its 1986 
production of such substances for the purposes of determining its calculated 
level of production for 1986, provided that such facilities are completed by 
31 December 1990 and that such production does not raise that Party's annual 
calculated level of consumption of the controlled substances above 0.5 
kilograms per capita. 
7. 	Any transfer of production pursuant to paragraph 5 or any addition of 
production pursuant to paragraph 6 shall be notified to the secretariat, no 
later than the time of the transfer or addition. 
8. 	(a) Any Parties which are Members States of a regional economic 
integration organization as defined in Article 1 (6) of the Convention may 
agree that they shall jointly fulfil their obligations respecting consumption 
under this Article provided that their total combined calculated level of 
consumption does not exceed the levels required by this Article. 
(b) The Parties to any such agreement shall inform the secretariat of 
the terms of the agreement before the date of the reduction in consumption 
with which the agreement is concerned. 
(c) Such agreement will become operative only if all Member States of 
the regional economic integration organization and the organization concerned 
are Parties to the Protocol and have notified the secretariat of their manner 
of implementation. 
9. 	(a) Based on the assessments made pursuant to Article 6, the Parties may 
decide whether: 
(i) Adjustments to the ozone depleting potentials specified in 
Annex A should be made and, if so, what the adjustments should 
be; and 
(ii) Further adjustments and reductions of production or consumption 
of the controlled substances from 1986 levels should be 
undertaken and, if so, what the scope, amount and timing of any 
such adjustments and reductions should be; 
(b) Proposals for such adjustments shall be communicated to the Parties 
by the secretariat at least six months before the meeting of the Parties at 
which they are proposed for adoption; 
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(c) In taking such decisions, the Parties shall make every effort to 
reach agreement by consensus. If all efforts at consensus have been 
exhausted, and no agreement reached, such decisions shall, as a last resort, 
be adopted by a two-thirds majority vote of the Parties present and voting 
representing at least fifty per cent of the total consumption of the 
controlled substances of the Parties; 
(d) The decisions, which shall be binding on all Parties, shall 
forthwith be communicated to the Parties by the Depositary. Unless otherwise 
provided in the decisions, they shall enter into force on the expiry of six 
months from the date of the circulation of the communication by the Depositary. 
10. (a) Based on the assessments made pursuant to Article 6 of this Protocol 
and in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 9 of the Convention, 
the Parties may decide: 
(i) Whether any substances, and if so which, should be added to or 
removed from any annex to this Protocol; and 
(ii) The mechanism, scope and timing of the control measures that 
should apply to those substances; 
(b) Any such decision shall become effective, provided that it has been 
accepted by a two-thirds majority vote of the Parties present and voting. 
11. Nothwithstanding the provisions contained in this Article, Parties may 
take more stringent measures than those required by this Article. 
ARTICLE 3: CALCULATION OF CONTROL LEVELS 
For the purposes of Articles 2 and 5, each Party shall, for each Group of 
substances in Annex A, determine its calculated levels of: 
(a) Production by: 
(i) Multiplying its annual production of each controlled substance 
by the ozone depleting potential specified in respect of it in 
Annex A; and 
(ii) Adding together, for each such Group, the resulting figures; 
(b) Imports and exports, respectively, by following, mutatis mutandis, 
the procedure set out in subparagraph (a); and 
(c) Consumption by adding together its calculated levels of production 
and imports and subtracting its calculated level of exports as determined in 
accordance with subparagraphs (a) and (b). However, beginning on 
1 January 1993, any export of controlled substances to non-Parties shall not 
be subtracted in calculating the consumption level of the exporting Party. 
ARTICLE 4: CONTROL OF TRADE WITH NON-PARTIES 
1. Within one year of the entry into force of this Protocol, each Party 
shall ban the import of controlled substances from any State not party to this 
Protocol. 
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2. Beginning on 1 January 1993, no Party operating under paragraph 1 of 
Article 5 may export any controlled substances to any State not party to this Protocol. 
3. Within three years of the date of the entry into force of this Protocol, 
the Parties shall, following the procedures in Article 10 of the Convention, 
elaborate in an annex a list of products containing controlled substances. 
Parties that have not objected to the annex in accordance with those 
procedures shall ban, within one year of the annex having become effective, 
the import of those products from any State not party to this Protocol. 
4. Within five years of the entry into force of this Protocol, the Parties 
shall determine the feasibility of banning or restricting, from States not 
party to this Protocol, the import of products produced with, but not 
containing, controlled substances. If determined feasible, the Parties shall, 
following the procedures in Article 10 of the Convention, elaborate in an 
annex a list of such products. Parties that have not objected to it in 
accordance with those procedures shall ban or restrict, within one year of the 
annex having become effective, the import of those products from any State not 
party to this Protocol. 
5. Each Party shall discourage the export, to any State not party to this 
Protocol, of technology for producing and for utilizing controlled substances. 
6. Each Party shall refrain from providing new subsidies, aid, credits, 
guarantees or insurance programmes for the export to States not party to this 
Protocol of products, equipment, plants or technology that would facilitate 
the production of controlled substances. 
7. Paragraphs 5 and 6 shall not apply to products, equipment, plants or 
technology that improve the containment, recovery, recycling or destruction of 
controlled substances, promote the development of alternative substances, or 
otherwise contribute to the reduction of emissions of controlled substances. 
B. 	Nothwithstanding the provisions of this Article, imports referred to in 
paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 may be permitted from any State not party to this 
Protocol if that State is determined, by a meeting of the Parties, to be in 
full compliance with Article 2 and this Article, and has submitted data to 
that effect as specified in Article 7. 
ARTICLE 5: SPECIAL SITUATION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
1. 	Any Party that is a developing country and whose annual calculated level 
of consumption of the controlled substances is less than 0.3 kilograms per 
capita on the date of the entry into force of the Protocol for it, or any time 
thereafter within ten years of the date of entry into force of the Protocol 
shall, in order to meet its basic domestic needs, be entitled to delay its 
compliance with the control measures set out in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 2 
by ten years after that specified in those paragraphs. However, such Party 
shall not exceed an annual calculated level of consumption of 0.3 kilograms 
per capita. Any such Party shall be entitled to use either the average of its 
annual calculated level of consumption for the period 1995 to 1997 inclusive . 
 or a calculated level of consumption of 0.3 kilograms per capita, whichever is 
the lower, as the basis for its compliance with the control measures. 
. . . 
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2. The Parties undertake to facilitate access to environmentally safe 
alternative substances and technology for Parties that are developing 
countries and assist them to make expeditious use of such alternatives. 
3. The Parties undertake to facilitate bilaterally or multilaterally the 
provision of subsidies, aid, credits, guarantees or insurance programmes to 
Parties that are developing countries for the use of alternative technology 
and for substitute products. 
ARTICLE 6: ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW OF CONTROL MEASURES 
Beginning in 1990, and at least every four years thereafter, the Parties 
shall assess the control measures provided for in Article 2 on the basis of 
available scientfific, environmental, technical and economic information. At 
least one year before each assessment, the Parties shall convene appropriate 
panels of experts qualified in the fields mentioned and determine the 
composition and terms of reference of any such panels. Within one year of 
being convened, the panels will report their conclusions, through the 
secretariat, to the Parties. 
ARTICLE 7: REPORTING OF DATA 
1. Each Party shall provide to the secretariat, within three months of 
becoming a Party, statistical data on its production, imports and exports of 
each of the controlled substances for the year 1986, or the best possible 
estimates of such data where actual data are not available. 
2. Each Party shall provide statistical data to the secretariat on its 
annual production (with separate data on amounts destroyed by technologies to 
be approved by the Parties), imports, and exports to Parties and nor-Parties, 
respectively, of such substances for the year during which it becomes a Party 
and for each year thereafter. It shall forward the data no later than nine 
months after the end of the year to which the data relate. 
ARTICLE 8: NON-COMPLIANCE 
The Parties, at their first meeting, shall consider and approve 
procedures and institutional mechanisms for determining non-compliance with 
the provisions of this Protocol and for treatment of Parties found to be in 
non-compliance. 
ARTICLE 9: RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC AWARENESS 
AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION 
I. 	The Parties shall co-operate, consistent with their national laws, 
regulations and practices and taking into account in particular the needs of 
developing countries, in promoting, directly or through competent 
international bodies, research, development and exchange of information on: 
(a) Best technologies for improving the containment, recovery, recycling 
or destruction of controlled substances or otherwise reducing their emissions; 
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(b) Possible alternatives to controlled substances, to products 
containing such substances, and to products manufactured with them; and 
(c) Costs and benefits of relevant control strategies. 
2. The Parties, individually, jointly or through competent international 
bodies, shall co-operate in promoting public awareness of the environmental 
effects of the emissions of controlled substances and other substances that 
deplete the ozone layer. 
3. Within two years of the entry into force of this Protocol and every two 
years thereafter, each Party shall submit to the secretariat a summary of the 
activities it has conducted pursuant to this Article. 
ARTICLE 10: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
1. The Parties shall in the context of the provisions of Article 4 of the 
Convention, and taking into account in particular the needs of developing 
countries, co-operate in promoting technical assistance to facilitate 
participation in and implementation of this Protocol. 
2. Any Party of Signatory to this Protocol may submit a request to the 
secretariat for technical assistance for the purposes of implementing or 
participating in the Protocol. 
3. The Parties, at their first meeting, shall begin deliberations on the 
means of fulfilling the obligations set out in Article 9, and paragraphs 1 and 
2 of this Article, including the preparation of workplans. Such workplans 
shall pay special attention to the needs and circumstances of the developing 
countries. States and regional economic integration organizations not party 
to the Protocol should be encouraged to participate in activities specified in 
such workplans. 
ARTICLE 11: MEETINGS OF THE PARTIES 
1. The Parties shall hold meetings at regular intervals. The secretariat 
shall convene the first meeting of the Parties not later than one year after 
the date of the entry into force of this Protocol and in conjunction with a 
meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention, if a meeting of 
the latter is scheduled within that period. 
2. Subsequent ordinary meetings of the parties shall be held, unless the 
Parties otherwise decide, in conjunction with meetings of the Conference of 
the Parties to the Convention. Extraordinary meetings of the Parties shall be 
held at such other times as may be deemed necessary by a meeting of the 
Parties, or at the written request of any Party, provided that, within six 
months of such a request being communicated to them by the secretariat, it is 
supported by at least one third of the Parties. 
3. The Parties, at their first meeting, shall: 
(a) Adopt by consensus rules of procedure for their meetings; 
(b) Adopt by consensus the financial rules referred to in paragraph 2 of 
Article 13; 
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(c) Establish the panels and determine the terms of reference referred 
to in Article 6; 
(d) Consider and approve the procedures and institutional mechanisms 
specified in Article 8; and 
(e) Begin preparation of workplans pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article 10. 
4. 	The functions of the meetings of the Parties shall be to: 
(a) Review the implementation of this Protocol; 
(b) Decide on any adjustments or reductions referred to in paragraph 9 
of Article 2; 
(c) Decide on any addition to, insertion in or removal from any annex of 
substances and on related control measures in accordance with paragraph 10 of 
Article 2; 
(d) Establish, where necessary, guidelines or procedures for reporting 
of information as provided for in Article 7 and paragraph 3 of Article 9; 
(e) Review requests for technical assistance submitted pursuant to 
paragraph 2 of Article 10; 
(f) Review reports prepared by the secretariat pursuant to subparagraph 
(c) of Article 12; 
(g) Assess, in accordance with Article 6, the control measures provided 
for in Article 2; 
(h) Consider and adopt, as required, proposals for amendment of this 
Protocol or any annex and for any new annex; 
(i) Consider and adopt the budget for implementing this Protocol; and 
(j) Consider and undertake any additional action that may be required 
for the achievement of the purposes of this Protocol. 
5. 	The United Nations, its specialized agencies and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, as well as any State not party to this Protocol, may be 
represented at meetings of the Parties as observers. Any body or agency, 
whether national or international, governmental or non-governmental, qualified 
in fields relating to the protection of the ozone layer which has informed the 
secretariat of its wish to be represented at a meeting of the Parties as an 
observer may be admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present 
object. The admission and participation of observers shall be subject to the 
rules of procedure adopted by the Parties. 
ARTICLE 12: SECRETARIAT 
For the purposes of this Protocol, the secretariat shall: 
(a) Arrange for and service meetings of the Parties as provided for in 
Article 11; 
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(b) Receive and make available, upon request by a Party, data provided 
pursuant to Article 7; 
(c) Prepare and distribute regularly to the Parties reports based on 
information received pursuant to Articles 7 and 9; 
(d) Notify the Parties of any request for technical assistance received 
pursuant to Article 10 so as to facilitate the provision of such assistance; 
(e) Encourage non-Parties to attend the meetings of the Parties as 
observers and to act in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol; 
(f) Provide, as appropriate, the information and requests referred to in 
subparagraphs (c) and (d) to such non-party observers; and 
(g) Perform such other functions for the achievement of the purposes of 
this Protocol as may be assigned to it by the Parties. 
ARTICLE 13: FINANCIAL PROVISIONS 
1. The funds required for the operation of this Protocol, including those 
for the functioning of the secretariat related to this Protocol, shall be 
charged exclusively against contributions from the Parties. 
2. The Parties, at their first meeting, shall adopt by consensus financial 
rules for the operation of this Protocol. 
ARTICLE 14: RELATIONSHIP OF THIS PROTOCOL TO THE CONVENTION 
Except as otherwise provided in this Protocol, the provisions of the 
Convention relating to its protocols shall apply to this Protocol. 
ARTICLE 15: SIGNATURE 
This Protocol shall be open for signature by States and by regional 
economic integration organizations in Montreal on 16 September 1987, in Ottawa 
from 17 September 1987 to 16 January 1988, and at United Nations Headquarters 
in New York from 17 January 1988 to 15 September 1988. 
ARTICLE 16: ENTRY INTO FORCE 
1. 	This Protocol shall enter into force on 1 January 1989, provided that at 
least eleven instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval of the Protocol 
or accession thereto have been deposited by States or regional economic 
integration organizations representing at least two-thirds of 1986 estimated 
global consumption of the controlled substances, and the provisions of 
paragraph 1 of Article 17 of the Convention have been fulfilled. In the event 
that these conditions have not been fulfilled by that date, the Protocol shall 
enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date on which the 
conditions have been fulfilled. 
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2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, any such instrument deposited by a 
regional economic integration organization shall not be counted as additional 
to those deposited by member States of such organization. 
3. After the entry into force of this Protocol, any State or regional 
economic integration organization shall become a Party to it on the ninetieth 
day following the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession. 
ARTICLE 17: PARTIES JOINING AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE 
Subject to Article 5, any State or regional economic integration 
organization which becomes a Party to this Protocol after the date of its 
entry into force, shall fulfil forthwith the sum of the obligations under 
Article 2, as well as under Article 4, that apply at that date to the States 
and regional economic integration organizations that became Parties on the 
date the Protocol entered into force. 
ARTICLE 18: RESERVATIONS 
No reservations may be made to this Protocol. 
ARTICLE 19: WITHDRAWAL 
For the purposes of this Protocol, the provisions of Article 19 of the 
Convention relating to withdrawal shall apply, except with respect to Parties 
referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 5. Any such Party may withdraw from 
this Protocol by Living written notification to the Depositary at any time 
after four yer - If assuming the obligations specified in paragraphs 1 to 4 of 
Article 2. ALv such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of one year 
after the date of its receipt by the Depositary, or on such later date as may 
be specified in the notification of the withdrawal. 
ARTICLE 20: AUTHENTIC TEXTS 
The original of this Protocol, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, 
French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited 
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF THE UNDERSIGNED, BEING DULY AUTHORIZED TO THAT EFFECT, 
HAVE SIGNED THIS PROTOCOL. 
DONE AT MONTREAL THIS SIXTEENTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, ONE THOUSAND NINE 




Group 	Substance 	Ozone Depleting 
Potential*/ 
Group I 
CFC13 	(CFC-11) 	1.0 
CF2C1 2 (CFC-12) 1.0 
C2F3C1 3 (CFC-113) 0.8 
C2F4 C1 2 	(CFC-114) 	1.0 
C2F5C1 (CFC-115) 0.6 
Group II 
CF2BrC1 	(halon-1211) 	3.0 
CF3Br (halon-1301) 10.0 
C2F4Br2 (halon-2402) 	(to be determined) 
*/ These ozone depleting potentials are estimates based on existing 
knowledge and will be reviewed and revised periodically. 
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Appendix A.4 -- Final Statement of the 
Second World Climate Conference (Geneva, 1990) 
7 November 1990 
SECOND WORLD CLIMATE CONFERENCE 
FINAL CONFERENCE STATEMENT 
SUMMARY 
1. Climate issues reach far beyond atmospheric and oceanic sciences, 
affecting every aspect of life on this planet. The issues are increasingly 
pivotal in determining future environmental and economic well-being. 
Variations of climate have profound effects on natural and managed 
systems, the economies of nations and the well-being of people 
everywhere. A clear scientific consensus has emerged on estimates of the 
range of global warming which can be expected during the 21st century. 
If the increase of greenhouse gas concentrations is not limited, the 
predicted climate change would place stresses on natural and social 
systems unprecedented in the past 10,000 years. 
2. At the First World Climate Conference in 1979, nations were urged "to 
foresee and to prevent potential man-made changes in climate that might 
be adverse to the well-being of humanity". The Second World Climate 
Conference concludes that, notwithstanding scientific and economic 
uncertainties, nations should now take steps towards reducing sources 
and increasing sinks of greenhouse gases through national and regional 
actions, and negotiation of a global convention on climate change and 
related legal instruments. The long-term goal should be to halt the build-
up of greenhouse gases at a level that minimizes risks to society and 
natural ecosystems. The remaining uncertainties must not be the basis 
for deferring societal responses to these risks. Many of the actions that 
would reduce risk are also desirable on other grounds. 
3. A major international observational and research effort will be essential 
to strengthen the knowledge-base on climate processes and human 
interactions, and to provide the basis for operational climate monitoring 
and prediction. 
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PART I 
MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. 	Greenhouse Gases and Climate Change 
1. Emissions resulting from human activities are substantially increasing 
atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gases. These increases will enhance the natural 
greenhouse effect, resulting on average in an additional warming of the Earth's surface. The 
Conference agreed that this and other scientific conclusions set out by the IPCC reflect the 
international consensus of scientific understanding of climate change. Without actions to reduce 
emissions, global warming is predicted to reach 2 to 5 degrees C over the next century, a rate of 
change unprecedented in the past 10,000 years. The warming is expected to be accompanied by 
a sea level rise of 65 cm ± 35 cm by the end of the next century. There remain uncertainties in 
predictions, particularly in regard to the timing, magnitude and regional patterns of climate 
change. 
2. Climate change and sea level rise would seriously threaten low-lying islands and 
coastal zones. Water resources, agriculture and agricultural trade, especially in arid and semi-arid 
regions, forests, and fisheries are especially vulnerable to climate change. Climate change may 
compound existing serious problems of the global mismatch between resources, population and 
consumption. In many cases the impacts will be felt most severely in regions already under 
stress, mainly in developing countries. 
3. Global warming induced by increased greenhouse gas concentrations iF .a, 
by the oceans; hence, much of the change is still to come. Inertia in the climate system d ae to the 
influence of the oceans, the biosphere and the long residence times of some greenhouse gases 
means that climate changes that occur may persist for centuries. 
4. Natural sources and sinks of greenhouse gases are sensitive to a change in 
climate. Although many of the response or feedback processes are poorly understood, it appears 
likely that, as climate warms, these feedbacks will lead to an overall increase rather than a 
decrease in greenhouse gas concentrations. 
5. The historical growth in emissions has been a direct consequence of the increase 
of human population, rising incomes, the related exploitation of fossil fuels by industrialized 
societies and the expansion of agriculture. Under "Business-as-Usual" assumptions*, it is 
projected that emissions will continue to grow in the future as a consequence of a projected 
doubling of energy consumption in the first half of the 21st century and an expected doubling of 
population by the latter half. As a result, the effect of human-induced greenhouse gas 
concentrations on the earth's radiation balance would by 2025 correspond to a doubling of carbon 
dioxide unless remedial actions are taken. 
6. Over the last decade, emissions of carbon dioxide (CO 2) contributed 55% of the 
increased radiative forcing produced by greenhouse gases from human activities. The CFCs 
contributed about 24% of the past decade's changes, and methane 15%, with the balance due to 
other greenhouse gases. With controls on CFCs under the Montreal Protocol, the relative 
importance of CO2 emissions will increase, provided the substitutes for CFCs have minimal 
"Business-as-Usual" assumes that few or no steps are taken to limit greenhouse gas emissions. 
Energy use and clearing of tropical forests continue and fossil fuels, in particular coal, remain the 
world's primary energy source. The Montreal Protocol comes into effect but without strengthening 
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greenhouse warming potential. Some 75% of total CO 2 emissions have come from the 
industrialized countries. 
7. The above emissions can be expected to change the planet's atmosphere and 
climate, and a clear scientific consensus has been reached on the range of changes to be expected. 
Although this range is large, it is prudent to exercise, as a precautionary measure, actions to 
manage the risk of undesirable climate change. In order to stabilize atmospheric carbon dioxide 
concentrations by the middle of the 21st century at about 50% above pre-industrial 
concentrations, a continuous world-wide reduction of net carbon dioxide emissions by 1 to 2% 
per year starting now would be required. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate change 
(IPCC) also considered three other emissions scenarios, which would not lead to stabilization of 
CO2  concentrations in the 21st century. A 15 to 20% reduction in methane emissions would 
stabilize atmospheric concentrations of that gas. 
8. This Conference concludes that technically feasible and cost-effective 
opportunities exist to reduce CO 2 emissions in all countries. Such opportunities for emissions 
reductions are sufficient to allow many industrialized countries to stabilize CO 2 emissions from 
the energy sector and to reduce these emissions by at least 20 percent by 2005. The measures 
include increasing the efficiency of energy use and employing alternative fuels and energy 
sources. As additional measures to achieve further cost-effective reductions are identified and 
implemented, even greater decreases in emissions would be achieved in the following decades. 
In addition, reversing the current net losses in forests would increase storage of carbon. The 
economic and social costs and benefits of such measures should be urgently examined by all 
nations. An internationally coordinated assessment s'iould be undertaken through the IPCC. 
9. Countries are urged to take immediate actions to control the risks of climate 
change with initial emphasis on actions that would be economically and socially beneficial for 
other reasons as well. Nations should launch negotiations on a convention on climate change and 
related legal instruments without delay and with the aim of signing such a convention in 1992. 
B. 	Use of Climate Information in Assisting Sustainable Social and 
Economic Development 
Climate data, analyses, and eventually climate predictions, can contribute substantially to 
enhancing the efficiency and security of economic and developmental activities in 
environmentally sustainable ways. These benefits are particularly important in food and wood 
production, water management, transportation, energy planning and production (including 
assessment of potential resources of biomass, hydropower, solar and wind energy), urban 
planning and design, human health and safety, combatting of drought and land degradation, and 
tourism. This requires both data on the climate system, and its effective application. Data 
acquisition, collection, management and analysis must be more vigorously supported in all 
countries and special assistance provided to developing countries through international 
cooperation. Transfer of techniques for applying climate information should be accelerated 
through more widespread use of software (e.g. CLICOM) for readily available personal 
computers and other means. Further development of methods for predicting short-term 
variations in climate and the environmental and social impacts should be vigorously pursued. 
These advances would provide enormous economic and other welfare benefits in coping with 
droughts, prolonged rain, and periods of severe hot and cold weather. Such predictions will 
require major steps forward in ocean-atmosphere-biosphere observing systems. Much greater 
efforts are also needed to increase involvement in these fields by developing countries, especially 
through increased education and training. 
312 
SWCC • CONFERENCE STATEMENT • SWCC • CONFERENCE STATEMENT • SWCC • CONFERENCE STATEMENT • SWCC 
C. 	Priorities for Enhanced Research and Observational Systems 
1. 	A consensus exists among scientists as summarized in the Report of Working 
Croup I of the IPCC that climate change will occur due to increasing greenhouse gases. However, 
there is substantial scientific uncertainty in the details of projections of future climate change. 
Projections of future regional climate and climate impacts are much less certain than those on a 
global scale. These uncertainties can only be narrowed through research addressing the following 
priority areas: 
- clouds and the hydrological cycle 
- greenhouse gases and the global carbon and biogeochemical cycles 
- oceans: physical, chemical and biological aspects; and 
exchanges with the atmosphere 
- paleo-climatic studies 
- polar ice sheets and sea ice 
- terrestrial ecosystems. 
2. 	These subjects are being addressed by national programmes, the World Climate 
Research Programme and the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme and other related 
international programmes. Increased national support and substantially increased funding of 
these programmes is required if progress on the necessary time scale is to be made in reducing the 
uncertainties. 
3. 	Present observational systems for monitoring the climate system are inadequate 
for operational and research purposes. They are deteriorating in both industrialized and 
developing regions. Of special concern is the inadequacy of observation systems in large parts of 
the southern hemisphere. 
4. 	High priority must be 	i on the provision and international exchange of 
high-quality, lorg-term data for climate-tited studies. Data should be available at no more than 
the cost of reproduction and distribution. A full and open exchange of global and other data sets 
needed for climate-related studies is required. 
5. 	There is an urgent need to create a Global Climate Observing System (GCOS) built 
upon the World Weather Watch Global Observing System and the Integrated Global Ocean 
Service System and including both space-based and surface-based observing components. GCOS 
should also include the data communications and other infrastructure necessary to support 
operational climate forecasting. 
6. 	GCOS should be designed to meet the needs for: 
(a) climate system monitoring, climate change detection and response 
monitoring, especially in terrestrial ecosystems 
(b) data for application to national economic development 
(c) research towards improved understanding, modelling and prediction of the 
climate system. 
7. 	Such a GCOS would be based upon: 
(1) an improved World Weather Watch Programme 
(2) the establishment of a global ocean observing system (GOOS) of physical, 
chemical and biological measurements 
(3) the maintenance and enhancement of monitoring programmes of other key 
components of the climate system, such as the distribution of important 
atmospheric constituents (including the Global Atmosphere Watch), 
changes in terrestrial ecosystems, clouds and the hydrological cycle, the 
earth's radiation budget, ice sheets, and precipitation over the oceans. 
313 
C +17f;:q4 	ZNCE STATEMENT swot; . C.;ONFERF7NCE '''CIA`TEVENT 	CONFERENCE STATEMENT SWCC 
8. The further development and implementation of the GCOS concept should be 
pursued, with urgency, by scientists, governments and international organizations. 
9. The impacts of climate variability on human socio-economic systems have 
provided major constraints to development. Climate change may compound these constraints. 
In semi-arid regions of Africa, drought episodes have been directly responsible for major human 
disasters. Research undertaken during the first decade of the WCP and through other 
international and national programmes has improved drought early warning systems, including 
FAO's Global Early Warning System, and increased the reliability of climate impact analyses. But 
much more remains to be done. Intensified efforts are required to refine further our ability to 
predict short-term climate variability, anticipate climate impacts, and identify rational strategies 
to mitigate or prevent adverse effects. The threat of climate change brings new challenges to the 
future well-being of people. This requires greater efforts to understand impacts of climate 
change. Mitigation and adaptation strategies are also essential. Immediate steps to be taken 
include: 
(a) national and regional analyses of the impacts of climate variability and 
change on society, and study of the range of response and adaptation 
options available 
(b) closer co-operation and communication among natural and social scientists, 
to ensure that climate considerations are accounted for in development 
planning 
(c) significant increases in resources to carry out impact/adaptation studies. 
.10. 	Improvements in energy efficiency and non-fossil fuel energy technologies are of 
paramount importance, not only to reduce greenhouse gas emissions but to move to more 
sustainable development pathways. Such advances will require research and development, as 
well as technology transfer and co-development. 
11. 	A specific initiative would create a network of regional, interdisciplinary research 
centres, located primarily in developing countries, and focussing on all of the natural science, 
engineering and social science disciplines required to support fully integrated studies of global 
change and its impacts and policy responses. The centres would conduct research and training 
on all aspects of global change and study the interaction of regional and global policies. 
D. , Public Information 
People need better information on the crucial role climate plays in development and the 
additional risks posed by climate change. Governments, intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations should give more emphasis to providing accurate public information 
on climate issues. The public information and education and training component in the WCP and 
IGBP must also be expanded. 
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1.1 	Among the most important impacts of climate change will be its effects on the 
hydrological cycle and water management systems, and through these, on socio-economic 
systems. Increases in incidence of extremes, such as floods and droughts, would cause increased 
frequency and severity of disasters. 
1.2 	The design of many costly structures to store and convey water, from large dams 
to small drainage facilities, is based on analyses of past records of climatic and hydrological 
parameters. Some of these structures are designed to last 50 to 100 years or even longer. Records 
of past climate and hydrological conditions may no longer be a reliable guide to the future. The 
design and management of both structural and non-structural water resource systems should 
allow for the possible effects of climate change. 
1.3 	Data systems and research must be strengthened to predict water resources 
impacts, detect hydrological changes, and improve hydrological parameterization in global 
climate models. 
1.4 	Existing and novel technologies, for more efficient use of water for irrigation, 
should be made available to developing countries in semi-arid zones. 
2. Agriculture and Food 
2.1 	Important uncertainties remain regarding the prediction of the magnitude and 
nature of potential impacts of changing climate and higher CO 2 levels on global food security. 
The potential impact on food production in developing countries, with more than half the world's 
population, could be more uncertain than recent reviews suggest. 
2.2 	High priority should therefore be given to research on the direct effects of rising 
CO2 concentrations on food and fibre crop productivity and equal priority should be given to 
research on agricultural emissions so as to determine agriculture's present and potential role as a 
source of and sink for greenhouse gases, and to clarify the costs and possible trade-offs arising 
from limitation measures. 
2.3 	New or strengthened institutional mechanisms are required to upgrade natural 
resource inventories, research strategies and extension services to raise agricultural productivity 
and minimize emissions. These mechanisms should include collaborative programmes between 
FAO and international and national agencies with stress on interdisciplinary activities on food 
security and related topics. 
3. Oceans, Fisheries and Coastal Zones 
3.1 	The earth's climate including shorter-term variations is influenced by the 
coupled atmosphere - ocean system. Coastal zones and their associated high biological 
productivity, including fisheries, are especially affected. Thus, an improved data base of oceanic 
parameters is considered indispensable for operational climate forecasting. It is recommended 
that a global ocean observing and data management system be developed for improving 
predictions of climate change. Research on the oceans will provide quantification of important 
feedback loops in climate processes. Observation and research on the El Nifio - Southern 
Oscillation phenomena, on upwelling areas and on biological productivity of the open sea are 
also important. 
3.2 	Coastal zones, which are the source of most of the global fish catch, are especially 
susceptible to effects of global warming and sea level rise. Predicting the impact of changes 
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would be of enormous benefit to the increasing number of people living in coastal areas. Thus, it 
is also recommended that a programme of coastal zone research and monitoring be established to 
identify the effects of climate change on the coast and coastal ecosystems, and to assess the 
vulnerability of various natural and managed ecosystems such as coral reefs, mangroves and 
coastal aquaculture. 
3.3 	Action should be taken now to develop coastal zone adaptation strategies and 
policies. 
4. Energy 
4.1 	In order to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases while 
allowing for growth in emissions from developing countries, industrialized countries must 
implement reductions even greater than those required, on average, for the globe as a whole. 
However, even where very large technical and economic opportunities have been identified for 
reducing energy-related greenhouse gas emissions, and even where there are significant and 
multiple benefits associated with these measures, implementation is being slowed and sometimes 
prevented by a host of barriers. These barriers exist at all levels — at the level of consumers, 
energy equipment manufacturers and suppliers, industries, utilities, and governments. 
Overcoming the barriers obstructing least-cost approaches to meeting energy demands will 
require responses from all parts of society — individual consumers, industry, governments, and 
non-governmental organizations. 
4.2 	Developing countries also have an important role in limiting climate change. 
Maintaining development as a principal objective, energy and development paths can be chosen 
that have the additional benefit of minimizing radiative forcing. 
5. Land Use and Urban Planning 
Population growth, increasing urbanization, and competing demands for finite areas of 
arable land will produce increasingly severe problems of food supply, energy production, and 
water resources. Climate changes may exacerbate these problems in some regions. Prudent 
planning will require baseline analyses of land use, quality and quantity of water resources, and 
the assessment of vulnerability of urbanized societies to environmental change. In particular, 
improved adaptation of urban areas to local climatic regimes needs to be achieved by more 
appropriate layouts and building densities, and improved building construction through 
modifications to building and planning regulations. Because conurbations make a major 
contribution to energy-related greenhouse gas emissions, the design and efficiency of all aspects 
of urban systems should be enhanced. 
6. Health and Human Dimensions 
6.1 	The direct impact of climate change on people, their health and cultural heritage, 
could be severe. There is likely to be increased health inequity between peoples of developing 
and developed countries. Climatic change could result in increasing numbers of environmental 
refugees with associated increases of ill-health, disease and death among them. 
6.2 	Global warming is likely to shift the range of favourable conditions for certain 
pests and diseases, causing additional stresses on people, particularly those of the semi-arid 
tropics. It must be appreciated however that serious problems may arise in all parts of the world. 
6.3 Research into how human behaviour contributes to and responds to climate 
change must have increased emphasis. Public awareness and education programmes are 
particularly essential in this regard. 
7. Environment and Development 
7.1 	Climate change, superimposed on population pressures, excessive consumption, 
and other stresses on the environment imperils the sustainability of socio-economic development 
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throughout the world. In addition, slowing climate change will give countries more time to 
enhance their prospects for sustainable development. The developed countries need to reduce 
emissions and assist the developing countries to adopt new, clean technologies. 
7.2 	Climate change has such important implications for the sustainability of 
development that policy responses, including measures to reduce greenhouse gases, measures to 
reduce deforestation, and the commitment of financial and other resources, are justified for that 
reason alone. Economic policies, such as subsidies and trade restraints, can distort markets so 
they harm the environment and contribute to global warming and sea level rise. There is an 
imperative need for development policies that not only reduce global warming trends but also 
increase economic and social resilience. 
8. 	Forests 
While increasing forest cover can contribute to the slowing of global climate change, this 
is not the major cure for the problem. 
Five priority actions are recommended: 
(1) Assessing national opportunities to increase forest carbon storage commensurate 
with national resource development policies, developing an approach by 1992 
and completing assessment by 1995 
(2) Managing the world's forests to optimize biomass and resultant carbon storage 
in addition to the maintenance of sustainable yields of forest products, biological 
diversity, water quality and the many other values that forests provide 
(3) Accelerating research to assess the added contribution that forests can make to 
atmospheric CO2 reduction and the impacts of climate change on the world's 
forests 
(4) Designing and implementing international monitoring systems to determine 
conditions and changes in forest ecosystems in response to anticipated climate 
changes 
(5) Supporting the development of an international instrument ol conservation and 
development of the world's forests linked with climate and biodiversity 
conventions. 
PART III 
ORGANIZATIONAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR 
INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES 
1. 	The Future Structure of the WCP 
1.1 	The WCP should be broadened and closely coordinated with related 
programmes of other agencies in response to increased emphasis on the prediction of climate and 
its impacts. 
1.2 	The World Climate Data Programme, renamed the World Climate System 
Monitoring Programme, should be redefined to take into account new objectives. 
1.3 Greater emphasis in the strengthened WCP (WCP-2) should be given to 
adaptation, mitigation and education, with adaptation and mitigation activities closely linked to 
the Ithpact Studies Programme (WCIP). 
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1.4 	The World Climate Applications Programme should be renamed the World 
Climate Applications and Services Programme (WCASP) to reflect the need for intensifying 
efforts to provide climatological services to a wide variety of users. There should be strong 
interaction between WCIP and WCASP. 
1.5 	The organizational framework for international scientific research is in place, 
constituted by the WCRP, emphasizing the physical aspects, and the IGBP, covering bio-
geochemical aspects. 
	
1.6 	Governments should establish national committees for the WCP to mobilize 
support for national activities and to coordinate efforts. The UN agencies and ICSU should work 
towards ensuring regular contact and exchange of information with national committees. 
1.7 The mechanism established for overall coordination of the WCP, involving 
meetings of the chairs of steering bodies for the various components, should be actively 
supported by WMO, the other UN bodies concerned and ICSU. Annual meetings of Executive 
Heads should consider their recommendations. 
1.8 	Restructuring and strengthening of the WCP will also be necessary to support 
new activities, such as the development of the proposed GCOS. The Conference recommended 
that a proposal for the new structure of WCP be formulated by the organizations involved, taking 
into account the above comments, and presented to the Eleventh World Meteorological Congress, 
May 1991, and at appropriate meetings of other participating organizations. 
2. 	Special Needs of the Developing Countries 
2.1 	As stated in the IPCC report, industrialized and developing countries have a 
common but differentiated responsibility for dealing with the problems of climate change. The 
problem is largely the consequence of past patterns of economic growth in the industrial 
countries. However, in future the much needed economic growth in the developing countries 
could play an important role in determining the rate of climate change. 
2.2 	Developing countries are being asked to participate in the alleviation of the 
legacy of environmental damage from prior industrialization. If they are to avoid the potentially 
disastrous course followed by industrialized countries in the past, they need to adopt modern 
technologies early in the process of development, particularly in regard to energy efficiency. They 
also must be full partners in the global scientific and technical effort that will be required. It is 
clear that developing countries must not go through the evolutionary process of previous 
industrialization but rather, must "leapfrog" ahead directly from a status of under-development 
through to efficient, environmentally benign, technologies. 
2.3 	Although developing countries have collaborated in providing data, and 
participated to a degree in meetings and research, they have benefited to a lesser extent from the 
analyses developed from their contributions, and even less so from the applications derived 
therefrom. 
2.4 	Therefore, a massive and sustained flow of scientific and technological expertise 
towards the development of the intellectual resources, technical and institutional capacity of the 
developing countries is a necessary complement to the efforts of those countries. 
2.5 	Developing countries should be assisted to build up their capabilities 
- to monitor, assess and apply climate information 
- to prepare inventories of greenhouse gases emissions and future emissions 
projections 
- to identify impacts of potential global warming 
to prepare cost estimates and priorities for response strategies to adapt and 
mitigate problems posed by climate change 
- to participate in the World Climate Programme. 
2.6 	The mechanisms of the transfer of technology and provision of technical 
assistance and co-operation to developing countries should take into account considerations such 
as the need for preferential and assured access, intellectual property rights, the environmental 
soundness of such technology and the financial implications. 
2.7 	Taking note that industry plays a significant role in the development and transfer 
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of science and technology, efforts by industry to promote further the development and transfer of 
environmentally sound technologies should be encouraged, and policies to encourage such 
efforts should be formulated. 
2.8 	Additional financial resources will have to be channelled to developing countries 
for those activities which contribute both to limiting greenhouse gas emissions and/or adapting 
to any adverse effects of climate change, and promoting economic development. Areas for co-
operation and assistance could include the efficient use of energy, land use planning, forest 
management, soil and water conservations, strengthening of observational systems and scientific 
and technological capabilities. 
3. Co-operation in International Research 
3.1 	The existing and planned research projects of the WCRP and the IGBP address 
the highest priority scientific issues related to the understanding and prediction of climate 
variability and change. 
3.2 	These programmes should be implemented completely and rigorously. It is 
particularly important that adequate funding, including long-term funding commitments, be 
provided. 
3.3 	In view of the progress made in climate research, it is now timely to proceed to 
the detailed design of an operational global climate observing system (Section C, paras. 5 - 8), 
together with the data communications and other infrastructure needed to support operational 
climate forecasting. Governments should enter into early discussions aimed at international 
cooperation in operational climate forecasting. 
4. Co-ordinated International Activities and Policy Development 
4.1 	The Conference endorsed the three streams of international activity: 
a. Global measurement and research efforts through the WCP, IGBP, and other 
related international programmes 
b. Assessment functions of a continuing IPCC to support negotiation of and 
provide technical input to a Convention 
c. Development of a Convention on Climate Change. 
It is essential that all parties to a Convention and related legal instruments should, as part of their 
obligations, be required to participate fully in the free exchange and flow of information 
necessary for technical input to the convention. Such a convention should include a technical 
annex to provide for: 
- International co-operation in research, systematic observation and 
exchange of related information 
- Adjustments based on up-dates of scientific knowledge 
- Strengthening national scientific and environmental capabilities of 
developing countries. 
4.2 	The development of policy regarding climate change requires on the part of 
policy makers an understanding of the underlying science and a weighing of the scientific 
uncertainties associated with the prediction of climate change and its likely impacts. An 
important aspect of future work is therefore a continued dialogue between scientists and policy 
makers. 
4.3 	The UN Conference on Environment and Development (Brazil 1992) provides a 
valuable opportunity to relate the above three themes to the other environment/development 
issues and objectives being examined by the Conference. It is therefore essential that the three 
streams should interact effectively with UNCED. 
4.4 	It is proposed that the sponsoring agencies for the SWCC consider the possibility 
of holding a Third World Climate Conference at an appropriate time about the year 2000. 
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